Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-401 (2026)

Research References

ALR.

Downward departure under state sentencing guidelines permitting downward departure for defendants with significantly reduced mental capacity, including alcohol or drug dependency. 113 A.L.R.5th 597.

Construction and Application of Rule Announced in Miller v. Alabama that Sentences of Life Without Parole for Persons Under 18 at Time of Committing Homicide Offense Violate Eighth Amendment If Mandatory and Imposed Without Considering Youth-Related Factors. 16 A.L.R.7th Art. 4 (2015).

Ark. L. Rev.

Case Note, Criminal Liability for Attempting to Inflict the AIDS Virus: Possibilities in Arkansas' Future, 45 Ark. L. Rev. 505.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Legislation of the 1983 General Assembly, Criminal Law, 6 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 613.

Survey — Criminal Law, 10 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 559.

Survey — Criminal Procedure, 10 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 567.

Survey — Probate, 10 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 599.

Notes, Criminal Law — Child Abuse Resulting in Death — Arkansas Amends its First Degree Murder Statute, 10 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 785.

Annual Survey of Caselaw, Criminal Procedure, 26 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 885.

Case Notes

In General.

Sentencing in Arkansas is entirely a matter of statute. State v. Freeman, 312 Ark. 34, 846 S.W.2d 660 (1993).

Granting of the inmate's petition for postconviction relief was inappropriate because the circuit court failed to make the required finding under Strickland's prejudice prong since a defendant who received a sentence less than the maximum sentence for the offense could not show prejudice from the sentence itself. The maximum sentence that the inmate could have received for the offense of first-degree battery was 20 years and a $15,000 fine; she received 180 months in prison and a fine of $7,500. State v. Smith, 368 Ark. 620, 249 S.W.3d 119 (2007).

Construction.

When a defendant is facing his third violent felony conviction, his “third strike,” a defendant will receive a harsher sentence under § 5-4-501(d) than he would have otherwise received under this section. Nahlen v. State, 330 Ark. 1, 953 S.W.2d 877 (1997).

Because Class D felonies are the only classified felonies that do not have a specified lower limit for sentencing, “zero” was held to be the lower limit of the sentencing range for a Class D felony. Slaughter v. State, 69 Ark. App. 65, 12 S.W.3d 240 (2000).

While it is true that a term of zero years in prison or a fine of zero dollars are, strictly speaking, no imprisonment and no fine, the terms “up to” and “not exceeding,” as used in Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-401(a)(5), includes zero when no lower limit is set. Because courts strictly construe criminal statutes and resolve any doubt in favor of the defendant, it only follows that a sentencing range which allows for a term of imprisonment “up to” a set number of years or a fine “not exceeding” a set amount includes zero. Donaldson v. State, 370 Ark. 3, 257 S.W.3d 74 (2007).

Applicable Law.

The reclassification of an offense from one class of felony to another was a substantive change in the law and that those charged with the offense after the effective date of the amendment should be tried under the substantive law in effect when the crime was committed. Smith v. State, 277 Ark. 64, 639 S.W.2d 348 (1982); Young v. State, 14 Ark. App. 122, 685 S.W.2d 823 (1985).

Revocation of defendant's probation and sentence of eight years imprisonment was proper where the State met its burden of proof for a conviction of a felon in possession of a firearm, a Class B felony; because defendant's conviction on the Class B level was not illegal on its face, the trial court did not impose an illegal sentence upon him when resentencing him after his probation revocation, notwithstanding any possible confusion of the trial court's intent concerning which felony level. Timmons v. State, 81 Ark. App. 219, 100 S.W.3d 52 (2003).

Applicable Range.

Defendant was sentenced to six years' imprisonment for Class D possession of marijuana, but as there was no evidence that he was sentenced as a habitual offender, the applicable range was zero to six years. Reed v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 432 (2013), aff'd, 2014 Ark. App. 10 (2014).

While it appeared the attorneys were under the impression that defendant's exposure was within the sentencing range of the habitual-offender statute, nothing showed he was sentenced as a habitual offender, and therefore the applicable sentencing range for his Class C felonies was three to 10 years. Reed v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 432 (2013), aff'd, 2014 Ark. App. 10 (2014).

Conditions of probation signed by defendant warned him that any violation could result in a sentence of up to 10 years' imprisonment, and because he was sentenced within the range allowed by the applicable statutes, the revocation and sentence were affirmed. Leal v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 673 (2014).

Defendant's sentence for manslaughter was illegal on its face, as the judgment reflected a sentence of zero years' imprisonment for the manslaughter conviction, a Class C felony, which required a three-year minimum; however, as the State did not file a notice of appeal or of cross-appeal, the legality of the manslaughter sentence could not be considered. Blackwell v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 96, 455 S.W.3d 848 (2015).

Attempted Capital Murder.

