Ark. Code Ann. § 14-56-425 (2026)

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Antley, Judicial Review of Non-Court Decisions: A Constitutionally Based Examination of Arkansas' Review System, 49 Ark. L. Rev. 425.

Recent Developments: Administrative Agencies–Appellate Procedure, 59 Ark. L. Rev. 511.

Case Note, Lost in Translation: Combs v. City of Springdale, An Overview of the Ins and Outs of Appeals Procedure for Administrative Decisions by Local Governments, 61 Ark. L. Rev. 351.

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Annual Survey of Case Law: Practice, Procedure, and Courts, 29 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 905.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

This section is not void for vagueness, notwithstanding the contention that it fails to give adequate notice of the proper procedure for perfecting an appeal from the decision of a city planning commission, since the statute's requirements may be adequately determined by reference to a prior decision of the court. Night Clubs, Inc. v. Fort Smith Planning Comm'n, 336 Ark. 130, 984 S.W.2d 418 (1999).

Administrative Agencies.

In spite of the language of Wenderoth v. City of Ft. Smith, 251 Ark. 342, 472 S.W.2d 74 (1971), which held this section unconstitutional when applied to allow de novo review of zoning or rezoning ordinances enacted by city legislative bodies, the provision of § 14-56-416 requiring appeals to a court of record from actions of a board of zoning adjustment is not subject to the constitutional limitations applicable to city council zoning actions because the board of adjustment acts administratively, not legislatively; appeals to the circuit court from the board of adjustment are permitted. City of Paragould v. Leath, 266 Ark. 390, 583 S.W.2d 76 (1979).

Pursuant to this section, the city's Board of Zoning Adjustment (BZA) was an administrative agency and did not have power to legislate; the city's BZA was acting in an adjudicatory or quasi-judicial manner when it denied the owner's variance request; the statute was constitutional as it did not violate the doctrine of separation of powers, expressed in Ark. Const., Art. 4, § 2. City of Fort Smith v. McCutchen, 372 Ark. 541, 279 S.W.3d 78 (2008).

Collateral Attacks.

A city cannot test the validity of a building permit issued by its own agency by collaterally attacking its correctness in an original injunctive proceeding in chancery court. City of Paragould v. Leath, 266 Ark. 390, 583 S.W.2d 76 (1979).

Compliance with Court Rules.

In landowner's challenge to a decision by the board of zoning adjustment that he had abandoned a nonconforming use of the property, the circuit court never had jurisdiction where the landowner failed to perfect his appeal in the time and manner provided by AICR 9. Board of Zoning Adjustment v. Cheek, 328 Ark. 18, 942 S.W.2d 821 (1997).

Trial court had jurisdiction to hear landowners' appeal as their affidavit was sufficient to comply with Pulaski County, Ark., Dist. Ct. R. 9(c) where the substance of the affidavit and the clerk's response made clear that the record was not available to the landowners on July 7 and would not be available until after it was transcribed and approved by the city board of directors. Nettles v. City of Little Rock, 96 Ark. App. 86, 238 S.W.3d 635 (2006).

Where the city council permitted a landowner to make curb cuts in front of his home that were contrary to the development plans' uniform design, the developers did not appeal that decision within thirty days as required by Ark. Dist. Ct. R. 9. The trial court did not have jurisdiction over their complaint and appeal filed a year later; the developers did not file either a certified copy of the city council's proceedings or an affidavit stating that they could not timely file the record. Franks v. Mt. View, 99 Ark. App. 205, 258 S.W.3d 799 (2007).

Landowner's complaint filed in circuit court was not an appeal of final action taken by the City Council, but was, instead, a complaint against the mayor based on his alleged failure to comply with a mandatory duty; therefore, this section did not apply, and the landowner was not required to comply with the directives of Ark. Dist. Ct. R. 9, and the circuit court had subject-matter jurisdiction of his claims. Brock v. Townsell, 2009 Ark. 224, 309 S.W.3d 179 (2009).

