Ark. Code Ann. § 5-10-102 (2026)

Research References

ALR.

Propriety of lesser included offense charge of voluntary manslaughter to jury in state murder prosecution — Twenty-first century cases. 3 A.L.R.6th 543.

Sufficiency of Evidence to Support Homicide Conviction Where No Body Was Produced. 65 A.L.R.6th 359.

Ark. L. Rev.

Case Note, Criminal Liability for Attempting to Inflict the AIDS Virus: Possibilities in Arkansas' Future, 45 Ark. L. Rev. 505.

Article, Ethical and Effective Representation in Arkansas Capital Trials, 60 Ark. L. Rev. 1.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Criminal — Law, 4 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 583.

Survey — Criminal Law, 10 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 559.

Notes, Criminal Law — Child Abuse Resulting in Death — Arkansas Amends its First Degree Murder Statute, 10 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 785.

Survey — Criminal Law, 14 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 753.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

The overlapping nature of § 5-10-101 and this section do not render those statutes unconstitutional in their application. Wilson v. State, 271 Ark. 682, 611 S.W.2d 739 (1981); McClendon v. State, 295 Ark. 303, 748 S.W.2d 641 (1988); White v. State, 298 Ark. 55, 764 S.W.2d 613 (1989); Hill v. State, 303 Ark. 462, 798 S.W.2d 65 (1990); Coulter v. State, 304 Ark. 527, 804 S.W.2d 348 (1991), cert. denied, Coulter v. Arkansas, 502 U.S. 829, 112 S. Ct. 102 (1991).

Capital murder statute and the first-degree murder statute are not vague, since they clearly set out what acts are prohibited and are not constitutionally infirm, even though they overlap, because there is no impermissible uncertainty in the definition of the offenses. Earl v. State, 272 Ark. 5, 612 S.W.2d 98 (1981); McArthur v. State, 309 Ark. 196, 830 S.W.2d 842 (1992).

Where the wording of the capital felony murder statute and the first-degree murder statute overlap, such overlapping is not unconstitutionally vague and the overall scheme is not unconstitutional. Ruiz v. State, 273 Ark. 94, 617 S.W.2d 6 (1981), cert. denied, Ruiz v. Arkansas, 454 U.S. 1093, 102 S. Ct. 659 (1981).

The capital murder statute, § 5-10-101, and the first-degree murder statute are not unconstitutionally vague even though they overlap in such a way that an accused may be charged with either crime for the same conduct. Simpson v. State, 274 Ark. 188, 623 S.W.2d 200 (1981).

The overlap of § 5-10-101(a)(1) and subdivision (a)(1) of this section does not render them unconstitutionally vague, since they clearly set out what acts are prohibited and there is no impermissible uncertainty in the definition of the offenses. Coble v. State, 274 Ark. 134, 624 S.W.2d 421 (1981).

The capital felony murder statute is not unconstitutional on the ground that it overlaps with the first-degree felony murder statute. Abernathy v. State, 278 Ark. 250, 644 S.W.2d 590 (1983).

Capital murder and first-degree murder statutes are constitutional. Simpson v. State, 278 Ark. 334, 645 S.W.2d 688 (1983).

The capital felony murder statute, § 5-10-101(a)(1), and the first-degree murder statute, subdivision (a)(1), are not void for vagueness because they overlap. Owens v. State, 283 Ark. 327, 675 S.W.2d 834 (1984).

Murder during the course of a felony may either be charged as capital or first-degree murder at the discretion of the state and this overlap is not unconstitutional under the void for vagueness doctrine. Penn v. State, 284 Ark. 234, 681 S.W.2d 307 (1984).

The overlap of § 5-10-101(a)(1) with subdivision (a)(1) of this section does not deprive the accused of due process and equal protection of the laws. Cannon v. State, 286 Ark. 242, 690 S.W.2d 725 (1985).

Both the capital murder statute, § 5-10-101, and this section clearly identify the conduct prohibited and unambiguously describe the applicable penalties, thus providing adequate notice; therefore, these sections are not unconstitutionally vague. Simmons v. Lockhart, 626 F. Supp. 872 (E.D. Ark. 1985), aff'd, 814 F.2d 504 (8th Cir. 1987).

Overlapping between “premeditation and deliberation” in the capital murder statute and “purpose” in the first degree murder statute does not render the two statutes void for vagueness. Weaver v. State, 305 Ark. 180, 806 S.W.2d 615 (1991); Ward v. State, 308 Ark. 415, 827 S.W.2d 110 (1992), cert. denied, Ward v. Arkansas, 506 U.S. 841, 113 S. Ct. 124 (1992); Camargo v. State, 327 Ark. 631, 940 S.W.2d 464 (1997).

While § 5-10-101 and this section may appear to overlap on the degree of required intent, this does not render them unconstitutional due to vagueness or arbitrariness. Van Pelt v. State, 306 Ark. 624, 816 S.W.2d 607 (1991); Simpson v. Lockhart, 942 F.2d 493 (8th Cir. 1991).

Section 5-10-101 is not unconstitutionally vague nor does it deny a defendant equal protection because it overlaps with this section. Hill v. Lockhart, 824 F. Supp. 1327 (E.D. Ark. 1993), modified, 28 F.3d 832 (8th Cir. 1994).

This section and the capital murder section, § 5-10-101, are not unconstitutionally vague, and any overlap in the two sections does not create a constitutional infirmity in the sections. Vickers v. State, 313 Ark. 64, 852 S.W.2d 787 (1993).

Subdivision (a)(2) of this section is not void for vagueness, but merely broad enough to cover two situations in which a purposeful killing might occur. Vickers v. State, 313 Ark. 64, 852 S.W.2d 787 (1993).

The phrase “causes the death of another person” in subdivision (a)(2) of this section is commonly understood to have a certain meaning and is not unconstitutionally vague. Vickers v. State, 313 Ark. 64, 852 S.W.2d 787 (1993).

The overlapping of § 5-10-101(a)(4) and subdivision (a)(2) of this section does not constitute some sort of constitutional violation. Buchanan v. State, 315 Ark. 227, 866 S.W.2d 395 (1993).

This section does not unconstitutionally overlap with § 5-10-101. Echols v. State, 326 Ark. 917, 936 S.W.2d 509 (1996), cert. denied, Echols v. Arkansas, 520 U.S. 1244, 117 S. Ct. 1853, 137 L. Ed. 2d 1055 (1997).

This section is not unconstitutional for failure to adequately distinguish between those people for whom death is appropriate and those for whom it is not because § 5-4-603 narrows the death-eligible class at the sentencing phase. Camargo v. State, 327 Ark. 631, 940 S.W.2d 464 (1997).

There is no unconstitutional overlap in the definition of capital felony murder and the definition of first-degree felony murder provided in this section. Jones v. State, 328 Ark. 307, 942 S.W.2d 851 (1997).

The 1989 version of subdivision (a)(2) of this section, which referred to causing the death of “any person,” while acting with a purpose to cause the death of “another person,” was not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. Hubbard v. State, 334 Ark. 321, 973 S.W.2d 804 (1998).

At the conclusion of the guilt phase of the death-row inmate's trial, the state trial court instructed the jury on the elements of capital murder, § 5-10-101(a)(1), and first-degree murder, subdivision (a)(1) of this section, which were substantively identical because the underlying felony for both offenses was kidnapping; this overlap did not violate due process by risking arbitrary decisionmaking in a capital case. Williams v. Norris, 576 F.3d 850 (8th Cir. 2009).

Construction.

The reference in subdivision (a)(1) of this section to “a felony” was not meant to exclude the felonies specified in § 5-10-101. Cromwell v. State, 269 Ark. 104, 598 S.W.2d 733 (1980).

Circuit court erred in instructing the jury on felony manslaughter as a lesser included offense of capital felony murder, because the “extreme indifference” element was not a culpable mental state relating to a specific homicide victim but merely described the dangerous circumstances generally set in motion by defendant, and since the “extreme indifference” standard was not a mens rea related to a specific victim, it could not support a lesser included offense based on a less culpable mental state; the sole mens rea element in capital felony murder and first degree felony murder related to the underlying felony and not to the homicide itself. Perry v. State, 371 Ark. 170, 264 S.W.3d 498 (2007).

Accomplice.

There was sufficient proof defendant assisted in the commission of murder, kidnapping and attempted murder, where there was testimony he drove car in which victims were confined, assisted in confining them, and encouraged shootings of the victims. Williams v. State, 329 Ark. 8, 946 S.W.2d 678 (1997).

Trial court properly denied defendant's motion for a directed verdict even though the state medical examiner stated that he could not determine the order in which each of the shots was fired or which shooter (defendant or accomplice) fired each of the 13 gunshots; there was no distinction between principals and accomplices, each was an accomplice and criminally liable for the conduct of both. Tillman v. State, 364 Ark. 143, 217 S.W.3d 773 (2005).

Substantial evidence supported appellant's first-degree murder conviction on an accomplice theory where the multiple phone calls between appellant and his brother, who was accused of shooting the two victims, and witness testimony that appellant and the brother discussed a pistol-whipping incident supported the jury's findings of guilt. Taylor v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 331 (2017).

Substantial evidence supported defendant's convictions as an accomplice to first-degree murder and aggravated robbery. Defendant was in the proximity of the crime; a video put defendant inside the victim's home shortly before the video tended to establish the victim had been killed; and he had the opportunity to aid in the commission of the crime in that he returned quicky to the residence after the other party entered, using his shirt to open the door, and subsequently ran from the house carrying the victim's bag. Jackson v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 330, 552 S.W.3d 55 (2018).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's conviction for the first-degree murder of her four-year-old daughter because the jury—which viewed autopsy photographs and heard testimony describing the numerous bruises and other injuries covering the victim's body—could have concluded that defendant knew or had reasonable cause to know of the abuse of the victim by defendant's boyfriend and failed to make a proper effort to prevent it, thus making defendant guilty as an accomplice. Dycus v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 385, 585 S.W.3d 167 (2019).

Aggravating Circumstances.

There is no distinction based upon the finding of aggravating circumstances between capital murder under § 5-10-101 and murder in the first degree under this section since neither section makes aggravating circumstances an element of the offense; thus, there is no need to make a finding of some aggravating circumstances in order to sustain a conviction for capital murder. Wilson v. State, 271 Ark. 682, 611 S.W.2d 739 (1981).

Appellate Review.

Substantial evidence supported defendant's first-degree murder conviction; substantial evidence, separate from his sister's testimony, connected defendant to the murder, and whether the sister was less credible because she was once charged as an accomplice was for the jury to decide. However, the case was reversed and remanded for a new trial because the record was not sufficient for the Supreme Court of Arkansas to conduct its review under Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 4-3(i). Thrower v. State, 2018 Ark. 256, 554 S.W.3d 825 (2018).

Assistance of Counsel.

Where the defendant, who had been interrogated for several hours, requested a lawyer, and the police asked her who she wanted to call, but when she did not answer, continued the interrogation, all statements made by the defendant after she requested counsel should have been excluded, and her conviction for the murder of her son was reversed. Hughes v. State, 289 Ark. 522, 712 S.W.2d 308 (1986).

Denial of appellant's, an inmate's, petition for postconviction relief was proper because, while he was not able to directly appeal any challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, there was substantial evidence to support his felony-murder conviction. He failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by trial counsel's error in failing to make a directed-verdict motion on the lesser-included charge of first-degree felony murder under subdivision (a)(1) of this section. Lockhart v. State, 2011 Ark. 396 (2011).

Attempted Murder.

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for attempted first-degree murder under § 5-3-201(a)(2) and subdivision (a)(1) of this section as the evidence demonstrated that defendant, in the process of fleeing a store that he had just robbed at gunpoint, shot at a police officer two times. A jury could reasonably conclude that the act of shooting at someone was a substantial step toward causing that person's death. Lambert v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 258 (2011).

Burden of Proof.

Where murder in the first degree was charged to have been committed in either of two ways, proof of one would not sustain the charge of the other. Rayburn v. State, 69 Ark. 177, 63 S.W. 356 (1901) (decision under prior law).

