Arkansas Code Annotated

Ark. Code Ann. § 18-50-117 (2026)

Foreign corporations and other entities

✓ current as of May 2026

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No person, firm, company, association, fiduciary, or partnership, either domestic or foreign, shall avail themselves of the procedures under this chapter unless authorized to do business in this state.

History. Acts 2003, No. 1303, § 1.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Lynn Foster, Symposium Article: Statutory Foreclosures in Arkansas: The Law and Recent Developments, 66 Ark. L. Rev. 111 (2013).

Mark James Chaney, Recent Developments: The Eighth Circuit Interprets Arkansas Law as Allowing Out-of-State Financial Institutions to Utilize the State's Non-Judicial Foreclosure Procedure Even If They Are Not Registered with the Secretary of State to Do Business in Arkansas, 66 Ark. L. Rev. 907 (2013).

Emily C. Goins, Case Note: Foreign Corporation Registration and the Ability to Perform Non-Judicial Foreclosures in Arkansas in Light of JPMorgan Chase Bank v. Johnson, 67 Ark. L. Rev. 435 (2014).

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Survey of Legislation, 2003 Arkansas General Assembly, Property Law, Statutory Foreclosure Law, 26 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 459.

Case Notes

Authorized to Do Business.

Entity may be authorized to do business in Arkansas for Arkansas Statutory Foreclosure Act (SFA) purposes pursuant to either state or federal law; in appellee bank's case, National Bank Act provided such authorization, and bank could avail itself of the benefit of the SFA. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Johnson, 719 F.3d 1010 (8th Cir. 2013).

Arkansas Supreme Court would hold registration with state entity was not exclusive means by which an entity may be authorized to do business in Arkansas. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Johnson, 719 F.3d 1010 (8th Cir. 2013).

Because Arkansas Statutory Foreclosure Act contained no express state certification requirements, court had to presume that General Assembly did not intend to include exclusive state registration it had insisted upon in other statutes. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Johnson, 719 F.3d 1010 (8th Cir. 2013).

Fannie Mae satisfied the “authorized-to-do-business” requirement of this section, where its charter clearly contemplated that it would engage in the business of dealing in mortgages in any state, and such authorization was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of this section. Dickinson v. SunTrust Nat'l Mortg. Inc., 2014 Ark. 513, 451 S.W.3d 576 (2014).

This section does not require an entity to be licensed under Arkansas law. Dickinson v. SunTrust Nat'l Mortg. Inc., 2014 Ark. 513, 451 S.W.3d 576 (2014).

Mortgagees.

National banking association was authorized to avail itself of the Arkansas Statutory Foreclosure Act even though it was not registered with the Arkansas Secretary of State where it was chartered by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and as such, it was authorized to do business within the state by virtue of this section. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Johnson, 470 B.R. 829 (E.D. Ark. 2012), aff'd, 719 F.3d 1010 (8th Cir. 2013).

Chapters 51-59 [Reserved.]

[Reserved]

Chapter 60 Miscellaneous Proceedings Relating to Property

Subchapter 1 — General Provisions

Effective Dates. Acts 1875, p.128, § 7: effective on passage.

Acts 1921, No. 224, § 3: approved Mar. 3, 1921. Emergency clause provided: “This act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, an emergency is hereby declared, and this act shall take effect and be in full force from and after its passage.”

Acts 1937, No. 7, § 2: approved Jan. 26, 1937. Emergency clause provided: “Whereas thousands of acres of land are now held by bona fide purchasers and donees from the State and are now paying revenue to the State in the form of taxes, and whereas these people are in jeopardy by reason of certain defects in the tax sales under which they purchased, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this act shall take effect from and after its passage.”

Acts 1937, No. 29, § 2: approved Feb. 4, 1937. Emergency clause provided: “Whereas, it is found that many timber owners are having their property raided by thieves and, Whereas, there is now no proper penalty for the wrongful cutting of timber an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, it shall take effect and be in full force from and after its passage.”

Acts 1957, No. 88, § 3: Feb. 26, 1957. Emergency clause provided: “It has been found and is declared by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the laws of this State do not provide adequate damages for co-owners of land against trespassers who cut, destroy, and carry away timber and other property without the consent of such co-owners, that such co-owners are being deprived of much property each year because of such trespasses, and that the enactment of this Act will provide an adequate penalty against the taking of such property and will discourage such trespasses. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall take effect and be in force from the date of its approval.”

Acts 1993, No. 366, § 5: Mar. 5, 1993. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that present law subjects landowners to liability for injuries to trespassers caused by the landowners' gross negligence which is something less than the willful and wanton misconduct which should cause a defendant in rightful possession of real estate to be liable to a trespasser who is injured. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1993, No. 581, § 5: Mar. 18, 1993. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that present law subjects landowners to liability for injuries to trespassers caused by the landowners' gross negligence which is something less than the willful or wanton misconduct which should cause a defendant in rightful possession of real estate to be liable to a trespasser who is injured and that a change in the definition of trespasser as used in that section is urgently needed; that legislation (SB 45) is currently pending which would partially correct this problem but that it is urgent that this section be amended further even if Senate Bill 45 becomes law; that this act is designed to correct all the apparent problems in Arkansas Code 18-60-108 and to supersede the provisions of Senate Bill 45 in the event it becomes law; and that this act is urgently needed to correct the inadequate provisions of 18-60-108 whether or not Senate Bill 45 becomes law, and should be given effect immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 6 cases, 2004–2014 · leading case: Dickinson v. Suntrust Nat'l Mortg. Inc., 2014 Ark. 513 (Ark. 2014).

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Dickinson v. Suntrust Nat'l Mortg. Inc., 2014 Ark. 513 (Ark. 2014). · cites it 67× “COURTNEY HUDSON GOODSON, Associate Justice This case presents the following certified question from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, Judge Brian Miller: Whether the Federal National Mortgage Association satisfies the Statutory Foreclosure…”

In Re Johnson, 460 B.R. 234 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2011). · cites it 47× “Morgan stipulated that it was not authorized to do business as is required Ark.Code Ann. § 18-50-117. Nonetheless, it maintains that it was qualified to use Arkansas’ non-judicial foreclosure process.”

JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Johnson, 470 B.R. 829 (E.D. Ark. 2012). · cites it 37× “Morgan stipulated that it was not authorized to do business as is required [by] Ark.Code Ann. § 18-50-117.”), at 241 (“J.”

JPMorgan Chase Bank v. Daniel Johnson, 719 F.3d 1010 (8th Cir. 2013). · cites it 3× “Ark.Code Ann. § 18-50-117. The provision applies if the mortgagee is a bank, savings and loan, or mortgage company.”

Cockrell v. Union Planters Bank, 194 S.W.3d 178 (Ark. 2004). “§ 18-50-101 through § 18-50-117 (Repl. 2003), were not the proper procedures for foreclosure on this property and that the sale was void from its inception.”

Dickinson v. Sun Trust Mortg., Inc., 2014 Ark. 161 (Ark. 2014). · cites it 4× “After a review of the certifying court’s analysis and explanation of the need for this court to answer the question of law presently pending in that court, we accept certification |2of the following question, as herein formulated: Whether the Federal National Mortgage…”

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