Arkansas Code Annotated

Ark. Code Ann. § 17-25-101 (2026)

Definition. [Effective July 1, 2020.]

✓ current as of May 2026
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    1. As used in this chapter, “contractor” means any person, firm, partnership, copartnership, association, corporation, or other organization, or any combination thereof, that for a fixed price, commission, fee, or wage attempts to or submits a bid to construct or demolish, or contracts or undertakes to construct or demolish, or assumes charge, in a supervisory capacity or otherwise, or manages the construction, erection, alteration, demolition, or repair, or has or have constructed, erected, altered, demolished, or repaired, under his or her, their, or its direction, any building, apartment, condominium, highway, sewer, utility, grading, or any other improvement or structure on public or private property for lease, rent, resale, public access, or similar purpose, except single-family residences, when the cost of the work to be done, or done, in the State of Arkansas by the contractor, including, but not limited to, labor and materials, is fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) or more.
    2. However, when a person or an entity acts as a contractor in the construction, erection, alteration, demolition, or repair of his or her own or its own property, such action shall not result in the person's or entity's being required to obtain a license, but the person or entity shall comply with all other provisions of this chapter.
  1. However, the fifty-thousand-dollar exception shall not apply to any project of construction in which any of the construction work necessary to complete the project, except any in-progress change orders, is divided into separate contracts of amounts less than fifty thousand dollars ($50,000), a purpose being to circumvent the provisions of this chapter.
  2. It is the intention of this definition to include all improvements, demolition, or structures, excepting only single-family residences.
    1. Materials purchased by a prime contractor from a third party shall not be considered as part of the subcontractor's project if the prime contractor has the proper classification listed on a current contractor's license for the work being performed by the subcontractor.
    2. Materials purchased by a person or an entity acting as a contractor in the construction, erection, alteration, or repair of his or her own or its own property from a third party shall not be considered as a part of the subcontractor's project, provided that the subcontract is for wood framing, shingle roofing, painting, floor covering, concrete labor, or installation of playground equipment.
  3. “Owner” means a person who owns property or is a lessee of property.
  4. “Person” means any natural person, limited or general partnership, corporation, association, limited liability company, trust or other legal entity, and any organization capable of conducting business, or any combination thereof.
  5. “Prime contractor” means a contractor who contracts directly with the owner of property.
  6. “Subcontractor” means a person who contracts directly with a prime contractor or another subcontractor.

History. Acts 1965, No. 150, § 1; 1967, No. 142, § 1; 1971, No. 397, § 1; 1977, No. 684, § 1; 1979, No. 1020, § 1; 1985, No. 180, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 71-701; Acts 1987, No. 495, § 1; 1989, No. 26, § 1; 1995, No. 553, § 1; 1999, No. 1358, § 1; 2007, No. 275, § 1; 2015, No. 858, § 1; 2015, No. 1048, § 1; 2019, No. 386, § 12; 2019, No. 805, § 1[2].

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2019, No. 805, § 1, provided: “Legislative findings and intent.

“(a) The General Assembly finds that:

“(1) Arkansas is taking a leading role in the nationwide pursuit of reforms to the system of occupational licensing;

“(2) Arkansas became one (1) of eleven (11) states chosen to participate in the Occupational Licensing Policy Learning Consortium, an initiative funded by a grant from the United States Department of Labor and supported in partnership with the National Conference of State Legislatures, the Council of State Governments, and the National Governors Association;

“(3) Governor Asa Hutchinson appointed seventeen (17) individuals to the Red Tape Reduction Working Group to review and address occupational licensing regulations that create unnecessary barriers to labor market entry;

“(4) The Red Tape Reduction Working Group issued a final report to the Governor in the fall of 2018 with five (5) recommendations for substantive legislative reform, which are to:

“(A) Establish an expedited procedure for occupational licensing entities to collectively submit administrative rules that are responsive to new legislation;

“(B) Extend Acts 2017, No. 781, to allow repeal of subsections of rules;

