Ark. Code Ann. § 16-58-121 (2026)
Method of service — Nonresident or absent owner, chauffeur, driver, or operator — Survival of action
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- The acceptance by a nonresident owner, chauffeur, driver, or operator, or by a resident owner, chauffeur, driver, or operator of any motor vehicle who subsequently absents himself or herself physically from the state, except such nonresident owners or operators, drivers, or chauffeurs as may have a designated agent within this state upon whom valid and binding service of process may be had under the laws of this state, of the rights and privileges conferred by the laws of the State of Arkansas to drive or operate or permit or cause to be operated or driven a motor vehicle upon the public highway, private property, and property owned or controlled by the United States Government within this state as evidenced by his or her or its operating or causing or permitting a motor vehicle to be operated or driven thereon or the operation by a nonresident owner, nonresident operator or chauffeur, or resident owner, operator, or chauffeur subsequently absenting himself or herself from the state, or the causing or permitting by the nonresident owner, nonresident operator or chauffeur or resident owner, resident operator, or chauffeur subsequently absenting himself or herself physically from the state, of a motor vehicle to be operated on the highway, private property, and property owned or controlled by the United States Government within the State of Arkansas shall be deemed equivalent to the appointment by the nonresident owner, nonresident operator, or chauffeur, or by the resident owner, resident operator, or chauffeur subsequently absenting himself or herself from the state, whether the nonresident owner, nonresident operator, or chauffeur or resident owner, resident operator, or chauffeur subsequently absenting himself or herself from the state, is an individual, firm, or corporation, of the Secretary of the State of Arkansas or his or her successor in office to be the true and lawful attorney and agent of the nonresident owner, or nonresident operator, or chauffeur or resident owner, resident operator, or chauffeur subsequently absenting himself or herself from the state upon whom may be served all lawful process in any action or proceedings against him or her against any such person, firm, or corporation, or in the case of death of any such person, against any administrator, executor, or other legal representative of his estate, growing out of any accident or collision in which the nonresident owner, nonresident operator, or chauffeur or resident owner, resident operator, or chauffeur subsequently absenting himself or herself from the state, or any agent, servant, or employee of any such nonresident owner, nonresident operator, or chauffeur or resident owner, resident operator, or chauffeur subsequently absenting himself or herself from the state, may be involved while operating a motor vehicle on a highway, private property, or property owned or controlled by the United States Government within this state, whether the nonresident operator or chauffeur or resident operator or chauffeur subsequently absenting himself or herself from the state is the owner of the motor vehicle or not.
- Such acceptance or operation shall be a signification of the agreement of any such person, firm, or corporation, that any such process against any such person, firm, or corporation, or against the administrator, executor, or other legal representative of the estate of such person who may not have survived in such accident or collision, which is so served shall be of the same legal force and validity as if served on such person, firm, or corporation personally.
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- Service of the process shall be made by serving a copy of the process on the Secretary of State, notifying the Secretary of State that service is being effected pursuant to this subsection, and paying the Secretary of State the sum of twenty-five dollars ($25.00). Such service shall be sufficient service upon the nonresident owner, nonresident operator, or chauffeur or upon the resident owner, resident operator, or chauffeur who has subsequently absented himself or herself physically from the state, or upon the executor, administrator, or other legal representative of his or her estate in case he or she has not survived such accident or collision or has since died, if notice of the service and a copy of the process are forthwith sent by registered mail by the plaintiff or his or her attorney to the defendant at his or her last known address or to the administrator, executor, or other legal representative of the estate in the case he or she has not survived the accident or collision or has since died, and notice of such service and a copy of the process are forthwith sent by registered mail by the plaintiff or his or her attorney to the defendant at his or her last known address, or to the administrator, executor, or other legal representative of the estate of the deceased wrongdoer or tortfeasor, and the defendant's return receipt, or the return receipt of the administrator, executor, or other legal representative of the estate of the deceased person, or the affidavit of the plaintiff or his or her attorney of compliance herewith are to be appended to the writ of process and entered and filed in the office of the clerk of the court wherein the cause is brought. The Secretary of State, upon receiving a copy of the service of summons shall also forthwith mail a copy of the summons together with a copy of the complaint by first class mail to the last and best known address of the named defendant in the suit, notifying him or her of the filing of the suit.
