Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-308 (2026)

Case Notes

Burden of Proof.

In order to revoke probation or a suspension trial court has to find by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant inexcusably violated a condition of the probation or suspension. Rudd v. State, 76 Ark. App. 121, 61 S.W.3d 885 (2001) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Where evidence showed that a law enforcement officer saw a car stopped in a road in the middle of night in a high crime area, the officer saw the driver exchange something with another driver, the officer stopped one of the cars and smelled burnt marijuana, defendant was the only passenger in that car, during a consensual search of the car the officer found four baggies of marijuana packaged as if for sale, and the marijuana was in a location accessible to defendant in the car, the state met its burden under subsection (d) of showing that defendant had violated a condition of his probation by the constructive possession of contraband. Jones v. State, 355 Ark. 630, 144 S.W.3d 254 (2004) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Revocation of a defendant’s probation was supported by a preponderance of the evidence: defendant admitted to more than one violation of defendant’s probation and a judge was not required to believe defendant’s explanations or excuse defendant’s failure to comply with the conditions of defendant’s probation. Ingram v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 729, 363 S.W.3d 6 (2009) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Cause for Revocation.

The trial court did not err in taking into consideration, in revoking defendant's probation and suspended sentence, that defendant had been associating with a convicted felon, who was his first cousin and who was regarded as a member of his immediate family. Cureton v. State, 266 Ark. 1034, 589 S.W.2d 204 (Ct. App. 1979) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

A conviction in municipal court for loitering, as well as a prior conviction for burglary, would constitute good cause to revoke probation. Murphy v. State, 269 Ark. 181, 599 S.W.2d 138 (1980) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Where the suspended sentence was expressly conditioned upon the successful completion of the drug rehabilitation program, but where defendant did not complete the program, and there was no showing that defendant was arbitrarily dismissed from the program, then the trial judge could justifiably find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant had failed to comply with a condition of his suspension or probation. Adams v. State, 269 Ark. 601, 599 S.W.2d 437 (Ct. App. 1980) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Where probationer failed to pay fines, restitution, court costs, and attorney's fees until after his arrest for probation violation and where probationer failed to report his change of address to the probation officer, the trial court was correct in finding that these were not de minimis excusable violations and revoking probation. Simmons v. State, 13 Ark. App. 208, 681 S.W.2d 422 (1985) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

A conviction in violation of probation warrants revocation even though the conviction may have been appealed. Barnes v. State, 294 Ark. 369, 742 S.W.2d 925 (1988) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Where one of the conditions of the probation was that the defendant subject himself and his home to being searched, the defendant's refusal gave the officers “reasonable cause to believe that the defendant had failed to comply with a condition of his probation.” Therefore, his actual arrest, occurring a few minutes later, was not illegal. Wilson v. State, 25 Ark. App. 45, 752 S.W.2d 46 (1988) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

The fact that the defendant had been truant once, tardy twice and suspended for ten days from school, all within a period of less than a month, was sufficient proof of his lack of a good faith effort to obtain his high-school diploma or GED in violation of his probation. Ramsey v. State, 60 Ark. App. 206, 959 S.W.2d 765 (1998) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Despite the fact that an order suspending defendant's sentence for theft of property and residential burglary did not specifically state that defendant was required to surrender to police on a certain date in order to serve jail time, the preponderance of the evidence showed that defendant's failure to report violated the provisions of the order that required good behavior and a law-abiding lifestyle; evidence showed that defendant was caught after leading police on a chase. Richardson v. State, 85 Ark. App. 347, 157 S.W.3d 536 (2004) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Evidence was sufficient to revoke defendant's probation as the state successfully showed, by a preponderance of the evidence, that defendant failed to pay his fees and abide by the terms of his probation; moreover, defendant was convicted of two new criminal offenses, kidnapping and attempted burglary. Davis v. State, 368 Ark. 351, 246 S.W.3d 433 (2007) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Defendant's drug-court probation under §§ 16-98-301 to 16-98-304 was revoked for failing to attend drug testing, failing to attend a group meeting, and being arrested because she inexcusably failed to comply, despite a delirium diagnosis. Defendant did not show that she was suffering from such on the dates that probation was violated; moreover, an examination showed no mental defect, and her hallucinations were not involved with her probation revocation. Anglin v. State, 98 Ark. App. 34, 249 S.W.3d 836 (2007) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Trial court properly revoked defendant's suspended sentence for sexual abuse and sentenced defendant to six years in prison because it was undisputed that defendant never completed the Arkansas Reduction of Sexual Victimization Program, and evidence was presented that showed that defendant refused to comply with the program's entry requirements. Seamster v. State, 2009 Ark. 258, 308 S.W.3d 567 (2009) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Where defendant pleaded guilty to commercial burglary, breaking or entering, two counts of theft of property, and first-degree criminal mischief, he was sentenced to 60 months' supervised probation. Because defendant consented to going to the residential drug treatment in accordance with § 16-98-201, his placement in a regional punishment facility could not be classified as a probation revocation; when he violated the terms of the drug-court program based on his public intoxication and testing positive for cocaine, the trial court did not err by revoking his probation and imposing a 120 month sentence in the Arkansas Department of Correction, with 48 months suspended. Doyle v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 94, 302 S.W.3d 607 (2009) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

When defendant was placed on two years' probation on his plea of guilty to possession of cocaine, one of the conditions was that he not violate any state law; defendant's plea of guilty to criminal trespass in violation of § 5-39-203(a)(2) alone was sufficient to support the finding that he violated his probation. An adverse evidentiary ruling and the denial of his motion for continuance at the revocation hearing was not prejudicial; therefore, defendant's appeal of the revocation order lacked merit. Johnson v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 527, 334 S.W.3d 419 (2009) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Defendant’s suspended sentence was properly revoked because defendant committed a robbery, and defendant’s parole officer testified that when she conducted a “parole search” of the motel room where defendant was staying, “possible marijuana,” cocaine, and drug paraphernalia were found in the room; defendant admitted that he would test positive for marijuana. Williams v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 551 (2009) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Where the state’s three witnesses testified that defendant threatened to kill the victim during an argument over money, the state proved by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant committed second-degree terroristic threatening. The trial court was free to reject defendant’s testimony that he never threatened the victim and was not a violent person; the trial court did not err by revoking his suspended sentence. Whitney v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 726 (2009) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Decision to revoke probation due to a probationer’s failure to comply with conditions was proper because written conditions were provided probationer as required by § 5-4-303; there was evidence that the conditions were expressly communicated in writing and verbally to the probationer; and there was no evidence of confusion on the probationer’s part. White v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 157 (2010) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Trial court did not err in revoking defendant’s suspended sentence on the ground that he committed the offense of possession of drug paraphernalia with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine because the evidence showed that a reliable source had tipped off the police to the fact that defendant, contrary to the terms and conditions of his release, was continuing to manufacture methamphetamine, and defendant directed the purchases and provided an explanation for each component of the methamphetamine recipe; it was shown that defendant conceived and proposed the methamphetamine cook, buy, and sell arrangement for the manufacture and distribution of the illegal substance, and simply by asserting the defense of entrapment, § 5-2-209, defendant necessarily admitted committing the offense. Lowe v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 284 (2010) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Judgment revoking appellant’s probated sentence was affirmed where (1) despite appellant’s attempt to excuse his failure to pay fines and restitution, the trial court found that appellant had committed a multitude of violations and that these violations specifically included a failure to make good-faith efforts to pay fines and restitution; and (2) there was evidence that appellant spent his money on something nonessential, alcohol, and this use of alcohol was also in violation of his terms of probation. Barringer v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 369 (2010)Trial court did not err in finding that defendant violated the conditions of his suspended imposition of sentence by failing to pay child support since pleading guilty to nonpayment of support because the state presented testimony that the victim had not received any payments in more than six months, the child-support registry was introduced without objection, and defendant himself testified that he had failed to pay child support since he had pleaded guilty to the charge of nonpayment of support. Vick v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 29 (2010) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Even if defendant's motivations for moving to Texas were good, the conditions of his probation did not allow him to unilaterally relocate to Texas. Even though defendant offered his reasons for moving, he offered no reasonable justification for failing to get written permission to do so from his probation officer. Perry v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 312, 550 S.W.3d 907 (2018).

Competency.

There was no evidence to suggest incompetency other than the fact that defendant rambled, had an unusual speech pattern, and testified to irrelevant matters, which was insufficient to require the trial court to sua sponte halt the proceedings and order a competency evaluation. Thus, defendant could not avail himself of the exception to the rule that a court would not address arguments raised for the first time on appeal, and as he failed to raise the issue below, and the trial court was not obligated to raise it sua sponte, the revocation of probation was affirmed. Lewis v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 503, 505 S.W.3d 725 (2016).

Court's Authority.