Since statutory law regarding conviction for attempted capital murder only allowed for a 30-year sentence, defendant's sentence on that charge had to be modified so that a 30-year sentence, and not the 40-year original sentence, could be imposed. Flowers v. Norris, 347 Ark. 760, 68 S.W.3d 289 (2002).

During a trial for attempted first-degree murder, defendant was not entitled to a mistrial based on the prosecutor's questions to a witness during the sentencing phase of the trial about blood stains on the bridge; defendant failed to request a cautionary instruction. He could not show prejudice, because his twenty-eight-year sentence was within the statutory range set forth in subdivision (a)(2) of this section for a Class A felony and less than the maximum sentence within the statutory range. Jones v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 135 (2009).

Due Process.

Where defendant was sentenced under the 1983 amended version of the Arkansas habitual offender statute not in force when he committed his crime, and which on its face did not apply to him, there was a violation of the ex post facto clause of the Constitution, denying him due process. Jones v. Arkansas, 929 F.2d 375 (8th Cir. 1991).

Because defendant was unable to show that he was prejudiced by his 40 year sentence for first-degree murder, as it was less than the maximum possible sentence for his conviction, the court did not consider his claim that his due process rights were violated by the admission of a photographic history of the victim's life during sentencing. Tate v. State, 367 Ark. 576, 242 S.W.3d 254 (2006).

Evidence.

Because defendant was sentenced to the minimum sentence on the first count of commercial burglary and to probation on the remaining counts, he could not establish prejudice from the introduction of evidence during sentencing of his marijuana use. Gillean v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 698, 478 S.W.3d 255 (2015).

Factors Considered.

Since this section allows the punishment to range from minimum term to a maximum term of years, vesting great discretionary latitude in the jury, the legislature intended for the jury to consider all the aggravating and mitigating circumstances shown by the evidence, else there would be no basis for the exercise of discretion. Hunter v. State, 264 Ark. 195, 570 S.W.2d 267 (1978).

The nature of the prior felony and the facts surrounding the incident leading to defendant's arrest do reflect on the seriousness of the crime and are relevant in the determination of sentence, and if these factors were not meant to be considered in sentencing, the General Assembly could have provided for imprisonment for a definite term upon conviction of a felon for possession of a firearm rather than allowing the jury to impose any sentence not in excess of five years. Combs v. State, 270 Ark. 496, 606 S.W.2d 61 (1980).

Habitual Offenders.

The use of the word “may” in this section and § 5-4-501 does not mean that, in all habitual offender cases, the provisions of both sections are available and that the court is required to choose from those two statutes; the sentences for habitual offenders are governed by § 5-4-501, and the minimum sentences for habitual offenders are different than for persons who have not been convicted of two or more felonies. Rogers v. State, 10 Ark. App. 19, 660 S.W.2d 949 (1983).

Illegal Sentences.

Sentences imposed upon revocation of defendant's suspended imposition of sentences were illegal because there was no evidence in the record that defendant was convicted and sentenced as a habitual offender and the sentences imposed by the trial court exceeded the statutory range. Reed v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 10 (2014).

Juveniles.

Juvenile's capital-murder sentence of life without parole under § 5-10-101(c) was unconstitutional; the case was remanded for resentencing under the discretionary range for a Class Y felony, under subdivision (a)(1) of this section, after a sentencing hearing at which the juvenile could present mitigating evidence to a jury. Whiteside v. State, 2013 Ark. 176, 426 S.W.3d 917 (2013), cert. denied, Whiteside v. Arkansas, — U.S. —, 134 S. Ct. 311, 187 L. Ed. 2d 220 (2013).

When defendant sought a resentencing hearing under Miller after being sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for a murder committed in 1986 when defendant was a juvenile, it was error to deny the request and resentence defendant to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole after 30 years based on the Fair Sentencing of Minors Act of 2017 (FSMA); the FSMA did not apply for the reasons stated in Harris v. State, 2018 Ark. 179, and Robinson v. State, 2018 Ark. 353. Segerstrom v. State, 2019 Ark. 36, 566 S.W.3d 466 (2019).

In accord with Harris v. State, 2018 Ark. 179. Circuit court erred in applying the Fair Sentencing of Minors Act of 2017 (FSMA) to defendant juvenile's case because defendant committed his crime before the effective date of the FSMA, and thus, the penalty provisions did not apply; defendant was entitled to a hearing to present evidence for consideration and sentencing within the discretionary range for a Class Y felony, which was 10 to 40 years or life. Ray v. State, 2019 Ark. 46, 567 S.W.3d 63 (2019).

Modification of Sentence.

While the Supreme Court may reduce a sentence which results from passion or prejudice or is an abuse of the jury's discretion, it is not empowered to reduce a sentence which is within the statutory limits in the absence of error in the proceeding, simply because it might think the sentence to be excessive since to do so would not only be an act of clemency but would be a substitution of the judgment of a group of appellate judges who had not seen or heard the parties and witnesses for the judgment of a jury and a trial judge who had done so. Stout v. State, 263 Ark. 355, 565 S.W.2d 23 (1978).

