Ark. Code Ann. § 5-13-201 (2026)

Research References

ALR.

Dog as deadly or dangerous weapon for purposes of statutes aggravating offenses such as assault and robbery. 124 A.L.R.5th 657.

Parts of Human Body, other than Feet, as Deadly or Dangerous Weapons or Instrumentalities for Purposes of Statutes Aggravating Offenses such as Assault and Robbery. 67 A.L.R.6th 103.

Ark. L. Rev.

Case Note, Criminal Liability for Attempting to Inflict the AIDS Virus: Possibilities in Arkansas' Future, 45 Ark. L. Rev. 505.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey — Criminal Law, 10 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 559.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

This section is not unconstitutionally vague or defective. Martin v. State, 261 Ark. 80, 547 S.W.2d 81 (1977).

In General.

To sustain a conviction for first degree battery, there must be a severe injury in connection with a wanton or purposeful culpable mental state. Henderson v. State, 291 Ark. 138, 722 S.W.2d 842 (1987), cert. denied, Henderson v. Clinton, 493 U.S. 896, 110 S. Ct. 247 (1989).

Accomplice.

Because the status of the driver of the car and the juvenile who gave directions to the victim's house as accomplices was a mixed question of law and fact, the trial court properly did not instruct the jury that they were accomplices as a matter of law as agreeing to drive defendant and the accomplice to the victim's house with no questions asked did not conclusively show that the driver knew about or participated in the robbery or battery; it was the role of the jury to determine whether the juvenile had to have known that the robbery and battery were about to occur; and no testimony showed beyond dispute that either the driver or the juvenile knew of defendant's plan to rob the victim or that they encouraged him to shoot the victim. West v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 416, 530 S.W.3d 355 (2017).

Burden of Proof.

By the statutory definition of the offense of battery in the first degree under subdivision (a)(4), the State must prove the defendant committed a felony and, in the course of committing that felony, caused serious injury to another person; consequently, proof of the first-degree battery, by statutory definition, must include proof of the underlying felony when the charge is for violating that particular subsection. Thomas v. State, 280 Ark. 593, 660 S.W.2d 169 (1983).

Civil Actions.

Where the defendant's attorney asked the prosecuting witness about a $1,000,000 civil suit which the prosecuting witness had filed against the defendant arising from the alleged battery, and the attorney implied by one of his questions that, had the defendant paid the prosecuting witness $18,000, the criminal charges would have been dismissed, the trial court was in error in granting a mistrial. If the cross-examination had been allowed, the jury would have been informed that the prosecuting witness may have been biased due to a financial interest; on the other hand, the jury may have thought that the civil complaint and damages sought were well-founded and that the evidence supported the prosecuting witness's testimony. Wilson v. State, 289 Ark. 141, 712 S.W.2d 654 (1986).

Culpable Mental State.

The phrase “under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life” indicates that attendant circumstances must be such as to demonstrate the culpable mental state of the accused and such language provides sufficient notice of the type of conduct proscribed. Martin v. State, 261 Ark. 80, 547 S.W.2d 81 (1977).

An element of first degree battery is the intent to inflict serious physical injury. Golden v. State, 265 Ark. 99, 576 S.W.2d 955 (1979).

To sustain a conviction of first-degree battery, life endangering conduct must generally be involved; there must be a severe injury in conjunction with a wanton or purposeful culpable mental state; and each subsection of this section describes conduct that would produce murder liability if death resulted. Bolden v. State, 267 Ark. 504, 593 S.W.2d 156 (1980).

The words “under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life” are defined in the nature of a culpable mental state and therefore are akin to “intent” for the proof of which evidence of other offenses is admissible under § 16-41-101, Rule 404(b). State v. Vowell, 276 Ark. 258, 634 S.W.2d 118 (1982).

While subdivision (a)(3) of this section does not contain or specify the culpable mental state required for its violation, § 5-2-203(b) provides that if the statute defining an offense does not prescribe a culpable mental state, culpability is nonetheless required, and is established only if a person acts purposely, knowingly, or recklessly; thus, the Criminal Code recognizes three distinct culpable mental states under this section to sustain a conviction for first-degree battery. Coleman v. State, 12 Ark. App. 214, 671 S.W.2d 221 (1984).