The fact that defendant was not arrested with a warrant for violation of his suspended sentence nor given formal notice of the time and place of the revocation hearing did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to hear the petition, nor void the trial court's action in revoking the suspended sentence. Reynolds v. State, 282 Ark. 98, 666 S.W.2d 396 (1984) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Where more than five years had passed since the defendant was given a suspended sentence of three years on the condition that he pay court costs and a fine, the trial court no longer had the authority to revoke the suspended sentence for the defendant's failure to pay the fine. Drain v. State, 10 Ark. App. 338, 664 S.W.2d 484 (1984) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Where defendant was sentenced to 10 years with 5 years suspended and was paroled from the penitentiary, the court held to have no authority to revoke that suspension more than five years later. Vann v. State, 16 Ark. App. 199, 698 S.W.2d 814 (1985) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Whether there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that the defendant had violated conditions of her suspended imposition of sentence was purely a question which required resolution of the witnesses' credibility and was one within the sound discretion of the trial court. Jared v. State, 17 Ark. App. 223, 707 S.W.2d 325 (1986) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Where, while the defendant was serving probation imposed by the court of one county, he was convicted of an unrelated felony by the court of a second county, the court of the second county was without authority to revoke his probation; instead, the defendant should have been returned to the first county for a revocation hearing. Gill v. State, 290 Ark. 1, 716 S.W.2d 746 (1986) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Where revocation of probation did not occur until after the completion of the defendant's imposed sentence, the trial court could not sentence the defendant to serve additional time in prison. Gautreaux v. State, 22 Ark. App. 130, 736 S.W.2d 23 (1987) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

This section does not require that one accused of violation of probation be summoned or arrested, only that he may be. Barnes v. State, 294 Ark. 369, 742 S.W.2d 925 (1988) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

The revocation of a suspension for a subsequent crime prior to conviction of that crime was not an abuse of discretion. Rudd v. State, 308 Ark. 401, 825 S.W.2d 565 (1992) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

The fact that a municipal court judgment is on appeal does not prevent the trial court from using it as a basis for revocation. DeHart v. State, 312 Ark. 323, 849 S.W.2d 497 (1993) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Where defendant's suspended imposition of sentence had expired, and defendant's subsequent offense on which the revocation of the suspended sentence was based did not occur until nearly 4 years later, and although defendant allegedly had also violated the conditions of his suspension by failing to pay court-ordered restitution and costs, but the State presented no proof and the court made no findings on those allegations, then neither of the exceptions in subsection (e) (now (f)) of this section and § 5-4-303(f) (see now § 16-93-311) to subsection (d) of this section were applicable, and the trial court was without authority to revoke the suspension. Jones v. State, 52 Ark. App. 179, 916 S.W.2d 766 (1996) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

The court did not have the power to revoke defendant's suspended sentence prior to the commencement of the suspension period. Harness v. State, 352 Ark. 335, 101 S.W.3d 235 (2003) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Although the trial court had the authority to revoke defendant's probation after the state's second request because it was based on a violation of a condition in the original probation order, the trial court exceeded its authority when it entered a three-year suspended sentence. Thronebury v. State, 85 Ark. App. 352, 154 S.W.3d 272 (2004) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Trial court lacked authority to revoke defendant’s probation because defendant’s initial 24-month probationary period had expired and defendant was not lawfully on probation at the time of the revocation hearing. Cross v. State, 2009 Ark. 597, 357 S.W.3d 895 (2009) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Trial court did not utilize defendant’s failure to register as a sex and child offender as an additional ground to support the revocation of his suspended sentence because the trial court merely entered a judgment declaring defendant guilty of that charge and pronounced a prison sentence on the registration violation for which he was originally given a suspended sentence; imposition of the sentence was separate and apart from the revocation and was well within the discretion of the trial court. Lowe v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 284 (2010) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Expiration of Period.

Under the plain language of subsection (e) (now (f)), a warrant issued in 1990, during defendant's probationary period, but not served until 1995, after the expiration of defendant's probationary period, was not stale. Richmond v. State, 326 Ark. 728, 934 S.W.2d 214 (1996) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

When defendant's probation period expired without her having been arrested for a probation violation and without an arrest warrant having been issued for violation of probation, the circuit court lost jurisdiction to revoke probation. Carter v. State, 350 Ark. 229, 85 S.W.3d 914 (2002) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

The circuit court erred in not dismissing the petition for revocation where the probationary term had expired and the state failed to arrest the defendant or issue an arrest warrant during the period of probation as required by subsection (e) (now (f)) of this section. Troup v. State, 80 Ark. App. 323, 95 S.W.3d 823 (2003) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

An “alias bench warrant” did not meet the requirements of subsection (e) (now (f)) of this section because such a warrant was not issued for an arrest due to violation of probation; however, under former § 5-4-303(h)(2) (see now § 16-93-311), which was adopted after this section, the trial court retained jurisdiction to revoke defendant's probation, even beyond the expiration of defendant's probation period in 2000, where defendant had failed to pay the full amount of required restitution. Smith v. State, 83 Ark. App. 48, 115 S.W.3d 820 (2003) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Hearings.

Requirement that a suspension or revocation hearing be conducted within 60 days after arrest applies only to arrest for a revocation or suspension of a suspended sentence, not an arrest on another charge while defendant was allegedly serving a suspended sentence. Walker v. State, 262 Ark. 215, 555 S.W.2d 228 (1977). But see Vann v. State, 16 Ark. App. 199, 698 S.W.2d 814 (1985) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

The 60-day limitation for a revocation hearing provided by § 5-4-310(b) (now § 16-93-307(b)) must also be applied to subsection (e) (now (f)) of this section in determining whether a defendant has been arrested for violation of the conditions of a suspended or probated sentence before the expiration of the period of the suspension or probation. Vann v. State, 16 Ark. App. 199, 698 S.W.2d 814 (1985) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Compliance with this section and § 5-4-310 (now § 16-93-307) was sufficient where the defendant was not surprised by the timing of the hearing nor was he prejudiced in any way by not having been arrested or summoned. Barnes v. State, 294 Ark. 369, 742 S.W.2d 925 (1988) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Circuit court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant's motion to dismiss the revocation of his probation because defendant waived his right to have a preliminary hearing since he never requested a preliminary hearing but filed a motion to dismiss over a year after his arrest; defendant failed to show how the delay, which the circuit court determined was caused by his repeated requests for continuances, prejudiced him. Hart v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 434, 530 S.W.3d 366 (2017).

Implied Repeal.

Subsection (f) (now (g)) of this section was partially repealed by implication by a 1979 amendment to former § 16-93-402 (repealed 2011), which provided that when a court revoked an offender's probation, it could require him to serve the sentence imposed or any lesser sentence which might have been originally imposed. Culpepper v. State, 268 Ark. 263, 595 S.W.2d 220 (1980) (decision under prior law), superseded by statute as stated in, Smith v. State, 18 Ark. App. 152, 713 S.W.2d 241 (1986).

Jurisdiction.

Trial court did not have jurisdiction to revoke defendant's probation because the revocation occurred after the end of his probationary term and there were no circumstances allowing for revocation after the end of the probationary term; defendant was not arrested during the probation period for matters relating to his probation within the meaning of subsection (e) (now (f)) of this section. Harris v. State, 80 Ark. App. 181, 92 S.W.3d 690 (2002) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Although defendant's probation was revoked several months after his one-year probationary period had expired, the fact that a valid arrest warrant was issued prior to the expiration of his probation established extraordinary jurisdiction. Duncan v. State, 103 Ark. App. 107 (2008) (substituted op.) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Trial court erred in sentencing defendant pursuant to a probation revocation that involved two cases; while defendant was arrested for a violation of probation prior to the expiration of the probation period, the trial court lost jurisdiction to revoke defendant's probation based on subsection (f) of this section without entry of a sentencing order or an order extending defendant's probation, despite defendant's plea of guilty, where defendant was not arrested nor was an arrest warrant issued pursuant to one of the case numbers. Trif v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 452, 503 S.W.3d 802 (2016).

No Cause for Revocation.

Trial court had no jurisdiction to revoke defendant's suspended sentence, because defendant owed no restitution at the end of his suspended sentence, and the trial court could not retain jurisdiction over him; defendant's child support was not to make good an actual economic loss of a victim of his failure to comply with the reporting requirements of the Sex and Child Offender Registration Act. Owens v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 532, 337 S.W.3d 527 (2009) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Trial court erred in revoking defendant’s probation for failure to pay a child support arrearage following a conviction for felony nonsupport in violation of § 5-26-401(a) and (b)(2)(B) where defendant asserted an inability to pay and offered a disability as a reasonable excuse for his nonpayment and where the state offered no evidence of defendant’s other sources of income, his assets, or his expenses. The trial court should have applied the general inexcusably failed to comply standard in subsection (d) of this section as refined by the restitution-specific factors in § 5-4-205(f). Hanna v. Arkansas, 2009 Ark. App. 809, 372 S.W.3d 375 (2009) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Notice.

There was no error in failure to give defendant written notice of the time and place of revocation hearing, in light of the fact that defendant did receive actual notice of the time and place of the hearing and did not ask for a continuance. Reynolds v. State, 282 Ark. 98, 666 S.W.2d 396 (1984) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Revocation petition did not notify defendant of the allegation regarding drug possession, but because the trial court did not err in finding that he constructively possessed a revolver, a finding that independently supported the violation of conditions, the lack of notice regarding drugs did not require reversal. Webb v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 257, 460 S.W.3d 820 (2015).

One Violation.

Since only one violation is necessary to support a revocation, the second ground given for revoking defendant's probation was not addressed. Whitmore v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 445 (2015).

Procedure.

Trial court did not err in refusing to dismiss a revocation petition for lack of a notary where appellant cited no authority requiring a verified affidavit for a petition to revoke, and this section contains no requirement that a petition to revoke be notarized, verified, or accompanied by an affidavit. Todd v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 270, 493 S.W.3d 350 (2016).

Proof.

