Arkansas Code Annotated

Ark. Code Ann. § 16-56-106 (2026)

Recovery of charges for medical services

✓ current as of May 2026
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  1. No action shall be brought to recover charges for medical services performed or provided prior to April 1, 1985, by a physician or other medical service provider after the expiration of a period of eighteen (18) months from the date the services were performed or provided.
  2. No action shall be brought to recover charges for medical services performed or provided after March 31, 1985, by a physician or other medical service provider after the expiration of a period of two (2) years from the date the services were performed or provided or from the date of the most recent partial payment for the services, whichever is later.

History. Acts 1983, No. 638, § 1; 1985, No. 894, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 37-245.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Limitation period in this section is both reasonable and constitutional. Ballheimer v. Service Fin. Corp., 292 Ark. 92, 728 S.W.2d 178 (1987); HCA Medical Servs. of Midwest, Inc. v. Rodgers, 292 Ark. 359, 730 S.W.2d 229 (1987).

Applying this section to debt for hospital services incurred prior to the enactment of this section was not unconstitutional. Thomas v. Service Fin. Corp., 293 Ark. 190, 736 S.W.2d 3 (1987).

Applicability.

This section, and not § 16-56-111, covers all actions brought to recover charges for medical services. Ballheimer v. Service Fin. Corp., 292 Ark. 92, 728 S.W.2d 178 (1987).

Limitations period contained in this section, and not that of § 16-56-111, is applicable to a debt for hospital services. Thomas v. Service Fin. Corp., 293 Ark. 190, 736 S.W.2d 3 (1987).

Where Chapter 13 debtors filed a complaint alleging that a creditor violated the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., by filing a proof of claim in an attempt to collect a medical services debt that was potentially time-barred under this section, the court dismissed their complaint, as they could have simply objected to the proof of claim under one of the exceptions provided in the Bankruptcy Code or could have proceeded under the Bankruptcy Rules, arguing that the claim was not warranted by existing law. The FDCPA was not the controlling statute after debtors filed a voluntary petition, and debtors could not bypass procedural safeguards in the Bankruptcy Code in favor of asserting a potentially more lucrative claim under the FDCPA. Gatewood v. CP Medical LLC (In re Gatewood), No. 5:13-bk-73363, 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 2906 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. Feb. 6, 2015), aff'd, Gatewood v. CP Med., LLC (In re Gatewood), 533 B.R. 905 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2015) (“[f]iling in a bankruptcy case an accurate proof of claim containing all the required information, including the timing of the debt, standing alone, is not a prohibited debt collection practice”).

Fraud.

No mere ignorance on the part of the plaintiff of his rights, nor the mere silence of one who is under no obligation to speak, will prevent the statute bar; there must be some positive act of fraud, something so furtively planned and secretly executed as to keep the plaintiff's cause of action concealed, or perpetrated in a way that it conceals itself. And if the plaintiff, by reasonable diligence, might have detected the fraud, he is presumed to have had reasonable knowledge of it. Miles v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Prods., Inc., 992 F.2d 813 (8th Cir. 1993).

Representations in a seller's promotional magazine which did not contain information regarding problems with a product did not rise to the level of affirmative conduct concealing buyer's cause of action sufficient to toll the statute of limitations. Miles v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Prods., Inc., 992 F.2d 813 (8th Cir. 1993).

Ignorance of Right.

A plaintiff's ignorance of his or her right to sue does not toll the running of the statute of limitations. Miles v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Prods., Inc., 992 F.2d 813 (8th Cir. 1993).

Medical Service Provider.

A psychologist is not a medical service provider within the meaning of this section. Southwestern Human Servs. Inst., Inc. v. Mitchell, 287 Ark. 59, 696 S.W.2d 722 (1985).

Hospital held medical service provider. Ballheimer v. Service Fin. Corp., 292 Ark. 92, 728 S.W.2d 178 (1987).

Partial Payment.

A partial payment begins the running of the statute of limitations; a five-dollar payment was sufficient. Jones v. Hempel, 316 Ark. 647, 873 S.W.2d 540 (1994).

Revival of Debt.

A lawsuit filed by injured party, in which he sought damages that included his medical expenses, did not demonstrate his acknowledgment of the debt to his medical service providers and was not sufficient to revive the debt. Kitchens v. Evans, 45 Ark. App. 19, 870 S.W.2d 767 (1994).

Cited: Dupree v. Twin City Bank, 300 Ark. 188, 777 S.W.2d 856 (1989); University Hosp. v. Undernehr, 307 Ark. 445, 821 S.W.2d 26 (1991).

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 5 cases, 1989–1994 · leading case: Dupree v. Twin City Bank, 777 S.W.2d 856 (Ark. 1989).
Dupree v. Twin City Bank, 777 S.W.2d 856 (Ark. 1989). · cites it 2× “Ark. Code Ann. § 16-56-106 (1987); Talbot v.”
Kitchens v. Evans, 870 S.W.2d 767 (Ark. Ct. App. 1994). · cites it 3× “Kitchens first argues that the trial court erred in failing to find this action barred by Ark. Code Ann. § 16-56-106 (1987), which provides as follows: (a) No action shall be brought to recover charges for medical services performed or provided prior to April 1, 1985, by a…”
Ripplemeyer v. Nat'l Grape Co-Op. Ass'n, Inc., 807 F. Supp. 1439 (W.D. Ark. 1992). · cites it 2× “As such, defendants contend the claims are barred by the applicable three year statute of limitations,' Ark.Code Ann. § 16-56-106 (1987). Alternatively, defendants argue the plaintiffs have no evidence to support their cause of action for fraud on substantive grounds.”
Univ. Hosp. v. Undernehr, 821 S.W.2d 27 (Ark. 1991). · cites it 4× “12, and alleged that the Hospital’s medical services had been provided in February 1987 and that the Hospital was barred by the two year statute of limitations codified at Ark. Code Ann. § 16-56-106 (1987). The Hospital responded and asserted that it was exempt from application…”
Jones v. Hempel, 873 S.W.2d 540 (Ark. 1994). · cites it 5× “Jurisdiction is proper in this court as it requires the interpretation of a statute, Ark. Code Ann. § 16-56-106 (1987). Appellee admittedly received medical services from appellant in May of 1987 and made no payment until March 6, 1992, in the amount of five dollars.”
— Ark. Code Ann. § 16-56-106(b) — 1 case
Univ. Hosp. v. Undernehr, 821 S.W.2d 27 (Ark. 1991). “12, and alleged that the Hospital’s medical services had been provided in February 1987 and that the Hospital was barred by the two year statute of limitations codified at Ark. Code Ann. § 16-56-106 (1987). The Hospital responded and asserted that it was exempt from application…”
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