Where the trial court's errors could have improperly influenced the jury in its setting of the sentence, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction but reduced the sentence to the minimum the jury could have given for the offense of which the defendant was convicted. Philmon v. State, 267 Ark. 1121, 593 S.W.2d 504 (1980).

Where the sentence was within the lawful maximum for the offense and was unaffected by any demonstrated error in the trial, the Supreme Court had no authority to modify the sentence. Lear v. State, 278 Ark. 70, 643 S.W.2d 550 (1982).

Where the defendant was originally sentenced to 50 years with 15 years suspended for a Class Y felony, the trial judge was right to modify the sentence to 35 years, but the defendant was not entitled to the 15 years suspended under the original sentence. Campbell v. State, 288 Ark. 213, 703 S.W.2d 855 (1986).

Defendant's conviction for simultaneous possession of drugs and a firearm constituted a Class Y felony for which no part of her sentence could be suspended pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-301(a)(1)(C); therefore, the trial court erred when it suspended 7 years of defendant's 10-year sentence. State v. Hardiman, 353 Ark. 125, 114 S.W.3d 164 (2003).

Although defendant's Class C felony conviction for theft by receiving in excess of $500.00 could not stand, defendant did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence showing that he was generally guilty of theft by receiving and, as the value of the stolen generator was at most $499.99, defendant still stood convicted of a Class A misdemeanor; accordingly, his conviction was modified to reflect the maximum sentence for a Class A misdemeanor of one year, with credit for any time defendant had already served. Russell v. State, 367 Ark. 557, 242 S.W.3d 265 (2006).

Upon the revocation of defendant's probation for eight violations of the Arkansas Hot Check Law, the trial court was authorized under §§ 5-4-301(d)(2) and 5-4-309(f)(1)(A) to modify the original order and impose multiple sentences of imprisonment to be served consecutively in accordance with Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-403(a). The trial court did not err by sentencing defendant to twenty years in prison each on four hot-check counts to run consecutively and ten years in prison each on the other felony hot-check counts to run concurrently; the sentences were within the parameters authorized for multiple felony convictions under this section. Maldonado v. State, 2009 Ark. 432 (2009).

Where defendant's conviction for aggravated residential burglary under § 5-39-204 was reversed because there was insufficient evidence that defendant attempted to inflict a serious physical injury and defendant did not dispute that residential burglary under § 5-39-201 was proven, his 40-year sentence was modified to the maximum allowed for residential burglary, a Class B felony, which was 20 years' imprisonment. Inskeep v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 135, 484 S.W.3d 709 (2016).

Multiple Penalty Statutes.

If the general assembly specifically authorizes cumulative punishment under two statutes, regardless of whether those two statutes proscribe the same conduct, the trial court may impose cumulative punishment in a single trial. Jernigan v. State, 38 Ark. App. 102, 828 S.W.2d 864 (1992).

When two punishment statutes exist, a court is not prevented from using the more stringent provision. Jernigan v. State, 38 Ark. App. 102, 828 S.W.2d 864 (1992).

Optional or Mandatory Sentences.

Inasmuch as the assessment of penalties is optional with the jury, it was reversible error for the trial court to submit a verdict form which indicated that the assessment of penalties was mandatory in case of a verdict of guilty. Bolden v. State, 262 Ark. 718, 561 S.W.2d 281 (1978).

Where statute's sentencing provisions are mandatory and imprisonment is required, such a sentence cannot be reduced or suspended by the judge. Lovell v. State, 283 Ark. 434, 681 S.W.2d 395 (1984).

Postconviction Proceedings.

Where appellant entered negotiated pleas of guilty to kidnapping under § 5-11-102 and additional charges, he was sentenced to 120 months' in prison with an additional 120-month suspended sentence; appellant was not entitled to postconviction relief under Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1, because he could not prove that counsel failed to advise him of a possible life sentence under this section. On the record, counsel indicated that he had advised appellant that he could be subject to a life sentence if he violated the terms of the suspended sentence. French v. State, 2009 Ark. 443 (2009).

Trial court properly denied defendant's motion for postconviction relief because the evidence showed that defendant's guilty pleas were made on the advice of competent counsel; had defendant not pled guilty, defendant potentially faced up to life in prison for each rape offense and up to 10 years in prison for a failure-to-appear offense, pursuant to subdivisions (a)(1) and (4) of this section. Henson v. State, 2011 Ark. 375 (2011).

Prejudice.