While revocation of a suspended sentence requires only a preponderance of the evidence, a conviction requires the finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Ellerson v. State, 261 Ark. 525, 549 S.W.2d 495 (1977) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Since a defendant in a probation revocation proceeding is not being tried on a criminal charge where the defendant's guilt has to be established beyond a reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of the evidence is necessary to support a finding that the probationer has inexcusably breached a condition associated with his release resulting in a revocation order. Thornton v. State, 267 Ark. 675, 590 S.W.2d 57 (Ct. App. 1979) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

In order to revoke a suspended sentence, the state must prove not only that a condition was violated but also that there was nothing that could be said to fairly excuse the violation; however, these factors need only be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. Brown v. State, 10 Ark. App. 387, 664 S.W.2d 507 (1984) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

On a hearing to revoke a suspended sentence, the burden is upon the state to prove the violation of a condition by a preponderance of the evidence. Cavin v. State, 11 Ark. App. 294, 669 S.W.2d 508 (1984); Reese v. State, 26 Ark. App. 42, 759 S.W.2d 576 (1988) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

To revoke a suspended sentence, the state must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated a condition of her suspension. Jared v. State, 17 Ark. App. 223, 707 S.W.2d 325 (1986) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

The burden of proof does not shift; however, once the state has introduced evidence of nonpayment of restitution, the burden of going forward does shift to the defendant to offer some reasonable excuse for his failure to pay. To hold otherwise would place a burden upon the state which it could never meet; it would require the state, as part of its case in chief, to negate any possible excuses for nonpayment. Reese v. State, 26 Ark. App. 42, 759 S.W.2d 576 (1988) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

A revocation of suspended sentence hearing is not a criminal prosecution and requires only the lowest showing of proof. Palmer v. State, 60 Ark. App. 97, 959 S.W.2d 420 (1998) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

The burden of proof on the State in a revocation hearing is to prove the violation of a condition of probation by a preponderance of the evidence; “reasonable doubt” has no application in revocation proceedings. Palmer v. State, 60 Ark. App. 97, 959 S.W.2d 420 (1998) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Trial court did not err under subsection (d) of this section in revoking defendant's suspended sentence because the state presented evidence that defendant committed various new drug crimes; one of the terms of defendant's suspension was that defendant not use, sell, distribute, or possess any controlled substance. Sherman v. State, 2009 Ark. 275, 308 S.W.3d 614 (2009) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Trial court did not err in revoking defendant’s probation based on his possessing and using alcohol and drinking in public, although defendant testified that he did not have a beer and that police fabricated their story because they were angry defendant had been granted an appeal bond. Credibility was an issue for the trial court. Graves v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 32 (2010) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Review.

In appeal from revocation of probation, defendant must show that court's finding that he violated the terms of his probation was clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Pearson v. State, 262 Ark. 513, 558 S.W.2d 149 (1977) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

A reviewing court will not overturn a decision in the trial court to grant a petition to revoke a suspended sentence unless it is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Drain v. State, 10 Ark. App. 338, 664 S.W.2d 484 (1984); Cavin v. State, 11 Ark. App. 294, 669 S.W.2d 508 (1984) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

To revoke probation, the burden is on the state to prove the violation of a condition of probation by a preponderance of the evidence, and on appellate review, the trial court's findings will be upheld unless they are clearly against a preponderance of the evidence. Lemons v. State, 310 Ark. 381, 836 S.W.2d 861 (1992) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Defendant could raise for the first time on appeal the issue that the revocation of his suspended sentence needed to be reversed because, inter alia, the period of suspension had expired. Jones v. State, 52 Ark. App. 179, 916 S.W.2d 766 (1996) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Appeal from revocation of suspended sentences which were revoked on the basis that defendant violated their terms by using marijuana, was unsuccessful because defendant admitted using marijuana and, although violation of this condition was not among the allegations in the state’s petition to revoke, defendant did not object to testimony elicited on the subject nor to the trial court’s ruling in open court. Josenberger v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 243 (2010) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

In a probation revocation case, the appellate court did not need to reach the merits of defendant's argument that she did not willfully fail to pay as ordered because she failed to challenge the other two bases for the revocation that she failed to report to her probation officer and committed criminal mischief when she damaged another individual's vehicle. Williams v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 601, 509 S.W.3d 677 (2016).

Order revoking appellant's suspended imposition of sentence was upheld, where there was nothing before the appellate court showing appellant's release date on his initial charge. With no evidence of appellant's date of release, there was no evidence of error. Cooper v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 580, 565 S.W.3d 130 (2018).

Revocation Improper.

Where the defendant had failed to work all the hours that he was required to as a condition of suspension of his sentence, but both he and his wife had been sick or injured during much of that time, the violation was not inexcusable, and his suspended sentence should not have been revoked. Cogburn v. State, 264 Ark. 173, 569 S.W.2d 658 (1978) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Where the state failed to prove that the check was issued or presented for payment prior to the closure of the bank account upon which it was drawn, the trial court could not reasonably infer that the check was forged; therefore, the trial court erred in finding that defendant violated the terms of her probation by passing a forged instrument. Bedford v. State, 96 Ark. App. 38, 237 S.W.3d 516 (2006) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Where the state did not establish that proper procedures were followed in testing defendant's urine sample for drugs, the trial court's finding that he violated a condition of his probation was against the preponderance of the evidence under subsection (d) of this section. The probation officer testified that defendant's sample was stored overnight in a refrigerator, and tested next day without checking the temperature; medication that defendant was taking for acid reflux could have caused a false-positive reading. Wilcox v. State, 99 Ark. App. 220, 258 S.W.3d 785 (2007) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Order revoking defendant's suspended sentences was overturned where the trial court erred in failing to consider whether defendant's failure to pay fines, costs, and restitution was excusable under § 5-4-205(f)(3); there was evidence showing that defendant had only $60 left after monthly expenses. Phillips v. State, 101 Ark. App. 190, 272 S.W.3d 123 (2008) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Trial court erred in revoking defendant's suspended sentence for failure to enroll in and complete a prison sex offender program because defendant did all that he could do to enroll in the program by being placed on a waiting list for the program, it was unlikely that he could get into the program before his release, and the State did not introduce any testimony or other evidence to support its argument regarding an inmate's options when ordered released under the Emergency Powers Act of 1987, § 12-28-601 et seq. Reyes v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 55, 454 S.W.3d 279 (2015).

Insufficient evidence supported the trial court's conclusion that defendant violated his conditions of probation where nothing in his probation conditions required him to move to a different, more stable residence if requested by his probation officer, and being charged with aggravated robbery in another county did not show that he had actually committed that crime. Baney v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 20, 510 S.W.3d 799 (2017).

While there was sufficient evidence to support the new convictions, the circuit court's order was illegal on its face regarding the theft of property misdemeanor where the 12-month sentence for the misdemeanor was completed before the State even filed its first petition to revoke defendant's suspended sentence. Payne v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 265 (2017).

Trial court erred in denying defendant's motion to dismiss the State's petition to revoke her probation, because the State did not present evidence at the revocation hearing to support that defendant was guilty of a misdemeanor other than the docket sheet showing the guilty plea and the docket sheet was silent on whether defendant was represented by counsel when she pleaded guilty in the district court. King v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 278, 549 S.W.3d 407 (2018).

Because defendant's conviction for residential burglary was not supported by the evidence, as the trial court found that defendant committed a crime with which he was not charged, and that conviction was used for the revocation of the suspended imposition of sentence, the revocation was reversed. Williams v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 349, 553 S.W.3d 753 (2018).

Revocation of probation as to defendant's misdemeanor theft-of-property charge was reversed where she had already served her sentence as to that charge. Vangilder v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 385, 555 S.W.3d 413 (2018).

Circuit court erred by denying defendant's motion to dismiss the petition to revoke his probation as the evidence was insufficient to show that he committed a driving while intoxicated (DWI) offense and thus violated his probation because the record was devoid of any evidence of defendant's alleged DWI offense; the docket sheet was never admitted into evidence, and the probation officer had no knowledge of the facts giving rise to the conviction and merely testified that defendant had been convicted. Boyd v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 363, 583 S.W.3d 406 (2019).

Revocation Proper.

Revocation of probation for failure to report and make payments and for receiving new criminal charges was proper because the probationer’s signature on the documents listing the conditions of probation was sufficient to support the trial court’s determination that the probationer knew, understood, and consented to the conditions. Berry v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 217 (2010) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Probation was properly revoked under subsection (d) of this section because, even setting aside alleged fine delinquencies and a misdemeanor conviction, appellant violated the conditions of his probation that prohibited him from possessing or using alcohol or illegal drugs. Pfeifer v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 556 (2012).

Revocation of defendant's suspended sentence under subsection (d) of this section was not clearly against the preponderance of the evidence because while the case rested largely on the credibility of a passenger in defendant's vehicle, who was a convicted felon, and police officers, the trial court was in the best position to judge their credibility. Wooten v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 729 (2013).

Because additional adverse rulings pertained only to a firearm violation, and the State presented conclusive evidence that defendant inexcusably failed to pay costs and fees, this was another reason why any potential error was rendered harmless because the State only needed to prove one violation, and revocation was proper. Alexander v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 40 (2014).

State presented evidence that defendant had paid nothing toward his costs and fees as required by the conditions of his suspension, and defendant offered no excuse, and thus the trial court's decision to revoke was not clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Alexander v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 40 (2014).

Counsel's motion to withdraw was granted because counsel's “no merit” brief demonstrated that an appeal would be wholly without merit, where a sheriff's department employee testified that defendant paid nothing toward his costs and fines, defendant admitted that he was convicted on several criminal counts and other violations, and the trial judge's decision to revoke defendant's probation was not clearly erroneous or clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Bishop v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 41 (2014).

Defendant violated the conditions of his suspended impositions of sentence because a trial court did not clearly err in finding that defendant's confession about selling 10 oxycodone pills was sufficient to show that he possessed the drugs with the purpose to deliver. The trial court was free to reject testimony regarding defendant's personal use of oxycodone and to assess conflicting testimony. Jones v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 167 (2014).