Where defendant was convicted of battery in the first degree for hitting sleeping victim in the head three times with a baseball bat it made little difference that defendant did not take the bat with him to victim's house as he could have formed the requisite intent after he arrived at the house, and purpose to commit a crime can be formed in an instant. Tarentino v. State, 302 Ark. 55, 786 S.W.2d 584 (1990).

First-degree battery involves actions which create at least some risk of death and which, therefore, evidence a mental state on the part of the accused to engage in some life-threatening activity against the victim. Tigue v. State, 319 Ark. 147, 889 S.W.2d 760 (1994).

There was substantial evidence that defendant acted with the purpose to cause serious physical injury to the victim under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life where he kicked the victim in the head repeatedly after the victim was down. Harmon v. State, 340 Ark. 18, 8 S.W.3d 472 (2000).

Evidence was sufficient to establish that the defendant acted with the requisite mental state for battery in the first degree where there was testimony that the defendant came at the victim's head like a field-goal kicker approaches a football, and that he was the last one to leave the scene and did so only after delivering several more kicks at the victim's head. Harmon v. State, 340 Ark. 18, 8 S.W.3d 472 (2000).

Evidence was sufficient to establish that the defendant acted under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life where the defendant, along with five or six other assailants, kicked the victim in the face and head multiple times while the victim was on the ground. Harmon v. State, 340 Ark. 18, 8 S.W.3d 472 (2000).

Defendant was not career offender because his conviction for first-degree battery was not crime of violence under force clause of career offender guideline as crime could be violated by reckless driving, and his conviction was also not crime of violence under residual clause of guideline as statute of conviction was not similar in kind or degree of risk to enumerated crimes. United States v. Boose, 739 F.3d 1185 (8th Cir. 2014).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain the jury's finding that defendant acted knowingly and with extreme indifference to the value of human life where defendant was alone with the baby for approximately two hours, the baby developed a deformed head by the time the mother arrived home, defendant packed a bag and insisted on driving his own vehicle to the hospital, and defendant initially claimed that nothing had happened and then offered two improbable explanations for how the baby's skull had been fractured. Suchey v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 225, 490 S.W.3d 320 (2016).

Defendant's motion for directed verdict on the charge of first-degree battery against a law enforcement officer was properly denied as the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding that defendant caused serious physical injury to the police chief under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life. Defendant told law enforcement that he was armed with two firearms, that he wanted to go out in a battle, and that he would come to law enforcement if law enforcement did not come to his apartment; he intentionally fired a round as he came out of his apartment to encounter law enforcement personnel; and the police chief was subsequently struck with a bullet from one of defendant's firearms. Rongey v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 617, 566 S.W.3d 161 (2018).

Substantial evidence supported defendant's first-degree battery conviction under subdivision (a)(3) of this section arising out of a motor vehicle collision where he had pled guilty to DWI, thereby admitting that he possessed the requisite intent; further, the presence of three different drugs in defendant's system (although there was no quantitative analysis) and the testimony showing that he drove at a high rate of speed, swerved in and out of traffic, crossed the center line, and struck the victim's vehicle head on without any indication of an attempt to apply his brakes demonstrated an extreme indifference to the value of human life at the time of the wreck. Turner v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 476, 588 S.W.3d 375 (2019).

Deadly Weapon.

A gun is a deadly weapon, even if it has faulty ammunition that could not inflict serious injury. Mitchell v. State, 290 Ark. 87, 717 S.W.2d 195 (1986).

Because the definition of first degree battery contains the use of a “deadly weapon” as an element of the offense, a court would err in allowing enhancement for such a conviction. Johnson v. State, 26 Ark. App. 286, 764 S.W.2d 621 (1989).

Defense or Justification.

Where a conductor, assaulted by a passenger, used force to repel such assault, the burden was on the railroad company to show that the conductor used no more force than appeared to him, as a reasonable man, necessary to repel the assault. Saint Louis S.W. Ry. v. Berger, 64 Ark. 613, 44 S.W. 809 (1898) (decision under prior law).

The defendant had to be free from all carelessness in reaching the conclusion that his own safety demanded the action he took against the plaintiff. Downey v. Duff, 106 Ark. 4, 152 S.W. 1010 (1912) (decision under prior law).

