Except as otherwise provided by this section, a debt collector who fails to comply with this subchapter with respect to a person is liable to the person in an amount equal to the sum of:
An actual damage sustained by the person as a result of the failure;
In the case of:
An action by an individual, the additional damages as the court may allow not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000); or
A class action:
The amount each named plaintiff could recover under subdivision (a)(2)(A) of this section; and
The amount the court may allow for all other class members without regard to a minimum individual recovery not to exceed the lesser of five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000) or one percent (1%) of the net worth of the debt collector; and
In the case of a successful action to enforce the foregoing liability, the costs of the action, together with a reasonable attorney's fee as determined by the court.
If the court finds that an action under this section was brought in bad faith or for the purpose of harassment, the court may award to the defendant attorney's fees reasonable in relation to the work expended and costs.
In determining the amount of liability in an action under subsection (a) of this section, the court shall consider among other relevant factors:
In an individual action under subdivision (a)(2)(A) of this section, the frequency and persistence of noncompliance by the debt collector, the nature of the noncompliance, and the extent to which the noncompliance was intentional; or
In a class action under subdivision (a)(2)(B) of this section, the frequency and persistence of noncompliance by the debt collector, the nature of the noncompliance, the resources of the debt collector, the number of persons adversely affected, and the extent to which the debt collector's noncompliance was intentional.
A debt collector may not be held liable in an action brought under this subchapter if the debt collector shows by a preponderance of the evidence that the violation was not intentional and resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid the error.
An action to enforce a liability created by this subchapter may be brought in a court of competent jurisdiction within one (1) year from the date on which the violation occurs.
A provision of this section imposing liability shall not apply to an act done or omitted in good faith in conformity with an advisory opinion of the Federal Trade Commission addressing appropriate conduct under the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 — 1692p, notwithstanding that after the act or omission has occurred, the opinion is amended, rescinded, or determined by judicial or other authority to be invalid for a reason.
History.
Acts 2009, No. 1455, § 1.
Case Notes
Attorney's Fees.
Consumer was not entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs even though it was shown that the debt collector technically violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and the Arkansas Fair Debt Collection Practices Act because the consumer was not awarded any actual or statutory damages, and the consumer's conduct as outlined in his posts and emails left no doubt that he brought, and then pursued, the action in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment.
Scroggin v. Credit Bureau of Jonesboro, Inc., 973 F. Supp. 2d 961 (E.D. Ark. 2013), aff'd, 576 Fed. Appx. 632 (8th Cir. 2014).
United States District Court for Eastern District of Arkansas agrees that to be entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs for having successfully brought an action to enforce defendant's liability under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), it is not enough that plaintiff prove a technical violation of the FDCPA by defendant if the violation will not support an award of actual or statutory damages in plaintiff's favor; rather, a prerequisite to an award of attorney's fees and costs against an FDCPA defendant is recovery of actual or statutory damages from that defendant.
Scroggin v. Credit Bureau of Jonesboro, Inc., 973 F. Supp. 2d 961 (E.D. Ark. 2013), aff'd, 576 Fed. Appx. 632 (8th Cir. 2014).
Debt collector was entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs because the debt collector affirmatively showed that the consumer brought the action in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment, the consumer was not a prevailing or successful party, and, while the debt collector was arguably not a prevailing defendant, subjecting the consumer to liability for the debt collector's attorney's fees and costs would have deterred others who believed that they could set up a debt collector into violating the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and the Arkansas Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, and attempt to collect damages and attorney's fees for technical and harmless violations.
Scroggin v. Credit Bureau of Jonesboro, Inc., 973 F. Supp. 2d 961 (E.D. Ark. 2013), aff'd, 576 Fed. Appx. 632 (8th Cir. 2014).
Prevailing Plaintiff.
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas agrees that to be a prevailing or successful plaintiff, one must receive formal relief or settlement that provides similar relief and that it is not enough that the court merely enter judgment.
Scroggin v. Credit Bureau of Jonesboro, Inc., 973 F. Supp. 2d 961 (E.D. Ark. 2013), aff'd, 576 Fed. Appx. 632 (8th Cir. 2014).
Chapter 25
Contractors
Publisher's Notes.
Prior to the 1995 replacement of this volume, this chapter was codified as § 17-22-101 et seq.
Cross References.
Contractor's bonds, § 18-44-501 et seq.
Research References
ALR.
Building and construction artisan or contractor: failure to procure business or occupational license as affecting enforceability of contract or right of recovery for work done. 44 A.L.R.4th 271.
Case Notes
Construction.
The language in licensing statutes must be strictly construed. Brimer v. Ark. Contractors Licensing Bd., 312 Ark. 401, 849 S.W.2d 948 (1993).
Purpose.
The purpose of this chapter is to require contractors who desire to engage in certain types of construction work to meet certain standards of responsibility, such as experience, ability, and financial condition, and these purposes are no less valid for a subcontractor than for a general contractor. Bird v. Pan W. Corp., 261 Ark. 56, 546 S.W.2d 417 (1977).