“(C) Establish provisions to allow certain agencies to consider occupational relevance with regard to criminal background issues;

“(D) Authorize occupational licensing entities to identify types of individuals or entities that may be issued temporary or provisional licenses; and

“(E) Establish a systematic process for review of:

“(i) New occupational licensure and occupational licensing entities; and

“(ii) Existing occupational licensure and occupational licensing entities;

“(5) Several occupational licenses are needlessly regulated and could be deregulated or de-licensed without causing detrimental harm to the citizens of the State of Arkansas and the economy of the this state;

“(6) Research has found that occupational licensing reduces access to jobs, inhibits geographic mobility, and raises the costs of services; “(b) It is the intent of the General Assembly to amend the laws concerning contractors and to allow registration of subcontractors and eliminate the subcontractor licensing requirement”.

Publisher's Notes. For text of section effective until July 1, 2020, see the preceding version.

Amendments. The 2007 amendment inserted “or demolish” and “demolition” throughout (a) and in (c); in (a)(1), deleted “unless the context otherwise requires” following “chapter” and inserted “demolished”; deleted “must” following “entity” in (a)(2); and made stylistic changes.

The 2015 amendment by No. 858 added “or installation of playground equipment” in (d)(2).

The 2015 amendment by No. 1048 substituted “fifty thousand dollars ($50,000)” for “twenty thousand dollars ($20,000)” in (a)(1); in (b), substituted “fifty-thousand-dollar exception” for “twenty-thousand-dollar exception” and substituted “fifty thousand dollars ($50,000)” for “twenty thousand dollars ($20,000)”.

The 2019 amendment by No. 386 substituted “chapter” for “subchapter” in (a)(2).

The 2019 amendment by No. 805 added (e) through (h).

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, No. 805, § 22[23]: July 1, 2020.

Case Notes

Construction.

Code provisions imposing penalties for noncompliance with licensing requirements, such as this section and § 17-22-103 (now 17-25-103), must be strictly construed. Wilcox v. Safley, 298 Ark. 159, 766 S.W.2d 12 (1989).

The holding in Bird v. Pan W. Corp., 261 Ark. 56, 546 S.W.2d 417 (1977) did not change the long-standing rule that language contained in licensing statutes must be strictly construed. Wilcox v. Safley, 298 Ark. 159, 766 S.W.2d 12 (1989).

Language of subsection (a) of this section is not clear and unambiguous because, under this subsection, a contractor is a person who attempts to or submits a bid to construct, contracts or undertakes to construct, or manages the construction, erection, alteration, or repair of a building, apartment, condominium, highway, sewer, utility, grading, or any other improvement; in narrowly construing this language, the Supreme Court of Arkansas has concluded that it is reasonably open to different interpretations. Meadow Lake Farms, Inc. v. Cooper, 360 Ark. 164, 200 S.W.3d 399 (2004).

Contractor.

The language of subsection (a) is not clear and unambiguous. Wilcox v. Safley, 298 Ark. 159, 766 S.W.2d 12 (1989).

Activities of sodding, sprigging, and seeding held not to fall within the definition of construction, erection, alteration, or repair. Wilcox v. Safley, 298 Ark. 159, 766 S.W.2d 12 (1989).

Trial court erred in granting summary judgment to one farmer because there existed a genuine factual issue as to whether another farmer that had provided field grading services for crop production and who claimed not to be a contractor was in fact a contractor because he had worked on property “for lease, rent, resale, public access, or similar purpose” and was, thus, operating as a contractor without a license. Meadow Lake Farms, Inc. v. Cooper, 360 Ark. 164, 200 S.W.3d 399 (2004).