Court did not err in instructing jury that no one was allowed to exercise right of self defense, if he willingly entered into a fight, where defendant did not request clarification, and made no specific objection to the instruction. Hadaway v. State, 215 Ark. 658, 222 S.W.2d 799 (1949) (decision under prior law).

Substantial evidence negated defendant's claim of self-defense under § 5-2-607(a)(2) in his trial for first degree battery under this section because there was no evidence that the victim was armed when defendant shot him and, although defendant testified that the victim attacked him earlier in the day, there was no evidence of an injury to defendant and defendant testified that he was not afraid of the victim; although defendant testified at trial that he was afraid that the victim was going to attack him at the time that he shot him, defendant never made a similar claim in his statement to the police after the incident. Metcalf v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 55 (2011).

Elements.

There was no violation of defendant's rights under § 5-1-110(a)(4) because when comparing the elements of the two offenses it was evident that the conduct of committing a terroristic act under § 5-13-310 was not a specific instance of conduct constituting first-degree battery under this section. Warren v. State, 103 Ark. App. 124, 286 S.W.3d 768 (2008).

Plain language of this section does not require the State to additionally prove that an offender knew or should have known that his or her victim was a law enforcement officer acting in the line of duty. Because the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant, with the purpose of causing physical injury to another person, caused physical injury to the victim by means of a firearm and that the victim was a law enforcement officer acting in the line of duty, defendant was guilty of a Class Y felony. Boose v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 302 (2017).

Circuit court did not err in allowing the amendment of the battery charge from subdivision (a)(8) of this section to subdivision (a)(4) of this section as the amendment did not change the nature of the charge, just the manner in which the battery took place, and defendant offered no argument of prejudice. Davis v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 496, 532 S.W.3d 589 (2017).

Evidence.

Evidence held sufficient to support conviction. Henry v. State, 125 Ark. 237, 188 S.W. 539 (1916); Hadaway v. State, 215 Ark. 658, 222 S.W.2d 799 (1949); Dickson v. State, 230 Ark. 491, 323 S.W.2d 432 (1959); Williams v. State, 257 Ark. 8, 513 S.W.2d 793 (1974) (preceding decisions under prior law); Henderson v. State, 291 Ark. 138, 722 S.W.2d 842 (1987), cert. denied, Henderson v. Clinton, 493 U.S. 896, 110 S. Ct. 247 (1989); Henderson v. State, 291 Ark. 138, 722 S.W.2d 842 (1987), cert. denied, Henderson v. Clinton, 493 U.S. 896, 110 S. Ct. 247 (1989); Parkman v. State, 294 Ark. 339, 742 S.W.2d 927 (1988); Pharo v. State, 30 Ark. App. 94, 783 S.W.2d 64 (1990); Bangs v. State, 338 Ark. 515, 998 S.W.2d 738 (1999).

Evidence held insufficient to support conviction. Bolden v. State, 267 Ark. 504, 593 S.W.2d 156 (1980).

Evidence held sufficient to establish the elements of “purpose” and “serious physical injury” under subdivision (a)(1). Cook v. State, 2 Ark. App. 278, 621 S.W.2d 224 (1981).

Evidence held sufficient to support the jury's finding that the defendant caused serious physical injury to another person under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life. Nolen v. State, 278 Ark. 17, 643 S.W.2d 257 (1982).

Evidence held sufficient to convict mother of battery in the first degree under subdivision (a)(3) of this section for her abuse of a newborn infant, and for permitting abuse of a child under § 5-27-221. Reams v. State, 45 Ark. App. 7, 870 S.W.2d 404 (1994).

Where the victim, a child, was bathed by defendant and received second-degree burns, the physicians at the hospital determined that the child had sustained an intentionally-inflicted immersion injury in which she was forcibly held in position while immersed in scalding water, and the child still bore scars from the incident two years later, there was substantial evidence to show that the victim sustained a serious physical injury as required by § 5-1-102(19), and defendant's conviction for first degree battery under subdivision (a)(6) was proper. Britt v. State, 83 Ark. App. 117, 118 S.W.3d 140 (2003).

Victim's testimony was sufficient in and of itself to sustain defendant's convictions for aggravated robbery and battery in the first degree because the victim was cross-examined at length by defense counsel regarding the inconsistencies in his testimony but remained adamant that defendant was the person who had come into his house and told him to “break yourself”; in addition, the victim also identified defendant in a photo lineup and identified him again at trial. Mosley v. State, 87 Ark. App. 127, 189 S.W.3d 456 (2004).