Defendant failed to show prejudice resulting from the admissibility of his juvenile criminal record at sentencing because defendant could have been sentenced to a total of 30 years, but was sentenced to 12 years' imprisonment, followed by 18 years' suspended imposition of sentence; therefore, defendant received a sentence short of the maximum sentence and was not prejudiced from the sentence itself. Johnson v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 606, 378 S.W.3d 152 (2010), review denied, — Ark. —, — S.W.3d —, 2010 Ark. LEXIS 486 (Oct. 21, 2010).

Defendant received 17 years in prison for second-degree sexual assault, which was within the statutory range; because defendant could not establish a sentencing phase error as a matter of law, the appellate court was not required to address whether the circuit court erred in admitting certain evidence. Holley v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 557, 444 S.W.3d 884 (2014).

Propriety of Sentence.

Evidence sufficient to find that it could not be said that the punishment resulted from passion or prejudice or that the jury abused its discretion, and such sentence was not so wholly disproportionate to the crime as to shock the moral sense of the community. Stout v. State, 263 Ark. 355, 565 S.W.2d 23 (1978).

Where sentence was within the permissible maximum, it was therefore not excessive. Hunter v. State, 264 Ark. 195, 570 S.W.2d 267 (1978).

Supreme Court upheld the sentence as within the limits fixed by this section even though the court might have thought it to be unduly severe. Jennings v. State, 268 Ark. 216, 594 S.W.2d 855 (1980).

Where defendant who, on another charge, had previously had execution of his sentence suspended and had been placed on probation was again charged and convicted of an offense, the trial court did not err in sentencing him on the revocation of probation or suspended sentence to more time than the term of his probation. Jefferson v. State, 270 Ark. 909, 606 S.W.2d 592 (1980).

Sentence did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment, since the sentence was within the limits imposed by statute; the fact that punishment is severe does not make it cruel or unusual. Conti v. State, 10 Ark. App. 352, 664 S.W.2d 502 (1984).

Sentencing of defendant to five years imprisonment for each of five counts of sexual abuse in the first degree was within the statutory range and the Supreme Court would not review defendant's contention that the sentences given for the separate counts were excessive. Cupit v. State, 324 Ark. 438, 920 S.W.2d 853 (1996).

Sentencing range of 10 years to 40 years or life was the appropriate range for aggravated robbery by a person who was not a habitual offender notwithstanding that the defendant asserted he was erroneously identified by the trial court as a habitual offender. Love v. State, 324 Ark. 526, 922 S.W.2d 701 (1996).

Subdivision (a)(1) of this section authorized a sentence of ten to forty years or life in prison for a Class Y felony, which rape was considered to be, and § 5-4-403(a) allowed a court to impose consecutive sentences for multiple convictions; thus, defendant's sentence was not unduly harsh. Simmons v. State, 95 Ark. App. 114, 234 S.W.3d 321 (2006).

Trial court's decision to permit the introduction of evidence relating to defendant's criminal history during the sentencing phase of his trial was consistent with the mandates of § 16-97-103; at sentencing, under subdivision (a)(1) of this section, defendant was subjected to the normal ranges of Class A and Y felonies as opposed to the enhanced ranges designated for habitual offenders. Defendant actually received the minimum sentences allowed on two of his four convictions and less than the maximum on the other two and, under § 5-4-403, his sentences were ordered to run concurrently rather than consecutively, as they could have; thus, defendant not only failed to establish a threshold evidentiary error supporting reversal, but he also failed to show that he suffered prejudice during sentencing. Wilson v. State, 100 Ark. App. 14, 262 S.W.3d 628 (2007).

Trial judge did not err in denying defendant's motion to recuse on the ground that the judge knew his fiancee's parents because defendant failed to show bias; defendant's 20-year sentences for two counts of possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver did not include a possession of drug paraphernalia conviction for which defendant could have received up to 20 years in prison under subdivision (3) of this section and § 5-64-403(c)(5)(A). Rudd v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 784 (2010).

In a case where probation was revoked, a 20-year sentence for Class B felony kidnapping was not improper since it was authorized under subdivision (a)(3) of this section; the appellate court was unable to reduce a sentence within the range of punishment contemplated by the Arkansas Legislature. Moreover, since appellant failed to object to the sentence imposed, he was unable to argue on appeal that the trial court erred by failing to consider alternatives to the 20-year sentence. Pfeifer v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 556 (2012).

Inmate's appeal of the denial of the inmate's petition to correct an illegal sentence, pursuant to § 16-90-111, was dismissed because (1) Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.2(b) said all postconviction relief grounds cognizable under Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1 had to be raised in a Rule 37.1 petition filed within 90 days of the date of judgment when a defendant pled guilty, even though § 16-90-111 let a trial court correct an illegal sentence at any time, as the statute was superseded to the extent the statute conflicted with the Rule's time limits, (2) the petition was filed over six years after judgment was entered, (3) the time limits in Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.2 were jurisdictional, denying a trial court jurisdiction if the time limits were not met, and, on appeal, a reviewing court, and (4) the inmate's sentence was within the prescribed statutory ranges in § 5-4-501(b)(2)(A) and subdivision (b)(1) of this section. Redus v. State, 2013 Ark. 9 (2013).

