Ark. Code Ann. § 4-88-101 (2026)

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Nathan Price Chaney, The Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act: The Arkansas Supreme Court Should Adopt the Specific-Conduct Rule, 67 Ark. L. Rev. 299 (2014).

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Resolving the Circuit Split on Standing in False Advertising Claims and Incorporation of Prudential Standing in State Deceptive Trade Practices Law: The Quest for Optimal Levels of Accurate Information in the Marketplace, 29 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 283.

Case Notes

Applicability.

Appellate court would not decide the issue of whether this section applied to a company's actions in the state where the company's actions were also the subject of a Federal Trade Commission order; the appellate court did not consider issues of jurisdiction in an appeal that arose out of the issuance of a preliminary injunction. Mercury Mktg. Techs. of Del., Inc. v. State ex rel. Beebe, 358 Ark. 319, 189 S.W.3d 414 (2004).

Plaintiff's motion to dismiss defendant's Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (ADTPA) claim on the ground that the ADTPA was not cognizable because defendant was not a consumer was denied because one did not have to be a consumer to recover under the ADTPA pursuant to this section, and §§ 4-88-102(5) and 4-88-113(f). Valor Healthcare, Inc. v. Pinkerton, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105988 (W.D. Ark. Dec. 23, 2008).

Self-regulating national securities dealer association and its investigatory and disciplinary arm properly removed an Arkansas corporation's suit from state court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.S. § 1441(b) because although the corporation purported to seek relief solely under the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (ADTPA), its claims actually arose under federal law: (1) the corporation filed its suit after it was investigated for alleged security law violations; (2) the corporation alleged that the association and its arm violated the ADTPA by issuing fraudulent securities registrations to undercover investigators and by taking other actions to make it appear that those registrations were legitimate; (3) Ninth Circuit precedent held that 15 U.S.C.S. § 78aa vested exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts as to claims arising under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act), and (4) the corporation's claims clearly arose under the Exchange Act because the association acted pursuant to 15 U.S.C.S. § 78o in issuing the registrations to the undercover investigators. Shimoda-Atlantic, Inc. v. Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., Inc., — F. Supp. 2d —, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37900 (W.D. Ark. May 8, 2008).

Both the preamble to the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (ADTPA), §§ 4-88-101 to 4-88-503, and the activities that the ADTPA makes unlawful show that the ADTPA protects consumers from unfair ways of doing business: (1) the application of the ADTPA is limited to trade practices; (2) “unconscionable” conduct prohibited by the ADTPA must be considered in light of trade practices; and (3) there is nothing in the ADTPA that supports the conclusion that the ADTPA protects consumers against third party criminal conduct. Independence County v. Pfizer, Inc., 534 F. Supp. 2d 882 (E.D. Ark. 2008), aff'd, Ashley County v. Pfizer, Inc., 552 F.3d 659 (8th Cir. 2009).

Disappointed loan applicant had no contract or tort claim against either the lender or the loan broker, because no contract was ever formed and neither the lender or the broker owed the applicant a duty of care, and the applicant could not recover under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act, pursuant to this section, because both the broker and lender were regulated by the state and the federal government. Arloe Designs, LLC v. Arkansas Capital Corp., 2014 Ark. 21, 431 S.W.3d 277 (2014).

District court did not err in dismissing plaintiff's claim under the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (ADTPA), as plaintiff failed to establish that defendants' acts of conversion and fraud were consumer-oriented or impacted consumers in any way. The ADTPA does not apply to deception and fraud claims regarding business between a manufacturer and its distributor when consumers are not deceived or defrauded. Stonebridge Collection, Inc. v. Carmichael, 791 F.3d 811 (8th Cir. 2015).

Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act's safe-harbor provision in subdivision (3) of this section is to be applied according to the specific-conduct rule, meaning that it precludes claims only when the actions or transactions at issue have been specifically permitted or authorized under laws administered by a state or federal regulatory body or officer. Air Evac EMS, Inc. v. USAble Mut. Ins. Co., 2017 Ark. 368, 533 S.W.3d 572 (2017) (answering certified questions from federal district court).

The specific-conduct rule should be applied to the safe-harbor provision in subdivision (3) of this section, because (1) the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act is to be liberally construed, and the general-activity rule would undermine the Act's purpose by exempting virtually all conduct, since virtually all conduct is regulated in some way, such that the general-activity rule would essentially read the Act out of existence, and (2) the General Assembly's 2017 amendment of the provision to add “specifically” before “permitted” showed an intent to follow the specific-conduct rule. Air Evac EMS, Inc. v. USAble Mut. Ins. Co., 2017 Ark. 368, 533 S.W.3d 572 (2017) (answering certified questions from federal district court).

Because the matter was before the Supreme Court on an interlocutory appeal of a permanent injunction, it did not consider the merits of a competitor's claim that a corporation violated the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (ADTPA) because the ADTPA does not provide for a private cause of action seeking injunctive relief. Apprentice Info. Sys. v. DataScout, LLC, 2018 Ark. 146, 544 S.W.3d 39 (2018).

Trial court properly ruled that an air ambulance service's claims under the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act against a plan insurer were precluded by the act's safe-harbor provision in subdivision (3) of this section because the service's claims were based on the terms and rates of the insurer's plans that were approved by the Insurance Commissioner under § 23-79-109(a)(1)(A)(i). Air Evac EMS, Inc. v. USAble Mut. Ins. Co., 931 F.3d 647 (8th Cir. 2019).