In an assault case arising from shaking a baby under subdivision (a)(4)(A) of this section, testimony of defendant's actions toward the same infant two weeks earlier was admissible under Ark. R. Evid. 404(b) and 403 because it was offered to show state of mind and to negate the claim of accident. Smith v. State, 90 Ark. App. 261, 205 S.W.3d 173 (2005).

Defendant's convictions were supported by substantial evidence where it was shown that (1) shortly after the incident, defendant had a blood-alcohol level of .23 percent, (2) defendant was driving the car that hit two women and narrowly missed a third, (3) just before the impact, defendant was witnessed to speed up and actually swerve the vehicle toward the women's path, and (4) defendant drove away after the impact. Estacuy v. State, 94 Ark. App. 183, 228 S.W.3d 567 (2006).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction for first degree battery because defendant drove a fully loaded commercial vehicle weighing over 82,000 pounds while under the influence of methamphetamine, and the entire vehicle, with the exception of the right rear axle, crossed into the oncoming-traffic lane, striking a motor home, and ultimately driving through it. Defendant never attempted to brake prior to the accident or to return to the proper lane of traffic. Hoyle v. State, 371 Ark. 495, 268 S.W.3d 313 (2007), rehearing denied, — Ark. —, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Ark. LEXIS 12 (Jan. 10, 2008).

Evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for first-degree battery under subdivision (a)(8) of this section where defendant purposely fired three times at an occupied truck on a highway; a passenger was struck and seriously injured. There was a presumption that defendant intended the natural and probable consequences of his actions. Spight v. State, 101 Ark. App. 400, 278 S.W.3d 599 (2008).

Evidence that included defendant's firing a shot in the direction of a victim's truck, testimony of two individuals that on separate occasions defendant told them he had shot a man, and defendant's evading the responding police was sufficient to convict defendant of first-degree battery in violation of subdivision (a)(3) of this section. Warren v. State, 103 Ark. App. 124, 286 S.W.3d 768 (2008).

When defendant's infant son was taken to the emergency room, the treating physician found that his broken femur was indicative of child abuse; the infant had fourteen broken rib bones in various stages of healing, and defendant admitted that he would squeeze his son when he got mad. Defendant was convicted of three counts of battery in the second degree in violation of § 5-26-304 and one count of battery in the first degree under subdivision (a)(7) of this section; whether defendant committed serious physical injury under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life was not an issue in the case, because he was not charged under subdivision (a)(3) of this section. Davis v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 573 (2009).

Sufficient evidence supported the conclusion that a defendant intended to cause serious physical harm to a victim: a witness testified that the witness gave defendant a gun, other witnesses testified that defendant shot the victim with that gun, the victim was shot in the arm and hip, which required surgery, and the victim continued to suffer with pain and impairment as a result of the injuries. Hawkins v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 675 (2009).

Where the state's three witnesses testified that defendant threatened to kill the victim during an argument over money, the state proved by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant committed second-degree terroristic threatening under this section. The trial court was free to reject defendant's testimony that he never threatened the victim and was not a violent person; the trial court did not err by revoking his suspended sentence. Whitney v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 726 (2009).

Defendant's conviction of first-degree battery based upon defendant's participation as an accomplice was proper because there was sufficient evidence, including certain statements made by defendant, in addition to accomplice testimony, to support the conviction; defendant's own statement showed that when defendant left a store where a codefendant bought camouflage ski masks defendant knew, at a minimum, that the codefendant was carrying a gun and planning to harm an individual. Porter v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 657, 379 S.W.3d 528 (2010).

Substantial evidence supported defendant's conviction for first-degree battery pursuant to subdivision (a)(3) of this section because the evidence supported the jury's finding that defendant caused serious physical injury to the victim, who was the boyfriend of defendant's daughter, under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life; defendant shot a gun through a door when he knew the victim was directly on the other side of it, and both the victim and the daughter told an investigator that they thought defendant intended to kill the victim and would have done so if the daughter had not called 911. Reed v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 352, 383 S.W.3d 881 (2011).

Defendant, while in a drunken rage, intentionally shot an unarmed person who was 15 feet away and trying to help calm him; the evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude that defendant intended to shoot the victim and cause her harm, rather than to defend himself. Stocker v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 624 (2012).

