The definition of an offense that excludes conduct with a spouse shall not be construed to preclude accomplice liability of a spouse.
When the criminality of conduct depends on a child's being below fourteen (14) years of age and the actor is twenty (20) years of age or older, it is no defense that the actor:
Did not know the age of the child; or
Reasonably believed the child to be fourteen (14) years of age or older.
When criminality of conduct depends on a child's being below fourteen (14) years of age and the actor is under twenty (20) years of age, it is an affirmative defense that the actor reasonably believed the child to be of the critical age or above.
However, the actor may be guilty of the lesser offense defined by the age that the actor reasonably believed the child to be.
When criminality of conduct depends on a child's being below a critical age older than fourteen (14) years, it is an affirmative defense that the actor reasonably believed the child to be of the critical age or above.
However, the actor may be guilty of the lesser offense defined by the age that the actor reasonably believed the child to be.
When criminality of conduct depends on a victim's being incapable of consent because he or she is mentally defective or mentally incapacitated, it is an affirmative defense that the actor reasonably believed that the victim was capable of consent.
Survey of Legislation, 2003 Arkansas General Assembly, Criminal Law, Sexual Offenses, 26 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 372.
Case Notes
Affirmative Defenses.
Defendant's due process rights were not violated by trial court's refusal to allow the introduction of a mistake-of-age defense in a rape trial because the legislature had the authority to define crimes and defenses; moreover, there were exceptions to the rule that every crime was required to contain a mens rea element. Gaines v. State, 354 Ark. 89, 118 S.W.3d 102 (2003).
In a proceeding regarding placement on a child maltreatment registry, evidence that there was a mistake of age did not negate the finding of child maltreatment.
C.C.B. v. Ark. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 368 Ark. 540, 247 S.W.3d 870 (2007).
Appellant's sexual assault conviction under § 5-14-127(a)(3) was affirmed where his argument that he reasonably believed that the victim was older than 16 was an affirmative defense under § 5-14-102(d)(1) and thus, the trial court properly concluded that he, rather than the State, bore the burden of proof under § 5-1-111(d)(1).
Wright v. State, 98 Ark. App. 271, 254 S.W.3d 755 (2007).
Court rejected petitioner's contention that the reasonable mistake of age defense in subsection (d) of this section violated the Due Process Clause by shifting the burden of proof on an essential element to the defendant; if the Arkansas statute employed a strict-liability standard concerning the victim's age, then the state retained the burden of proving all elements of the offense, and no further facts are either presumed or inferred in order to constitute the crime (the defendant's reasonable ignorance of the victim's age would therefore mitigate the offense, not rebut a presumed element).
Neely v. McDaniel, 677 F.3d 346 (8th Cir. 2012), rehearing denied, — F.3d —, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 12159 (8th Cir. Ark. June 14, 2012).
Petitioner was properly placed on the Arkansas Child Maltreatment Central Registry; the administrative hearing was not untimely because the petitioner requested a continuance and the ensuing delay was attributable to him; moreover, the ALJ did not err by failing to consider evidence of an affirmative defense because the petitioner, at the age of eighteen, engaged in sexual intercourse with a girl who was fourteen, which was sexual abuse, and even though the child testified that she told the petitioner that she was sixteen years old, it was not sufficient to negate the finding of child maltreatment.
Marrufo v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2013 Ark. 323, 429 S.W.3d 210 (2013).
Intent.
Sexual molestation is an intentional act as a matter of law. Silverball Amusement, Inc. v. Utah Home Fire Ins. Co., 842 F. Supp. 1151 (W.D. Ark.), aff'd, 33 F.3d 1476 (8th Cir. Ark. 1994).
Short v. State, 79 S.W.3d 313 (Ark. 2002). · cites it 20ד” Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-102 (b) (Repl. 1997).”
Gaines v. State, 118 S.W.3d 102 (Ark. 2003). · cites it 12דIn addition, we hold that Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-102 (b) (Repl. 1997), which prohibits a mistake-of-age defense, does not violate Gaines’s right to due process and a fair trial as guaranteed by the United States Constitution and the Arkansas Constitution.”