Arbitration.

Farm owners' claims against a poultry processor for violation of the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, § 4-88-101 et seq., were arbitrable under a broad arbitration clause contained in an agreement between the parties; an Arkansas choice-of-law provision in the agreement did not require application of § 16-108-230(b)(1) of the Arkansas Uniform Arbitration Act, under which contractual arbitration provisions did not apply to tort claims. An arbitration panel did not violate 9 U.S.C.S. § 10(a)(3) or (4) of the Federal Arbitration Act and did not manifestly disregard the law by finding that the owners' tort claims were barred by res judicata; the tort claims could have been litigated in a prior arbitration. Hudson v. ConAgra Poultry Co., 484 F.3d 496 (8th Cir. 2007).

District court properly ruled that it could determine the threshold question of whether a customer's Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, § 4-88-101 et seq., claims were subject to arbitration pursuant to the terms of the customer's service agreement. Although the customer's challenge to the validity of the arbitration provision was a “claim” arising from the agreement and, thus, was covered by the arbitration provision, the provision also contained an exemption for certain disputes, the challenge to the validity of the arbitration provision was an exempted “dispute,” and the exemption overrode other language that stated that arbitrations would be conducted under American Arbitration Association rules, which gave arbitrators the authority to determine the arbitrability of claims. Enderlin v. XM Satellite Radio Holdings, 483 F.3d 559 (8th Cir. 2007).

District court erred when it denied the 9 U.S.C.S. § 4 motion to compel arbitration filed by a creditor's assignees: (1) the district court properly addressed in the first instance whether the creditor's assignment of a consumer's credit card agreement was valid, which was a precondition for making the assignees a party to the agreement; (2) the district court erred in concluding that the assignment was invalid because the consumer had purportedly paid the full amount owed on her credit card account before the assignment took place; (3) even if she had settled her debt as she claimed, that did not release the consumer from her obligations under the agreement, including her obligation to arbitrate disputes arising out of the agreement; (4) the consumer's continuing obligations under the agreement gave the creditor a present, assignable interest in the agreement even after the consumer settled her debt; (5) the agreement's arbitration provision broadly covered any claim, dispute, or controversy arising from or related to the agreement; and (6) the debtor could be compelled to arbitrate her Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act claims because those claims were based on the assignees' alleged efforts to collect on the consumer's already-paid debt, and disputes over the collection of debts incurred under the agreement constituted controversies arising from or related to the agreement. Koch v. Compucredit Corp., 543 F.3d 460 (8th Cir. 2008).

Consumer Protection Acts.

Where the complaint alleged that the defendants violated the Consumer Protection Acts by selling the co-op demand notes by means of misrepresentations, this section was not applicable. Robertson v. White, 633 F. Supp. 954 (W.D. Ark. 1986). But see Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 110 S. Ct. 945, 108 L. Ed. 2d 47 (1990), rehearing denied, 494 U.S. 1092, 110 S. Ct. 1840, 108 L. Ed. 2d 968 (1990)

In a class action suit against a check-cashing business and its corporate officers, the trial court did not err in piercing the corporate veil and holding the officers individually liable as they failed to properly maintain business records, thereby failing to comply with § 23-52-112(a) [repealed] of the Arkansas Check Casher's Act. Anderson v. Stewart, 366 Ark. 203, 234 S.W.3d 295 (2006)

Elements of Claim.

Because a breach of contract, in and of itself, was not tortious, the supplier had no cognizable tortious interference or Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act claims. B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Fastenal Co., 688 F.3d 917 (8th Cir. 2012).

Practice of Law.

Trial court properly dismissed the complaint with prejudice because the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, as codified in this section, did not apply to the practice of law, and the Arkansas Supreme Court made rules regulating the practice of law and that responsibility could not be discharged if it were dependent upon or controlled by statutes enacted by the Arkansas General Assembly; the attorney agreed to represent the husband in the medical malpractice action, which was dismissed with prejudice because the attorney was not authorized to practice law in Arkansas. Preston v. Stoops, 373 Ark. 591, 285 S.W.3d 606 (2008).

Dismissal of a claim under the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (ADTPA), § 4-88-101 et seq., was proper in an action by debtors against a law firm acting as a debt collector because the ADTPA did not apply to the practice of law. Born v. Hosto & Buchan, PLLC, 2010 Ark. 292, 372 S.W.3d 324 (2010).

Because a law firm and its attorneys were attorneys engaged in the practice of law at the time of their alleged collection of amounts in excess of those set forth in § 4-60-103 by a holder of a dishonored check, the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (ADTPA), §§ 4-88-101 to 4-88-804, had no applicability to their actions. The law firm was engaged in the practice of law by engaging in settlement negotiations for its clients. Bennett & Deloney, P.C. v. State ex rel. McDaniel, 2012 Ark. 119, 388 S.W.3d 12 (2012).

Preemption.

Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act claim in a putative class action against an air ambulance service could not impose a state statutory price disclosure obligation beyond the scope of any agreement the air ambulance service had with its passenger because such disclosure obviously related to both price and service and was preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 41713. Ferrell v. Air EVAC EMS, Inc., 900 F.3d 602 (8th Cir. 2018).