Evidence was sufficient for aggravated robbery, first-degree battery, and theft of property under $1,000 convictions since defendant's arguments all presented questions of fact and involved the credibility and weight of the evidence, which were matters for the jury to decide; the jury heard all of the evidence, and defense counsel was permitted to cross-examine the witnesses to point out the very weaknesses that defendant complained of on appeal. As to Facebook conversations, the appellate court was able to consider both properly and improperly admitted evidence on a sufficiency of the evidence review. Means v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 643, 476 S.W.3d 168 (2015).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of unlawful discharge of a firearm from a motor vehicle and battery as the victim suffered a serious physical injury. The victim testified that he received three gunshot wounds, was hospitalized, lost a kidney, and suffered further infections as a result of the wound; and the victim's injury caused protracted impairment of his health as the victim testified about the complications that resulted in infection and required him to return to the hospital, receive antibiotics, and have drainage tubes placed in his body. Johnson v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 71, 510 S.W.3d 298 (2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated robbery and first-degree battery because defendant, armed with a deadly weapon, along with the accomplice, forced his way into the victim's home and demanded marijuana, shot the victim when he did not produce marijuana, and stole a pair of the victim's shoes and a box of shotgun shells; the jury could conclude that a backpack and a cell phone belonged to defendant, or at least were used by him, and connected him with the shooting; and substantial evidence supported a determination that the juvenile was not an accomplice, that his testimony tended to connect defendant to the robbery and battery, and that his testimony independently established the commission of those crimes. West v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 416, 530 S.W.3d 355 (2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of first-degree battery as the finding that defendant fired the shots with the purpose of causing physical injury to someone was supported by substantial evidence; the testimony established that defendant entered the office, verbally threatened to kill the victims, fired his weapon repeatedly, shot his employer in the head, chased at least one of the victims out of the office while shooting at him, and was standing in the parking lot still armed with the gun when the officers arrived. Martinez v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 187, 545 S.W.3d 264 (2018).

In a circumstantial evidence case, defendant's conviction for first-degree battery related to an infant's injuries had to be reversed because the State failed to exclude every other reasonable hypothesis; on the evidence, it was just as reasonable to conclude that the infant's mother was the perpetrator since defendant and the mother both had access to the infant. Snow v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 612, 568 S.W.3d 290 (2018).

Federal Law.

Defendant's prior conviction of first-degree battery under subdivision (a)(8) of this section was a violent felony under the force clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i); defendant was charged with purposefully causing physical injury to a person with a firearm. United States v. Eason, 907 F.3d 554 (8th Cir. 2018).

Firearm.

The clear intent of § 5-13-201(a)(7) is to criminalize and treat as battery in the first-degree any physical injury caused by use of a firearm as a firearm because of the inherent potentially deadly character of the discharge of a firearm, and the subdivision is not intended to include an injury such as clubbing; the plain and ordinary meaning of “by means of a firearm” is that the firearm be used as a firearm. Smith v. State, 352 Ark. 92, 98 S.W.3d 433 (2003).

Information.

State's amendment of an information did not violate § 16-85-407 because the amendment did not constitute a severance of offenses under Ark. R. Crim. P. 22.1(c), and the evidence would have been introduced in any case as part of the events leading up to the shooting whether it was included in the charging instrument or not; the only offense charged in the case was first-degree battery under subdivision (a)(3) of this rule, and the amendment did not change the nature or degree of the crime but merely clarified the manner in which the offense was committed. Reed v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 352, 383 S.W.3d 881 (2011).

Instructions.

The offense of first-degree battery was properly submitted to the jury on instruction since the jury could reasonably find that shooting a person in the mouth creates a substantial risk of death; court's refusal to submit the lesser included offense of third-degree battery, even if error, was cured by the jury's choice of first-degree rather than second-degree battery, which was also submitted. Jones v. State, 282 Ark. 56, 665 S.W.2d 876 (1984).

Where the medical examiner presented a detailed analysis of the injuries sustained by the victims and asserted that they constituted “serious physical injury,” one of the elements of battery in first degree, but doctors called by the defense disputed the examiner's findings, insisting that neither victim suffered serious physical injury within the statutory definitions, it would have been reversible error had the trial court refused to give the instruction on the lesser included offenses of second and third-degree battery because evidence was presented tending to disapprove one of the elements of the larger offense. Hinson v. State, 18 Ark. App. 14, 709 S.W.2d 106 (1986).