In homicide cases, the state had to prove the corpus delicti, which meant that it had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that deceased was in fact killed and that deceased came to his death by the act of someone other than himself. Hays v. State, 230 Ark. 731, 324 S.W.2d 520 (1959) (decision under prior law).

Nothing in either § 5-10-101 or this section relieves the state of proving each element necessary to constitute a higher degree of culpability than the first-degree murder statute in trying a case under the capital murder statute, and nothing relieved the state of the absolute burden of proving each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Wilson v. State, 271 Ark. 682, 611 S.W.2d 739 (1981).

It is not a denial of due process for the state to place on the defendant the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence of an affirmative defense which negates an element of the crime. Hobgood v. Housewright, 698 F.2d 962 (8th Cir. 1983).

Causation.

State produced sufficient evidence that defendant caused the victim's death; although the expert testimony left open possible concurrent causes for the victim's death, the skull injury clearly contributed to his death, defendant was the only person to hit the victim with the aluminum bat, and the victim's blood was found on the bat. Rollf v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 520, 472 S.W.3d 490 (2015).

Defenses.

One who, while in the actual perpetration of a felony by violence, killed another attempting to prevent the felony could not plead self-defense. Spear v. State, 184 Ark. 1047, 44 S.W.2d 663 (1931) (decision under prior law).

Jury was entitled to determine issue of self-defense in murder trial. Long v. State, 223 Ark. 387, 266 S.W.2d 66 (1954) (decision under prior law).

Where a man was assaulted with a murderous intent, he was under no obligation to retreat but could stand his ground and if need be, kill his adversary; however a requested instruction to the effect that a person viciously assaulted by another is not required to retreat was properly refused where the words “murderous intent” were not used therein. Seward v. State, 228 Ark. 712, 310 S.W.2d 239 (1958) (decision under prior law).

Instruction as to self-defense which appeared in last sentence in instruction “if, however, the assault is so fierce as to make it, apparently, as dangerous for him to retreat as to stand, it is not his duty to retreat, but he may stand his ground, and, if necessary to save his own life, or to prevent a great bodily injury, slay his assailant” was sufficient. Seward v. State, 228 Ark. 712, 310 S.W.2d 239 (1958) (decision under prior law).

Evidence held sufficient to negate claim of self-defense. Seward v. State, 228 Ark. 712, 310 S.W.2d 239 (1958) (decision under prior law); Girtman v. State, 285 Ark. 13, 684 S.W.2d 806 (1985).

Voluntary intoxication could not have the effect of reducing the degree of homicide unless it was accompanied by a temporary destruction of the reason. Young v. State, 230 Ark. 737, 324 S.W.2d 524 (1959) (decision under prior law).

While defendant in murder prosecution did plead self-defense or justification, such plea did not permit the state to offer evidence of specific instances of prior misconduct to show she may have been the aggressor because her character was not an essential element of her claim of self-defense. Rowdean v. State, 280 Ark. 146, 655 S.W.2d 413 (1983).

Voluntary intoxication is a defense to specific intent crimes if the defendant's drunkenness negated the required intent; thus, since murder requires culpability, the defense would be available for a murder charge. David v. State, 286 Ark. 205, 691 S.W.2d 133 (1985).

Where defendant was not at his own home and was by all accounts standing outside when he commenced the shooting, and defendant failed to proffer an instruction with a complete statement of the law regarding the use of deadly force only if retreat was not possible, the trial court did not err in declining to give an instruction on self-defense. Ghoston v. State, 84 Ark. App. 387, 141 S.W.3d 907 (2004).

In a first-degree murder trial, there was substantial evidence supporting the jury's verdict that the State disproved defendant's justification defense; there was no other weapon found in the car with the victim, who was shot in the head from behind, defendant immediately fled the scene, defendant admitted it was his immediate reaction to shoot in response to the victim's grabbing him, and justification was a question of fact for the jury to resolve. Jimmerson v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 578, 590 S.W.3d 764 (2019).

Degree of Offense.

The homicide statutes do not confer arbitrary power upon prosecutors and juries to select between capital murder and murder in the first degree. Cromwell v. State, 269 Ark. 104, 598 S.W.2d 733 (1980).

Double Jeopardy.

A former acquittal for seduction would not have precluded a trial for the killing of an unborn quick child, though the woman involved in each case was the same and the same general testimony might be adduced at the trial. Young v. State, 176 Ark. 170, 2 S.W.2d 14 (1928) (decision under prior law).

The acquittal of a defendant on a charge of willful murder in the course of an armed robbery where the facts reflected that the jury could not have found defendant present at the crime scene without having been obligated to find him guilty of murder, even if it believed he did not actually fire the fatal shot, prevented a subsequent trial of the defendant on a charge of armed robbery arising from the same set of facts under the constitutional guarantees against double jeopardy. Turner v. Arkansas, 407 U.S. 366, 92 S. Ct. 2096, 32 L. Ed. 2d 798 (1972) (decision under prior law).

Since defendant was convicted of rape and attempted first degree murder, and rape and attempted first degree murder are separate and distinct offenses and each requires proof of a fact which the other does not, the convictions for rape and attempted first degree murder did not violate the double jeopardy clause. Wiman v. Lockhart, 797 F.2d 666 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1021, 107 S. Ct. 678, 93 L. Ed. 2d 728 (1986).

The double jeopardy clause and subsection (a) and subdivision (b)(1) of § 5-1-110 did not preclude the defendant's convictions of both attempted first degree murder and aggravated robbery, where the defendant held the first victim at gunpoint and examined her jewelry with the purpose of committing a theft, and then he shot the second victim. Kinsey v. State, 290 Ark. 4, 716 S.W.2d 188 (1986).

Evidence.

Evidence held sufficient to support conviction. King v. State, 68 Ark. 572, 60 S.W. 951 (1901); Jones v. State, 102 Ark. 195, 143 S.W. 907 (1912); Delaney v. State, 212 Ark. 622, 207 S.W.2d 37 (1948); Black v. State, 215 Ark. 618, 222 S.W.2d 816 (1949), cert. denied, Black v. Arkansas, 338 U.S. 956, 70 S. Ct. 490 (1950); Long v. State, 223 Ark. 387, 266 S.W.2d 66 (1954); Hays v. State, 230 Ark. 731, 324 S.W.2d 520 (1959); Young v. State, 230 Ark. 737, 324 S.W.2d 524 (1959); Moore v. State, 231 Ark. 672, 331 S.W.2d 841 (1960); Shipman v. State, 252 Ark. 285, 478 S.W.2d 421 (1972); Smith v. State, 256 Ark. 321, 507 S.W.2d 110 (1974); Robertson v. State, 256 Ark. 366, 507 S.W.2d 513 (1974); Witham v. State, 258 Ark. 541, 527 S.W.2d 905 (1975) (preceding decisions under prior law); White v. State, 266 Ark. 499, 585 S.W.2d 952 (1979); Titus v. State, 268 Ark. 9, 593 S.W.2d 164 (1980); Bly v. State, 267 Ark. 613, 593 S.W.2d 450 (1980); Williamson v. State, 277 Ark. 52, 639 S.W.2d 55 (1982); Long v. State, 280 Ark. 327, 657 S.W.2d 551 (1983); Girtman v. State, 285 Ark. 13, 684 S.W.2d 806 (1985); Mayer v. State, 285 Ark. 73, 685 S.W.2d 143 (1985); Mason v. State, 285 Ark. 479, 688 S.W.2d 299 (1985); Sims v. State, 286 Ark. 476, 695 S.W.2d 376 (1985); Williams v. State, 289 Ark. 69, 709 S.W.2d 80 (1986); Thomerson v. Lockhart, 835 F.2d 1257 (8th Cir. 1987); Harris v. State, 291 Ark. 504, 726 S.W.2d 267 (1987); Williams v. State, 294 Ark. 345, 742 S.W.2d 932 (1988); Bennett v. State, 297 Ark. 115, 759 S.W.2d 799 (1988); Thomas v. Swanson, 881 F.2d 523 (8th Cir. 1989); Hall v. State, 299 Ark. 209, 772 S.W.2d 317 (1989); Hill v. State, 299 Ark. 327, 773 S.W.2d 424 (1989); Williams v. State, 300 Ark. 84, 776 S.W.2d 359 (1989); Tillman v. State, 300 Ark. 132, 777 S.W.2d 217 (1989); Mulanax v. State, 301 Ark. 321, 783 S.W.2d 851 (1990); Starling v. State, 301 Ark. 603, 786 S.W.2d 114 (1990); Cherry v. State, 302 Ark. 462, 791 S.W.2d 354 (1990); Richmond v. State, 302 Ark. 498, 791 S.W.2d 691 (1990); McKinney v. State, 303 Ark. 257, 797 S.W.2d 415 (1990); Pomerleau v. State, 303 Ark. 275, 795 S.W.2d 929 (1990); Black v. State, 306 Ark. 394, 814 S.W.2d 905 (1991); Smith v. State, 308 Ark. 390, 824 S.W.2d 838 (1992); Coleman v. State, 315 Ark. 610, 869 S.W.2d 713 (1994); Akbar v. State, 315 Ark. 627, 869 S.W.2d 706 (1994); Banks v. State, 315 Ark. 666, 869 S.W.2d 700 (1994); Galvin v. State, 323 Ark. 125, 912 S.W.2d 932 (1996); Walker v. State, 324 Ark. 106, 918 S.W.2d 172 (1996); Booker v. State, 335 Ark. 316, 984 S.W.2d 16 (1998); Thompson v. State, 338 Ark. 564, 999 S.W.2d 192 (1999); Terrell v. State, 342 Ark. 208, 27 S.W.3d 423 (2000); Britt v. State, 344 Ark. 13, 38 S.W.3d 363 (2001); Leaks v. State, 345 Ark. 182, 45 S.W.3d 363 (2001), appeal denied, — Ark. —, — S.W.3d —, 2002 Ark. LEXIS 534 (2002); Britt v. State, 344 Ark. 13, 38 S.W.3d 363 (2001).

Circumstantial evidence would sustain a conviction for murder in the first degree. Culbreath v. State, 96 Ark. 177, 131 S.W. 676 (1910) (decision under prior law) Bennett v. State, 297 Ark. 115, 759 S.W.2d 799 (1988); Scott v. State, 303 Ark. 197, 795 S.W.2d 353 (1990).

Evidence held insufficient to support conviction. McClendon v. State, 197 Ark. 1135, 126 S.W.2d 928 (1939); Nichols v. State, 280 Ark. 173, 655 S.W.2d 450 (1983); Hallman v. State, 288 Ark. 454, 706 S.W.2d 387 (1986); Midgett v. State, 292 Ark. 278, 729 S.W.2d 410 (1987), rehearing denied, 292 Ark. 278, 731 S.W.2d 774 (1987), superseded by statute as stated in, Davis v. State, 325 Ark. 96, 925 S.W.2d 768 (1996).

Circumstantial evidence held sufficient to support a finding that defendant committed the murder. Murry v. State, 276 Ark. 372, 635 S.W.2d 237 (1982); Dixon v. State, 311 Ark. 613, 846 S.W.2d 170 (1993); Carter v. State, 324 Ark. 395, 921 S.W.2d 924 (1996).

Photographs of deceased held admissible. Fuller v. State, 278 Ark. 450, 646 S.W.2d 700 (1983); Smith v. State, 282 Ark. 535, 669 S.W.2d 201 (1984); Parker v. State, 290 Ark. 158, 717 S.W.2d 800 (1986).

Testimony held admissible to show motive and intent. Wood v. State, 280 Ark. 248, 657 S.W.2d 528 (1983); Shankle v. State, 309 Ark. 40, 827 S.W.2d 642 (1992).

Trial judge properly permitted introduction of statements made by defendant before he had been given the Miranda warnings where the officers did not even know if a killing had occurred, but trial judge properly excluded statement made after defendant said he wanted to talk to a lawyer. Futch v. State, 288 Ark. 323, 705 S.W.2d 11 (1986).

Testimony held admissible to disprove defendant's alibi. Taylor v. State, 288 Ark. 456, 706 S.W.2d 384 (1986).