Circuit court erred by denying appellant juvenile's petition for writ of habeas corpus; because he was only fourteen years old when he committed capital-murder and aggravated-robbery, his mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without parole violated the Eighth Amendment, U.S. Const. amend. VIII. In considering the capital-murder statute as it pertained to juveniles, the Supreme Court of Arkansas severed portions of § 5-10-101(c) which provided that capital murder was punishable by death or life imprisonment without parole; instead, the offense was subject to a punishement range for a Class Y felony under subdivision (a)(1) of this section of not less than ten years and not more than forty years, or life. Jackson v. Norris, 2013 Ark. 175, 426 S.W.3d 906 (2013).

Counsel was allowed to withdraw, because the appeal was wholly without merit, when the petitioner's sentence was appropriate; the petitioner was sentenced to ten years' incarceration on each charge to be run consecutively, for a total of twenty years, and the sentence was within the sentencing range for a Class B felony. Fritts v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 404 (2013).

Because defendant was sentenced in excess of the statutory amount for the two Class C offenses, there was an argument that the sentences were illegal. Reed v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 432 (2013), aff'd, 2014 Ark. App. 10 (2014).

While on its face, the 2011 sentence was within the statutory range, in 2008 he was sentenced to two years' imprisonment and later released, and thus the maximum imprisonment sentence he could receive upon revocation in 2011 was four years, and thus there was an argument that this sentence was illegal. Reed v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 432 (2013), aff'd, 2014 Ark. App. 10 (2014).

Defendant’s probation revocation sentence of 14 years in prison was proper because (1) Acts 1999, No. 1569 was in effect when the crimes were committed, so the trial court could impose any sentence originally available, (2) a maximum sentence of 20 years was originally available, and (3) defendant had served six years. Walden v. State, 2014 Ark. 193, 433 S.W.3d 864 (2014).

Defendant’s four-year suspended imposition of sentence on probation revocation was proper because (1) Acts 1999, No. 1569 was in effect when the crimes were committed, so the trial court could impose any sentence originally available, (2) a maximum sentence of 10 years was originally available, and (3) defendant had served six years. Walden v. State, 2014 Ark. 193, 433 S.W.3d 864 (2014).

Prosecutor was entitled to defend herself and defendant could not show prejudice from the prosecutor's rebuttal, given that for aggravated robbery, he could have received up to a 40-year prison term, yet he received the minimum sentence of 10 years, and for his theft conviction, he could have received up to a six-year prison term or a fine up to $10,000 or both, and he received no prison time and was ordered only to pay a $250 fine. Delatorre v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 498, 471 S.W.3d 223 (2015).

Sentence of 119 months for failure to appear was not an abuse of discretion, it was clear from the trial court's ruling that the severity of the sentence that defendant received was due to the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offense and there was no indication that defendant was being punished for offenses for which he was not convicted or that his sentence was a result of passion or prejudice. Whittier v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 536 (2015).

Imposing 20 days' incarceration on a wife who admittedly violated a divorce decree requiring her to notify the court before spending her daughter's funds was not an abuse of discretion where the wife admittedly and repeatedly violated a known court order over several years, and the court could have imposed up to 30 days' of incarceration under subdivision (b)(3) of this section. Coleman v. Coleman, 2016 Ark. App. 324, 497 S.W.3d 688 (2016).

Defendant's sentence for 26 years for residential burglary and theft of property worth more than $1,000 but less than $5,000 was not excessive because, while at the maximum, the sentence was within the statutory range. Bass v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 407 (2019).

Ranges.

Waiver form provided that defendant was facing sentences for up to 15 years, which range clearly showed the enhanced sentencing range, as ordinarily the range was not to exceed six years for a Class D felony, plus the circuit court directly referenced the enhanced punishment ranges and asked defendant if he understood the same; the waiver ensured that defendant understood that, if found guilty, he was to be sentenced by the circuit court, and his waiver was valid. Johns v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 560, 444 S.W.3d 873 (2014).

Under Arkansas law, possession of a firearm by a felon is at most a class B felony, punishable by no more than 20 years. Unless the flight causes serious physical injury to another, fleeing by vehicle is at most a class D felony, punishable by up to six years. United States v. Thomas, 790 F.3d 784 (8th Cir. 2015).

Defendant's sentence for second-degree assault against a family member was modified to 90 days, to be served concurrently with his 15-year sentence for the burglary, because the trial court erred in sentencing him to one year of imprisonment since the sentence could not exceed 90 days. Davis v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 234, 459 S.W.3d 821 (2015).