State's impeachment of defendant with remarks made by defendant's attorney during opening statement held not an abuse of discretion. Fisher v. State, 290 Ark. 490, 720 S.W.2d 900 (1986).

Circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's second-degree battery instruction because the offense charged was first-degree battery pursuant to subdivision (a)(3) of this section, and the jury was not required to find that defendant employed a firearm in order to convict him of that offense, nor was the jury required to apply the firearm enhancement if it convicted defendant of first-degree battery; the firearm enhancement was not an element of the first-degree-battery offense but was an additional sentence authorized by statute if defendant was convicted of first-degree battery, and the jury determined that defendant employed a firearm during commission of that offense. Reed v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 352, 383 S.W.3d 881 (2011).

Where a defendant appealed his conviction for first-degree battery, a trial court abused its discretion in failing to instruct the jury on third-degree battery since there was some evidence to support such an instruction. The defendant testified that he did not mean to drop the infant on her head and that it was an accident, and an expert offered his opinion that a baby's skull could be fractured by a fall such as the one described by the defendant. Washington v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 122 (2014).

Defendant, convicted of first-degree battery (law enforcement officer), failed to show that the jury instruction violated the principle established in Apprendi because the jury was specifically instructed that it was required to make a finding about the circumstances of the offense as directed on the verdict form if it found defendant guilty of battery in the first degree; the trial court then read the verdict form verbatim to the jury, specifically instructing that the jury was required to indicate whether it found beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim was a law enforcement officer. Boose v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 302 (2017).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give a proffered jury instruction that defendant knew or reasonably should have known he was shooting at a law enforcement officer because the plain language of this section does not require the State to prove that an offender knew or should have known that his or her victim was a law enforcement officer. Boose v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 302 (2017).

Defendant's contention that the trial court's refusal to include his proffered jury instruction was a violation of his due-process rights was unsupported by any citation to authority applicable to the facts. Boose v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 302 (2017).

Judicial Review.

On appeal from conviction of first-degree battery, the appellate court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the state in determining whether there is substantial evidence to support the verdict of guilty. Bolden v. State, 267 Ark. 504, 593 S.W.2d 156 (1980).

Lesser Included Offenses.

For cases discussing battery as a lesser included offense of robbery, see Britt v. State, 261 Ark. 488, 549 S.W.2d 84 (1977); Foster v. State, 275 Ark. 427, 631 S.W.2d 7 (1982); Akins v. State, 278 Ark. 180, 644 S.W.2d 273 (1983); Sanders v. State, 279 Ark. 32, 648 S.W.2d 451 (1983); Robinson v. State, 279 Ark. 61, 648 S.W.2d 446 (1983); Thomas v. State, 280 Ark. 593, 660 S.W.2d 169 (1983); Williams v. State, 11 Ark. App. 11, 665 S.W.2d 299 (1984).

One defendant was properly charged only with first-degree battery, since there was no basis for a conviction of the lesser degrees of battery, but the second defendant should have been also allowed a jury instruction on second-degree battery, since it could reasonably be found that he had acted recklessly but not purposely. Sbabo v. State, 264 Ark. 497, 572 S.W.2d 585 (1978).

The mere fact that the jury convicted the defendant of manslaughter, which required proof of reckless conduct, did not require a conclusion that the jury could not also have found him guilty of first-degree battery, an offense that requires a more culpable mental state, with respect to the survivor of the automobile accident that the defendant caused. Nolen v. State, 278 Ark. 17, 643 S.W.2d 257 (1982).

Because battery in the second degree is a lesser included offense of battery in the first degree, there was no inconsistency in holding one codefendant guilty of being an accomplice to the former offense while holding the other codefendant guilty of the latter offense. Blann v. State, 15 Ark. App. 364, 695 S.W.2d 382 (1985).

Where the defendant was armed with a gun and inflicted serious injury on the victim, first degree battery was a lesser included offense of aggravated robbery. Trotter v. State, 290 Ark. 269, 719 S.W.2d 268 (1986), overruled, Smith v. State, 292 Ark. 162, 729 S.W.2d 5 (1987).