The defendant's reference on the witness stand to his refusal to talk without obtaining legal advice was not analogous to the prosecution mentioning an accused's refusal to testify on his own behalf. Dix v. State, 290 Ark. 28, 715 S.W.2d 879 (1986).

In prosecution for first degree murder, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting the statement of the murder victim that she had been shot even though it was not disputed that she had been shot; the defendant could not prevent the introduction of relevant evidence simply by stipulating to a fact. Henderson v. State, 291 Ark. 138, 722 S.W.2d 842 (1987), cert. denied, Henderson v. Clinton, 493 U.S. 896, 110 S. Ct. 247 (1989).

Inflammatory photographs may be admitted if they tend to shed light on any issue or if they are useful in assisting the jury in understanding testimony. Williams v. State, 300 Ark. 84, 776 S.W.2d 359 (1989).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction for knowingly causing the death of a person fourteen (14) years of age or younger under circumstances manifesting cruel and malicious indifference to the value of human life. Porter v. State, 308 Ark. 137, 823 S.W.2d 846 (1992).

Circumstantial evidence held sufficient to support conviction. Smith v. State, 314 Ark. 448, 863 S.W.2d 563 (1993).

Circumstantial evidence sufficient to show that defendant acted with the purposeful intent to kill. Missildine v. State, 314 Ark. 500, 863 S.W.2d 813 (1993).

The nature of the weapon used, and the manner of its use, were such that the evidence of defendant's purpose was sufficient. Harris v. State, 314 Ark. 379, 862 S.W.2d 271, 863 S.W.2d 282 (1993).

Conviction of first-degree murder for the murder and rape of a seven-month-old child upheld. Kinney v. State, 315 Ark. 481, 868 S.W.2d 463 (1994).

The testimony of one witness that defendant spoke earlier of killing the woman he was living with, the testimony of gun dealer that defendant purchased five shotgun shells the afternoon of the murder, and the fact that defendant had the loaded shotgun at his side when he entered the house was sufficient to support his conviction for the first-degree murder of his girlfriend. McArty v. State, 316 Ark. 35, 871 S.W.2d 346 (1994).

Evidence held sufficient to sustain a conviction for first degree murder based on accomplice liability. Riggins v. State, 317 Ark. 636, 882 S.W.2d 664 (1994).

Evidence of shooting held sufficient to support first degree murder conviction. Robinson v. State, 318 Ark. 33, 883 S.W.2d 469 (1994).

The evidence that defendant stabbed victim purposefully causing his death was overwhelming. Bradley v. State, 320 Ark. 100, 896 S.W.2d 425 (1995).

Evidence held sufficient to support conviction where there was substantial evidence the defendant purposely aided and facilitated his accomplices in the commission of first-degree murder. Misskelley v. State, 323 Ark. 449, 915 S.W.2d 702.

The court erred in admitting into evidence a previous violent incident involving the defendant where there was no logical connection between the previous acts and the crime presently charged, although this error was harmless given the other admissible evidence of defendant's intent to commit murder. Abernathy v. State, 325 Ark. 61, 925 S.W.2d 380 (1996).

Evidence held sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction as an accomplice to first-degree murder where both the defendant and a codefendant testified that an accomplice carried a .38-caliber handgun on the night of the murder, and expert testimony indicated that the bullets recovered from the victim were fired from such a weapon. Matthews v. State, 56 Ark. App. 141, 940 S.W.2d 498 (1997).

Evidence held sufficient to show that defendant struck and shook the child knowing that the result could be serious injury or death. Ladwig v. State, 328 Ark. 241, 943 S.W.2d 571 (1997).

Evidence held sufficient to show that defendant's actions were done with the purpose of causing serious physical injury to another person which resulted in the death of the victim. Moore v. State, 58 Ark. App. 120, 947 S.W.2d 395 (1997).

Evidence that wife beat her husband to death in their apartment held sufficient. Goff v. State, 329 Ark. 513, 953 S.W.2d 38 (Ark. 1997).

Evidence of the numerous blunt-force injuries to the victim's skull, as well as the autopsy evidence that she was strangled, demonstrated that defendant acted with the purpose to cause the victim's death. Mulkey v. State, 330 Ark. 113, 952 S.W.2d 149 (1997).

Evidence was sufficient to show that the defendant acted knowingly in causing the death of his girlfriend's seven-month-old son where (1) the medical testimony of the physicians who treated the child presented uncontroverted evidence of child maltreatment, particularly from descriptions of blunt force trauma causing a skull fracture and brain swelling and hemorrhage leading to the child's death; (2) the radiological studies indicated that the life-threatening injuries occurred during the time in which the defendant was the only caregiver of the child; and (3) the intensive care physician testified that he was “100 percent certain” that the brain injury occurred within an hour of the child's arrival at the hospital. Byrd v. State, 337 Ark. 413, 992 S.W.2d 759 (1999), overruled in part, McCoy v. State, 347 Ark. 913, 69 S.W.3d 430 (2002).

The defendant was properly convicted of first degree murder, rather than manslaughter, notwithstanding his contention that he shot the victim under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was reasonable excuse, where (1) after having sex with the victim in his car and leaving the area, the defendant discovered that his wallet was missing, (2) the defendant went back to the area and found his wallet on the ground, with cash missing, (3) the defendant went home, got his gun and then found the victim and accused her of taking his money, (4) she stated that she did not have his money and taunted him, saying that she did not believe he would shoot her, and (5) the defendant then shot her three times. Franks v. State, 342 Ark. 167, 27 S.W.3d 377 (2000).

Where evidence showed that there was a history of domestic abuse and threats, that defendant had a knife, a pair of handcuffs, duct tape, a leatherman-type tool, and gloves when he was arrested, and that defendant told the unavailable officer that defendant intended to tie the victim up and kill her, the state had no direct evidence of defendant's intent to commit murder without the improperly admitted testimony of the unavailable officer. Proctor v. State, 349 Ark. 648, 79 S.W.3d 370 (2002).

Where the evidence presented showed that: (1) defendant had a stormy relationship with the victim; (2) they argued the night before a fatal shooting; (3) defendant had pointed a gun at the victim in the past; (4) defendant had retrieved a gun on the morning of the shooting; (5) and defendant admitted to shooting the victim, there was sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction for first-degree murder; the evidence was sufficient to show defendant acted purposely, rather than accidentally. Edmond v. State, 351 Ark. 495, 95 S.W.3d 789 (2003).

Based on the testimony of several eyewitnesses that defendant had shot a victim near a vehicle after an argument, there was sufficient evidence presented to infer that defendant acted with a conscious desire to kill the victim. Winbush v. State, 82 Ark. App. 365, 107 S.W.3d 882 (2003).

Sufficient evidence existed to affirm the jury's conclusion that the defendant killed his step-sister, who was residing with the defendant and his wife, based on the defendant's changing his story from the victim's leaving the defendant's home to go to unknown whereabouts to the victim being accidentally killed in a struggle over a rifle with the defendant in his home when she threatened him with the gun, the blood stains found in the home which contradicted the defendant's version of what happened, and the victim's arms being too short to have pulled the trigger and hit herself in the head with a bullet. Robinson v. State, 353 Ark. 372, 108 S.W.3d 622 (2003).

In a murder trial, the officer was not offered as an expert and his testimony on rebuttal, regarding the amount of blood loss in similar cases, was rationally based on the officer's years of experience as a homicide investigator and, therefore, the testimony was admissible as a lay opinion. Robinson v. State, 353 Ark. 372, 108 S.W.3d 622 (2003).

Because the decedent's character was not an essential element of a self-defense for first-degree murder, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that proffered testimony regarding the decedent's specific instances of violent conduct was not admissible under Ark. R. Evid. 405(b). Anderson v. State, 354 Ark. 102, 118 S.W.3d 574 (2003).

Where defendant, on cross-examination, had questioned the witness about the witness's felony record in order to imply that the witness had recently fabricated his denial that defendant shot the decedent in self-defense, the state was certainly entitled, under Ark. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(ii), to rebut the allegation with evidence that the witness had made the same statement about the shooting being in “cold blood” immediately after the offense and before the motive for fabrication came into existence. Anderson v. State, 354 Ark. 102, 118 S.W.3d 574 (2003).

Defendant's conviction and sentence for capital murder were affirmed and the trial court properly denied defendant's motion pursuant to suppress statements made while in police custody, as the statements in question were voluntary and were not coerced. Pilcher v. State, 355 Ark. 369, 136 S.W.3d 766 (2003).

There was sufficient evidence to support the verdict finding the first defendant guilty of first-degree murder where (1) the first defendant gave two recorded statements in which she admitted to being at the crime scene, (2) in one of her statements, the first defendant told the police that she intended to kill the victim but was unable to muster the strength and that she handed the murder weapon to the second defendant after he stated that he would kill the victim, thus, confessing to either murdering or aiding in the murder of the victim, and (3) the victim died as a result of a homicide. Woolbright v. State, 357 Ark. 63, 160 S.W.3d 315 (2004).

Evidence was sufficient for conviction of first-degree murder where the victim was last seen in the company of defendant, defendant made statements to his fellow inmates that he had killed the victim with his hands in a fight after an argument, defendant told his brother that he would like to kill the victim, the victim's body was placed on wood burning stove, defendant kicked the pipe off of the stove, and the victim's body was found charred. Johnson v. State, 358 Ark. 460, 193 S.W.3d 260 (2004).

It was not error to admit autopsy photographs of the victim and the condition in which he was found because the medical examiner could not pinpoint a cause of death, and he testified that the photographs would be helpful to the jury in showing why the cause of death was difficult to determine and to more fully explain the damage from the fire to the victim; the trial court properly weighed the potential prejudice against the probative value of the photographs. Johnson v. State, 358 Ark. 460, 193 S.W.3d 260 (2004).

Even if defendant's sufficiency of the evidence argument been preserved, the appellate court would have found that the evidence supporting the verdict of guilty of attempted first-degree murder and filing a false report was substantial where defendant reported her child as missing but later told police where they could find him. Gilbert v. State, 88 Ark. App. 296, 198 S.W.3d 561 (2004).

Trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to supress certain statements she made during questioning regarding her missing child; although defendant claimed that she had done the best she could to convey to the officer that she was concerned about continuing to talk to him without a lawyer present, when the officer asked defendant whether she was asking for a lawyer, she did not answer that question but continued answering other questions and did not mention a lawyer again during the interview. Gilbert v. State, 88 Ark. App. 296, 198 S.W.3d 561 (2004).

Where defendant fired four to five shots at the victim from his car, he was properly convicted of first-degree murder; the trial court's error in admitting an interspousal communication from defendant's wife in which defendant said he was going to “kill the other guy” was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt. Walker v. State, 91 Ark. App. 300, 210 S.W.3d 157 (2005).

In defendant's murder trial, victim's prior statement to police officer, that defendant assaulted her, was admissible under the catch-all exception of Ark. R. Evid. 804(b)(5) with respect to her unavailability and state of mind; as to whether the statement was admissible as a prior bad act, defendant's confession alone overwhelmingly established the elements of murder in the first degree and, thus, any error as to admitting the hearsay statement was harmless. Wooten v. State, 93 Ark. App. 178, 217 S.W.3d 124 (2005).

Defendant's convictions for first-degree murder, a terroristic act, and possession of firearms by certain persons were proper where the jury believed the witnesses's testimony that defendant fired the only shots and fired toward the group where the victim was standing and toward the nightclub. Jackson v. State, 363 Ark. 311, 214 S.W.3d 232 (2005).

There was sufficient evidence to establish that defendant acted with the purpose of causing the death of the victim; there was eyewitness testimony and the fact that defendant confessed the murder, plus third-party testimony placed defendant at the crime scene. Price v. State, 365 Ark. 25, 223 S.W.3d 817 (2006).

Trial court did not err in admitting juvenile defendant's confession to police officer as the transcript of the interview revealed that no assurance had been given regarding defendant being tried under the juvenile code; to the contrary, the transcript showed that the confession was given of defendant's own free will. Holland v. State, 365 Ark. 55, 225 S.W.3d 353 (2006).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of first degree murder and theft where, in addition to the testimony of defendant's wife, who was an accomplice, defendant's own statements to the police, his conduct before and after the crime, and statements of the victim's friends regarding her fear of defendant tended to connect him to the crimes; further, although there was no evidence that defendant ever drove victim's Cadillac or had the vehicle in his possession, the jury might have determined that defendant facilitated the theft by leaving the accomplice without a vehicle at the victim's house, and there was evidence that the theft of the Cadillac was part of the plan to murder the victim. MacKool v. State, 365 Ark. 416, 231 S.W.3d 676 (2006).