In a case involving drugs and weapons offenses, it was error to allow a video of law enforcement officers firing a weapon found in the search of the home to be played for the jury and admitted into evidence because it was not relevant to any of the specific offenses charged since the offenses did not require that the weapon be fireable; however, the error was harmless because the evidence against defendant was overwhelming and defendant's sentences fell within the statutory sentence ranges. Gutierrez v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 516, 472 S.W.3d 147 (2015).

Right to Jury Trial.

Wife was not entitled to a jury trial after the circuit court found her in indirect criminal contempt because there was no dispute that the sentence imposed on the wife was less than six months and that the misdemeanor statute did not authorize a sentence in excess of six months, and there was nothing to indicate from the court's colloquy with the wife's counsel that the court contemplated imposing a sentence greater than six months. Damron v. Damron, 2019 Ark. App. 160, 574 S.W.3d 166 (2019).

Stacking.

State v. Lawson, 295 Ark. 37, 746 S.W.2d 544 (1988), prohibits “stacking” of specific subsequent-offense penalty enhancements like the one in the driving while impaired statute, which operates to convert a misdemeanor to a felony because of multiple recurrences of the same underlying offense within a specified period of time; the Court of Appeals of Arkansas, Division One, declines to expand Lawson past that boundary. Therefore, there was no impermissible stacking of a specific firearm enhancement statute for a felon in possession of a firearm under § 5-73-103(c)(1) with the general habitual-offender enhancement statute under subdivision (b)(2)(C) of this section; § 5-73-103(c)(1) did not contain an enhancement for recidivism, there was no greater sentence than if either statute was applied singly, and the designation of the possession offense as a Class B felony was not an enhancement. Moore v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 662 (2012).

Suspension or Probation.

The proper sentence for rape, a Class Y felony under § 5-14-102(a)(1)(2), was 10 to 40 years imprisonment, or life under § 5-4-401(a)(1); probation was not a sentence option. State v. Pinell, 353 Ark. 129, 114 S.W.3d 175 (2003).

Trial court erred in imposing a 10-year sentence for defendant's terroristic threatening conviction after his probation was revoked because the terroristic threatening conviction was a Class D felony and was punishable by a maximum sentence of six years' imprisonment. Turner v. State, 88 Ark. App. 40, 194 S.W.3d 225 (2004), overruled in part, Bush v. State, 90 Ark. App. 373, 206 S.W.3d 268 (2005).

Where appellant had been sentenced to five years' probation and fined for first-degree sexual abuse, a trial court properly sentenced him to 10 years in prison upon revocation of probation under § 5-4-309(f) because appellant could have originally received that term under §§ 5-14-108, 5-4-401(a)(4) and there had been no sentence imposed that had been improperly modified under §§ 5-4-301(d) (1997), or 16-93-402(e). Rickenbacker v. Norris, 361 Ark. 291, 206 S.W.3d 220 (2005).

Circuit court did not err in revoking defendant's suspended sentence and probation and in sentencing him to 197 months imprisonment with forty-seven months suspended because the circuit court was within its authority to revoke the original sentences and prescribe the resulting sentence and was also within its authority to run the prescribed sentences consecutively when the prescribed sentence in the first case, thirty months with an additional forty-seven months' suspended, was within the circuit court's authority; because defendant was convicted of a Class C felony, the circuit court could have originally sentenced him to ten years' imprisonment for failure to appear pursuant to subdivision (a)(4) of this section, the sentence imposed as a result of revocation in the second case did not exceed the statutory maximum for the underlying offense and was not illegal on its face, and a notation on the judgment and disposition order in the second case was an insufficient basis for defendant's allegation that the circuit court unambiguously intended to impose a presumptive sentence of thirty-six months in the event he failed to comply with the conditions of his probation. Ward v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 79, 374 S.W.3d 62 (2010).

Trial court did not err in sentencing defendant after revoking his probation because defendant pleaded guilty to second-degree domestic battery, § 5-26-304, and third-degree domestic battery, § 5-26-305, and his sentences of ten and six years, respectively, were sentences that could have been originally imposed for the offenses of which he was found guilty. Jones v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 69, 388 S.W.3d 503 (2012).

Trial court erred in resentencing defendant because the five-year sentence with five years' suspended imposition of sentence that the court imposed on revocation of defendant's probation exceeded the maximum allowable sentence available for defendant's conviction for tampering with physical evidence, a Class D felony. Wilson v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 342 (2016).

Unauthorized Sentence.

Where after the defendant entered a guilty plea to class C felony theft of property, for which the maximum sentence is 10 years, a sentence of 6 years in prison, with 2 years suspended on condition that the defendant pay the sum of $135,000 at the rate of $200 per month, beginning 60 days after defendant's release from prison, and continuing for 12 years, at which time a civil judgment would be entered for the outstanding balance, was not authorized. Brimer v. State, 295 Ark. 20, 746 S.W.2d 370 (1988).