The Supreme Court fixed the punishment at the maximum for the crime of first degree battery, where there was insufficient evidence for the crime of aggravated robbery, but sufficient for the lesser offense of first degree battery. Trotter v. State, 290 Ark. 269, 719 S.W.2d 268 (1986), overruled, Smith v. State, 292 Ark. 162, 729 S.W.2d 5 (1987).

First degree battery is a lesser included offense of aggravated robbery. Carter v. Flintrol, Inc., 19 Ark. App. 317, 720 S.W.2d 337 (1986), superseded by statute as stated in, Service Chevrolet v. Atwood, 61 Ark. App. 190, 966 S.W.2d 909 (1998).

Battery in the first degree is distinguishable from aggravated robbery in that (1) the battery offense requires serious physical injury to another, while aggravated robbery does not, and (2) aggravated robbery requires the purpose of committing robbery while being armed with a deadly weapon, or the representation that one is so armed, while first-degree battery, by statutory definition, requires neither of these two elements. Consequently, defendant can be prosecuted for both offenses. Robinson v. Lockhart, 823 F.2d 210 (8th Cir. 1987).

First-degree battery and aggravated assault are not lesser included offenses of reckless driving and are not the same offenses for double jeopardy purposes. Sherman v. State, 326 Ark. 153, 931 S.W.2d 417 (1996).

In a first-degree battery case, a trial court did not err by refusing to give an instruction on second-degree battery because it was not a lesser included offense; both alternatives given in the proffered instruction required an additional element, serious physical injury, that was not required in the first-degree battery instruction that was given, which only required physical injury when the injury was caused by a firearm. Further, the proffered instruction was not a lesser included offense because the offense was not an attempt offense, and the proffered instruction did not differ from the offense charged only in the respect that a less serious injury to the same person sufficed to establish the offense's commission. Spight v. State, 101 Ark. App. 400, 278 S.W.3d 599 (2008).

During parents' trial for first-degree battery against their infant, in violation of subdivision (a)(9) of this section, the court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of third-degree battery because the physical injury the infant sustained could only be described as serious; the infant was severely malnourished to the point of starvation and death would have occurred within days without medical attention. Bruner v. State, 2013 Ark. 68, 426 S.W.3d 386 (2013).

Maiming.

Under former section defining the offense of maiming, it was implied that the act being unlawful in itself was evidence of a malicious intent and it was immaterial by what means or with what instrument the injury was effected or whether the party was deprived of the use of a limb or member or rendered permanently lame or whether his bodily vigor was merely affected by his strength, activity or the like being decreased. Baker v. State, 4 Ark. 56 (1841) (decision under prior law).

Multiple Convictions.

There was no violation of defendant's rights under § 5-1-110(a)(4) because when comparing the elements of the two offenses it was evident that the conduct of committing a terroristic act under § 5-13-310 was not a specific instance of conduct constituting first-degree battery under this section. Warren v. State, 103 Ark. App. 124, 286 S.W.3d 768 (2008).

Trial court properly denied appellant postconviction relief because he failed to show a double-jeopardy violation arising out of the charges for commission of a terroristic act, criminal attempt to commit first-degree battery, and aggravated assault; there were six separate criminal violations resulting from six separate impulses in the firing of six separate shots. Lee v. State, 2017 Ark. 337, 532 S.W.3d 43 (2017).

Physical Injury.

The evidence failed to show that defendant caused a victim serious physical injury as required by § 5-13-201(a)(1) or § 5-1-102(19) or physical injury by means of a firearm as required by § 5-13-201(a)(7), even though defendant hit the victim with the butt of a pistol, where the injury did not require stitches, and striking a person in such a manner did not constitute injury to another person by means of a firearm under § 5-13-201(a)(7); this injury was covered by § 5-13-202(a)(1). Smith v. State, 352 Ark. 92, 98 S.W.3d 433 (2003).

Evidence that defendant participated in kicking a 14-year-old victim while he was lying on the ground after having his two front teeth knocked out by one of defendant's fellow assailants, was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for first-degree battery in violation of subdivision (a)(3) of this section. Williamson v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 73, 381 S.W.3d 134 (2011).

Evidence was sufficient to show that a baby sustained a serious physical injury for purposes of subdivision (a)(9) of this section where the medical testimony described the skull fracture, the pain potentially caused by the subdural bleeding, and the greater risk of developing further complications. Suchey v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 225, 490 S.W.3d 320 (2016).