Circuit court did not err by admitting evidence regarding a probationer's arrest for public intoxication, when the incident was not listed in the petition as a basis for revocation, because the challenged testimony by a probation officer was presented and allowed by the court merely to explain the circumstances leading up to the officer's assignment to the case. Moreover, the court revoked the probation because of the probationer's failure to report to the probation officer as directed. Seaton v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 296 (2014).

State clearly showed that defendant was significantly delinquent in paying his court-ordered restitution, and he offered no reasonable excuse, plus, although only one violation was necessary to revoke the suspension, the State further showed that defendant violated his conditions by committing first-degree battery, and thus the decision to revoke defendant's suspended sentence was not clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Sherril v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 411, 439 S.W.3d 76 (2014).

Counsel complied with the rule and there was no merit to the appeal in this probation revocation case; there was proof of a serious and long-term delinquency on payments due, defendant stated that he did not pay despite consistently working, and he admitted not reporting to his probation officer and moving without having permission to do so, such that there was no clear error in finding that defendant inexcusably violated the conditions of his probation. White v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 24 (2015).

Evidence was sufficient for the trial court to revoke defendant's suspended imposition of sentence because he was a passenger in a vehicle that was stopped for a traffic violation (the driver was not wearing a seat belt), the driver and other occupants of the vehicle were persons of bad character who encouraged violation of the law (known gang members), and drugs and paraphernalia of which none of the occupants admitted ownership were present in the vehicle. Khanthamany v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 46 (2015).

Trial court, which revoked defendant's suspended sentences, could reasonably conclude that pinning the victim down and stabbing a knife into the floor around her head was purposeful conduct and that the purpose could not be anything other than evoking fear of death or serious physical injury. Ta v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 220, 459 S.W.3d 325 (2015).

Trial court properly revoked defendant's suspended imposition of sentences because a theft victim explained her initial naming of defendant's brother and later identifications of defendant, and defendant failed to comply with his court-ordered payments and presented no excuse for his failure to pay while he was not incarcerated. Lewis v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 222 (2015).

Trial court properly revoked defendant's probation because he admitted that he had made no payments toward his court-ordered fines and costs, could not give a logical excuse or reason as to why he had not paid them, and committed additional criminal offenses. Peel v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 226 (2015).

Trial court did not clearly err in finding that defendant constructively possessed the gun and the safe, or that, based upon the smell in the car, he knew that the safe contained marijuana, and thus the finding that he violated the terms of his probation was not against the weight of the evidence, and revocation of probation was affirmed. Webb v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 257, 460 S.W.3d 820 (2015).

Trial court properly revoked defendant's probation because he admitted that he quit reporting to probation after he failed a drug test; although the State presented evidence of multiple probation violations, the State only needed to prove one violation to sustain a revocation. Johnson v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 353 (2015).

Trial court's decision to revoke defendant's probation was not clearly erroneous or clearly against the preponderance of the evidence, and no issue of arguable merit could be raised on appeal to reverse that finding. Accordingly, defendant's appeal was wholly without merit. Griffin v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 405 (2015).

Adverse evidentiary rulings did not provide any meritorious grounds for reversal on appeal, and even assuming that there was any error, such was harmless because defendant's probation was revoked on another basis; the State was only required to show that defendant committed one violation in order to sustain a revocation. Henderson v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 411, 466 S.W.3d 418 (2015).

Based on the probation officer's testimony that defendant had failed to report to him as directed on several occasions, as well as the documents showing that defendant admitted to the use of marijuana during the term of his probation, there would be no merit to an appeal challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting defendant's revocation of probation. Kirkland v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 20 (2016).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain the revocation of defendant's probation given the witness testimony that defendant possessed a knife and had stabbed the victim, and the probation officer's testimony that defendant had failed to report. Brown v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 403, 500 S.W.3d 781 (2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support the revocation of a probationary sentence based on defendant's commission of domestic battering in the third degree and failure to pay fees. Defendant's boyfriend reported the incident to police, and photographs of his injuries were admitted into evidence without objection; defendant did not contest that her boyfriend was a household member or that his injuries met the statutory definition, and the boyfriend's testimony was sufficient to show that defendant caused the injuries recklessly or purposefully. In addition, the trial court was entitled to assess defendant's explanations for her failure to pay fees and conclude that the nonpayment was not excusable. Glennon v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 25, 480 S.W.3d 894 (2016).

Circuit court did not err in revoking defendant's suspended sentence based on defendant's constructive possession of a handgun, which was found in a car that defendant was driving. Although defendant was not the owner of the car, he was exercising dominion and control of the car when he was pulled over; and the gun was found in the glove compartment of the car, which was within close proximity to defendant. Phounsavath v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 65, 482 S.W.3d 332 (2016).

Circuit court did not clearly err in finding by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant inexcusably violated conditions of his probation where a deputy sheriff's testimony showed that defendant had committed the offense of fleeing, and the probation officer's testimony established that defendant had used methamphetamine and alcohol and was not gainfully employed. Lewis v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 101, 484 S.W.3d 277 (2016).

Evidence that defendant admitted to his probation officer, on several occasions, that he had been drinking alcohol in violation of a condition of his probation and testimony from the arresting officer that defendant appeared to be under the influence of some substance when he was arrested was sufficient to support the revocation of defendant's probation. King v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 292 (2016).

Defendant's probation was properly revoked because the State of Arkansas introduced sufficient evidence, through the testimony of an employee of the county sheriff's department and defendant's probation officer, to support the trial court's finding that defendant violated the conditions of his probation by failing to pay his fines and costs, failing to report to his probation officer as directed, and failing to remain in the jurisdiction of the court. Maxwell v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 348 (2016).

Trial court did not err in revoking defendant's probation because, at the revocation hearing, defendant's probation officer testified that the terms and conditions of defendant's probation had been explained to him and that he had appeared to understand them; the probation officer's testimony established that defendant had failed to report as directed; one of the conditions of his probation was that he refrain from the use or possession of any alcoholic beverage; and, even if defendant had tested positive for controlled substances due to prescribed pain medication, that did not explain why he also tested positive for alcohol. Kidwell v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 4, 511 S.W.3d 341 (2017).

Although defendant argued that the trial court impermissibly revoked his probation on the basis that he failed to register a change of address, which requirement applied to persons convicted of sex offenses, the record revealed that the trial court's displeasure with defendant's failure to register his new address was for sex-offender-registry and probation purposes and the trial court did not clearly err in revoking defendant's probation. Defendant informed the probation officer of his change in residence only after her visit to his grandmother's house, which he had listed as his address, and after the probation officer's request for an explanation from him; and defendant did not request prior approval, nor did he provide notice of his change in residence as soon as possible. Dunhoo v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 232, 547 S.W.3d 720 (2018).

Trial court did not clearly err in finding that defendant inexcusably violated a condition of probation that he not leave Arkansas without the written permission of his probation officer. Perry v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 312, 550 S.W.3d 907 (2018).

Defendant's probation was properly revoked because he failed to challenge the grounds for revocation based on his failure to report to his probation officer upon release from incarceration, failure to report changes of residence, and consumption of alcohol; although those unchallenged violations were enough to support the revocation, the circuit court's finding that defendant willfully violated the no-contact order involving his mother was not clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Clark v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 362, 584 S.W.3d 680 (2019).

Revocation of probation upheld. Lamb v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 494, 588 S.W.3d 409 (2019).

Circuit court did not err by finding that defendant inexcusably violated the terms and conditions of her probation where the probation officer's unchallenged testimony showed that she failed to report as directed, she was found at the home of a felon on multiple occasions and was living there, failed to provide a change of address after being told to move, and failed to pay supervision fees. Turner v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 534, 590 S.W.3d 158 (2019).

—Drug Use.

Evidence was sufficient to revoke defendant's probation because she admitted to using methamphetamine, admitted to failing to pay her court fines and costs, and there was testimony by the police officer that he found narcotics and two pipes at her residence; the court found defendant possessed and used controlled substances. McLane v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 258 (2013).

Only adverse ruling in this case was the trial court's decision to revoke defendant's suspension, and there could be no meritorious challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting revocation; the State demonstrated that, during the period of his suspension, defendant tested positive for controlled substances in violation of his conditions, which was alone a sufficient basis to revoke, and the trial court's decision was not clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Paschal v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 409 (2015).

Decision to revoke was not clearly against the preponderance of the evidence, as defendant's conditions of probation required that he refrain from using alcohol and controlled substances, and it was undisputed that he had used alcohol and marijuana during the term of his probation. Henderson v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 411, 466 S.W.3d 418 (2015).

State proved defendant inexcusably violated probation by testing positive for marijuana; while defendant was not explicitly required to pass mandatory drug screens, (1) defendant was required to obey state and federal laws, and (2) a positive drug screen could be evidence defendant violated a probation condition to lead a law-abiding life. Stewart v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 306, 550 S.W.3d 916 (2018).

—Failure to Pay Fines, Costs, Fees.