Defendant's sentence of 20 years imprisonment, suspended to an additional term of 20 years, pursuant to his guilty plea to one count of manufacturing methamphetamine, and two counts of possession of drug paraphernalia, was modified to provide that defendant was no longer required to report to a supervising officer, as the sentence was actually one of probation rather than suspension, which was a sentence specifically prohibited by statute. Harness v. State, 352 Ark. 335, 101 S.W.3d 235 (2003).

Where the jury sentenced defendant on fifteen of the twenty counts of violation of a minor to no term of imprisonment and a fine of zero dollars, the sentence was illegal as the sentencing range was five to twenty years imprisonment, or a fine not to exceed $15,000, or both; thus, remand for resentencing on those counts was ordered. Smith v. State, 354 Ark. 226, 118 S.W.3d 542 (2003).

Trial court was not authorized to impose a ten year sentence for a first-degree terroristic threatening conviction, a class D felony punishable by a maximum sentence of six years imprisonment, and defendant thus received an illegal sentence; further, the 10-year sentence recited in the judgment and commitment order was erroneous because the trial court pronounced sentence of only one year at the conclusion of the revocation hearing, and the oral pronouncement of the trial court governed. Turner v. State, 88 Ark. App. 40, 194 S.W.3d 225 (2004), overruled in part, Bush v. State, 90 Ark. App. 373, 206 S.W.3d 268 (2005).

Trial court imposed an illegal sentence when it rejected a jury's verdict and took it upon itself to sentence defendant where the jury's sentencing verdict of zero years in prison and a fine of zero dollars was a proper and valid sentence for second-degree battery under Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-401(a)(5). Donaldson v. State, 370 Ark. 3, 257 S.W.3d 74 (2007).

Upon defendant's conviction for rape and second-degree battery, the circuit court erred in ordering him to complete a sex-offender treatment program because he was sentenced under this section and § 5-4-501—these statutes did not authorize the court to order a sex-offender treatment program. White v. State, 2012 Ark. 221, 408 S.W.3d 720 (2012).

Court entered an illegal sentence by sentencing the petitioner to seventy-two-months' imprisonment on a misdemeanor, because if property damage occurred as a direct result of fleeing on foot, the offense was a Class A misdemeanor, and a sentence for a Class A misdemeanor should not exceed one year. Arter v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 327, 414 S.W.3d 391 (2012).

Because the sentence of 20 years' imprisonment with a 10-year suspended imposition of sentence, while falling within the statutory-sentencing range for Class A arson under § 5-38-301(b)(5) and subdivision (a)(2) of this section, exceeded the range for Class B residential burglary and Class C theft of property, under §§ 5-39-201(a)(2), 5-36-103(b)(2), and subdivisions (a)(3) and (4) of this section, the residential-burglary and theft-of-property sentences were illegal, and the case was remanded for resentencing. Wakeley v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 231 (2013).

Writ of Habeas Corpus Denied.

Denial of writ of habeas corpus was affirmed because the inmate failed to state a cognizable claim when he did not dispute that the sentences were within the range set in this section, and he was well informed as to the nature of the charges and the range of punishment those charges carried pursuant to his negotiated guilty pleas. Anderson v. Norris, 370 Ark. 110, 257 S.W.3d 540 (2007).

Denial of writ of habeas corpus was proper, because life imprisonment for aggravated robbery was within the statutory range, irrespective of any enhancement as a habitual offender, and a sentence that was within the prescribed range was not illegal. Goins v. Norris, 2012 Ark. 192 (2012).

Habeas relief was not warranted because an applicant was charged under a former first-degree murder statute where a murder was committed in the course of a robbery, and he was properly sentenced to life imprisonment without parole on his plea of guilty to capital-felony murder. An argument that murder in the first degree and capital murder were separate offenses with a separate penalty was rejected. Gooch v. Hobbs, 2014 Ark. 73 (2014) (Decided under former § 41-4701).