Because a construction company failed to perfect its appeal of the final decision of a city's planning commission in the time and manner provided by Ark. Dist. Ct. R. 9, the trial court did not have jurisdiction to hear it, and the commission's decision was a final action under this section since it ended the controversy and left no issues to be resolved as to the right-of-way requirement; because the decision was a final action, the company was required to comply with the directives of Rule 9 in filing an appeal, but it did not file its complaint until more than thirty days after the commission's decision, and failure to comply with the requirements of Rule 9 prevented the trial court from acquiring subject-matter jurisdiction. Ark. Constr. & Excavation, LLC v. City of Maumelle, 2009 Ark. App. 874 (2009).

Procedure.

When property owners and builder requested a writ of mandamus in circuit court, challenging a city's stop-work order on a building permit issued to the builder to construct a garage, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction as the builder and property owners prematurely circumvented the appellate process by filing a writ of mandamus prior to the board of zoning adjustment's reaching a final decision on the matter. Douglas v. City of Cabot, 347 Ark. 1, 59 S.W.3d 430 (2001).

Property owners' appeal of a trial court's order dismissing the property owners' challenge to an action taken by a city planning commission regarding a proposed mobile home park, on the grounds that the owners' lacked standing to bring the challenge, was dismissed by the appellate court for lack of jurisdiction because the commission's action was not final for the purposes of this section; although the term “final action” is not defined in this section, the court used principles drawn from other cases dealing with different issues and determined that the commission's action was not final, as there were several issues that still needed to be considered by the commission before it took final action on the proposal. Stromwall v. City of Springdale Planning Comm'n, 350 Ark. 281, 86 S.W.3d 844 (2002).

By enacting the ordinance in question, the board approved the recommended action and amended a prior ordinance, but it rezoned the subject property and added new conditions to accommodate the rezoning, and thus the board took legislative action delegated to it under § 14-56-402; because the action was not administrative, the landowners who challenged the ordinance were not required to proceed under this section and the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction. Summit Mall Co. v. Lemond, 355 Ark. 190, 132 S.W.3d 725 (2003).

Circuit court correctly granted the motion on the pleadings as to the property owner's counts against the city and planning commission for deprivation of property as the owner's appeal, filed two years after the city's decision, was well outside the 30-day requirement and was thus untimely; because the counts had nothing to do with action by the city council, the circuit court did not have subject matter jurisdiction. Ingram v. City of Pine Bluff, 355 Ark. 129, 133 S.W.3d 382 (2003).

Developer's appeal to circuit court of city council's conditional final approval of a subdivision plat was properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction where it was filed more than 30 days after the conditional approval was issued. Green v. City of Jacksonville, 357 Ark. 517, 182 S.W.3d 124 (2004).

Property owners' appeal of the denial of nonconforming use status was improperly dismissed because their appeal was perfected under Ark. Dist. Ct. R. 9 and this section by the timely filing of the record in circuit court; Ark. R. Civ. P. 4 did not apply because there was no requirement of service of summons and complaint for the appeal and, to the extent that Weiss v. Johnson, 331 Ark. 409, 961 S.W.2d 28 (1998), was inconsistent, it was overruled. Wright v. City of Little Rock, 366 Ark. 96, 233 S.W.3d 644 (2006).

Because a property owner did not appeal to the circuit court the decision of the Code Enforcement Board of Zoning Adjustments and Appeal declaring his property a nuisance, he was barred from raising the issue on appeal. Trice v. City of Pine Bluff, 2017 Ark. App. 638, 536 S.W.3d 139 (2017).

Trial De Novo.

This section requires that appeals from the board of adjustment to the circuit court be tried de novo on the same issue that was pending before the board. Arkansas Power & Light Co. v. City of Little Rock, 243 Ark. 290, 420 S.W.2d 85 (1967).

In an appeal from action of a board of zoning adjustment denying a variance, the petitioners were entitled to present their petition for a variance anew and have it tried de novo. City of Little Rock v. Leawood Property Owners Ass'n, 242 Ark. 451, 413 S.W.2d 877 (1967).

In an appeal to the circuit court from a board of zoning adjustment, it was error for the circuit court to review the decision of the board only as to whether or not there was substantial evidence in the record of the hearing before the board to support the ruling of the board instead of trying the petition for a variance de novo. Arkansas Power & Light Co. v. City of Little Rock, 243 Ark. 290, 420 S.W.2d 85 (1967).