There was substantial evidence to support defendant's convictions where one victim had an order of protection against defendant, he owned a gun that was consistent with the murder weapon, and he was seen the night of crime carrying a bag where he kept the gun; further, after the victim filed for divorce, defendant became increasingly obsessed with her, and a witness saw a fight between defendant and the victim and testified that defendant stated that he would rather see the victim dead than with another man. Brunson v. State, 368 Ark. 313, 245 S.W.3d 132 (2006).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's first degree murder conviction because defendant had a key to the victim's apartment, he admitted that he was at the apartment on the evening of the murder, defendant purchased drugs that night and told the seller that he had “busted a some-bitch's head,” and defendant lied to the police during the investigation. Dunn v. State, 371 Ark. 140, 264 S.W.3d 504 (2007).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain a first degree murder conviction because defendant admitted to hitting, kicking, and stabbing the victim, a knife blade was found at the crime scene, and a matching handle was later found at defendant's house, and defendant's statement to the investigating officer indicated that his conscious object was to cause the death of the victim. Navarro v. State, 371 Ark. 179, 264 S.W.3d 530 (2007).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's convictions for first-degree murder under subsection (a) of this section, and aggravated robbery under § 5-12-103(a), including the testimony of several witnesses who saw defendant with the victim's car, as well as the testimony of two witnesses who saw defendant drive the car under the bridge where the victim's body was found and return without the victim in the car. Defendant told one witness that he intended to kill the victim and steal his car, and after the murder he boasted about shooting the victim and showed two witnesses the bullet he found in the victim's car; the bullet he was carrying was consistent with the suspected murder weapon, and the victim's blood was found on his clothing. Boldin v. State, 373 Ark. 295, 283 S.W.3d 565 (2008).

Where defendant confessed and the state's witnesses testified that she shot two victims while they were sitting in her rental car, defendant fled the scene with blood on her hands; parts from a gun were found where she was hiding. The evidence was sufficient to support her conviction for two counts of first-degree murder in violation of subdivision (a)(2) of this section; defendant received consecutive sentences totaling sixty years in prison. Boyce-Reid v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 576 (2009).

Where the state's witness testified that she and defendant drove to the victim's RV in order to rob the victim, defendant entered the residence, grabbed the victim's wallet, handed it to the witness, and then she heard a pop sound; a second witness testified that he had seen defendant with a handgun that day, and defendant told him that he had shot the victim in the head. After the victim was found dead, defendant was convicted of first degree felony murder in violation of subdivision (a)(1) of this section with theft as the underlying felony under § 5-36-103; because defendant did not file a motion for a directed verdict challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for first degree felony murder, the issue was not preserved for review. Lockhart v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 587 (2009).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of first-degree murder for the killing of a romantic rival and to establish the requisite intent of purposefulness because it showed that defendant, while possessing a knife, drove to the victim's residence, confronted her, and stabbed her with the knife in the ensuing altercation. Mooney v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 622, 331 S.W.3d 588 (2009), review denied, — Ark. —, — S.W.3d —, 2009 Ark. LEXIS 820 (Dec. 10, 2009).

Appellant's conviction for first-degree murder in the death of his three-year-old niece was affirmed where (1) a rape kit indicated pubic hair on the victim's genitalia, and that pubic hair was found by Y-chromosome profiling to match appellant and any of his paternally related male relatives and there was no testimony that appellant's father or his brothers had been around the victim; and (2) the medical examiner testified that the victim could not have sustained such blunt-force trauma injuries and continued to play like a normal child, that she would have become lethargic and passed out. Smith v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 135, 374 S.W.3d 124 (2010), rehearing denied, — Ark. App. —, — S.W.3d —, 2010 Ark. App. LEXIS 286 (Mar. 31, 2010).

While there was no testimony that anyone saw defendant at the scene or with a gun, evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated robbery, under § 5-12-103, and first-degree murder, under subdivision (a)(1) of this section, as it showed defendant had access to a gun, the car defendant was driving that night was at the scene, and the victim's condition suggested a robbery. Bates v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 417 (2010).

Trial court did not err by denying defendant's motions for a directed verdict because substantial evidence supported his conviction, as there was evidence that: (1) defendant had prior knowledge of his wife's affair with the victim and investigated the victim's background; (2) defendant waited in his truck after arriving at the store until the victim and his wife were standing by their vehicles; and (3) defendant fired multiple shots, chased the victim, and stood over him to deliver a final shot to the head. James v. State, 2010 Ark. 486, 372 S.W.3d 800 (2010), overruled in part, Kou Her v. State, 2015 Ark. 91, 457 S.W.3d 659 (2015).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of first-degree murder under subdivision (a)(2) of this section, as a criminologist confirmed that gunshot residue was found on defendant's clothing, and the intent necessary for first-degree murder could be inferred from the type of weapon used and the nature and extent of the victim's wounds. Gill v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 524, 376 S.W.3d 529 (2010).

Trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion for a directed verdict during a trial for first-degree murder as an accomplice, in violation of subdivision (a)(2) of this section and § 5-2-403(a)(1), because a codefendant testified that defendant hired the codefendant to murder his wife; the state presented the testimony of five witnesses concerning the fear of defendant's wife that he would kill her. Camp v. State, 2011 Ark. 155, 381 S.W.3d 11 (2011).

Denial of appellant's, an inmate's, petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1 was appropriate because the evidence demonstrated that he was not prejudiced by his trial counsel's failure to properly renew his motion for directed verdict at the close of all the evidence. While the inmate was unable to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence in his direct appeal, there was substantial evidence to support the verdicts, including the inmate himself admitting to hitting his wife's car from behind and then getting out of his truck and shooting her; the surviving victim testified that after falling in an attempt to run away from the scene, she looked up and saw the inmate over her smiling and holding a shotgun. Davis v. State, 2011 Ark. 493 (2011).

Defendant's convictions for first-degree murder and aggravated robbery, in violation of subsection (a) of this section and §§ 5-3-201 and 5-12-103(a), were supported by sufficient evidence, as the evidence showed that defendant was armed with a deadly weapon for the purpose of committing the theft of a cab driver, that defendant threatened the driver, and that the driver was shot in the struggle over the gun. Garr v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 509 (2011).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of first-degree murder under subdivision (a)(2) of this section because the three gunshot wounds to the victim alone, at least two of which were fired 35-40 seconds apart, ran counter to defendant's accidental shooting theory; and the evidence supported an inference of purposeful intent under § 5-2-202(1). Smith v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 359 (2012), dismissed, Smith v. Kelley, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119827 (E.D. Ark. Sept. 9, 2015).

Appellant's first-degree murder conviction was affirmed because there was evidence that appellant had previously discussed robbing the victim by bashing in his head, there was evidence that appellant owed the victim money and had been cut off from his supply of drugs, and there was evidence that it would be very difficult for the gun to go off accidentally. McClard v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 573 (2012).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's attempted first-degree murder conviction because defendant knocked on a door and fired a gun at the victim when he opened the door. The jury could reasonably have inferred that defendant purposely engaged in conduct that constituted a substantial step in a course of conduct known to cause death to another person, regardless of that person's identity. Wells v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 596, 424 S.W.3d 378 (2012).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain a first-degree murder conviction because defendant admitted that he stabbed the victim, blood was seen on his shirt, he kept a knife in his room, he was seen going into the room, and a knife box and lid were found on the floor, implying that defendant went into the bedroom and got his knife. Stevenson v. State, 2013 Ark. 100, 426 S.W.3d 416 (2013).

During an inmate's trial for murder in the first degree, in violation of subdivision (a)(2) of this section, the court did not err in denying his motion for a directed verdict because there was ample evidence to support the conclusion that he purposely caused the victim's death under § 5-2-202(1); he admitted to the crime and that it was his intent to kill the victim and that he had to think about how to do it. Kaufman v. State, 2013 Ark. 126 (2013).

Ample evidence existed to support defendant's conviction for the first-degree murder of her husband because she told her daughter that she shot and killed him, the daughter saw her with the pistol, and it was determined that the two empty shell casings from in the kitchen were fired from the only pistol recovered from the scene. Livingston v. State, 2013 Ark. 264, 428 S.W.3d 474 (2013).

Guilty verdict on a first-degree murder charge under subdivision (a)(2) of this section was based on substantial evidence because defendant was alone in his apartment with the victim, his girlfriend, the same night the two had argued and she was shot; defendant admitted at trial that he was holding a loaded .45, with his finger on the trigger, when the gun fired. Shatwell v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 568, 430 S.W.3d 142 (2013).

There was substantial evidence to support defendant's conviction for first-degree murder, including defendant's statements to police, testimony that the victim feared defendant, and testimony from defendant's father that he saw defendant shoot the victim, and the jury was free not to believe defendant's justification defense, Airsman v. State, 2014 Ark. 500, 451 S.W.3d 565 (2014).

One eyewitness unequivocally identified defendant in a photo lineup and at trial as the person who shot the victim and the eyewitness, and his testimony was not so inherently improbable, and thus substantial evidence supported defendant's first-degree murder and attempted first-degree murder convictions. Thomas v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 492, 441 S.W.3d 918 (2014).

Evidence presented was substantial enough that the jury did not have to resort to conjecture to convict defendant of first-degree murder, given in part that witnesses testified that defendant and the victim had been fighting, and although defendant claimed self-defense, the victim was shot in the head, which supported the idea that the victim was shot intentionally, not during a struggle for defendant's life. Toombs v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 71, appeal dismissed, 2015 Ark. 471 (2015).

Defendant was properly convicted of first-degree murder because defendant acted with the purpose to cause the victim's death in that defendant, instead of leaving when defendant's paramour became angry and intoxicated, retrieved a handgun, hid it under a sofa cushion beside defendant, and shot defendant's paramour, after the paramour threw a cup of wine at defendant, when the paramour was in a vulnerable position reclined in the paramour's chair. Scott-Paxson v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 149, 457 S.W.3d 311 (2015).

It was defendant's brother who fired the shot that killed the victim, and although defendant claimed the State failed to prove it was his conscious object to assist his brother, the law in Arkansas made no distinction between the criminal liability of a principal and an accomplice; defendant drove around with the stated purpose to assist in hunting down and killing the victim, and thus the evidence supported his convictions of first-degree murder and committing a terroristic act, and the circuit court properly denied his motions for directed verdict. Starling v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 429, 468 S.W.3d 294 (2015).

Evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for first-degree murder because the victim felt threatened by defendant, defendant fired shots towards the victim while he was sitting in a car, and the victim retaliated by firing shots towards defendant. Fowler v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 579, 474 S.W.3d 120 (2015).

Circuit court did not err in denying defendant's motions for directed verdict because, through the testimony and evidence presented at trial, the jury was apprised of the involvement of the witnesses in the shooting of the victim, and the jury was presented with evidence that defendant chased the victim, blocked the victim's vehicle with defendant's vehicle, and ran up to the victim's car, shooting once into the hood of the car and a second time through the windshield of the car, killing the victim. Starling v. State, 2016 Ark. 20, 480 S.W.3d 158 (2016).

Substantial evidence supported a first-degree felony murder conviction and three terroristic-act convictions under § 5-13-310 where the State was only required to prove that defendant in fact shot at the conveyance the victims were occupying regardless of whether he intended to do so, and three eyewitnesses testified that the surviving victim was in the vehicle when defendant shot at it. Shelton v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 195, 517 S.W.3d 461 (2017).