The state has an interest in punishment and deterrence and is justified in pursuing a revocation of probation and the sentencing of a probationer for nonpayment of a fine when the defendant has willfully failed to pay the fine or failed to make bona fide efforts to do so. Drain v. State, 10 Ark. App. 338, 664 S.W.2d 484 (1984) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

In revocation proceedings for failure to pay a fine or restitution, a sentencing court must inquire into the reasons for the failure to pay; if the probationer willfully refused to pay or failed to make sufficient bona fide efforts legally to acquire the resources to pay, the court may revoke probation and sentence the defendant to imprisonment within the authorized range of its sentencing authority; however if the probationer could not pay despite sufficient bona fide efforts to acquire the resources to do so, the court must consider alternate measures of punishment other than imprisonment. Drain v. State, 10 Ark. App. 338, 664 S.W.2d 484 (1984) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Defendant’s suspended sentence was properly revoked because the state proved that defendant failed to pay fines and fees as ordered; fine-payment records introduced without objection showed that defendant was behind in payment of required fines and fees, and defendant provided no excuse for his failure to follow the court’s orders. Tyson v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 856 (2009) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Circuit court properly revoked defendant’s suspended sentence for nonpayment of court costs and fines because the state introduced, without objection, a ledger sheet reflecting defendant’s nonpayment and defendant did not have a reasonable excuse for failing to pay, pursuant to § 5-4-205(f)(3); the state proved defendant’s failure to pay was inexcusable. Burkhart v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 462 (2010) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Sufficient evidence supported the trial court's decision to revoke defendant's probation for residential burglary because he and a county employee testified that he did not pay his fines, costs, and fees as directed. Although defendant testified that he did not have a job or any income, the trial court did not err in revoking his probation because he did not provide a reasonable excuse under subsection (d) of this section for his failure to comply with his probation conditions. Foster v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 2 (2013).

Conditions of probation signed by defendant warned him that any violation could result in a sentence of up to 10 years' imprisonment, and because he was sentenced within the range allowed by the applicable statutes, the revocation and sentence were affirmed. Leal v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 673 (2014).

State proved by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant violated his probationary conditions by failing to pay his fines, costs, and fees as required, and he did not rebut this evidence; he offered nothing to explain his nonpayment or prove that he had become current on his payments, and thus the circuit court did not err in considering his payment delinquency as a basis for probation revocation. Leal v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 673 (2014).

Probation was properly revoked because the State presented testimony by a sheriff's department employee and the probationer's supervisor that the probationer, although employed and advising the supervisor that the probationer had made payments, had not made payments on the probationer's fines and costs, as directed. Furthermore, the probationer offered no reasonable excuse. Trotter v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 408, 465 S.W.3d 860 (2015).

Once the State introduced evidence of nonpayment of fines and costs associated with defendant's sentence, the burden of going forward shifted to defendant to offer some reasonable excuse for his failure to pay as directed, but defendant did not present any evidence in support of an alleged inability to pay or other justification for nonpayment. The trial court's decision revoking probation was not clearly erroneous or clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. McDonald v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 510 (2015).

In a probation revocation proceeding, the trial court's finding that appellant's failure to pay fines, costs, and probation fees was inexcusable was not clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. The State produced evidence of nonpayment, demonstrating that over a period of three years appellant had paid just $45 toward his costs and fines and was $595 behind on his probation fees. Cochran v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 511 (2015).

Trial court's determination that a probationer inexcusably failed to pay his costs, fines, and fees was not clearly against the preponderance of the evidence and this single violation justified revocation of probation. Collins v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 600, 474 S.W.3d 531 (2015).

Circuit court properly revoked defendant's probation because its finding that defendant's failure to pay fines was inexcusable was not clearly erroneous; defendant had sufficient disability income to cover the monthly payments but failed to make even one such payment. Holmes-Childers v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 464, 504 S.W.3d 645 (2016).

Trial court did not clearly err in finding that defendant inexcusably failed to make her court-ordered payments and in revoking her probation because the State presented testimony from the collector of fines and costs for the county sheriff's department that defendant was assessed a $1,000 fine and $875 in costs associated with her two guilty pleas; defendant had access to $14,000 at the time she was placed on probation and suspension, but she did not use the funds to make any payments toward her obligations; she also had an employment opportunity but did not take advantage of it; and defendant offered nothing to support her self-serving testimony that her bank accounts had been frozen. Ferguson v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 4, 479 S.W.3d 588 (2016).

Circuit court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant's motion to dismiss the revocation of his probation because the circuit court, as trier of fact, was entitled to assess defendant's explanation for his failure to pay court-ordered fines and conclude that his nonpayment was inexcusable; the circuit court's finding was not clearly against the preponderance of the evidence Hart v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 434, 530 S.W.3d 366 (2017).

Circuit court properly revoked defendant's suspended imposition of sentence because defendant did not present a reasonable excuse regarding his nonpayment of fines and costs. London v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 585, 534 S.W.3d 758 (2017).

Defendant's claim that the State did not prove defendant's failure to pay fines, costs, and fees was inexcusable failed because defendant offered no testimony or evidence of defendant's inability to pay. Stewart v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 306, 550 S.W.3d 916 (2018).

Circuit court, which revoked appellant's suspended sentence, did not clearly err in finding that the State proved by a preponderance of the evidence that appellant inexcusably failed to pay restitution, fines, fees, and costs. The case profiles showed that appellant had made no payments for restitution, fines, fees, and costs, and when the State introduced the documents, appellant did not object to their admissibility. Keyes v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 202, 575 S.W.3d 166 (2019).

Defendant's probation was properly revoked because the State introduced testimony that defendant had not paid fines, fees, and costs as directed; once the State established a record of nonpayment, defendant had the burden of demonstrating an inability to pay or some reasonable excuse for his failure to pay; defendant acknowledged that he had been employed at times during the term of his probation; and the circuit court, as the trier of fact, was entitled to assess defendant's explanation for his failure to pay and conclude that his nonpayment was not excusable. Straub v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 302, 577 S.W.3d 776 (2019).

—Failure to Pay Restitution.

Where the record revealed the state proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant's failure to pay restitution to his theft victims was inexcusable, and was not due solely to his inability to make the restitution payments, the revocation of the defendant's suspended sentence was justified. Cavin v. State, 11 Ark. App. 294, 669 S.W.2d 508 (1984) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

When defendant was serving a suspended sentence for overdraft, theft of property, theft by deception, and two counts of failure to appear, he failed to pay his court-ordered restitution of $82,000 in violation of the terms of his suspended sentence under this section; the trial court found that he willfully failed to pay his restitution. While defendant did have child support and daycare expenses, he testified that he made partial payments due to his mistaken understanding as to the amount due; the trial court did not err by revoking defendant’s suspended sentence and ordering him to serve ten years of incarceration. Reese v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 678 (2009) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Circuit court did not err in revoking the suspended sentence defendant received for second-degree forgery because the circuit court’s finding that defendant’s failure to pay restitution, a fine, and court costs was both willful and inexcusable was not clearly against the preponderance of the evidence; the circuit court could find that defendant was capable of working, that he was employed in some capacity, and that he received income from the government, and instead of meeting his financial obligations, defendant chose to spend money on nonessential items such as alcohol and cigarettes. Wicks v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 499, 375 S.W.3d 769 (2010) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Because a probationer offered no evidence to excuse the probationer's failure to pay after the State introduced the restitution-payment record, and because the probationer had not worked for two-and-a-half years, revocation of the probationer's suspended imposition of sentence was not clearly erroneous. Pitchford v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 188 (2011) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Revocation of defendant's probation was proper because the circuit court's finding that he willfully violated the condition of his probation requiring him to make payments as directed was not clearly against the preponderance of the evidence, it was undisputed that he failed to pay ordered amounts of restitution, fines, fees, and costs, the evidence also showed that he had the ability to pay, but chose not to, and the State only needed to prove one violation of probation to sustain a revocation. Haynes v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 363 (2014).

Circuit court did not clearly err in finding that defendant willfully violated the condition of her probation requiring her to make payments of court costs, a fine, and restitution and in revoking her probation because the circuit court found that she had paid $1,483.60 toward her fines and restitution, but that the remainder of the agreed-upon payments of $5,236.72 was outstanding; the amount of restitution and fines defendant agreed to pay were clearly explained in the judgment-and-disposition order she had signed; defendant's testimony that she had been ill or injured and unable to work was unsubstantiated; and the circuit court did not believe that she was making a sufficient effort to make payments. Bohannon v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 434, 439 S.W.3d 735 (2014).

Trial court properly revoked defendant's suspended imposition of sentence for willfully failing to comply with its terms and conditions because restitution was a condition of the suspended imposition of sentence and defendant's failure to pay restitution was “willful” where the State introduced, without objection, evidence of defendant's nonpayment of his restitution; it was only after defendant was arrested on the revocation warrant that he attempted to make payments towards his court-ordered restitution, and, although he had the complete ability to pay, he did not do so. Robertson v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 113 (2015).

Circuit court's decision to revoke defendant's probation was not clearly against the preponderance of the evidence due to defendant's failure to pay monthly restitution as ordered; the State showed the nonpayment was willful based on evidence defendant's disability income exceeded her expenses, which included nonessential items, including cable television. Young v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 580, 591 S.W.3d 385 (2019).

—Failure to Report.

Defendant inexcusably violated the terms of her probation where she admitted that she did not notify the probation officer of her change of address and that she purposely failed to report because she was “hiding out” from police. Dority v. State, 329 Ark. 631, 951 S.W.2d 559 (1997) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Because the trial court's finding that appellant failed to report to his probation officer was not clearly against the preponderance of the evidence as the probation officer testified that if appellant had in fact reported on August 10 it would be reflected in his records, revocation of his probation was proper under subsection (d) of this section. Major v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 501 (2012).

Defendant admitted that he did not report after he lost his job, and he stated that he no longer reported because he could not try to find a ride while attempting to secure employment, and this was enough to support the trial court's finding that defendant inexcusably failed to report to his probation officer as directed. Whitmore v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 445 (2015).

Revocation of defendant's probation was supported by a preponderance of the evidence. The record was clear that defendant failed to report to her probation officer twice. Wells v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 619 (2015).

