Ark. Code Ann. § 16-112-118 (2026)
Discharge
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No person shall be discharged under the provisions of this act:
- Who is in custody or held by virtue of any legal engagement or enlistment in the United States Army or the United States Navy;
- Who, being subject to the rules and articles of war, is confined by anyone legally acting under the authority thereof;
- Who is held as a prisoner of war under the authority of the United States; or
- Who is in custody for any treason, felony, or other high misdemeanor committed in any other state or territory and who, by the United States Constitution and laws of the United States, ought to be delivered up to the legal authorities of the state or territory.
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If it appears that the prisoner is in custody by virtue of process from any court legally constituted or issued by any officer in the exercise of judicial proceedings before him or her, the prisoner can only be discharged in one (1) of the following cases:
- Where the jurisdiction of the court or officer has been exceeded, either as to matter, place, sum, or person;
- Where, though the original imprisonment was lawful, yet, by some act, omission, or event which has taken place afterward, the party has become entitled to his or her discharge;
- Where the process is defective in some matter or substance required by law, rendering the process void;
- Where the process, though in proper form, has been issued in a case, or under circumstances, not authorized by law;
- Where the process, though in proper form, has been issued or executed by a person who is not authorized to issue or execute the process, or where the person having the custody of the prisoner, under the process, is not the person empowered by law to detain him or her; or
- Where the process is not authorized by any judgment, order, decree, or by any provision of law.
- No court under this act shall in any other matter have power to inquire into the legality or justice of the process, judgment, decree, or order of any court, legally constituted, nor into the justice or propriety of any commitment for contempt made by any court, officer, or body corporate, according to law, and plainly charged in the commitment, as provided in this act.
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If it appears that the prisoner is in custody by virtue of process from any court legally constituted or issued by any officer in the exercise of judicial proceedings before him or her, the prisoner can only be discharged in one (1) of the following cases:
- No person imprisoned on an indictment, found in any court of competent jurisdiction, or by virtue of any process or commitment to enforce an indictment, can be discharged under the provisions of this act. However, if the offense is bailable, he or she may be let to bail, and if the offense is not bailable, he or she shall be remanded forthwith.
- Where the imprisonment is for any criminal or supposed criminal matter, the court or judge before whom the prisoner shall be brought, under the provisions of this act, shall not discharge him or her for informality, insufficiency, or irregularity of the commitment. However, if from the examination taken and certified by the committing magistrate, or other evidence, it appears that there is sufficient legal cause for commitment, he or she shall proceed to take bail, if the offense is bailable and sufficient bail is offered, and if not, he or she shall recommit the prisoner to jail.
History. Rev. Stat., ch. 73, art. 3, §§ 7, 9, 10, 12, 13; C. & M. Dig., §§ 5077-5081; Pope's Dig., §§ 6340-6344; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 34-1732 — 34-1736.
Meaning of “this act”. Rev. Stat., ch. 73 codified as §§ 16-112-103, 16-112-105 — 16-112-109, 16-112-112, 16-112-113, 16-112-116, 16-112-118, 16-112-121 — 16-112-123.
Cross References. Persons privileged from arrest, discharge on habeas corpus, § 16-81-102.
Case Notes
In General.
Generally, the writ of habeas corpus will not be issued if the petitioner is in custody pursuant to a valid order or under process regular on its face and the court making the commitment did not lack jurisdiction. Robinson ex rel. Robinson v. Shock, 282 Ark. 262, 667 S.W.2d 956 (1984).
When the petitioner is in custody pursuant to a process which appears regular and valid on its face, the circuit court has jurisdiction to try the petitioner on the charge pending against him and petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief. Wade v. Tomlinson, 284 Ark. 432, 682 S.W.2d 751 (1985).
Juvenile Offenders.
What may constitute a valid order for an adult prisoner will not be facially valid where a juvenile offender in custody is involved; the constitutional right to counsel has been extended to juveniles, and where that right has been denied to the juvenile within the juvenile commitment process, then an order emanating from such a proceeding which does not reflect the fact that the juvenile was represented by legal counsel will not constitute a facially valid order and habeas corpus is an appropriate remedy. Robinson ex rel. Robinson v. Shock, 282 Ark. 262, 667 S.W.2d 956 (1984).
Writ Granted.
A person in the penitentiary was granted a writ of habeas corpus where he had been convicted by the officers of a court sitting at a time not fixed for holding court. Ex parte Jones, 27 Ark. 349 (1871).
A writ of habeas corpus may be issued to a person in a city prison convicted of a violation of a city ordinance. Ex parte Martin, 27 Ark. 467 (1872).
A convict who has been in custody of a contractor for a sufficient time to extinguish his fine and costs will be discharged. Duncan v. West, 167 Ark. 14, 267 S.W. 567 (1924).
Person committed to state hospital by county and probate judge without notice, hearing, or examination was entitled to release on habeas corpus in that the warrant or order delivered to the sheriff was not authorized by law. Rowland v. Rogers, 199 Ark. 1041, 137 S.W.2d 246 (1940).
Writ Not Granted.
Prisoner was not entitled to release because the commitment for misdemeanor failed to direct that he be imprisoned until the fine and costs were paid. Bomer v. Jones, 100 Ark. 226, 140 S.W. 22 (1911).
Cited: Von Luce v. Rankin, 267 Ark. 34, 588 S.W.2d 445 (1979); Stover v. Hamilton, 270 Ark. 310, 604 S.W.2d 934 (1980); Bruce ex rel. Bruce v. Dillahunty, 293 Ark. 479, 739 S.W.2d 522 (1987).