Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-604 (2026)

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Arkansas Law Survey, Irving and Schoen, Criminal Procedure, 9 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 129.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

This classification scheme of inmates to establish parole eligibility violates no constitutional due process right; there is no constitutional right or entitlement to parole. Stuart v. Lockhart, 587 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Ark. 1983).

Subdivision (b)(5) of this section not void for vagueness; the proscribed activity is committing four or more felonies, and the result is ineligibility for parole. Fain v. State, 286 Ark. 35, 688 S.W.2d 940 (1985).

Subsection (b) of this section does not violate the ex post facto clause of the United States constitution because it is not retrospective and it does not disadvantage the offender affected by it. Brown v. Lockhart, 288 Ark. 483, 707 S.W.2d 304 (1986).

This section and §§ 16-93-602 and 16-93-603, which provide for the classification of convicted felons for purposes of parole eligibility based on the number of prior convictions, do not violate the constitutions of the United States and this state. Blevins v. Norris, 291 Ark. 70, 722 S.W.2d 573, cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1040, 107 S. Ct. 1980, 95 L. Ed. 2d 819 (1987).

Juvenile offender's life sentence for attempted capital murder violated U.S. Const. amend. VIII because attempted capital murder was not a homicide offense that rendered the juvenile offender ineligible for parole. Bramlett v. Hobbs, 2015 Ark. 146, 463 S.W.3d 283 (2015).

Purpose.

The obvious intent of subdivision (b)(4) of this section is to lengthen the period of confinement before parole eligibility as the number of prior convictions increases. Tisdale v. Lockhart, 288 Ark. 203, 703 S.W.2d 849 (1986).

Purpose of this section is to lengthen period of confinement before parole eligibility as number of prior convictions increases. Michalek v. Lockhart, 292 Ark. 301, 730 S.W.2d 210 (1987).

Applicability.

No person may have the relatively more stringent parole eligibility requirements contained in this section applied to him if his latest felony — that for which he is now being classified — occurred prior to April 1, 1977; instead, the appropriate law would be that effective at the time the crime was committed. Stuart v. Lockhart, 587 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Ark. 1983).

Authority to Determine Eligibility.

Determining parole eligibility according to the sentences imposed by the trial courts is the prerogative of the Department of correction. Fain v. State, 286 Ark. 35, 688 S.W.2d 940 (1985).

Consecutive Sentences.

In determining parole eligibility status when consecutive sentences are involved, the parole eligibility statute governing the original sentence is the one that should control the cumulative sentence. Bosnick v. Lockhart, 283 Ark. 206, 677 S.W.2d 292 (1984).

Where the defendant was convicted of a rape committed while he was on probation from a federal conviction for possession of a stolen government check, the 35-year sentence for rape was not being served consecutively with his sentence on the federal felony conviction; consequently, subsections (d) and (e) of this section were not applicable, and the defendant had to serve a minimum of one-half of the 35 year sentence, with credit for good time, before he would become eligible for parole under subdivision (b)(3) of this section. Brown v. Lockhart, 288 Ark. 483, 707 S.W.2d 304 (1986).

Double Jeopardy.

A defendant who was sentenced as a habitual offender and determined to be ineligible for parole until he had served three-fourths of his sentence was not placed in double jeopardy; denial of parole is not a new punishment for purposes of double jeopardy. Clawitter v. Lockhart, 286 Ark. 131, 689 S.W.2d 558 (1985).

Habeas Corpus.

A writ of habeas corpus is not the appropriate method to challenge the determination of parole eligibility; habeas corpus petitions are restricted to the questions of whether the petitioner is in custody pursuant to a valid conviction or whether the convicting court had proper jurisdiction. Bargo v. Lockhart, 279 Ark. 180, 650 S.W.2d 227 (1983).

Liberty Interest.

A liberty interest is not created by this section and this section does not limit the board's discretion to determine which eligible inmates shall be paroled. Parker v. Corrothers, 750 F.2d 653 (8th Cir. 1984), superseded by statute as stated in, Wadlington v. Kelley, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161902 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 22, 2016), superseded by statute as stated in, Robinson v. Kelley, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125167 (E.D. Ark. July 6, 2017).

Post-Conviction Relief.

Where there was voluntary plea on defendant's part, since there was substantial, if not technical, compliance with Ark. R. Crim. P. 24.4 by the trial judge, defendant's remedy concerning parole eligibility, if any, was an action against the Department of Corrections rather than a proceeding under Ark. R. Crim. P. 37. Clark v. State, 271 Ark. 866, 611 S.W.2d 502 (1981).

Evidence showed defendant's allegation was not an allegation that could properly be considered on a petition for post-conviction relief because it attacked the execution of the sentence rather than the validity of the sentence imposed by the trial court; furthermore, any action the defendant might have as to the correctness of the computation of his sentence and the execution thereof would be against the Department of Correction. Bosnick v. State, 275 Ark. 52, 627 S.W.2d 23 (1982).

Evidence showed trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to vacate or modify sentence based on the defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in that he was not informed, prior to his plea, that he would be subject to the provisions of this section. Wells v. State, 279 Ark. 55, 648 S.W.2d 466 (1983).

A question involving parole eligibility is not an attack on the validity of the sentence imposed but rather is an attack on the execution of the sentence; such a challenge is not a proper matter to be considered in a petition for post-conviction relief. Carter v. State, 283 Ark. 23, 670 S.W.2d 439 (1984).

Defendant was not entitled to post-conviction relief on the ground that his plea was rendered involuntarily. Carter v. State, 283 Ark. 23, 670 S.W.2d 439 (1984).

Prior Convictions.

An unconstitutional prior conviction cannot be used in determining parole eligibility. Abdullah v. Lockhart, 780 F. Supp. 1221 (E.D. Ark 1991).

Sentencing.

Sentence held not improperly computed after second conviction. Michalek v. Lockhart, 292 Ark. 301, 730 S.W.2d 210 (1987).

Trial court cannot modify a valid sentence once execution has begun; thus, trial court, which had the discretion at the initial sentencing of imposing sentences concurrently or consecutively, made sentences concurrent and, having done so, had no power to change them to consecutive sentences after execution had begun. Avants v. State, 293 Ark. 24, 732 S.W.2d 149 (1987).

Third Offenders.

Where defendant committed his third felony while on parole from a 21-year sentence and received a 10-year sentence, which was to run concurrently with the 21-year sentence, the defendant was not eligible for parole under subdivision (b)(4) of this section until he had served three-fourths of the 10-year sentence, with credit for good-time, which would be later than his parole eligibility under the earlier 21-year sentence. Tisdale v. Lockhart, 288 Ark. 203, 703 S.W.2d 849 (1986).

Cited: Houff v. State, 268 Ark. 19, 593 S.W.2d 39 (1980); Hill v. Lockhart, 731 F.2d 568 (8th Cir. 1984); Schwindlig v. Smith, 596 F. Supp. 224 (E.D. Ark. 1984); Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S. Ct. 366, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1985); Walker v. Lockhart, 807 F.2d 136 (8th Cir. 1986); Wiggins v. Lockhart, 825 F.2d 1237 (8th Cir. 1987); Woods v. Lockhart, 292 Ark. 37, 727 S.W.2d 849 (1987); Garner v. Howell, 840 F.2d 616 (8th Cir. 1988); Chenowith v. State, 26 Ark. App. 256, 763 S.W.2d 103 (1989); Ford v. Lockhart, 904 F.2d 458 (8th Cir. 1990); Abdullah v. Lockhart, 302 Ark. 506, 790 S.W.2d 440 (1990).