Circuit court properly revoked defendant's probation because defendant failed to make a good-faith effort to comply with the terms and conditions of her probation; defendant's failure to report was inexcusable because she could have overcome the obstacle by putting forth even a modicum of effort to look up the phone number. Holmes-Childers v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 464, 504 S.W.3d 645 (2016).

Circuit court did not err in revoking defendant's probation because the State proved that she failed to report to her probation officer; and, although defendant now argued that no proof was submitted that she had appointments scheduled with her probation officer on the specific dates that he asserted she missed and that she missed later appointments because she was in jail, no evidence of those contentions was submitted to the circuit court. Alsbrook v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 8, 479 S.W.3d 584 (2016).

State proved defendant's failure to report to a probation officer was inexcusable because the State showed defendant failed to comply, requiring defendant to then show the noncompliance was excusable, which defendant did not; while defendant's mother offered excuses for the failure to report, the mother also testified defendant “chose” not to go. Stewart v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 306, 550 S.W.3d 916 (2018).

Trial court's finding that defendant violated the terms and condition of her probation by failing to report was affirmed where the probation officer testified that defendant had been informed of the reporting requirement, failed to report at least twice, and despite phone calls and a home visit, defendant made no contact with the probation office. Vangilder v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 385, 555 S.W.3d 413 (2018).

Revocation of probation upheld for failure to report. Thompson v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 421, 586 S.W.3d 682 (2019).

—New Offenses.

Defendant’s suspended sentence was properly revoked where the state proved that defendant committed third-degree domestic battery, under § 5-26-305(a), by showing that defendant inflicted physical injury under § 5-1-102 by pulling his wife’s hair and throwing her against a vehicle. Andrews v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 624 (2009) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Suspension of an earlier sentence was properly revoked because defendant committed domestic battery in the third degree where an infant child suffered an arm fracture in defendant's care, and a medical examination revealed healing fractures other places; moreover, there was evidence that other injury incidents had occurred while the child was in defendant's care, and there was testimony that defendant was too rough with the child. The standard for reckless was what a reasonable person in the circumstances would have observed. Singletary v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 699 (2013).

Circuit court properly revoked defendant's suspended imposition of sentences because he did not challenge one of the bases for them, specifically, the new offense of resisting arrest; the State had to prove only one violation to establish that defendant violated the conditions of his suspended sentence. Johnson v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 68 (2015).

Trial court properly revoked appellant's suspended imposition of sentence because the evidence supported the trial court's finding that appellant violated the terms and conditions of appellant's suspended sentence by committing theft, a charge for which appellant pleaded guilty. Sparkman v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 156 (2015).

Probation was properly revoked because a trial court's finding that probationer stole and pawned a window-unit air conditioner, violating the terms of his suspended sentence, was not clearly against the preponderance of the evidence; the probationer admitted to stealing the air conditioner from the window of a homeowner who hired the probationer to mow the homeowner's yard. Collins v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 600, 474 S.W.3d 531 (2015).

Circuit court's decision to revoke defendant's probation based on his committing the crime of manufacturing methamphetamine was not in error; although the evidence was insufficient to show that defendant committed that offense, it was sufficient to support the offense of attempting to manufacture methamphetamine. Atteberry v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 331 (2016).

Trial court did not clearly err in granting the State's petition to revoke defendant's suspended imposition of sentence and in sentencing him to 144 months based on its finding by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant committed the crimes of false imprisonment, assault, possession of a firearm as a felon, and battery in the third degree; the victims testified that they were met outside a house by a man and were brought inside, where they were held while defendant—armed with a silver and black automatic gun—asked who was responsible for a burglary of his stuff; and defendant hit, slapped, and kicked one of the victims. Mosley v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 353, 499 S.W.3d 226 (2016).

Trial court's decision to revoke defendant's suspended imposition of sentence based on his participation in the robbery was not against a preponderance of the evidence, which showed that defendant actively participated in the robbery by driving his SUV while his passengers discussed, planned, and committed the robbery of the victim in the SUV, he was still driving when the victim was kicked out on the side of the road, and he joined in divvying up the stolen cash and smoking the marijuana taken. Collins v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 563, 566 S.W.3d 139 (2018).

Uncorroborated testimony of defendant's alleged accomplice in a murder was a sufficient basis for the revocation of defendant's probation. Furthermore, the revocation did not have to be deferred until after the new murder charge was adjudicated; even if defendant was acquitted in the criminal trial, defendant's probation could still be revoked. Clark v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 158, 573 S.W.3d 551 (2019).

Right to Confront Witnesses.

Even assuming any Confrontation Clause error in the probation officer testifying to information gained from former probation officers, the error would be harmless because there was sufficient other evidence to support revoking defendant's suspended imposition of sentence for failing to remain on good behavior and committing new offenses. Gilbreth v. State, 2020 Ark. App. 86 (2020).

Sentence After Revocation.

Nothing in this section prohibited the trial court from revoking probation and imposing any sentence which might have originally been imposed; thus, defendant's sentence of 90 days in the county jail with 90 days credit as a period of confinement in the trial court's original order of probation did not preclude the court from ordering six years' imprisonment following the state's second petition for revocation and a finding of guilt on the part of the defendant for violating his probation. Moseley v. State, 349 Ark. 589, 80 S.W.3d 325 (2002) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Upon the revocation of defendant’s probation for eight violations of the Arkansas Hot Check Law, the trial court was authorized under § 5-4-301(d)(2) and this section to modify the original order and impose multiple sentences of imprisonment to be served consecutively in accordance with § 5-4-403(a). The trial court did not err by sentencing defendant to twenty years in prison each on four hot-check counts to run consecutively and ten years in prison each on the other felony hot-check counts to run concurrently. Maldonado v. State, 2009 Ark. 432 (2009) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Circuit court did not err in revoking defendant’s suspended sentence and probation and in sentencing him to 197 months imprisonment with forty-seven months suspended because the circuit court was within its authority to revoke the original sentences and prescribe the resulting sentence and was also within its authority to run the prescribed sentences consecutively when the prescribed sentence in the first case, thirty months with an additional forty-seven months’ suspended, was within the circuit court’s authority. Because defendant was convicted of a Class C felony, the circuit court could have originally sentenced him to ten years’ imprisonment for failure to appear pursuant to § 5-4-401(a)(4). The sentence imposed as a result of revocation in the second case did not exceed the statutory maximum for the underlying offense and was not illegal on its face, and a notation on the judgment and disposition order in the second case was an insufficient basis for defendant’s allegation that the circuit court unambiguously intended to impose a presumptive sentence of thirty-six months in the event he failed to comply with the conditions of his probation. Ward v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 79, 374 S.W.3d 62 (2010) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Argument that appellant's due process rights under Ark. Const. Art. 2, § 8 were violated when a trial court failed to consider all of the sentencing options available after a revocation of probation was not preserved for appellate review because the argument was not raised when appellant was sentenced. Mewborn v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 195 (2012).

In a case where probation was revoked, a 20-year sentence for Class B felony kidnapping was not improper since it was authorized under § 5-4-401(a)(3); the appellate court was unable to reduce a sentence within the range of punishment contemplated by the Arkansas Legislature. Moreover, since appellant failed to object to the sentence imposed, he was unable to argue on appeal that the trial court erred by failing to consider alternatives to the 20-year sentence. Pfeifer v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 556 (2012).

Counsel was allowed to withdraw, because the appeal was wholly without merit, when the petitioner's sentence was appropriate; the petitioner was sentenced to ten years' incarceration on each charge to be run consecutively, for a total of twenty years, and the sentence was within the sentencing range for a Class B felony. Fritts v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 404 (2013).

In a probation revocation case, defendant’s argument that the imposition of more time than her original sentence was improper was rejected because, even though the period of probation began to run when defendant was sentenced, the trial court could have imposed any sentence upon revocation that could have been imposed originally under former § 5-4-309(g)(1)(A) (now this section). Defendant pled guilty to 2 Class C felonies and was subject to a maximum sentence of 10 years on both counts; therefore, sentences of 72 months and 50 months upon revocation were permitted. Whitson v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 283 (2014).

Trial court did not impose an illegal sentence because defendant was a habitual offender and the nine-year sentence imposed by the circuit court following revocation of defendant's suspended sentence was lawfully within the range of sentences that he originally could have been given. Adams v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 718, 452 S.W.3d 113 (2014).

Trial court erred in resentencing defendant because the five-year sentence with five years' suspended imposition of sentence that the court imposed on revocation of defendant's probation exceeded the maximum allowable sentence available for defendant's conviction for tampering with physical evidence, a Class D felony. Additionally, it appeared that the court improperly revoked defendant's probation on misdemeanor theft-of-property and resisting-arrest offenses, because the probations on those offenses had already expired. Wilson v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 342 (2016).

Because appellant was not determined to be a habitual offender when his plea was accepted and he was placed on suspended imposition of sentence (SIS), he could not be sentenced as a habitual offender on revocation of that SIS. Appellant's 20-year sentence on revocation did not exceed the nonhabitual range for Class B felonies, but the sentencing order erroneously reflected that he was sentenced as a habitual offender and the case was remanded in part for entry of a corrected sentencing order. Robertson v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 379, 499 S.W.3d 247 (2016).

In a no-merit appeal, revocation of defendant's probation was affirmed; the four-year sentence with a judicial transfer to the regional punishment facility was less than the 10-year maximum sentence for a Class C felony, and was permissible. Parmer v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 5 (2017).