Poison.

There was substantial evidence to support conviction upon finding that poisoning of victim resulted in serious injury, posing a substantial risk of death. Weaver v. State, 324 Ark. 290, 920 S.W.2d 491 (1996).

Second-degree Battery.

The phrase “under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life” contained in subdivision (a)(3) of this section is what distinguishes conduct constituting first-degree battery from that of second-degree battery; giving the phrase its plain meaning, the circumstances of first-degree battery must by necessity be more dire and formidable in terms of affecting human life. Tigue v. State, 319 Ark. 147, 889 S.W.2d 760 (1994).

Where defendant held child-victim's hands under hot water for long enough to cause second- and third-degree burns, victim suffered a “serious physical injury,” as defined in § 5-1-102(19), but because defendant lacked the mental state required for first-degree battery, defendant was guilty of second-degree battery. Tigue v. State, 319 Ark. 147, 889 S.W.2d 760 (1994).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that defendant, charged with first-degree battery, was not entitled to a second-degree battery instruction under § 5-13-202(a)(1) because defendant provided no rational basis for a second-degree battery instruction, as (1) the victim's bullet wounds creating a substantial risk of death were a serious injury, (2) defendant's claim that the victim's injury was not serious was no basis for the instruction, as first- and second-degree battery both required a serious physical injury, and (3) evidence that defendant shot the victim in the neck and in the back as the victim fled showed intent to inflict serious physical injury. Dixon v. State, 2019 Ark. 245, 581 S.W.3d 505 (2019).

Violation of Probation.

Circuit court properly revoked defendant's probation and sentenced him to four years because he committed the new offense of first-degree battery; although the victim testified that he was high on drugs on the night he was attacked, that he believed his dog speaks to him, and that he believed he had been diagnosed with some form of mental illness, the victim's unrefuted testimony was that when he refused to shake defendant's hand, defendant stabbed him in the chest, which resulted in a punctured lung and a five-day hospital stay. Turner v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 682, 537 S.W.3d 299 (2017).

Violation of Suspension.

State clearly showed that defendant was significantly delinquent in paying his court-ordered restitution, and he offered no reasonable excuse, plus, although only one violation was necessary to revoke the suspension, the State further showed that defendant violated his conditions by committing first-degree battery, and thus the decision to revoke defendant's suspended sentence was not clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Sherril v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 411, 439 S.W.3d 76 (2014).

Cited: Austin v. State, 264 Ark. 318, 571 S.W.2d 584 (1978); Thomas v. State, 266 Ark. 162, 583 S.W.2d 32 (1979); Spratt v. State, 267 Ark. 687, 590 S.W.2d 65 (Ct. App. 1979); Mize v. State, 267 Ark. 743, 590 S.W.2d 75 (Ct. App. 1979); Williams v. State, 267 Ark. 527, 593 S.W.2d 8 (1980); Spillers v. State, 268 Ark. 217, 595 S.W.2d 650 (1980); Brown v. State, 278 Ark. 604, 648 S.W.2d 67 (1983); Lum v. State, 281 Ark. 495, 665 S.W.2d 265 (1984); Dudley v. State, 285 Ark. 160, 685 S.W.2d 170 (1985); Collins v. Lockhart, 771 F.2d 1580 (8th Cir. 1985); Wilson v. State, 289 Ark. 141, 712 S.W.2d 654 (1986); Ward v. State, 20 Ark. App. 172, 726 S.W.2d 289 (1987); Duhon v. State, 299 Ark. 503, 774 S.W.2d 830 (1989); Bates v. Bates, 303 Ark. 89, 793 S.W.2d 788 (1990); Hutcherson v. State, 34 Ark. App. 113, 806 S.W.2d 29 (1991); Smith v. Lockhart, 923 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1991); Nelson v. State, 324 Ark. 404, 921 S.W.2d 593 (1996); Meeks v. State, 55 Ark. App. 220, 936 S.W.2d 555 (1996); Steggall v. State, 340 Ark. 184, 8 S.W.3d 538 (2000); Harmon v. State, 340 Ark. 18, 8 S.W.3d 472 (2000); Misenheimer v. State, 100 Ark. App. 189, 265 S.W.3d 764 (2007).