Summary judgment dismissal of the contractor's suit was proper, because the contractor's construction of a natural-gas pipeline wherein space was leased fell squarely within the ambit of the statutory definition of contractor in subdivision (a)(1) of this section, and § 17-25-103(d) did not violate Ark. Const. Art. II, § 13, when the statute did not abrogate the right of all contractors to bring suit, but denied that right only to those contractors who did not possess a license; as designed to protect the public, the statute advanced the goal of providing an incentive for contractors to undergo the licensing process to ensure that the standards set by the licensing board were satisfied. Cent. Okla. Pipeline, Inc. v. Hawk Field Servs., LLC, 2012 Ark. 157, 400 S.W.3d 701 (2012).

Appellant excavating company fell under the definition of “contractor” as set forth in subdivision (a)(1) of this section, because the work described in the contracts at issue — demolition, fill work, cut work, excavation — was encompassed by at least one of the categories of the statute listed as construction, erection, alteration, demolition, or repair. Thus, § 17-25-103(d) was applicable and appellant was barred from enforcing the contracts because appellant did not have a valid Arkansas contractor's license when it entered into the contracts. J & J Excavating v. Doyne Constr. Co., 2012 Ark. App. 142, 391 S.W.3d 367 (2012).

Costs.

This section clearly indicates that the court is to look at the total cost of the work to be done and not merely the cost of materials actually ordered or passing through the contractor's hands; in short, this section refers to the cost of the project. Brimer v. Ark. Contractors Licensing Bd., 312 Ark. 401, 849 S.W.2d 948 (1993).

Evidence.

Evidence held sufficient to find that person undertaking a project was a “contractor” within the meaning of this section. Davidson v. Smith, 258 Ark. 969, 530 S.W.2d 356 (1975).

Substantial evidence supported the Contractors Licensing Board's decision that an engineering firm acted as a general contractor during a repair and remediation project without obtaining a license. The firm acted as the agent of the client in construction administration, including obtaining bids; in evaluating the bids and hiring the construction subcontractors; in supervising the subcontractors' work; in approving completed work for disbursement of payment; and in establishing the work schedule so that the facility could remain operational while the remediation was being performed. Gore Eng'g Assocs. v. Ark. Contrs. Licensing Bd., 2013 Ark. App. 353 (2013).

Exceptions.

Where an engineering firm acted as a general contractor during a repair and remediation project without obtaining a license, the exception in the statutory licensing requirement when the property owner acts as his own general contractor did not apply because the owner was not involved and entrusted all of these duties entirely to appellant. The owner testified that he knew of no contracts between the firm and any subcontractors, he did not know how the firm was negotiating prices with subcontractors, and he considered the firm to be administering the project. Gore Eng'g Assocs. v. Ark. Contrs. Licensing Bd., 2013 Ark. App. 353 (2013).

Subcontractors.

The definition of contractor is not limited only to those who contract with the owner of the property to be improved but may also apply to subcontractors. Bird v. Pan W. Corp., 261 Ark. 56, 546 S.W.2d 417 (1977).

Cited: Airport Constr. & Materials, Inc. v. Bivens, 279 Ark. 161, 649 S.W.2d 830 (1983); Ark. Contractors Licensing Bd. v. Butler Constr. Co., 295 Ark. 223, 748 S.W.2d 129 (1988); Johnson v. Southern Elec., Inc., 29 Ark. App. 160, 779 S.W.2d 190 (1989); Forever Green Ath. Fields, Inc. v. Lasiter Constr., Inc., 2011 Ark. App. 347, 384 S.W.3d 540 (2011).