In a probation revocation case, defendant's original sentence on a Class A misdemeanor was remanded for correction, because (1) the sentence was illegal on its face, as defendant was sentenced to both 20 days in jail and 12 months' probation and, contrary to § 5-4-304(a), the original sentencing order did not show that the 20 days' confinement was a condition of defendant's probation; and (2) the trial court failed to give defendant credit for the 20 days he was ordered to serve in the original order. Thompson v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 158, 516 S.W.3d 297 (2017).

When the trial court found defendant had violated the conditions of his suspended imposition of sentence by having a firearm in his possession, the trial court did not err in sentencing him to the Department of Correction for 10 years for the underlying offense of hindering apprehension or prosecution, a Class B felony that carried a 20-year maximum; the original sentence he received was 10 years in the Department of Correction, followed by 10 years' suspended imposition of sentence with jail-time credit for 554 days. Defendant's jail-time-credit argument did not involve the imposition of an illegal sentence and was not one that could be raised for the first time on appeal. Easley v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 317 (2017).

Defendant's 12-year sentence on revocation of probation was not illegal where the sentence was within the sentencing range for Class B felony arson. Taylor v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 30, 540 S.W.3d 295 (2018) (no-merit-appeal) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a one-year jail sentence following revocation of appellant's probation for repeated positive drug and alcohol tests; appellant had been placed on probation for the Class A misdemeanor offenses of negligent homicide and two counts of third-degree battery, and Class A misdemeanors carried a maximum one-year jail term. Talbert v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 412, 558 S.W.3d 396 (2018).

After revoking defendant’s probation, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by sentencing defendant to 10 years' imprisonment for second-degree domestic battery, six years' imprisonment for one count of aggravated assault on a family member, four years' imprisonment followed by two years' suspended imposition of sentence (SIS) for one count of aggravated assault on a family member, and six years' SIS for first-degree terroristic threatening, and in ordering the sentences to run consecutively, except the six years' SIS for first-degree terroristic threatening, which was to run concurrent to the second-degree battery sentence, because the sentences imposed by the circuit court were within the statutory range prescribed by law. The circuit court had been repeatedly lenient with defendant and warned him of the potential consequences of violating the no-contact order concerning his mother. Clark v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 362, 584 S.W.3d 680 (2019).

Circuit court did not err in sentencing defendant after revoking his probation because the court considered evidence only from the revocation hearing and did not consider evidence from defendant's prior hearing. Neal v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 489, 588 S.W.3d 759 (2019).

—Additional Cases.

Where part of terms of imprisonment was suspended during good behavior and it was ordered that the sentences in both convictions would run concurrently, the sentences were pronounced and only the execution of a portion of the sentences was suspended; thus, under these circumstances, the court was not authorized to change the prior sentences that were pronounced so as to make them run consecutively rather than concurrently, for once the concurrent sentences were imposed, the court was without jurisdiction to modify the sentences to make them run consecutively. Wolfe v. State, 266 Ark. 811, 586 S.W.2d 4 (Ct. App. 1979) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Where defendant was placed on probation after conviction and was subsequently convicted of loitering and his probation revoked, defendant was imprisoned for his original misconduct, not for what might appear to be a simple act of loitering. Murphy v. State, 269 Ark. 181, 599 S.W.2d 138 (1980) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Sentence is not imposed until the court pronounces a fixed term of imprisonment as opposed to simply specifying a definite period of time of probation. McGee v. State, 271 Ark. 611, 609 S.W.2d 73 (1980) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Where the trial court revoked the defendant's probation and sentenced him to a term of imprisonment at the Department of Correction, the court could not impose a term of probation on the defendant in addition to the imprisonment. Marion v. State, 4 Ark. App. 359, 631 S.W.2d 315 (1982) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Where court revoked suspension of sentence to run concurrently with sentence in federal court on a separate offense, and then over a year later entered order to the effect that defendant had violated the conditions of the suspended sentence and ordered him committed for five years, the second sentence was void since a second sentence cannot be imposed at a subsequent revocation hearing; moreover, since the first sentence had already been put into execution, the court was without jurisdiction when it pronounced the second sentence, for once a valid sentence is put into execution the trial court is without jurisdiction to modify, amend, or revise it. Cooper v. State, 278 Ark. 394, 645 S.W.2d 950 (1983) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Where defendant was sentenced to period of imprisonment for one year and any additional term of imprisonment for a period of up to five years was suspended, imposition of nine year sentence upon revocation of suspension when court found defendant, subsequent to his release, committed the crime of robbery was proper since 10 years is the maximum for the crime for which he was placed on suspension. Smith v. State, 18 Ark. App. 152, 713 S.W.2d 241 (1986) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

In accepting defendant's guilty plea, adjudicating him guilty, and placing him on probation for five years, trial court did not impose a sentence on defendant, and, upon revoking probation and sentencing defendant, court was not limited to the length of the probation, but could impose any sentence that it might have originally imposed for the charges to which defendant pleaded guilty. Lee v. State, 299 Ark. 187, 772 S.W.2d 324 (1989) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Where an order of suspension and a judgment contain conflicting information as to the sentence imposed, the judgment is controlling. Green v. State, 29 Ark. App. 69, 777 S.W.2d 225 (1989) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Once the defendant's probation was revoked for commission of a drug-related offense and the defendant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment, he could not later again have his probation revoked and be sentenced to an even longer term of imprisonment. Ramey v. State, 62 Ark. App. 204, 972 S.W.2d 952 (1998) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Where no sentence was imposed upon the appellant when he entered his guilty plea and, instead, he was placed on probation, the trial court was authorized to impose any sentence on the appellant which might have been originally imposed for the offense of which he was found guilty, even though the petition to revoke probation was filed on the last day of his probation. Lewis v. State, 336 Ark. 469, 986 S.W.2d 95 (1999) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Although the defendant's terms of probation on two separate crimes ran concurrently, when his probation was revoked, the court had authority to impose consecutive sentences. Webb v. State, 66 Ark. App. 367, 990 S.W.2d 591 (1999) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Subsection (f) (now (g)) provides a circuit court with ample authority and jurisdiction to enter a judgment of conviction upon a second or subsequent revocation and to impose any sentence that might have been imposed originally for the offense of which the defendant was found guilty. Bonham v. State, 73 Ark. App. 320, 43 S.W.3d 753 (2001) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Trial court lost subject matter jurisdiction under subsection (f) (now (g)) of this section to modify defendant's sentence by imposing an additional term of 15-year suspended sentence because, before Acts 1999, No. 1569 was enacted, once an original sentence was put into execution, an attempted modification of the original order was erroneous. Gates v. State, 353 Ark. 333, 107 S.W.3d 868 (2003) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Where appellant had been sentenced to five years' probation and fined for first-degree sexual abuse, a trial court properly sentenced him to 10 years in prison upon revocation of probation because appellant could have originally received that term and there had been no sentence imposed that had been improperly modified. Rickenbacker v. Norris, 361 Ark. 291, 206 S.W.3d 220 (2005) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

After revoking defendant's probation for controlled substance offenses, the trial court did not err in ordering him to serve a 40-year sentence where it could have done so originally; former § 16-93-402(e)(5) was inapplicable to the case because no sentence was originally imposed on defendant, he was placed on probation and fined. Cox v. State, 365 Ark. 358, 229 S.W.3d 883 (2006) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Sentences.

A prosecutor should not be required to file a revocation petition prior to the expiration of the suspension or probationary period in cases involving unpaid restitution because it cannot be known until the period has fully expired whether the defendant has made restitution; a defendant could conceivably pay the full amount owed on the last day of the period and fulfill his or her obligation. Kyle v. State, 312 Ark. 274, 849 S.W.2d 935 (1993) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Since, pursuant to § 5-4-303(f) (see now § 16-93-311), the trial court retains jurisdiction until the full amount of restitution is paid, even beyond the period originally allowed, the prosecutor was not required to comply with the requirements of subsection (e) (now (f)), because appellant's deferred sentence was not revoked but merely extended to allow her to pay the restitution. Kyle v. State, 312 Ark. 274, 849 S.W.2d 935 (1993) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Sexual-Offender Registration.

Where defendant was convicted of a sex offense and registered as a sex offender in another state, and while living in Arkansas for five years he was convicted of breaking and entering and felony theft of property and was given suspended sentences, but all the while he failed to register as a sex offender as required by § 12-12-905(a)(2) of the Sex Offender Registration Act, § 12-12-901 et seq., his failure to register or report a change of address was a Class D felony, and the State met its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant violated a condition of his suspended sentences. Williams v. State, 351 Ark. 229, 91 S.W.3d 68 (2002) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Trial court did not clearly err in finding that defendant made no effort to comply with sexual-offender registration requirements. Therefore, the trial court properly revoked defendant's suspended sentence. Muldrew v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 568 (2012).

Sufficiency of the Evidence.

Circumstantial evidence can be relevant to a revocation decision and may be sufficient to support revocation. Palmer v. State, 60 Ark. App. 97, 959 S.W.2d 420 (1998) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

The complete constructive-possession analysis does not apply to revocation proceedings; evidence sufficient for establishing possession in a revocation proceeding may be inadequate to establish a criminal conviction. Palmer v. State, 60 Ark. App. 97, 959 S.W.2d 420 (1998) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Evidence that is insufficient to convict a person of the offense may be sufficient to revoke probation. McKenzie v. State, 60 Ark. App. 161, 961 S.W.2d 775 (1998) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Trial court did not err in revoking defendant's probation based on circumstantial evidence that he was in constructive possession of a firearm found in the trunk of a car in which he was a passenger as defendant admitted that he was going to deer camp and was wearing hunter-orange clothing and a jumpsuit. Newborn v. State, 91 Ark. App. 318, 210 S.W.3d 153 (2005) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Trial court properly revoked defendant's suspended sentence because a preponderance of the evidence supported the finding that defendant was guilty of associating with other felons and associating with others violating criminal laws; when the police searched a car that defendant had been riding in, a rock of cocaine was found between the passenger seat and the door where defendant's hand had been. Blakes v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 451, 320 S.W.3d 651 (2009) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Because defendant failed to timely object to the admission of certain testimony, and because the circuit court was charged with resolving all questions of conflicting testimony and inconsistent evidence, pursuant to §§ 5-4-309(d) and 5-4-310(c)(2) (now §§ 16-93-308(d) and 16-93-307(c)(2)), a preponderance of the evidence supported the revocation of defendant's probation. Ellis v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 654 (2011).