Substantial evidence supported defendant's conviction for first-degree murder under the felony murder rule because defendant shot and killed a responding auxiliary sheriff's deputy while defendant was hiding two hours after fleeing from a residential burglary with items taken in the burglary. Furthermore, the jury reasonably found that defendant was not justified in defendant's use of deadly force. Kauffeld v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 440, 528 S.W.3d 302 (2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of first-degree murder because, after stabbing the victim, defendant immediately started trying to cover up evidence when she hid the knife and returned asking another individual what happened; defendant lied to the police during her first interview about her involvement; lying about a crime could indicate a consciousness of guilt, and a jury could properly consider an attempt to cover up one's connection to a crime as proof of a purposeful mental state; and, contrary to defendant's statement to police that she barely swung the knife, the medical examiner testified that the blade had gone halfway through the victim's body. Stearns v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 472, 529 S.W.3d 654 (2017).

Although the circuit court erred in allowing the State to introduce defendant's text message, the error was harmless because the evidence of defendant's guilt was overwhelming, and any prejudice caused by the introduction of the text message was slight; there was substantial evidence that defendant killed the victim by intentionally running over her with his truck multiple times. Cutsinger v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 647, 536 S.W.3d 134 (2017).

Circuit court did not err in denying defendant's motion for directed verdict as the evidence was sufficient to convict him of first-degree murder; defendant's mother testified at trial that her son told her that he had picked up the victim and helped her into the living room, and the DNA supervisor of the DNA section of the State Crime Laboratory testified that DNA found on the victim's left and right hands was consistent with the DNA profile obtained from defendant. Arnold v. State, 2018 Ark. 343, 561 S.W.3d 727 (2018).

Substantial evidence supported the murder convictions where according to defendant's own confession, he was alone with the two victims and shot them, and the fact that he asked the men to return to his house and had a gun hidden within reach was evidence that he planned the murders. Mosby v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 139, 544 S.W.3d 78 (2018).

Sufficient, direct evidence supported defendant's first-degree murder conviction because (1) a witness who stated she knew defendant and the victim said she saw defendant shoot the victim, (2) other witnesses confirmed the witness was near where the shooting occurred, (3) another witness said defendant shot the victim, (4) a medical examiner said the victim died from a gunshot wound, (5) police found a nine-millimeter shell casing near the victim's body, and witnesses said defendant's father showed the witnesses what looked like a nine-millimeter gun and said the gun was the murder weapon, and (6) any inconsistency in testimony went to weight rather than admissibility. Green v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 145, 544 S.W.3d 574 (2018).

Substantial evidence supported defendant's first-degree felony murder conviction where the jury heard eyewitness testimony that he facilitated, encouraged, and participated in the victim's murder during the course of the aggravated robbery that evening at a gambling house. Price v. State, 2019 Ark. 323, 588 S.W.3d 1 (2019).

Even though another person initially confessed to the murder, substantial evidence supported a first-degree murder conviction against defendant where the other person testified, inter alia, that she heard a shot and that defendant had dragged the victim's body, positioned the victim's truck over the body, and lit the truck on fire, and another witness testified that defendant had asked for help acquiring a gun earlier that day and that he saw defendant at the crime scene the afternoon of the murder. Terrell v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 433, 587 S.W.3d 594 (2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's first-degree murder conviction because the jury could have found that he acted with the purpose of causing the victim's death, despite defendant's contentions concerning PTSD; two bullet fragments recovered from the victim's brain were fired from defendant's gun, and defendant admitted that he shot his gun due to a disagreement with the victim, then defendant fled the scene. Jimmerson v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 578, 590 S.W.3d 764 (2019).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's conviction by a jury for the first-degree murder of her 19-month-old child under subdivision (a)(3) of this section; the child was determined to have died from blunt-force injuries and suffocation and the mother's only explanation for the child's internal injuries was discounted by the forensic pathologist who performed the autopsy. Jenkins v. State, 2020 Ark. App. 45 (2020).

Furtherance or Perpetration of Felony.

Murder committed in the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate certain felonies, including robbery, was deemed murder in the first degree. Washington v. State, 181 Ark. 1011, 28 S.W.2d 1055 (1930) (decision under prior law).

There is no requirement that the underlying felony be a violent one. Hall v. State, 299 Ark. 209, 772 S.W.2d 317 (1989).

Where an assault was only in the furtherance of a murder, not of some other felony, the defendant would not be guilty of felony-murder even if he were so charged because, for the phrase “in the course of and in furtherance of the felony” to have any meaning, the crime must have an independent objective which the murder facilitates. Allen v. State, 310 Ark. 384, 838 S.W.2d 346 (1992).

The trial court committed prejudicial error by denying the defendant's motion to dismiss a first-degree felony-murder charge where the proof at trial showed that he assaulted, beat, and kicked he victim in furtherance of the homicide, rather than in furtherance of committing an independent felony. Craig v. State, 70 Ark. App. 71, 14 S.W.3d 893 (2000).

Where defendant and his accomplices fired gunshots seven or eight minutes after robbing two men, they fled in the murder victim's car to avoid being arrested. The jury was free to find that the murder occurred in the course of the aggravated robbery; therefore, the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for first-degree felony murder under this section. Rhodes v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 665 (2009).

Circuit court did not err in denying defendant's directed-verdict motion in regard to the terroristic acts where the witnesses testified that he had pointed a gun and shot at the vehicle several times, and the officers testified as to the damage done to the vehicle. The evidence was sufficient to support the jury's inference that defendant shot the vehicle with the intent to cause property damage. Noble v. State, 2017 Ark. 142, 516 S.W.3d 727 (2017).

Looking at the plain language of this section, a person commits murder in the first degree if, in the course of and in furtherance of the felony terroristic act, the person causes the death of any person. Noble v. State, 2017 Ark. 142, 516 S.W.3d 727 (2017).

Circuit court properly denied defendant's motions for directed verdict on the charge of first-degree murder because there was substantial evidence that defendant “in the course of and in furtherance of” committing the terroristic acts of shooting at an occupied vehicle with the intent to cause property damage, caused the death of one of the occupants of the vehicle, defendant had an independent objective to commit terroristic acts, and his intent related to the acts of terrorism, not to the murder. Noble v. State, 2017 Ark. 142, 516 S.W.3d 727 (2017).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of first-degree felony murder, as there was substantial evidence that defendant, in the course of and in furtherance of committing the terroristic act of shooting at an occupied vehicle with the intent to cause property damage, caused the victim's death. Holmes v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 508, 588 S.W.3d 835 (2019).

Indictment or Information.

Indictment held sufficient. Turnage v. State, 182 Ark. 74, 30 S.W.2d 865 (1930) (decision under prior law).

Indictment in first degree murder prosecution, charging killing in perpetration of robbery, need not have alleged an intentional and willful killing. White v. State, 192 Ark. 1102, 96 S.W.2d 771 (1936) (decision under prior law).

Information charging that murder was committed while attempting to commit robbery and that the crime was premeditated and it was committed with malice aforethought was not inconsistent, premeditation being not an essential element that had to be alleged and proved when the indictment charged that the crime was perpetrated while the accused was attempting robbery. Noble v. State, 195 Ark. 453, 112 S.W.2d 631 (1938) (decision under prior law).

Amendment to the information that the offense of murder was committed by defendant while in the attempt to perpetrate the crime of rape was permissible since it changed neither the nature nor the degree of the crime charged. Lee v. State, 229 Ark. 354, 315 S.W.2d 916 (1958), cert. denied, Lee v. Arkansas, 359 U.S. 930, 79 S. Ct. 616 (1959) (decision under prior law).

Amended information did not substantially affect the degree of the alleged crime since the original information specifically designated first-degree murder as a capital felony and the amended information charging capital felony murder were virtually identical but for the statutory designation of the offense; the nature of the crime charged was not affected by the amendment. Pickens v. Lockhart, 714 F.2d 1455 (8th Cir. 1983).

One may be charged with conspiracy to commit capital murder and with capital murder also. One could also be charged as an accomplice in the same case. Shrader v. State, 13 Ark. App. 17, 678 S.W.2d 777 (1984).

Trial court did not err in refusing to reduce charge to second-degree murder on double jeopardy grounds. Lamb v. State, 23 Ark. App. 115, 743 S.W.2d 399 (1988).

In a murder case, the trial court did not err in allowing the state to amend the information on the morning of trial to include a felony-firearm enhancement. Because the charge defendant was tried for was contained in the original information, the reviewing court failed to see how defendant was unfairly surprised or otherwise prejudiced by the amended information. Plessy v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 74, 388 S.W.3d 509 (2012).

Instructions.

Refusal to instruct the jury as to the degree of homicide lower than murder in the first degree held not error. Alexander v. State, 103 Ark. 505, 147 S.W. 477 (1912); Dewein v. State, 114 Ark. 472, 170 S.W. 582 (1914) (preceding decisions under prior law).

Instruction in prosecution for first degree murder requiring finding that defendant willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with malice aforethought, and after premeditation and deliberation, or while in the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate robbery, killed the deceased, was proper though indictment did not allege that the killing was in perpetration of a robbery but alleged the malicious, deliberate and premeditated killing. House v. State, 192 Ark. 476, 92 S.W.2d 868 (1936) (decision under prior law).

In a prosecution for murder in the first degree where appellant allegedly poisoned her husband, it was not error for the court to instruct the jury on second degree murder and on this charge appellant was properly convicted. Smith v. State, 222 Ark. 650, 262 S.W.2d 272 (1953) (decision under prior law).

Refusal to instruct the jury on lesser degrees of homicide held error. Montague v. State, 240 Ark. 162, 398 S.W.2d 524 (1966); Bosnick v. State, 248 Ark. 846, 454 S.W.2d 311 (1970); Moore v. State, 280 Ark. 222, 656 S.W.2d 698 (1983) (preceding decisions under prior law).

Court did not err in instructing jury on first degree murder where evidence would have supported conviction on that charge. Ricketts v. State, 254 Ark. 409, 494 S.W.2d 462 (1973) (decision under prior law).

Where two persons are murdered, there can be no evidence to support an instruction on first degree murder because this section involves the premeditated and deliberate death of one person; accordingly, it was proper for the trial judge in a double murder prosecution to give instructions on capital murder, murder in the second degree and manslaughter, but to refuse to give a requested instruction on murder in the first degree. Couch v. State, 274 Ark. 29, 621 S.W.2d 694 (1981).

Failure to instruct the jury on the elements of aggravated robbery and robbery in conjunction with its instructions on first-degree murder where the court had already instructed the jury on the elements of those crimes when it gave the charge of capital murder held not error. Simpson v. State, 274 Ark. 188, 623 S.W.2d 200 (1981).

The trial court improperly inserted the words “a felony” in its instructions on first-degree murder instead of inserting the specific underlying felonies of either aggravated robbery or simple robbery. Simpson v. State, 274 Ark. 188, 623 S.W.2d 200 (1981).

Instruction on second-degree murder which provided alternate theories by which the defendant could be convicted held proper. McLemore v. State, 274 Ark. 527, 626 S.W.2d 364 (1982).

Defendant held not prejudiced by the trial court's refusal to give his proffered instruction on self-defense. Johnson v. State, 6 Ark. App. 342, 642 S.W.2d 324 (1982).

In a prosecution for first degree murder, the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser offense of negligent homicide where the trial court did instruct the jury on the lesser offenses of second degree murder and manslaughter. Sherron v. State, 285 Ark. 8, 684 S.W.2d 247 (1985).

Where the defense failed to remind the trial court to give the instruction, and the jury had already heard evidence that the defendant had admitted the killing, the defendant was not prejudiced by the trial court's failure to give a cautionary instruction which would have told the jury that the statement was to be considered only for impeachment purposes and not as substantive evidence of the defendant's guilt. Futch v. State, 288 Ark. 323, 705 S.W.2d 11 (1986).

When capital felony murder is charged under subdivision (a)(1) of § 5-10-101, first degree felony murder is “a lesser included offense” because the same evidence used to prove the former of necessity proves the latter; therefore, an instruction on first degree murder is required. Rhodes v. State, 290 Ark. 60, 716 S.W.2d 758 (1986).

Where the defendant was charged with homicide in the course of a burglary, the failure to instruct on first degree murder was not reversible error because the objection of counsel was that the court should have given the instruction because of evidence, which counsel could not recite, that the defendant entered the victim's residence for a purpose other than to commit a burglary. Rhodes v. State, 290 Ark. 60, 716 S.W.2d 758 (1986).