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 7 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 2003–2026 · leading case: Cent. Oklahoma Pipeline, Inc. v. Hawk Field Servs., LLC, 400 S.W.3d 701 (Ark. 2012).
Cent. Oklahoma Pipeline, Inc. v. Hawk Field Servs., LLC, 400 S.W.3d 701 (Ark. 2012). · cites it 15× “Further, the circuit court found that Hallmark’s affidavit constituted proof that the pipeline constructed by appellant for the Hawk defendants clearly brought the contracts in dispute within the requirements of section 17-25-101. The court also noted that appellant had failed…”
Meadow Lake Farms, Inc. v. Cooper, 200 S.W.3d 399 (Ark. 2004). · cites it 18× “Meadow Lake Farms argues on appeal that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment to the Coopers, because Meadow Lake Farms is not a “contractor” as defined by Ark. Code Ann. § 17-25-101 (a)(1) (Repl. 2001), and the Arkansas Contractor Licensing statutes should not be…”
Forever Green Athletic Fields, Inc. v. Lasiter Constr., Inc., 384 S.W.3d 540 (Ark. Ct. App. 2011). · cites it 4× “According to PSS and Forever Green, the violation occurred when Lasiter Construction required Forever Green to supervise the installation of the surfaces for the projects without Forever Green having a contractor’s license.”
Holloway v. Arkansas State Bd. of Architects, 101 S.W.3d 805 (Ark. 2003). “, or the practice of contracting as defined in the Contractors Licensing Law, § 17-25-101 et seq., but a registered architect may perform such engineering work as is incidental to the practice of architecture, and an engineer may practice such architectural work as is incidental…”
Meyer v. Cdi Contractors, LLC, 284 S.W.3d 530 (Ark. Ct. App. 2008). · cites it 4× “Strictly construing Ark. Code Ann. § 17-25-101 et seq., the Court finds that [appellant’s] claims against CDI are statutorily barred and must be dismissed.”
HardHat Workforce Solutions, LLC v. OSS-JPOW Solar Power Servs., LLC; Jingoli Power, LLC; & Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. (E.D. Ark. 2026). · cites it 6× “Ark. Code Ann. § 17-25-101 (a)(1). OSS-JPOW argues that HardHat is a contractor because, for a fee or wage of over $50,000, it (1) contracted to construct the solar project; (2) undertook to construct the solar project; and/or (3) has constructed the solar project.”
J & J Excavating v. Doyne Constr. Co., 391 S.W.3d 367 (Ark. Ct. App. 2012). · cites it 6× “Ark.Code Ann. § 17-25-101(a). Therefore, appellant claims that a contractor’s license was unnecessary.”
Ark. Code Ann. § 17-25-101(a): 1 case
J & J Excavating v. Doyne Constr. Co., 391 S.W.3d 367 (Ark. Ct. App. 2012). “Ark.Code Ann. § 17-25-101(a). Therefore, appellant claims that a contractor’s license was unnecessary.”
Ark. Code Ann. § 17-25-101(a)(1): 1 case
J & J Excavating v. Doyne Constr. Co., 391 S.W.3d 367 (Ark. Ct. App. 2012). “Ark.Code Ann. § 17-25-101(a). Therefore, appellant claims that a contractor’s license was unnecessary.”
Ark. Code Ann. § 17-25-101(a)(l): 4 cases
Cent. Oklahoma Pipeline, Inc. v. Hawk Field Servs., LLC, 400 S.W.3d 701 (Ark. 2012). “Further, the circuit court found that Hallmark’s affidavit constituted proof that the pipeline constructed by appellant for the Hawk defendants clearly brought the contracts in dispute within the requirements of section 17-25-101. The court also noted that appellant had failed…”
Meadow Lake Farms, Inc. v. Cooper, 200 S.W.3d 399 (Ark. 2004). “Meadow Lake Farms argues on appeal that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment to the Coopers, because Meadow Lake Farms is not a “contractor” as defined by Ark. Code Ann. § 17-25-101 (a)(1) (Repl. 2001), and the Arkansas Contractor Licensing statutes should not be…”
Forever Green Athletic Fields, Inc. v. Lasiter Constr., Inc., 384 S.W.3d 540 (Ark. Ct. App. 2011). “According to PSS and Forever Green, the violation occurred when Lasiter Construction required Forever Green to supervise the installation of the surfaces for the projects without Forever Green having a contractor’s license.”
Meyer v. Cdi Contractors, LLC, 284 S.W.3d 530 (Ark. Ct. App. 2008). “Strictly construing Ark. Code Ann. § 17-25-101 et seq., the Court finds that [appellant’s] claims against CDI are statutorily barred and must be dismissed.”
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