The purpose behind the Contractors Licensing Act is to require contractors who desire to engage in certain types of construction work to meet certain standards of responsibility such as experience, ability, and financial condition. Brimer v. Ark. Contractors Licensing Bd., 312 Ark. 401, 849 S.W.2d 948 (1993).
Applicability.
The contractor's licensing statute was not applicable to contract which involved only an hourly rate of pay and not the gross sum. Western Ark. Tel. Co. v. Cotton, 259 Ark. 216, 532 S.W.2d 424 (1976).
Subchapter 1
— General Provisions
Cross References.
Electricians and electrical contractors, § 17-28-101 et seq.
Effective Dates.
Acts 1965, No. 150, § 23: Mar. 9, 1965. Emergency clause provided: “It has been found and is declared by the General Assembly that the statutes regulating the practice of contracting are outmoded and in many particulars impossible to administer without great prejudice to contractors and the public; that there is an urgent need to amend these statutes throughout in order to establish a fair and workable system of regulation; and that enactment of this measure will provide an appropriate remedy. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall take effect and be in force from the date of its approval.”
Acts 1971, No. 397, § 5: became law without Governor's signature, Mar. 25, 1971. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that greater flexibility is required in the establishment of fees to be charged by the Contractors Licensing Board for examination, issuance and renewal of contractors' licenses to enable said board to provide for the efficient regulation of licensed contractors; that the establishment of federal occupational safety and health standards for licensed contractors makes it necessary that the Contractors Licensing Board be granted authority to advise, coordinate and inform licensed contractors in this state with respect to such standards for the purpose of assisting licensed contractors in complying therewith; and that the immediate passage of this act is necessary to accomplish the aforementioned purposes and to enable the Contractors Licensing Board to assume responsibilities for administering programs or standards promulgated with respect to occupational safety and health standards for licensed contractors if designated by appropriate federal or state laws or rules or regulations promulgated for the implementation thereof. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”
Acts 1977, No. 684, § 2: Mar. 22, 1977. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the Contractors Licensing Law is intended to protect the public with respect to construction contracts in the amount of $20,000 or more; that it is essential that all persons who manage construction projects be licensed contractors, thereby assuring that persons of competent professional training and abilities are in control of the management of such construction projects; and that the immediate passage of this act is necessary to clarify the definition of ‘contractor’ under the Contractors Licensing Law to correct this situation and thereby protect the health and safety of the people of this state. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”
Acts 1985, No. 180, § 8: Feb. 22, 1985. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the per diem received by members of the Contractors Licensing Board is inadequate to compensate members of said board for the time required to administer the duties of the board under the provisions of the Contractors Licensing Law; that the duties of the Contractors Licensing Board as now provided by law are in need of revision and clarification in order to strengthen the ability of the board to protect the interest of the public with respect to the qualifications and duties of licensed contractors in this state; and that the immediate passage of this act is necessary to accomplish such purposes. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”
Acts 1989, No. 795, § 6: Mar. 21, 1989. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the per diem received by members of the Contractors Licensing Board is inadequate to compensate members of the Board for the time required to administer the duties of the Board under the provisions of the Contractors Licensing Law; that the provisions of the Contractors Licensing Law are in need of revision and clarification in order to strengthen the ability of the Board and to protect the interest of the public with respect to the qualifications and duties of licensed contractors in the state; and that the immediate passage of this act is necessary to accomplish such purposes. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”
Acts 1995, No. 553, § 5: Mar. 8, 1995. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the Eightieth General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that it is customary for prime contractors to supply materials to certain types of subcontractors; that in determining whether a subcontractor is involved in a project for which he must be licensed, the cost of the materials is included, even if the materials have been provided by the prime contractor; that this requirement places an unfair burden on some subcontractors and that this act is necessary to provide immediate relief to the subcontractors. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”
Acts 2019, No. 805, § 22[23]: July 1, 2020.
Research References
U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.
Paul, The Law of Construction Bonds in Arkansas: A Review, 9 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 333.
McMahan v. Sentry ADR Servs., LLC (W.D. Ark. 2021). · cites it 11ד00) against Sentry pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 17-24-512 (a)(2)(A) and one thousand dollars ($1,000.”
Reygadas v. DNF Assocs. LLC (W.D. Ark. 2019). “h respect to any person is liable to such person in an amount equal to the sum of — (1) any actual damage sustained by such person as a result of such failure; (2)(A) in the case of any action by an individual, such additional damages as the court may allow, but not exceeding…”
— Ark. Code Ann. § 17-24-512(a)(2)(A) — 1 case
McMahan v. Sentry ADR Servs., LLC (W.D. Ark. 2021). “00) against Sentry pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 17-24-512 (a)(2)(A) and one thousand dollars ($1,000.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.