Cited: Wilson v. State, 261 Ark. 820, 552 S.W.2d 223 (1977); Berry v. State, 263 Ark. 446, 565 S.W.2d 418 (1978); Cannon v. State, 265 Ark. 270, 578 S.W.2d 20 (1979); Noland v. State, 265 Ark. 764, 580 S.W.2d 953 (1979); McDonald v. State, 266 Ark. 56, 582 S.W.2d 272 (1979); Chaviers v. State, 267 Ark. 6, 588 S.W.2d 434 (1979); Mathis v. State, 267 Ark. 904, 591 S.W.2d 679 (Ct. App. 1979); Rogers v. Britton, 476 F. Supp. 1036 (E.D. Ark. 1979); Reeves v. Mabry, 615 F.2d 489 (8th Cir. 1980); Mills v. State, 270 Ark. 141, 603 S.W.2d 416 (1980); Shepherd v. State, 270 Ark. 457, 605 S.W.2d 414 (1980); Acklin v. State, 270 Ark. 879, 606 S.W.2d 594 (1980); Caldwell v. State, 268 Ark. 713, 595 S.W.2d 253 (Ct. App. 1980); Branham v. State, 274 Ark. 109, 623 S.W.2d 1 (1981); Scott v. State, 1 Ark. App. 207, 614 S.W.2d 239 (1981); Summerlin v. State, 7 Ark. App. 10, 643 S.W.2d 582 (1982); Wright v. Burton, 279 Ark. 1, 648 S.W.2d 794 (1983); Henderson v. State, 279 Ark. 435, 652 S.W.2d 16 (1983); Stocker v. State, 280 Ark. 450, 658 S.W.2d 879 (1983); Masingill v. State, 7 Ark. App. 90, 644 S.W.2d 614 (1983); Bell v. Lockhart, 741 F.2d 1105 (8th Cir. 1984); O'Riordan v. State, 281 Ark. 424, 665 S.W.2d 255 (1984); Golden v. State, 10 Ark. App. 362, 664 S.W.2d 496 (1984); Simmons v. State, 13 Ark. App. 208, 681 S.W.2d 422 (1985); Scott v. State, 284 Ark. 388, 681 S.W.2d 915 (1985); Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S. Ct. 366, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1985); David v. State, 286 Ark. 205, 691 S.W.2d 133 (1985); Smith v. State, 286 Ark. 247, 691 S.W.2d 154 (1985); Oliver v. State, 14 Ark. App. 240, 687 S.W.2d 850 (1985); Smith v. State, 18 Ark. App. 152, 713 S.W.2d 241 (1986); Leggins v. Lockhart, 649 F. Supp. 894 (E.D. Ark. 1986); Nelson v. Lockhart, 828 F.2d 446 (8th Cir. 1987); Meadows v. State, 291 Ark. 105, 722 S.W.2d 584 (1987); Williams v. State, 292 Ark. 616, 732 S.W.2d 135 (1987); Pettit v. State, 296 Ark. 423, 758 S.W.2d 1 (1988); Johnson v. State, 26 Ark. App. 286, 764 S.W.2d 621 (1989); Scott v. State, 27 Ark. App. 1, 764 S.W.2d 625 (1989); Jones v. State, 27 Ark. App. 24, 765 S.W.2d 15 (1989); Campbell v. State, 300 Ark. 606, 780 S.W.2d 567 (1989); Dunlap v. State, 303 Ark. 222, 795 S.W.2d 920 (1990); Sherman v. State, 30 Ark. App. 217, 785 S.W.2d 49 (1990); Sossamon v. State, 31 Ark. App. 131, 789 S.W.2d 738 (1990); Hill v. State, 303 Ark. 462, 798 S.W.2d 65 (1990); Mullins v. State, 303 Ark. 695, 799 S.W.2d 550 (1990); Powell v. State, 33 Ark. App. 1, 799 S.W.2d 566 (1990); Smith v. Lockhart, 923 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1991); Pennington v. State, 305 Ark. 507, 808 S.W.2d 780 (1991); McKillion v. State, 306 Ark. 511, 815 S.W.2d 936 (1991); Butler v. State, 309 Ark. 211, 829 S.W.2d 412; Bonds v. State, 310 Ark. 541, 837 S.W.2d 881 (1992); State v. Murphy, 315 Ark. 68, 864 S.W.2d 842 (1993); McKee v. State, 316 Ark. 174, 871 S.W.2d 351 (1994); Tigue v. State, 319 Ark. 147, 889 S.W.2d 760 (1994); Woods v. State, 323 Ark. 605, 916 S.W.2d 728 (1996); Green v. State, 323 Ark. 635, 916 S.W.2d 756 (1996); Rush v. State, 324 Ark. 147, 919 S.W.2d 933 (1996); Baxter v. State, 324 Ark. 440, 922 S.W.2d 682 (1996); Higgins v. State, 326 Ark. 1030, 936 S.W.2d 740 (1996); Ashe v. State, 57 Ark. App. 99, 942 S.W.2d 267; Allstate Ins. Co. v. Burrough, 120 F.3d 834 (8th Cir. 1997); Kirkendoll v. State, 57 Ark. App. 321, 945 S.W.2d 400 (1997); State v. Zawodniak, 329 Ark. 179, 946 S.W.2d 936 (1997); Harmon v. State, 340 Ark. 18, 8 S.W.3d 472 (2000); Jester v. State, 367 Ark. 249, 239 S.W.3d 484 (2006); Small v. State, 371 Ark. 244, 264 S.W.3d 512 (2007); Ward v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 79, 374 S.W.3d 62 (2010); Reed v. State, 2011 Ark. 115 (2011); Washington v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 122 (2014); Singleton v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 165 (2014); Whitson v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 283 (2014); Jones v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 621 (2015).