- The court in which the action is pending may order any continuance as may be necessary to afford the defendant reasonable opportunity to defend the action.
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- Any cause of action arising out of the accident or collision against any person, in the case of the death of that person, shall survive against his or her administrator, executor, or other legal representative of his or her estate.
- Service of summons when obtained upon any such nonresident owner, nonresident operator, or chauffeur; or resident owner, resident operator or chauffeur subsequently absenting himself or herself physically from the state; or his or her executor, administrator, or other legal representative of his or her estate, as provided in this section for the service of process, shall be deemed sufficient service of summons and process to give to any of the courts of this state jurisdiction over the cause of action and over such nonresident owner, nonresident operator, or chauffeur, or resident owner, resident operator, or chauffeur subsequently absenting himself or herself from the state, or the defendant, and shall warrant and authorize personal judgment against such nonresident owner, nonresident operator or chauffeur; resident owner, resident operator, or chauffeur subsequently absenting himself or herself from the state; executor, administrator, or other legal representative of his or her estate; or the defendant in the event that the plaintiff prevails in the action.
History. Acts 1955, No. 38, §§ 1-3; 1959, No. 307, § 23; 1960 (Ex. Sess.), No. 11, § 1; 1963, No. 520, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 27-342.1 — 27-342.3; Acts 1997, No. 1213, § 2.
Publisher's Notes. As to penalty for violation of Acts 1959, No. 307, see § 27-50-305.
Research References
ALR.
Service of Process Via Computer or Fax. 30 A.L.R.6th 413.
Ark. L. Rev.
Meaning of Term “Public Highway” in Nonresident Motorist Service Act, 7 Ark. L. Rev. 323.
Substituted Service on Resident Owners or Operators of Motor Vehicles, 9 Ark. L. Rev. 390.
Arkansas Nonresident Motorist Service Statute — Actual Notice Necessary, 13 Ark. L. Rev. 381.
Conflict of Laws — Arkansas 1959-64, 18 Ark. L. Rev. 135.
The Uniform Long-Arm Act in Arkansas: The Far Side of Jurisdiction, 22 Ark. L. Rev. 627.
Conflict of Laws — Personal Jurisdiction and the Long-Arm Statute, 24 Ark. L. Rev. 106.
Civil Procedure — Arkansas' Non-Resident Motorist Statute — What Is Sufficient Compliance?, 26 Ark. L. Rev. 63.
Conflict of Laws: Arkansas, 1969-72, 27 Ark. L. Rev. 1.
Case Notes
Constitutionality.
Former similar section held not unconstitutional upon contention it denies nonresident owners of motor vehicles equal protection of the law and due process. Highway Steel & Mfg. Co. v. Kincannon, 198 Ark. 134, 127 S.W.2d 816, appeal dismissed, 308 U.S. 504, 60 S. Ct. 88, 84 L. Ed. 431 (1939); Alexander v. Bush, 199 Ark. 562, 134 S.W.2d 519 (1939)Questioned byForsgren v. Gillioz, 110 F. Supp. 647 (D. Ark. 1953) (preceding decisions under prior law).
Actual Notice.
Former similar section required actual notice of the pendency of the action before jurisdiction of the defendant was acquired. Alexander v. Bush, 199 Ark. 562, 134 S.W.2d 519 (1939)Questioned byForsgren v. Gillioz, 110 F. Supp. 647 (D. Ark. 1953) (decision under prior law).
Service under this section is complete, for purposes of determining prior jurisdiction as between state trial courts, at least when notice is actually received by the defendant or defendants, if not in fact complete prior to that time. Simmons v. Broomfield, 163 F. Supp. 268 (W.D. Ark. 1958).
Default judgment invalid where this section not properly complied with. Jenkins v. Hill, 240 Ark. 197, 398 S.W.2d 679 (1966); Halliman v. Stiles, 250 Ark. 249, 464 S.W.2d 573 (1971).
Attorney/Client Relationship.
Where service was attempted on nonresident defendant under similar former section but copy of summons was sent to attorney who allegedly represented defendant, question of whether an attorney and client relationship existed between defendant and the attorney was a question of fact for the trial judge. Harris v. Starr, 226 Ark. 127, 288 S.W.2d 332 (1956) (decision under prior law).
Guardian Ad Litem.