The trial judge did not err in refusing to give the defendant's requested instruction on accident where the defendant's argument that the shooting was accidental was addressed to each charge of first degree murder, second degree murder, and manslaughter, and its appropriately defined mental state, and all requisite mental states were before the jury in proper instructions. Sims v. State, 19 Ark. App. 45, 716 S.W.2d 774 (1986).

Where jury convicted defendant on the greater offense of first degree murder even though instructions regarding the lesser included offense of second degree murder had been given any error resulting from the failure to give instructions regarding lesser included offenses of manslaughter and negligent homicide was cured. Taylor v. State, 303 Ark. 586, 799 S.W.2d 519 (1990).

In cases where the statutes overlap and both instructions are required, the jury may refuse consideration of both the death penalty and life without parole by returning a guilty verdict as to the charge of murder in the first degree; where the trial court refused to give instructions on option of first degree murder, it took this option away from the jury and the defendant was prejudiced by the omission of the proper instruction. Sanders v. State, 305 Ark. 112, 805 S.W.2d 953 (1991).

Instruction that jury could find the defendant guilty of first-degree murder if they found he acted with the purpose of causing the death of one of the victims is consistent with the language of this section. Misskelley v. State, 323 Ark. 449, 915 S.W.2d 702.

Court of appeals held that, where a state jury could have convicted petitioner of first-degree murder under former § 5-10-102(a)(3) based on an erroneous jury instruction, trial counsel's failure to object to the instruction was prejudicial and habeas relief was warranted. Reagan v. Norris, 365 F.3d 616 (8th Cir. 2004).

Because the jury found defendant guilty of capital murder, it could not consider the charge of murder in the first degree nor its affirmative defense; accordingly, any error the trial court might have committed in instructing the jury on the affirmative defense murder in the first degree was harmless. Jackson v. State, 359 Ark. 87, 194 S.W.3d 757 (2004).

In addition to instructions on the elements of capital murder, the jury was instructed on lesser included offenses of first-degree murder, second-degree murder, and manslaughter, and defendant not assert that the model jury instructions inaccurately reflected the law; thus, despite his contention that his proffered instructions were more inclusive and a more clear statement of the law on the various issues, the trial court did not err in refusing to submit them to the jury in his capital murder case. Adams v. State, 2009 Ark. 375, 326 S.W.3d 764 (2009), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 1021, 130 S. Ct. 1922, 176 L. Ed. 2d 392 (2010).

Petitioner was properly denied postconviction relief because the jury was instructed as to the mental state required for each of the degrees of homicide, the jury considered the evidence presented at trial, and the jury found that petitioner had the requisite mental state for a first-degree-murder conviction; petitioner's conviction meant that the jury had found that petitioner had the requisite mental state for first-degree murder. Strain v. State, 2012 Ark. 184, 423 S.W.3d 1 (2012).

In a first-degree murder case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in instructing the jury on the lesser-included offense of second-degree murder because the evidence provided a rational basis for an acquittal on the first-degree-murder charge and a conviction on the second-degree-murder charge as defendant did not shoot and kill the victim, but handed his gun to codefendant; defendant could not have known with absolute certainty what codefendant would do; and the jury could have concluded that defendant knowingly caused the death of another person under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life in that he was practically certain that his conduct would cause the death of the victim. Northern v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 426, 467 S.W.3d 755 (2015).

Defendant, charged with first-degree murder, was not entitled to a second-degree murder instruction because the evidence consistently showed defendant shot the victim in the head at close range in the absence of any provocation. Dixon v. State, 2019 Ark. 245, 581 S.W.3d 505 (2019).

Defendant, charged with first-degree murder, was not entitled to a manslaughter instruction because defendant's interactions with a third person after defendant committed a murder did not show what defendant's mental state was when he shot the victim. Dixon v. State, 2019 Ark. 245, 581 S.W.3d 505 (2019).

Intent.

Defendant convicted of first degree murder under subsection (a) of this section failed to preserve his complaint that the evidence of intent was insufficient by failing to make a motion for directed verdict at the close of the state's case and at the close of all the evidence, as required by Ark. R. Crim. P. 33.1. Brown v. State, 374 Ark. 324, 287 S.W.3d 587 (2008).

As defendant hit the victim (his ex-wife's mother) in the head with the baseball bat and cut the victim's throat, threatened his ex-wife, and forced her to go with him from the scene of the crime, the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of first-degree murder, kidnapping, and terroristic threatening under subdivision (a)(2) of this section and §§ 5-11-102(a) and 5-13-301(a)(1)(A). Alvard v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 160 (2011).

Evidence was sufficient to support a finding of intent for the purpose of first-degree murder, in violation of subdivision (a)(2) of this section, because the victim was shot at least seven times and suffered several gunshot wounds to the back and front of the body; evidence of defendant's flight immediately after the murder further supported the verdict. Wells v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 276, 411 S.W.3d 211 (2012).

There was substantial evidence from which the jury could have inferred that it was defendant's conscious object to cause the victim's death, because defendant placed the gun less than one inch away from her head and pulled the trigger, killing her. Williamson v. State, 2013 Ark. 347, 429 S.W.3d 250 (2013).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's first-degree murder conviction because it supported the jury's determination that he purposely fired the fatal shot into his wife's right cheek at close range inside their vehicle. Two witnesses testified that defendant and his wife were fighting in the highway just before the shooting, the children's testimony made it abundantly clear that defendant raised the gun and shot his wife, and the children and another witness testified that before running into the woods defendant fired a shot at the witness. Drennan v. State, 2018 Ark. 328, 559 S.W.3d 262 (2018).

—In General.

One who commits homicide was not guilty of murder in the first degree unless there existed in his mind, before the act of killing, a specific intent to take the life of the person slain; but it was not necessary that such intent be formed for any particular length of time before the killing. Green v. State, 51 Ark. 189, 10 S.W. 266 (1889) (decision under prior law).

The intent need not be conceived for any particular length of time beforehand. Rosemond v. State, 86 Ark. 160, 110 S.W. 229 (1908); Ferguson v. State, 92 Ark. 120, 122 S.W. 236 (1909); Gilchrist v. State, 100 Ark. 330, 140 S.W. 260 (1911) (preceding decisions under prior law).

Striking one on the head with a bottle could not, as a matter of law, raise a presumption of intent to kill. Tolliver v. State, 113 Ark. 142, 167 S.W. 703 (1914) (decision under prior law).

Malice was a necessary element of murder either in the first or second degree. Ballentine v. State, 198 Ark. 1037, 132 S.W.2d 384 (1939) (decision under prior law).

—Evidence.

Where defendant intended to commit felony, defendant could be found guilty even if he did not intend to kill deceased. Hankins v. State, 206 Ark. 881, 178 S.W.2d 56 (1944); Black v. State, 215 Ark. 618, 222 S.W.2d 816 (1949), cert. denied, Black v. Arkansas, 338 U.S. 956, 70 S. Ct. 490 (1950) (decisions under prior law).

Evidence held sufficient to support a finding of malice. McClendon v. State, 197 Ark. 1135, 126 S.W.2d 928 (1939); Gulley v. State, 201 Ark. 744, 146 S.W.2d 706 (1941); Long v. State, 223 Ark. 387, 266 S.W.2d 66 (1954); Seward v. State, 228 Ark. 712, 310 S.W.2d 239 (1958); Young v. State, 230 Ark. 737, 324 S.W.2d 524 (1959) (preceding decisions under prior law).

It was not essential to prove any intention to kill, but it sufficed, and a case was made, if the killing occurred in the perpetration of or in the attempt to perpetrate any of the crimes named, although a killing was not intended. Rayburn v. State, 200 Ark. 914, 141 S.W.2d 532 (1940) (decision under prior law).

Evidence held sufficient to find a willful killing. Seward v. State, 228 Ark. 712, 310 S.W.2d 239 (1958) (decision under prior law).

Where prior intent to kill “someone” was shown, no ill-will need have been shown for deceased, selected at random for wanton execution, as such evidence implied the requisite degree of malice. Robertson v. State, 256 Ark. 366, 507 S.W.2d 513 (1974) (decision under prior law).

Premeditation, deliberation, and intent may all be inferred from the circumstances, such as the weapon used, the manner in which it was used, the wounds inflicted, and the conduct of the accused. Williams v. State, 289 Ark. 69, 709 S.W.2d 80 (1986); Thomerson v. Lockhart, 835 F.2d 1257 (8th Cir. 1987).

Intent to commit murder may, and often must, be inferred from circumstantial evidence. Parker v. State, 290 Ark. 158, 717 S.W.2d 800 (1986).

The necessary intent may be inferred from the type of weapon used, the manner of its use, and the nature, extent, and location of the wounds. Garza v. State, 293 Ark. 175, 735 S.W.2d 702 (1987); Williams v. State, 304 Ark. 509, 804 S.W.2d 346 (1991).

The jury could reasonably have inferred the defendant purposely killed his victim based on the type weapon used, the manner of its use, and the location of the wounds. Easter v. State, 306 Ark. 615, 816 S.W.2d 602 (1991).

It was reasonable to conclude that defendant acted purposefully as an accomplice in causing the death of the victim, where the defendant fired a shotgun at the unarmed victim from an approximate distance of 15 feet and the pathologist who conducted the autopsy testified there was a series of shotgun injuries in the victim's neck and limbs. Purifoy v. State, 307 Ark. 482, 822 S.W.2d 374 (1991).

There was substantial evidence from which jury could have concluded that defendant possessed a purposeful intent to kill. Williams v. State, 304 Ark. 509, 804 S.W.2d 346 (1991); Crawford v. State, 309 Ark. 54, 827 S.W.2d 134 (1992).

Evidence held sufficient to demonstrate that defendant acted with the “purpose of causing the death of another person,” under subdivision (a)(2) of this section. Coleman v. State, 314 Ark. 143, 860 S.W.2d 747 (1993).

From expert's testimony that the gun used in the shooting was fired at close, or point blank range, the inference could easily be drawn that it was the purpose of the person firing to kill the victim. One is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of one's act. Furr v. State, 308 Ark. 41, 822 S.W.2d 380 (1992), appeal dismissed, — Ark. —, — S.W.3d —, 2003 Ark. LEXIS 666 (Dec. 11, 2003).

Intent is seldom capable of proof by direct evidence. Akbar v. State, 315 Ark. 627, 869 S.W.2d 706 (1994).

Psychiatric testimony concerning whether a defendant has the ability to conform his conduct to the requirements of law at the time of the killing as part of an insanity defense may seem in some cases to approximate testimony on whether the defendant had or did not have the required specific intent to commit murder at a precise time; however, a general inability to conform one's conduct to the requirements of the law due to mental defect or illness is the gauge for insanity, and is different from whether the defendant had the specific intent to kill another individual at a particular time. Stewart v. State, 316 Ark. 153, 870 S.W.2d 752 (1994).

Evidence held sufficient to prove defendant acted intentionally. Williams v. State, 321 Ark. 635, 906 S.W.2d 677 (1995).

Intent or state of mind, for the purposes of this section, is seldom capable of proof by direct evidence and must usually be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the killing. Russey v. State, 322 Ark. 786, 912 S.W.2d 420 (1995).

Where defendant claimed he shot his wife accidentally, detective's testimony concerning domestic violence call some days prior to the shooting was relevant to show lack of mistake or accident on defendant's part; at the very least, detective's testimony showed, by fair inference, that defendant and his loaded shotgun necessitated a call and an investigation by the police. Russey v. State, 322 Ark. 786, 912 S.W.2d 420 (1995).

Proof of purpose and lack of justification in violation of subdivision (a)(2) shown where defendant used a handgun to shoot the victim while the victim was pleading for his life and dodging and ducking bullets. Williams v. State, 325 Ark. 432, 930 S.W.2d 297 (1996).

Evidence was sufficient to establish intent where the defendant repeatedly confessed to shooting the victim, he had previously stated that he would “get” the victim, he obtained .22 shells for his gun, and he shot the victim in the back of his head and back six times. Copeland v. State, 343 Ark. 327, 37 S.W.3d 567 (2001).

