Ark. Code Ann. § 4-2-725 (2026)
Statute of limitations in contracts for sale
- An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within four (4) years after the cause of action has accrued. By the original agreement the parties may reduce the period of limitation to not less than one (1) year but may not extend it.
- A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made, except that where a warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have been discovered.
- Where an action commenced within the time limited by subsection (1) is so terminated as to leave available a remedy by another action for the same breach such other action may be commenced after the expiration of the time limited and within six (6) months after the termination of the first action unless the termination resulted from voluntary discontinuance or from dismissal for failure or neglect to prosecute.
- This section does not alter the law on tolling of the statute of limitations nor does it apply to causes of action which have accrued before midnight, December 31, 1961.
History. Acts 1961, No. 185, § 2-725; A.S.A. 1947, § 85-2-725.
Research References
ALR.
Causes of action governed by limitations period in UCC § 2-725. 49 A.L.R.5th 1.
Applicability of UCC Article 2 to Mixed Contracts for Sale of Consumer Goods and Services. 1 A.L.R.7th Art. 3 (2015).
Applicability of UCC Article 2 to Mixed Contracts for Sale of Goods and Services: Distributorship, Franchise, and Similar Business Contracts. 8 A.L.R.7th Art. 4 (2015).
Applicability of UCC Article 2 to Mixed Contracts for Sale of Business Goods and Services: Manufacturing, Construction, and Similar Contracts. 15 A.L.R.7th Art. 7 (2015).
Ark. L. Rev.
Unconscionable Contracts and the Uniform Commercial Code, 20 Ark. L. Rev. 165.
Legislative Note — Act 111 of 1973: An Act to Impose Liability for Injury and Damages Done in Certain Circumstances by Defective Products, 27 Ark. L. Rev. 562.
For Whom the Bell Tolls — An Interpretation of the UCC's Exception as to Accrual of a Cause of Action for Future Performance Warranties, 28 Ark. L. Rev. 312.
The Personal Injury Action in Warranty — Has the Arkansas Strict Liability Statute Rendered It Obsolete? 28 Ark. L. Rev. 335.
Note, The Arkansas Product Liability Act of 1979, 35 Ark. L. Rev. 364.
Case Notes
Applicability.
The Arkansas savings statutes, this section and § 16-56-126, apply to actions originally filed in a foreign state where the original action was commenced within the statute of limitations specified for similar causes of action under Arkansas law. LaBarge, Inc. v. Universal Circuits, Inc., 751 F. Supp. 807 (W.D. Ark. 1990).
The three-year statute of limitations found in § 16-116-103 of the Arkansas Product Liability Act of 1979, rather than the general four-year limitation in this section, governs a breach-of-warranty suit when damages for personal injury are sought; the Product Liability Act is both more specific and more recent than Arkansas's adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code. Follette v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 41 F.3d 1234 (8th Cir. 1994).
Appellants' warranty claims were barred by the limitations period of the Arkansas Product Liability Act, § 16-116-103, instead of the limitations period of the Uniform Commercial Code in this section, because a claim for the costs of repairing the buses with corroded flooring would be a claim for property damage within the meaning of the Act, § 16-116-102(5). IC Corp. v. Hoover Treated Wood Prods., 2011 Ark. App. 589, 385 S.W.3d 880 (2011).
Court of appeals did not need to decide whether appellants' claims for “economic loss” were covered by this section, the Uniform Commercial Code, instead of the Arkansas Product Liability Act, § 16-116-103, because appellants failed to plead or present evidence as to lost profits or lost goodwill, matters that had to be specifically pled under Ark. R. Civ. P. 9(g). IC Corp. v. Hoover Treated Wood Prods., 2011 Ark. App. 589, 385 S.W.3d 880 (2011).
Even if the court interpreted the buyer's limited promotional duty as creating a “mixed” contract for the sale of goods and services, the agreement was fundamentally one for the sale of goods, and the Uniform Commercial Code governed; therefore, the four-year statute of limitations applied to the supplier's breach of contract claim. B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Fastenal Co., 688 F.3d 917 (8th Cir. 2012).
Trial court erred in granting summary judgment to a distributor in a manufacturer's breach of contract action and in dismissing a manufacturer's complaint as time-barred because a material fact question existed on whether the parties' transactions embodied a sale-of-goods relationship versus an oral sale-of-services contract. Lucci Corp. v. Breaux Mfg. Co., 2013 Ark. App. 705 (2013).
Claim Barred.
Warranty claim, based on goods delivered more than four years prior to the filing of plaintiff's action, was barred. Jackson v. Swift-Eckrich, 830 F. Supp. 486 (W.D. Ark. 1993).
Statute of limitations began to run no later than June 2005, when the supplier alleged that the buyer failed to perform as required by the agreement; because the complaint was filed on May 3, 2010, well more than four years after the alleged breach in June 2005, the statute of limitations barred the breach-of-contract claim. B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Fastenal Co., 688 F.3d 917 (8th Cir. 2012).
Extension of Warranty.
Action for breach of warranty was barred by this section, where action was not brought until after the expiration of the statutory period, since an implied warranty could not be explicitly extended to future performance. General Motors Corp. v. Tate, 257 Ark. 347, 516 S.W.2d 602 (1974).
Cited: Wawak v. Stewart, 247 Ark. 1093, 449 S.W.2d 922 (1970); Trace X Chem., Inc. v. Gulf Oil Chem. Co., 724 F.2d 68 (8th Cir. 1983); Mobil Exploration & Producing N. Am., Inc. v. Graham Royalty Ltd., 910 F.2d 504 (8th Cir. 1990).