Ark. Code Ann. § 14-56-201 (2026)
Authority generally
Municipal corporations shall have the power to:
- Regulate the erection, construction, reconstruction, alteration, and repair of buildings;
- Make regulations for the purpose of guarding against accidents by fire;
- Require the use of fireproof or fire-resistant materials in the erection, construction, reconstruction, alteration, or repairs of buildings; and
- Provide for the removal of any buildings, or additions thereto, erected contrary to this prohibition.
History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 13, p. 1; 1887, No. 32, § 1, p. 41; C. & M. Dig., § 7544; Pope's Dig., § 9619; Acts 1939, No. 102, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2801.
Case Notes
Construction.
Section 14-56-202 conferred upon cities of the first class the exclusive power to issue or refuse to issue building permits and to regulate the building of houses and thereby denied such power to cities of the second class, despite the general powers listed in § 14-56-201. First State Bank v. City of Elkins, 2018 Ark. 191, 546 S.W.3d 477 (2018) (answering question of law certified by the federal district court).
Billboards.
Motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim was improperly granted because a complaint filed by a lessor and a lessee sufficiently alleged that their rights or other legal relations were affected by Avoca, Ark., Ordinance No. 69 where a town was making demands regarding the removal of billboards; therefore, the lessor and the lessee were entitled to declaratory relief under § 16-111-104. They were arguing that the town lacked power to regulate the billboards at issue. Statewide Outdoor Adver., LLC v. Town of Avoca, 104 Ark. App. 10, 289 S.W.3d 111 (2008).
Erection, Construction, Etc.
A city may regulate the construction of buildings, but it cannot prevent construction unless the proposed construction is dangerous per se to the public health and safety. Bennett v. City of Hope, 204 Ark. 147, 161 S.W.2d 186 (1942).
Provisions authorizing a city to regulate the construction, alteration, and repair of buildings by passing ordinances for the general welfare does not authorize an ordinance establishing building and setback lines. City of Stuttgart v. Strait, 212 Ark. 126, 205 S.W.2d 35 (1947).
Where general zoning law of state provides for certain procedure and statutory provisions authorize the giving of permits by city council in special instances, a permit given by the council is valid, but if ordinances are not passed under provisions providing for issuance of permits, but under a statute which did not provide for permits, the provisions allowing for permits are not relevant in determining validity of permit. Meyer v. Seifert, 216 Ark. 293, 225 S.W.2d 4 (1949).
Cities, in certain instances, have the authority to regulate some features relating to public buildings. Where the ordinance is not before the reviewing court, the court cannot make a sweeping finding that the municipality cannot regulate, in any manner, any phase, aspect, or feature relating to the construction of a public building. Lavender v. City of Rogers, 232 Ark. 673, 339 S.W.2d 598 (1960); Lavender v. City of Rogers, 233 Ark. 161, 343 S.W.2d 103 (1961).
A board of adjustment had authority to authorize the enlargement of a kindergarten being operated in a residential district as a preexisting nonconforming use of the property. Williams v. Kuehnert, 243 Ark. 746, 421 S.W.2d 896 (1967).
In light of the devastation caused by a tornado, the city had the authority to adopt an ordinance which added new requirements for the construction and anchoring of manufactured homes. Smith v. City of Arkadelphia, 336 Ark. 42, 984 S.W.2d 392 (1999).
Refusal of the department of inspection and zoning to issue a repair permit was not a procedural due process violation; in order to make an informed decision about whether repair was feasible and would promote public safety, the department reasonably exercised its regulatory power by requesting more detailed plans from an engineer or architect. Trice v. City of Pine Bluff, 2017 Ark. App. 638, 536 S.W.3d 139 (2017).
Fire Prevention.
A town council has power to prohibit the erection of wooden buildings in certain districts of the town as a precaution against fire; and if such building be erected in violation of an ordinance prohibiting it, the council may promptly remove it without any prosecution or judicial proceedings of any kind against the owner of the building. McKibbin v. City of Ft. Smith, 35 Ark. 352 (1880). See Paris v. Hall, 131 Ark. 104, 198 S.W. 705 (1917).
City may extend its fire limits, but cannot give it an ex post facto effect. Wilder v. City of Little Rock, 150 Ark. 439, 234 S.W. 479 (1921).
An ordinance prohibiting the construction of wooden buildings and enlargement and alteration of old buildings within fire limits is authorized. The term “alteration” means that an old building shall not be changed in such a way as to convert it into a new and different structure. Earle v. Shackleford, 177 Ark. 291, 6 S.W.2d 294 (1928).
Where city passed ordinances relative to guarding against destruction of buildings by fire and prohibited erection of nonfireproof building, a permit issued by the city council to erect a nonfireproof building was invalid where statute under which ordinances were passed did not provide for issuance of permits. Meyer v. Seifert, 216 Ark. 293, 225 S.W.2d 4 (1949).
Cited: Corning v. Watson, 252 Ark. 1277, 482 S.W.2d 797 (1972).