A de novo hearing on appeal is proper when the appeal is from actions taken by administrative boards, commissions, and agencies exercising adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions. McCammon v. Boyer, 285 Ark. 288, 686 S.W.2d 421 (1985); City of Jonesboro v. Vuncannon, 310 Ark. 366, 837 S.W.2d 286 (1992).

Review de novo of a legislative act is unconstitutional. City of Jonesboro v. Vuncannon, 310 Ark. 366, 837 S.W.2d 286 (1992).

Where appeal to the circuit court was from action of the City Council on application of its zoning regulations rather than from the enactment of them, de novo review was proper. City of Jonesboro v. Vuncannon, 310 Ark. 366, 837 S.W.2d 286 (1992).

Pursuant to this section, “appeals” to circuit court are not limited proceedings where the circuit court merely conducts a substantial evidence review but instead, are trials de novo. Carmical v. McAfee, 68 Ark. App. 313, 7 S.W.3d 350 (1999).

City council meeting where the council denied landowner's request to split his lots was the final decision for purposes of triggering the time limit on when to appeal under this section. Combs v. City of Springdale, 336 Ark. 31, 233 S.W.3d 130 (2006).

Rational basis circuit court review of denial of a conditional use permit for operation of a group home was improper, as an Arkansas municipality's decision granting or denying an application for conditional use under a zoning ordinance was a quasi-judicial act requiring a de novo review by the circuit court under this section. King's Ranch of Jonesboro, Inc. v. City of Jonesboro, 2011 Ark. 123 (2011).

Although the circuit court did err in its statement of the standard of review applicable to factual findings of the Board of Adjustment by citing the substantial evidence standard of review rather than the de novo standard required under this section, no prejudice could possibly have resulted from the error because there was no dispute regarding the relevant facts: the case was submitted on cross-motions for summary judgment and decided on undisputed facts. Loca Luna, LLC v. Bd. of Adjustment, 2013 Ark. App. 336 (2013).

Zoning Cases.

Because the city council's decision to deny a developer's petition to rezone land was legislative, this section did not apply and the judicial branch did not have the authority to review the decision de novo. As the city council expressed legitimate concerns about traffic and safety, the Supreme Court of Arkansas held that its zoning decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. PH, LLC v. City of Conway, 2009 Ark. 504, 344 S.W.3d 660 (2009).

Although this section allowed for a jury trial in a circuit court in an appeal from a zoning board's decision, appellees also asserted a claim in equity for a private nuisance and only sought injunctive relief; thus, the circuit court erred by submitting the private nuisance claim to a jury. Ludwig v. Bella Casa, LLC, 2010 Ark. 435, 372 S.W.3d 792 (2010).

Circuit court did not abuse its discretion in granting an adjacent city's motion to dismiss a town's declaratory judgment action because the town was presented the opportunity to adduce any additional evidence; although the circuit court made a collateral finding that the adjacent city's zoning decision was not arbitrary or capricious, it nonetheless set the matter for a hearing on the remaining merits, at which time the legislative decision to rezone the property would be reviewed. City of Bethel Heights v. City of Springdale, 2017 Ark. App. 81, 514 S.W.3d 472 (2017).

Circuit court did not err in granting an adjacent city summary judgment in a town's action alleging that the adjacent city's rezoning was not compatible with or equivalent to those of the adjacent lands in the town as required by § 14-56-306. By providing affidavits and exhibits, the adjacent city established a prima facie case that its rezoning of property from agricultural to industrial was a use that was compatible with the zoned uses of the town, and the plaintiff town did not meet proof with proof. City of Bethel Heights v. City of Springdale, 2017 Ark. App. 81, 514 S.W.3d 472 (2017).

Cited: Osage Oil & Transp., Inc. v. City of Fayetteville, 260 Ark. 448, 541 S.W.2d 922 (1976); Corder v. City of Sherwood, 579 F. Supp. 1042 (E.D. Ark. 1984); Talley v. City of N. Little Rock, 2009 Ark. 601, 381 S.W.3d 753 (2009).