There was sufficient evidence for the jury to determine that defendant had the requisite mens rea for first-degree murder at the time he shot and killed his wife as an expert for the state testified that defendant did not have a mental disease or defect at the time of the shooting; the jury was entitled to believe the State's expert over defendant's expert. Davis v. State, 368 Ark. 401, 246 S.W.3d 862 (2007).

Circuit court did not err by admitting into evidence photographs of the murder victim because her wounds were relevant to show defendant's intent to kill her; they also assisted the jury in understanding the crime-scene investigator's description of the scene, and the circuit court performed a proper evaluation of the photographs before allowing them to be presented to the jury. Davis v. State, 368 Ark. 401, 246 S.W.3d 862 (2007).

Circuit court did not err in denying defendant's motion for directed verdict on a first-degree murder charge where defendant lied about seeing the victim, had buried her body, and had disposed of a necktie and bag, and thus, the jury could have concluded from the testimony and circumstantial evidence that he had placed a bag over the victim's head with the purpose of causing her death. Williams v. State, 2015 Ark. 316, 468 S.W.3d 776 (2015).

State produced sufficient evidence that defendant purposely killed the victim; it was defendant's conscious object to end the victim's life, given that even after defendant had beaten the victim with a bat for several minutes, and the victim begged her to stop, she did not stop, she made efforts to conceal the crime, including burying the victim's body, and she fled when investigators found the body. Rollf v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 520, 472 S.W.3d 490 (2015).

In a first-degree murder case, defendant's motions for directed verdict were properly denied as there was sufficient evidence that defendant acted with the purpose of causing the death of the victim because there was testimony that defendant drew a gun and immediately shot the victim in the neck without warning; and the jury was shown the video footage of the altercation at the club. Jaquize v. State, 2019 Ark. 259, 584 S.W.3d 236 (2019).

—Expert Testimony.

Expert testimony on the ability of a defendant to form specific intent to murder is not admissible. Stewart v. State, 316 Ark. 153, 870 S.W.2d 752 (1994).

Where defendant was found guilty of first-degree murder and attempted first-degree murder, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding certain expert testimony regarding defendant's capacity to form intent. The expert's report did not state that defendant lacked the capacity to form intent, only that it was impacted or impaired, and the expert also opined that defendant's psychotic disorder did not render him unable to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. Furthermore, there was ample evidence of purposeful conduct where defendant left a bar and returned with a shotgun that he used against the victims. Edwards v. State, 2015 Ark. 377, 472 S.W.3d 479 (2015).

Where the trial court excluded expert testimony in a first-degree murder trial regarding defendant's capacity to form intent, defendant's assertion that he was denied due process by the deprivation of his only defense was not preserved for appellate review because defendant did not raise the argument to the circuit court. Edwards v. State, 2015 Ark. 377, 472 S.W.3d 479 (2015).

Appellant's trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to elicit testimony from appellant's expert regarding appellant's general capacity to form intent. There was ample evidence of purposeful conduct as there was testimony that appellant came into the bar with a shotgun after a fight, indicated he was looking for the man who had fought with him, and then shot that man twice. Thus, appellant would have been unable to present a successful case on the affirmative defense regardless of any testimony from the expert regarding appellant's general capacity to form intent. Edwards v. State, 2017 Ark. 207 (2017).

—Knowingly.

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of murder in the first degree under subdivision (a)(3) of this section where the victim was the youngest of defendant's children, a forensic examiner and experts testified that he had died of starvation, evidence showed that defendant had withheld formula from him, and defendant had previously cared for the victim's five other premature siblings, all of whom survived infancy; there was substantial evidence presented to support a conclusion that defendant, who had an IQ of 75, was aware of the risk caused by the infant's obvious malnourishment and that she was aware that it was practically certain her conduct would cause the infant's death. Bowman v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 469, 588 S.W.3d 129 (2019).

—Motive.

The state is not bound to prove a motive for the killing. Jones v. State, 11 Ark. App. 129, 668 S.W.2d 30 (1984), review denied, 282 Ark. 507, 669 S.W.2d 456 (1984); Horne v. State, 12 Ark. App. 301, 677 S.W.2d 856 (1984).

Absence of motive is only a circumstance to be considered with other facts and circumstances in determining guilt or innocence. Jones v. State, 11 Ark. App. 129, 668 S.W.2d 30 (1984), review denied, 282 Ark. 507, 669 S.W.2d 456 (1984).

Where the evidence was substantial that the defendant deliberately and with premeditation killed the victim, the defendant's motive for killing the victim was not something the state had to prove. Parker v. State, 290 Ark. 158, 717 S.W.2d 800 (1986); Ford v. State, 297 Ark. 77, 759 S.W.2d 556 (1988).

Although the state is not required to prove motive, it may introduce evidence showing all of the circumstances that explain the act, illustrate the accused's state of mind, or show a motive for the crime. Dixon v. State, 311 Ark. 613, 846 S.W.2d 170 (1993).

—Premeditation and Deliberation.

While the law presumed that an unlawful killing was malicious, it did not presume it premeditated. Simpson v. State, 56 Ark. 8, 19 S.W. 99 (1892) (decision under prior law).

When the intent to kill the person slain was the result of deliberation and premeditation, and reason was not dethroned, it might have been conceived in a moment. Green v. State, 51 Ark. 189, 10 S.W. 266 (1889) (decision under prior law).

In the absence of premeditation and deliberation, a killing could not be murder in the first degree. King v. State, 68 Ark. 572, 60 S.W. 951 (1901); Howard v. State, 82 Ark. 97, 100 S.W. 756 (1907); Gilchrist v. State, 100 Ark. 330, 140 S.W. 260 (1911); King v. State, 117 Ark. 82, 173 S.W. 852 (1915); Harris v. State, 119 Ark. 408, 177 S.W. 1144 (1915); Stanley v. State, 183 Ark. 1093, 40 S.W.2d 415 (1931) (preceding decisions under prior law).

Evidence held sufficient to find premeditation and/or deliberation. King v. State, 68 Ark. 572, 60 S.W. 951 (1901); Long v. State, 223 Ark. 387, 266 S.W.2d 66 (1954); Seward v. State, 228 Ark. 712, 310 S.W.2d 239 (1958); Young v. State, 230 Ark. 737, 324 S.W.2d 524 (1959) (preceding decisions under prior law); McLemore v. State, 274 Ark. 527, 626 S.W.2d 364 (1982); Long v. State, 280 Ark. 327, 657 S.W.2d 551 (1983); Jones v. State, 11 Ark. App. 129, 668 S.W.2d 30 (1984), review denied, 282 Ark. 507, 669 S.W.2d 456 (1984); Thomerson v. Lockhart, 835 F.2d 1257 (8th Cir. 1987); Garza v. State, 293 Ark. 175, 735 S.W.2d 702 (1987); Williams v. State, 294 Ark. 345, 742 S.W.2d 932 (1988).

In order to constitute murder in the first degree, there must have been in the mind of the accused a willful, deliberate, and premeditated specific intention to take life. McClendon v. State, 197 Ark. 1135, 126 S.W.2d 928 (1939); Gulley v. State, 201 Ark. 744, 146 S.W.2d 706 (1941) (preceding decisions under prior law).

Deliberation had to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Simmons v. State, 227 Ark. 1109, 305 S.W.2d 119 (1957) (decision under prior law).

Deliberation and premeditation could have been inferred from the circumstances of the case. House v. State, 230 Ark. 622, 324 S.W.2d 112 (1959) (decision under prior law); Garza v. State, 293 Ark. 175, 735 S.W.2d 702 (1987).

The necessary elements of deliberation and premeditation in the offense of murder in the first degree may be inferred from the factual circumstances as shown by the evidence, where those circumstances clearly warrant the jury in such an inference or conclusion. In this case, the circumstances as reflected by the evidence were inconsistent with any other hypothesis than that of murder in the first degree. Walker v. State, 241 Ark. 300, 241 Ark. 663, 408 S.W.2d 905 (1966), appeal dismissed, 386 U.S. 682, 87 S. Ct. 1325, 18 L. Ed. 2d 403 (1967) (decision under prior law); Ford v. State, 297 Ark. 77, 759 S.W.2d 556 (1988).

The rule that the requisite state of mind of premeditation and deliberation need not exist for any particular length of time is still law. Fields v. State, 280 Ark. 153, 655 S.W.2d 419 (1983); Thomerson v. Lockhart, 835 F.2d 1257 (8th Cir. 1987).

The jury may infer premeditation and deliberation from the circumstances of the case, such as the character of the weapon used, the manner in which it was used, the nature, extent and location of the wounds inflicted and the like. Jones v. State, 11 Ark. App. 129, 668 S.W.2d 30 (1984), review denied, 282 Ark. 507, 669 S.W.2d 456 (1984); Parker v. State, 290 Ark. 158, 717 S.W.2d 800 (1986).

The trier of fact must determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused premeditated and deliberated the killing in order to find the accused guilty of first-degree murder. Thomerson v. Lockhart, 835 F.2d 1257 (8th Cir. 1987).

Premeditation and deliberation need not be proven by direct evidence. Thomerson v. Lockhart, 835 F.2d 1257 (8th Cir. 1987).

Premeditation and deliberation need not exist for any particular length of time and may in fact be formed almost on the spur of the moment. Harris v. State, 291 Ark. 504, 726 S.W.2d 267 (1987); Garza v. State, 293 Ark. 175, 735 S.W.2d 702 (1987).

Where jury's acquittal of defendant on robbery charge removed the underlying felony from the capital murder charge set forth in the information, which contained no language addressing a question of premeditation and deliberation, the defendant could be convicted of no crime greater than second-degree murder, and conviction for first-degree murder violated defendant's right to due process. Hill v. State, 303 Ark. 462, 798 S.W.2d 65 (1990).

The mens rea for first degree murder is no longer premeditation and deliberation, therefore, the state is not required to prove that defendant acted with such a mental state. Smith v. State, 310 Ark. 247, 837 S.W.2d 279 (1992).

Intoxication.

Testimony by medical doctor about blackout alcoholism in murder trial was simply another means of using voluntary intoxication as a defense and the trial court was correct in its ruling excluding the witness' testimony since voluntary intoxication was no longer a defense to criminal prosecutions. Spohn v. State, 310 Ark. 500, 837 S.W.2d 873 (1992).

Voluntary intoxication is not a defense to the charge of murder in the first degree or to the charge of battery in the second degree; voluntary intoxication is not available as a defense for purposes of negating specific intent. Gilkey v. State, 41 Ark. App. 100, 848 S.W.2d 439 (1993).

Lesser-Included Offenses.

Where the prosecution of defendant for first-degree murder and aggravated robbery arose from the same incident, his convictions for both aggravated robbery and first-degree murder violated the prohibition against double jeopardy since the aggravated robbery was a lesser included offense of first-degree murder; therefore, his conviction and sentence for aggravated robbery would be set aside. Brewer v. State, 277 Ark. 40, 639 S.W.2d 54 (1982).

Where the defendant was convicted and sentenced for both aggravated robbery and attempt to commit first-degree murder, but the evidence showed that the aggravated robbery was the underlying felony to the charge of attempted murder, the trial court did not have the authority to impose sentences for both offenses; therefore, the conviction and sentence for the less serious offense, the attempted first-degree murder, would be set aside. Wilson v. State, 277 Ark. 219, 640 S.W.2d 440 (1982).

In prosecution for attempted capital felony murder, the jury should have been instructed that attempted murder in the first degree and aggravated assault were lesser included offenses in the charge of criminal attempt to commit capital murder. Moore v. State, 280 Ark. 222, 656 S.W.2d 698 (1983).

It was permissible for the jury to reject the more serious charge of attempted first degree murder, which would require a finding of a higher degree of culpability than was required of the lesser included offense, and to find defendant guilty of the lesser offense of aggravated assault. Maples v. State, 16 Ark. App. 175, 698 S.W.2d 807 (1985).

In a felony murder conviction, the underlying felony is a lesser included offense of the greater offense of felony murder, and the defendant cannot be convicted of, and sentenced for, both offenses. Wiman v. Lockhart, 797 F.2d 666 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1021, 107 S. Ct. 678, 93 L. Ed. 2d 728 (1986).