This section is by its terms a personal service statute, therefore appellant's claim that judgment by default was improperly rendered on constructive service because no attorney ad litem was appointed to represent him, and that he had right to have action retried within two years after judgment had no merit. Agee v. Wildman, 240 Ark. 111, 398 S.W.2d 542 (1966).
Invalid Service.
Where the plaintiff did not demonstrate that sufficient inquiry was made in attempting to ascertain defendant's last known address and thereby deprived defendant of reasonably probable actual notice consistent with due process, the substitute service statute was not sufficiently complied with and default judgment was void. Halliman v. Stiles, 250 Ark. 249, 464 S.W.2d 573 (1971).
Service found to be invalid but the summons itself was not void and an order of dismissal based on this ground was error since it would prevent the service of a properly issued summons by a duly authorized person. Merriott v. Whitsell, 251 Ark. 1031, 476 S.W.2d 230 (1972).
Constructive service obtained on motorist under this section was not valid, where there was no allegation that motorist was from outside the state or had absented himself from the state. Morphew v. Safeco Ins. Co., 256 Ark. 809, 510 S.W.2d 543 (1974).
Ownership.
Service on defendant was proper under this section where she signed a statement before the accident, referring to the pickup truck which she turned over to stepson motorist as “my Ford Truck,” when she conceded in her brief on appeal that an inference could be made that title was in her name at the time of the accident, and where the certificate of title reflected that 12 days after the accident she transferred title from her deceased husband's estate to herself. Renfro v. Adkins, 323 Ark. 288, 914 S.W.2d 306 (1996).
Perfection of Service.
Where nonresident defendant filed a motion to quash summons for the reason that plaintiff did not mail copy of summons and complaint by registered mail, and plaintiff subsequently complied with the statute by mailing the copies by registered mail to the defendant, the motion to quash would be overruled, as service had been perfected. Fritchey v. Summar, 86 F. Supp. 391 (W.D. Ark. 1949) (decision under prior law).
Trial court had personal jurisdiction over defendant where service was perfected on the Secretary of State pursuant to this section, notwithstanding the fact that the record did not contain a return of service as proof that service was accomplished, since perfection of service was never contested by defendant. Renfro v. Adkins, 323 Ark. 288, 914 S.W.2d 306 (1996).
Second Suit.
Where plaintiff failed to allege defendant was a nonresident and thereafter filed a second suit in which he alleged defendant was a nonresident and defendant filed a motion in the second suit to quash the return of summons, motion was properly overruled, as second suit superseded first as both suits were the same except for allegation that defendant was a nonresident. Webb v. Pope County Circuit Court, 214 Ark. 890, 218 S.W.2d 722 (1949) (decision under prior law).
Standing.
Defendant in action by minor who was injured by motorist who was allegedly encouraged to speed by defendant did not have standing to raise issue of whether the absentee motorist had been properly served under this section. Cobb v. Indian Springs, Inc., 258 Ark. 9, 522 S.W.2d 383 (1975).
Sufficient Compliance.
Service on nonresident operator pursuant to this section is valid, hence part of summons referring to prior statute, which only authorized service against nonresident owner, will be treated as surplus. Hamlin v. Darr, 220 Ark. 841, 250 S.W.2d 532 (1952).
Service against nonresident motorist may be obtained under this section in proceeding by tortfeasor against whom judgment was obtained to obtain contribution from other joint tortfeasors. Burnett v. Agent, 227 Ark. 1050, 303 S.W.2d 575 (1957).
Survival of Action.
Statutory agency of Secretary of State for service of process was held not to expire upon the death of a nonresident motorist. Oviatt v. Garretson, 205 Ark. 792, 171 S.W.2d 287 (1943) (decision under prior law).
Cited: Simmons v. Broomfield, 163 F. Supp. 268 (W.D. Ark. 1958); Aufderhar v. American Employers Ins. Co., 331 F.2d 681 (8th Cir. 1964); Davis v. Schimmel, 252 Ark. 1201, 482 S.W.2d 785 (1972); Merriott v. Whitsell, 251 Ark. 1031, 476 S.W.2d 230 (1972); Stubbs v. United States, 593 F. Supp. 521 (E.D. Ark. 1984); Franklin v. Griffith, 282 Ark. 271, 668 S.W.2d 518 (1984).