Stewart v. State, 423 S.W.3d 69 (Ark. 2012). · cites it 4דOn appeal, appellant cites to Ark.Code Ann. § 5-14-102(e) (Repl.2006), which provides that when the criminality of conduct depends on a victim’s being incapable of consent because he or she is mentally defective or mentally incapacitated, it is an affirmative | fidefense that…”
Ridling v. State, 72 S.W.3d 466 (Ark. 2002). · cites it 4דThe prosecutor cited Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-102 (b) (Repl. 1997), which specifically provides that “[wjhen the criminality of conduct depends on a child being below the age of fourteen (14) years, it is no defense that the actor did not know the age of the child, or reasonably…”
Hopkins v. Jegley, 267 F. Supp. 3d 1024 (E.D. Ark. 2017). · cites it 2דProof of *1087 intent regarding the victim's age is not required because statutory rape is a strict liability crime, although there are certain affirmative defenses available depending on the age of the accused.”
Sansevero v. State, 45 S.W.3d 840 (Ark. 2001). · cites it 2דSee Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-102 (b) (Repl. 1997).”
United States v. Wilson, 66 M.J. 39 (C.A.A.F. 2008). “§ 45-5-511 (2007); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-9-11 (West 2007); N.”
Garnett v. State, 632 A.2d 797 (Md. 1993). “) (age 14); Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-102 (1987) (age 14); Col.”
Neely v. McDaniel, 677 F.3d 346 (8th Cir. 2012). · cites it 2דHe further asserts that although Arkansas law offers an affirmative defense for individuals who “reasonably believed the child to be of the critical age or over” when “criminality of conduct depends on a child’s being below a critical age older than fourteen,” Ark.Code Ann. §…”
Wright v. State, 254 S.W.3d 755 (Ark. Ct. App. 2007). · cites it 2דArkansas Code-Annotated section 5-14-102(d)(l) (Supp. 2005) provides that “when criminality of conduct depends on a child’s age being below a critical age older than fourteen (14) years, it is an affirmative defense that the actor reasonably believed the child to be of the…”
C.C.B. v. Arkansas Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 247 S.W.3d 870 (Ark. 2007). · cites it 2דwas not a violation of any law, as evidenced by the General Assembly’s enactment of Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-102 (Repl. 2003), that provides an affirmative defense based on mistake of age where the child is younger than thirteen and the actor is younger than twenty, as was the case…”
Short v. State, 79 S.W.3d 313 (Ark. 2002). “” Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-102 (b) (Repl. 1997).”
Gaines v. State, 118 S.W.3d 102 (Ark. 2003). “In addition, we hold that Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-102 (b) (Repl. 1997), which prohibits a mistake-of-age defense, does not violate Gaines’s right to due process and a fair trial as guaranteed by the United States Constitution and the Arkansas Constitution.”
Ridling v. State, 72 S.W.3d 466 (Ark. 2002). “The prosecutor cited Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-102 (b) (Repl. 1997), which specifically provides that “[wjhen the criminality of conduct depends on a child being below the age of fourteen (14) years, it is no defense that the actor did not know the age of the child, or reasonably…”
— Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-102(d)(1) — 4 cases
Neely v. McDaniel, 677 F.3d 346 (8th Cir. 2012). “He further asserts that although Arkansas law offers an affirmative defense for individuals who “reasonably believed the child to be of the critical age or over” when “criminality of conduct depends on a child’s being below a critical age older than fourteen,” Ark.Code Ann. §…”
Wright v. State, 254 S.W.3d 755 (Ark. Ct. App. 2007). “Arkansas Code-Annotated section 5-14-102(d)(l) (Supp. 2005) provides that “when criminality of conduct depends on a child’s age being below a critical age older than fourteen (14) years, it is an affirmative defense that the actor reasonably believed the child to be of the…”
— Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-102(e) — 1 case
Stewart v. State, 423 S.W.3d 69 (Ark. 2012). “On appeal, appellant cites to Ark.Code Ann. § 5-14-102(e) (Repl.2006), which provides that when the criminality of conduct depends on a victim’s being incapable of consent because he or she is mentally defective or mentally incapacitated, it is an affirmative | fidefense that…”
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