Trial court revoked defendant's suspended sentence for burglary based on allegations that he failed to pay his court-ordered fees, did not notify the sheriff of his current address, and committed new criminal offenses; at the revocation hearing, a county employee testified that defendant did not make any payments toward his $700 bill for costs and the court also heard testimony indicating that defendant shot a man seven times. Defendant did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the revocation of his suspended sentence under subsection (d) of this section. Love v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 600 (2012).

Revocation of defendant's probation was proper under this section because defendant admitted to drinking alcohol and failing to report to his probation officer. Any argument that the trial court's findings were against the preponderance of the evidence would clearly be without merit; because of that, counsel's motion to be relieved as counsel under Ark. Sup. Ct. & Ct. App. R. 4-3 was properly granted. Martin v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 7 (2013).

Trial court did not err under subsection (d) of this section in revoking defendant's probation for possession of a controlled substance; defendant admittedly failed to abide by the terms of probation, particularly with respect to an obligation to report to the probation officer in person. Lanfair v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 51 (2013).

—Evidence Insufficient.

Trial court's decision that defendant inexcusably failed to comply with probation conditions was clearly against a preponderance of the evidence. Baldridge v. State, 31 Ark. App. 114, 789 S.W.2d 735 (1990) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Where a defendant appealed the revocation of his probation, there was insufficient evidence to support the revocation. The testimony by a probation officer in Arkansas was insufficient for the trial court to conclude that defendant willfully violated the terms and conditions of his probation, as there was no evidence that he was required to report in Pennsylvania, there was no testimony from anyone that he was given directions to whom to report in Pennsylvania, and there was no evidence of any violation of any condition of defendant's probation. Prillerman v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 46 (2014).

—Evidence Sufficient.

Revocation of probation was not clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Morgan v. State, 267 Ark. 28, 588 S.W.2d 431 (1979); Jones v. State, 31 Ark. App. 23, 786 S.W.2d 851 (1990) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

The trial court's finding that defendant had inexcusably failed to comply with the conditions of his probation and suspended sentence held not to be against the preponderance of the evidence. Cureton v. State, 266 Ark. 1034, 589 S.W.2d 204 (Ct. App. 1979) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Finding that defendant had inexcusably failed to comply with the conditions of his probation held supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Thornton v. State, 267 Ark. 675, 590 S.W.2d 57 (Ct. App. 1979) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Evidence sufficient to find that it was proper to revoke defendant's suspended sentence under this section. Queen v. State, 271 Ark. 929, 612 S.W.2d 95, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 963, 102 S. Ct. 502, 70 L. Ed. 2d 378 (1981), cert. denied, United States ex rel. Dzambazovic v. Lane, 454 U.S. 903, 102 S. Ct. 411, 70 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1981); Dunavin v. State, 18 Ark. App. 178, 712 S.W.2d 326 (1986); Palmer v. State, 31 Ark. App. 97, 788 S.W.2d 248 (1990) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Evidence sufficient to find that there was no error in a trial court's revocation of probation. Brewer v. State, 274 Ark. 38, 621 S.W.2d 698 (1981); Brandon v. State, 300 Ark. 32, 776 S.W.2d 345 (1989) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Evidence was sufficient to support the court's judgment that defendant's failure to pay was inexcusable. Finn v. State, 36 Ark. App. 89, 819 S.W.2d 25 (1991) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Even if the defendant was badly influenced by other inmates of the county jail and fell victim to the excitement of their escape, he inexcusably failed to comply with the conditions of suspended sentence where he committed third degree battery, rape, kidnapping, and escape from jail. Bangs v. State, 310 Ark. 235, 835 S.W.2d 294 (1992) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Evidence sufficient to prove by preponderance of the evidence that defendant violated his conditions of probation and suspension of sentence. Greene v. State, 324 Ark. 465, 921 S.W.2d 951 (1996) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Revocation upheld where the defendant's own testimony placed him in the stolen vehicle shortly before it was found within a block of his parents' home and the defendant went to Tennessee and stayed in a motel because he was aware the police were looking for him. Lamb v. State, 74 Ark. App. 245, 45 S.W.3d 869 (2001) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Evidence showed that defendant violated at least one condition of his probation on drug charges and supported the trial court's order revoking defendant's probation and sentencing defendant to prison. Sisk v. State, 81 Ark. App. 276, 101 S.W.3d 248 (2003) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Where victim testified that she was working at the hospital during the night shift when defendant, her supervisor, pushed her to the ground and raped her, the evidence of rape was sufficient to support revocation of defendant's probation; although the victim had difficulty identifying defendant at the rape trial because he changed his hairstyle, added facial hair, and gained weight since the time of the rape, during the revocation proceeding the victim positively identified defendant as the rapist and the medical director for the hospital also recognized defendant in the courtroom. Stewart v. State, 88 Ark. App. 110, 195 S.W.3d 385 (2004) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Evidence was sufficient to revoke defendant's probation after defendant entered a guilty plea, without counsel, to a misdemeanor theft charge, as the crime was one that could potentially have resulted in a period of imprisonment and, thus, defendant violated a condition of his probation by committing a crime that was punishable by imprisonment; further, the state entered sufficient evidence at the revocation hearing, independent of the guilty plea, that showed defendant had committed the theft. Haley v. State, 96 Ark. App. 256, 240 S.W.3d 615 (2006) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Defendant's suspended sentence was properly revoked based on committing an aggravated assault upon an employee of a correctional facility in violation of § 5-13-211 because there was ample evidence that he purposely spat on a deputy, resulting in his saliva coming in contact with the deputy under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to the deputy's personal hygiene. Foster v. State, 104 Ark. App. 108, 289 S.W.3d 476 (2008) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

During a hearing on the state’s petition to revoke a defendant’s suspended sentence, defendant admitted that he slapped his pregnant wife and a responding officer testified to a personal observation of the wife’s injuries; this evidence was sufficient to find that defendant inexcusably violated a condition of that suspension. May v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 703 (2009) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Pregnant wife’s testimony that appellant pushed and threatened her — causing red marks on her neck and arm—was sufficient to prove by a preponderance, as required by subsection (d) of this section, that appellant violated the conditions of his suspended sentence by committing the criminal offenses of domestic battery in the third degree, pursuant to § 5-26-305(b)(2)(A), and terroristic threatening in the second degree, under § 5-13-301(b)(1). Autrand v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 245 (2010) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Evidence was sufficient to revoke defendant's suspended sentence because the state presented evidence that the glass door of a store front was shot out in a drive-by shooting, the owner recognized defendant's car driving away from the scene, defendant was stopped a short time later with marijuana, a loaded gun, and ammunition matching the brand and caliber used in the shooting in his vehicle, and a search of defendant's phone revealed photos of him holding the gun. Ortiz v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 442 (2013).

Evidence was sufficient to revoke defendant's probation on the basis of terroristic threatening because the victim testified that he heard a noise outside his bedroom window, he received a phone call from defendant threatening to cut his throat with the same knife he used to cut his window screen, and while the screen had not been cut, it had been tampered with and was loose in its frame. Coupey v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 446 (2013).

Based on the evidence, the circuit court's decision that defendant used or possessed alcohol in violation of the conditions of his probation was not clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Jefferson v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 509, 470 S.W.3d 687 (2015).

Revocation of appellant's suspended sentence was not clearly against the preponderance of the evidence where a witness had testified that the pills appellant sold to her in the video were the ones she turned over to the police. Robertson v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 379, 499 S.W.3d 247 (2016).

Evidence was sufficient to revoke defendant's suspended imposition of sentence (SIS) because, on July 22, 2015, defendant and his ex-girlfriend argued and she told defendant that they needed a break; defendant went back to the ex-girlfriend's house later and assaulted her; the July 22 allegations against defendant were for assault on a family or household member and second-degree domestic battery; the ex-girlfriend suffered broken teeth, a broken nose, and a black eye; and defendant failed to raise objections to the State's failure to enter into evidence the actual SIS document or the failure to ask the trial court to take judicial notice of the original order placing him on SIS, precluding consideration of those issues on appeal. Baker v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 468 (2016).

—Preponderance of the Evidence.

Ruling of trial court which revoked suspension of sentence was supported by a preponderance of the evidence, which is all that the law requires. Gordon v. State, 269 Ark. 946, 601 S.W.2d 598 (Ct. App. 1980) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Alleged sexual assault victim's prior sexual conduct completely irrelevant to the issue of the revocation of defendant's suspended sentences on prior, unrelated charges. Gaines v. State, 313 Ark. 561, 855 S.W.2d 956 (1993) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Although defendant's conviction required a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, revocation of prior suspended sentences required a finding based upon only a preponderance of the evidence; thus, based on the jury's finding of guilt, the judge's decision to revoke the suspension of sentence was supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Gaines v. State, 313 Ark. 561, 855 S.W.2d 956 (1993) (decided under former § 5-4-309).

Cited: Egger v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 471, 469 S.W.3d 811 (2015); Jones v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 621 (2015).