Ark. Code Ann. § 16-58-120 (2026)
Method of service — Resident and nonresident defendants out of state — Secretary of State agent
- Any cause of action arising out of acts done in this state by an individual in this state or by an agent or servant in this state of a foreign corporation may be sued upon in this state, although the defendant has left this state, by process served upon or mailed to the individual or corporation outside the state.
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- Any resident or nonresident person who commits acts in this state sufficient to give an individual in this state a cause of action against the person committing the acts shall have deemed to have appointed the Secretary of State as his or her agent for service of process on him or her in any suit arising out of the acts committed by said resident or nonresident.
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Service of the process shall be made by:
- Serving three (3) copies of the process on the Secretary of State;
- Notifying the Secretary of State that service is being effected pursuant to this subsection; and
- Paying the Secretary of State the sum of twenty-five dollars ($25.00).
- Such service shall be sufficient service upon the nonresident person or any resident person who has subsequently absented himself or herself physically from the state or upon the executor, administrator, or other legal representative of his or her estate, in case he or she has since died, if notice of the service and a copy of the process are forthwith sent by certified mail by the plaintiff or his or her attorney to the defendant at his or her last known address or to the administrator, executor, or other legal representative of the estate in case the person has died, and the defendant's return receipt or the return receipt of the administrator, executor, or other legal representative of the estate of the deceased person is attached to the writ of process and entered and filed in the office of the clerk of the court in which such cases are brought.
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Service of the process shall be made by:
- The court in which the action is pending may order some continuance as may be necessary to afford the defendant reasonable opportunity to defend the act.
- The Secretary of State, upon receiving a copy of the service of summons, shall also forthwith mail a copy of the summons, together with a copy of the complaint, by first-class mail to the last and best known address of the named defendant in the suit, notifying him or her of the filing of the suit.
- A defendant so summoned shall have thirty (30) days in which to answer after service upon him or her.
- The provisions of this section shall not apply to a corporation that has an agent for service of process registered with the Secretary of State.
History. Acts 1963, No. 119, §§ 1, 2; 1983, No. 167, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 27-339.1, 27-339.2; Acts 1997, No. 1213, § 1.
Research References
ALR.
Service of Process Via Computer or Fax. 30 A.L.R.6th 413.
Ark. L. Notes.
Gitelman and Watkins, No Requiem for Ricarte: Separation of Powers, the Rules of Evidence, and the Rules of Civil Procedure, 1991 Ark. L. Notes 27.
Ark. L. Rev.
Legislative Notes — No. 119 — Personal Jurisdiction Over Out-of-State Defendants, 18 Ark. L. Rev. 124.
Conflict of Laws: Arkansas, 32 Ark. L. Rev. 1.
U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.
Survey of Arkansas Law, Civil Procedure, 1 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 131.
Survey of Arkansas Law, Family Law, 1 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 200.
Survey of Arkansas Law: Family Law, 6 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 159.
Case Notes
In General.
When an issue of jurisdiction arises under a broad long-arm statute such as this section, the plaintiff must first establish the validity of his substantive cause of action; the complaint must allege facts bringing the case within the long-arm statute and must state a prima facie cause of action and conclusory allegations do not suffice. Howard v. County Court, 278 Ark. 117, 644 S.W.2d 256 (1983).
In a divorce action, where service on the husband was attempted by sending the complaint and summons by certified mail to the husband's last known address, but the summons was returned unclaimed, the trial court erred in allowing service by warning order, without the filing of an affidavit that a diligent inquiry had been made into the husband's whereabouts as required by Ark. R. Civ. P. 4(f), and the divorce decree that had been entered was void. Jackson v. Jackson, 81 Ark. App. 249, 100 S.W.3d 92 (2003).
Applicability.
This section is not limited to tort actions. Mallory v. Edmondson, 257 Ark. 909, 521 S.W.2d 215 (1975).
The acquisition of personal jurisdiction under the “long-arm statute” is not restricted to tort actions but applies to all causes of action arising out of acts done within this state, including divorce, alimony, support, and property division. Knox v. Knox, 25 Ark. App. 107, 753 S.W.2d 290 (1988).
Personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state trucking company was not dependent on § 16-4-101 where, at trial, the proof was not in dispute as to the situs of the collision; thus, Arkansas acquired personal jurisdiction over the defendant under this section because the plaintiff's cause of action arose directly from an act committed in this state by the agent of the defendant. Watkins Motor Lines v. Hedrick, 316 Ark. 683, 873 S.W.2d 814 (1994).
The plain language of this section requires that the person upon whom service is sought must be one who has subsequently absented himself physically from this state. Dougherty v. Sullivan, 318 Ark. 608, 887 S.W.2d 305 (1994).
As appellant failed to personally serve appellee and thus did not attach a return receipt to the writ of process and file it in the clerk's office, it could not avail itself of the long-arm statute. Pulaski Choice, L.L.C. v. 2735 Villa Creek, L.P., 2010 Ark. App. 451, 376 S.W.3d 500 (2010).
Appellant could not avail itself of the long-arm statute as this section did not apply to in rem proceedings like appellant's quiet title action. Pulaski Choice, L.L.C. v. 2735 Villa Creek, L.P., 2010 Ark. App. 451, 376 S.W.3d 500 (2010).
Evidence.
Evidence insufficient for court to obtain jurisdiction. Hinson v. Culberson-Stowers Chevrolet, Inc., 244 Ark. 853, 427 S.W.2d 539 (1968); Janni v. Janni, 271 Ark. 953, 611 S.W.2d 785 (1981); Howard v. County Court, 278 Ark. 117, 644 S.W.2d 256 (1983).
Evidence sufficient for court to obtain jurisdiction. Mallory v. Edmondson, 257 Ark. 909, 521 S.W.2d 215 (1975); Bunker v. Bunker, 261 Ark. 851, 552 S.W.2d 641 (1977).
Reasonableness.
Whether the exercise of jurisdiction on the basis of acts done within this state is reasonable depends on the “basic fairness” test of due process and on consideration of other factors. Knox v. Knox, 25 Ark. App. 107, 753 S.W.2d 290 (1988).
Whether the exercise of jurisdiction on the basis of acts done in this state is reasonable depends upon the facts of each individual case, with the principle factors to be considered being the nature and quality of the acts, the extent of the relationship of the defendant to this state, and the degree of inconvenience which would result to the defendant by being forced to stand suit in this state. Jessie v. Jessie, 53 Ark. App. 188, 920 S.W.2d 874 (1996).
Service of Process.
In a case based on § 4-60-103, which permits recovery on checks written on accounts with insufficient funds, appellant's service through the Secretary of State did not effect proper service on an LLC, whose certificate of authority in Arkansas had been revoked, despite appellant's contention that service was properly effected based on this section; the complaint did not allege that any acts were done in Arkansas, appellant was not in Arkansas, and appellant did not send process to appellee's last known address. Eliasnik v. Y&S Pine Bluff, LLC, 2018 Ark. App. 138, 546 S.W.3d 497 (2018).
Cited: White v. Ray, 267 Ark. 83, 589 S.W.2d 28 (1979); Franklin v. Griffith, 282 Ark. 271, 668 S.W.2d 518 (1984); Young v. Mt. Hawley Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 81 (8th Cir. 1988); Renfro v. Adkins, 323 Ark. 288, 914 S.W.2d 306 (1996).