When capital felony murder is charged under § 5-10-101, first-degree murder is a “lesser included offense” because the same evidence used to prove the former of necessity proves the latter. Therefore, an instruction on first-degree murder is required. Hill v. State, 303 Ark. 462, 798 S.W.2d 65 (1990).

Where the circuit court acquired jurisdiction over a juvenile, criminal defendant, upon the filing of a first degree murder charge, it retained jurisdiction to convict and sentence for the lesser included offense of manslaughter. Walker v. State, 309 Ark. 23, 827 S.W.2d 637 (1992).

In a prosecution for first-degree murder for knowingly causing the death of a person aged 14 years or younger, there was no rational basis to justify charging the jury with the lesser offense of second-degree murder because the additional language of knowingly causing the death under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life was not charged in the information and was not required to be proven. Byrd v. State, 337 Ark. 413, 992 S.W.2d 759 (1999), overruled in part, McCoy v. State, 347 Ark. 913, 69 S.W.3d 430 (2002).

Felony manslaughter is not a lesser included offense of capital felony murder or first-degree felony murder. Hill v. State, 344 Ark. 216, 40 S.W.3d 751 (2001), overruled in part, McCoy v. State, 347 Ark. 913, 69 S.W.3d 430 (2002), but see McCoy v. State, 347 Ark. 913, 69 S.W.3d 430 (2002), restating the test for determining when an offense is included in another offense.

Evidence that supports a finding that a defendant has acted knowingly under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to the value of human life rather than purposely entitles a defendant to a jury instruction on attempted second-degree murder pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 5-10-103(a)(1); that circumstance, attempted second-degree murder is a lesser-included offense of attempted first degree murder as defined by subsection (a)(2). McCoy v. State, 74 Ark. App. 414, 49 S.W.3d 154 (2001), aff'd, 347 Ark. 913, 69 S.W.3d 430 (2002).

In defendant's first-degree murder case, the court erred by refusing a requested second-degree murder instruction where (1) there was evidence that defendant got into an argument with his wife that escalated into physical violence, (2) when she began hitting him and threatening to kill him, defendant reacted by putting her in a headlock, or possibly choking her, or putting his arms around her neck, and (3) he did not let go until she died; based on the evidence, the jury could have found that defendant assaulted his wife, knowing his conduct was practically certain to cause her death, while being extremely indifferent to the value of human life. Wyles v. State, 357 Ark. 530, 182 S.W.3d 142 (2004).

Where the jury was only given instructions on first and second-degree murder and they convicted defendant of first-degree murder, per the “skip rule”, any error in the trial court's failing to give an instruction on manslaughter was cure since defendant was convicted of the greater offense. Wooten v. State, 93 Ark. App. 178, 217 S.W.3d 124 (2005).

Denial of postconviction relief was proper, because the petitioner failed to show the second-degree-murder instruction added an extra element not present in the greater offense of first-degree murder and that counsel should have objected; Second-degree murder was a lesser-included offense of first-degree murder, as it differed from the greater offense only to the extent that it required a lesser kind of culpable mental state. Holloway v. State, 2013 Ark. 140, 426 S.W.3d 462 (2013).

Circuit court, which instructed the jury on first-degree murder and the lesser-included offense of second-degree murder, did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on reckless manslaughter because the jury was presented with evidence that defendant chased the victim, blocked the victim's vehicle with defendant's vehicle, and ran up to the victim's car, shooting once into the hood of the car and a second time through the windshield of the car, killing the victim. Starling v. State, 2016 Ark. 20, 480 S.W.3d 158 (2016).

Preservation for Review.

Difference between the elements of capital murder and first-degree murder under the particular subsections of the statutes at issue is in terms of specificity; the capital-murder statute contains a list of specific felonies the defendant must have committed—here, aggravated robbery, whereas the first-degree murder statute simply requires a death to have occurred during the commission of “a felony”. Jackson v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 330, 552 S.W.3d 55 (2018).

Defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction as an accomplice to first-degree murder was preserved; although defense counsel did not mention “first-degree murder” in his directed-verdict motion, considering the subsections of the statutes on which the jury was instructed, the elements of capital murder and first-degree murder were the same. Jackson v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 330, 552 S.W.3d 55 (2018).

Sentence.

Where evidence was insufficient to establish murder in the first degree, but did establish the crime of murder in the second degree, the sentence of murder in the first degree should be set aside and the cause remanded to the circuit court with directions to sentence the prisoner for murder in the second degree. Simpson v. State, 56 Ark. 8, 19 S.W. 99 (1892) (decision under prior law).

Where the defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree and error was committed in excluding evidence which might have reduced the punishment to that of murder in the second degree, the Supreme Court could, in its discretion, have remanded the cause with directions to the trial court to sentence the defendant for murder in the second degree. Vance v. State, 70 Ark. 272, 68 S.W. 37 (1902) (decision under prior law).

Where, in a murder case, it was shown that the accused and the decedent both used guns but was uncertain which began the shooting, on account of the absence of evidence of deliberation and premeditation, a conviction of murder in the first degree would have been reduced to murder in the second degree. Phillips v. State, 190 Ark. 1004, 82 S.W.2d 836 (1935) (decision under prior law).

Sentence properly reduced to range prescribed for second-degree murder. Wilkins v. State, 292 Ark. 596, 731 S.W.2d 775 (1987).

Because defendant was unable to show that he was prejudiced by his 40 year sentence for first-degree murder, as it was less than the maximum possible sentence for his conviction, the court did not consider his claim that his due process rights were violated by the admission of a photographic history of the victim's life during sentencing. Tate v. State, 367 Ark. 576, 242 S.W.3d 254 (2006).

Habeas relief was not warranted because an applicant was charged under a former first-degree murder statute where a murder was committed in the course of a robbery, and he was properly sentenced to life imprisonment without parole on his plea of guilty to capital-felony murder. An argument that murder in the first degree and capital murder were separate offenses with a separate penalty was rejected. Gooch v. Hobbs, 2014 Ark. 73 (2014) (Decided under former § 41-2205).

Circuit court properly denied defendant's petition for writ of habeas corpus because the sentence of life imprisonment that was imposed after he entered a negotiated plea of guilty to first-degree murder when he was 15 years old did not violate the Eighth Amendment, as a 2017 statutory amendment created a possibility of parole. Lohbauer v. Kelley, 2018 Ark. 26 (2018).

Trial court's erroneous instruction during the sentencing phase that defendant would be eligible for parole after serving 70% of his sentence for first-degree murder did not provide any relief to defendant, because he failed to object to the error when it occurred and the error did not fit within the third Wicks exception concerning certain flagrant and highly prejudicial errors. Muhammad v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 87, 572 S.W.3d 21 (2019).

Serious Physical Injury.

Sufficient evidence supported the conclusion that a defendant intended to cause serious physical harm to a victim: a witness testified that the witness gave defendant a gun, other witnesses testified that defendant shot the victim with that gun, the victim was shot in the arm and hip, which required surgery, and the victim continued to suffer with pain and impairment as a result of the injuries. Hawkins v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 675 (2009).

Venue.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion for a change of venue in first-degree murder case where the motion came only 2 weeks before trial, after the case had been pending for 9 months, and the affiants could cite little or nothing beyond their own convictions that a fair trial was not possible in the action. Snell v. State, 290 Ark. 503, 721 S.W.2d 628 (1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 872, 108 S. Ct. 202 (1987).

View of Crime Scene.

A request to view a place pertinent to a material fact is a matter within the trial court's discretion, and denial of the request is not a ground for reversal absent an abuse of that discretion. Williams v. State, 289 Ark. 69, 709 S.W.2d 80 (1986).

Cited: Hammers v. State, 261 Ark. 585, 550 S.W.2d 432 (1977); Clark v. State, 264 Ark. 630, 573 S.W.2d 622 (1978); Westbrook v. State, 265 Ark. 736, 580 S.W.2d 702 (1979); Davis v. State, 267 Ark. 507, 592 S.W.2d 118 (1980); Finnie v. State, 267 Ark. 638, 593 S.W.2d 32 (1980); Brewer v. State, 271 Ark. 254, 608 S.W.2d 363 (1980); Ward v. State, 272 Ark. 99, 612 S.W.2d 118 (1981); Spillers v. State, 272 Ark. 212, 613 S.W.2d 387 (1981); Curry v. State, 272 Ark. 291, 613 S.W.2d 829 (1981); Graham v. State, 2 Ark. App. 266, 621 S.W.2d 4 (1981); Ford v. State, 276 Ark. 98, 633 S.W.2d 3 (1982); Daniels v. State, 277 Ark. 23, 638 S.W.2d 676 (1982); Montgomery v. State, 277 Ark. 95, 640 S.W.2d 108 (1982); Branam v. State, 277 Ark. 204, 640 S.W.2d 445 (1982); Henderson v. State, 279 Ark. 435, 652 S.W.2d 16 (1983); Maxwell v. State, 279 Ark. 423, 652 S.W.2d 31 (1983); Rhodes v. State, 280 Ark. 156, 655 S.W.2d 421 (1983); Clines v. State, 280 Ark. 77, 656 S.W.2d 684 (1983); Johnson v. Lockhart, 746 F.2d 1367 (8th Cir. 1984); Pruett v. State, 282 Ark. 304, 669 S.W.2d 186; Owens v. State, 283 Ark. 327, 675 S.W.2d 834 (1984); Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S. Ct. 366, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1985); Reichert v. State, 15 Ark. App. 388, 695 S.W.2d 845 (1985); Madison v. State, 287 Ark. 179, 697 S.W.2d 106 (1985); Barnes v. State, 287 Ark. 297, 698 S.W.2d 504 (1985); Turner v. State, 287 Ark. 348, 698 S.W.2d 798 (1985); Wood v. Lockhart, 809 F.2d 457 (8th Cir. 1987); Simmons v. Lockhart, 814 F.2d 504 (8th Cir. 1987); Rode v. Lockhart, 675 F. Supp. 491 (E.D. Ark. 1987); Henderson v. State, 291 Ark. 138, 722 S.W.2d 842 (1987); Muck v. State, 292 Ark. 310, 730 S.W.2d 214 (1987); Hedrick v. State, 292 Ark. 411, 730 S.W.2d 488 (1987); Shipley v. State, 25 Ark. App. 262, 757 S.W.2d 178 (1988); Irvin v. State, 28 Ark. App. 6, 771 S.W.2d 26 (1989); Findley v. State, 300 Ark. 265, 778 S.W.2d 624 (1989); Pharo v. State, 30 Ark. App. 94, 783 S.W.2d 64 (1990); Ritchie v. State, 31 Ark. App. 177, 790 S.W.2d 919 (1990); Findley v. State, 307 Ark. 53, 818 S.W.2d 242 (1991); Sanders v. State, 317 Ark. 328, 878 S.W.2d 391 (1994); Sutton v. State, 317 Ark. 447, 878 S.W.2d 748 (1994); Reagan v. State, 318 Ark. 380, 885 S.W.2d 849 (1994); Dansby v. State, 319 Ark. 506, 893 S.W.2d 331 (1995); O'Neal v. State, 321 Ark. 626, 907 S.W.2d 116 (1995); Jordan v. State, 323 Ark. 628, 917 S.W.2d 164 (1996); Smith v. State, 324 Ark. 74, 918 S.W.2d 714 (1996); Webb v. State, 328 Ark. 12, 941 S.W.2d 417 (1997); Rankin v. State, 329 Ark. 379, 948 S.W.2d 397 (1997); Cates v. State, 329 Ark. 585, 952 S.W.2d 135 (1997); Cox v. Norris, 133 F.3d 565 (8th Cir. 1997); Landreth v. State, 331 Ark. 12, 960 S.W.2d 434 (1998); Noel v. Norris, 194 F. Supp. 2d 893 (E.D. Ark. 2002); Smith v. State, 351 Ark. 468, 95 S.W.3d 801 (2003); Isom v. State, 356 Ark. 156, 148 S.W.3d 257 (2004); Smith v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 216 (2010); Holian v. State, 2013 Ark. 7 (2013); Bramlett v. Hobbs, 2015 Ark. 146, 463 S.W.3d 283 (2015).