Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-302 (2026)

Research References

ALR.

Amnesia as Affecting Defendant's Competency to Stand Trial. 100 A.L.R.6th 535 (2014).

Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) as Defense to Murder, Assault, or other Violent Crime. 4 A.L.R.7th Art. 5 (2015).

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Survey of Legislation, 2001 Arkansas General Assembly, Criminal Law, 24 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 429.

Case Notes

Construction.

This section, which precludes trial, conviction, or sentencing of a person who lacks capacity to understand the proceedings or assist in his defense, does not conflict with § 5-2-313 which specifically provides for a judgment of acquittal of such person. Stover v. Hamilton, 270 Ark. 310, 604 S.W.2d 934 (1980).

Amnesia.

Amnesia or lack of memory is not an adequate ground for holding a defendant incompetent to stand trial. Lawrence v. State, 39 Ark. App. 39, 839 S.W.2d 10 (1992).

Burden of Proof.

A defendant in a criminal case is ordinarily presumed to be mentally competent to stand trial, and the burden of proving incompetence is upon the defendant. Mask v. State, 314 Ark. 25, 869 S.W.2d 1 (1993).

Competency.

In order to be competent to stand trial, a defendant must have the capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings brought against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in the preparation of his defense. Addison v. State, 298 Ark. 1, 765 S.W.2d 566 (1989), overruled, State v. Bell, 329 Ark. 422, 948 S.W.2d 557 (1997).

For a finding of fitness to stand trial, this section does not require that the accused be able to identify with specificity the charges filed against him or her, as in the distinction between first degree murder and capital murder, instead it requires only that the accused understand the proceedings. Key v. State, 325 Ark. 73, 923 S.W.2d 865 (1996).

A criminal defendant is presumed to be competent, and the burden of proving incompetence is on the accused; the test of competency to stand trial is whether a defendant has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and whether he has a rational, as well as factual, understanding of the proceedings against him. Haynes v. State, 346 Ark. 388, 58 S.W.3d 336 (2001).

Where physician testified the only disorder defendant suffered from was antisocial personality disorder and that defendant understood the charges against him, as well as the role of the trial judge, prosecutor, and defense counsel, and where the record revealed that defendant stated in open court that he had instructed his attorneys to file a motion to dismiss and in another instance wrote a letter to the trial judge seeking new counsel and discussing the nature of judicial proceedings, the trial court did not err in finding defendant competent to stand trial. Ware v. State, 348 Ark. 181, 75 S.W.3d 165 (2002).

Where doctor determined that defendant demonstrated a fully-developed, persecutory-type delusion, the court suspended defendant's trial for attempting to commit capital murder and did not proceed until his fitness was restored; at that time, two doctors testified that defendant did not lack the capacity to understand the proceedings against him and to assist effectively in his own defense. Steward v. State, 95 Ark. App. 6, 233 S.W.3d 180 (2006).

Determination of defendant's capacity was supported by credible testimony of a qualified medical expert that defendant, despite some mental illness, understood the proceedings sufficiently to assist counsel in defendant's defense. Bayless v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 456 (2010).

Trial court erred under subsection (a) of this section in denying defendant's petition for writ of error coram nobis because the record overwhelmingly illustrated that his cognitive deficits and mental illnesses interfered with his ability to effectively and rationally assist counsel during his murder trial. Newman v. State, 2014 Ark. 7 (2014), appeal dismissed, 2017 Ark. 257, 525 S.W.3d 457 (2017).

There was no evidence to suggest incompetency other than the fact that defendant rambled, had an unusual speech pattern, and testified to irrelevant matters, which was insufficient to require the trial court to sua sponte halt the proceedings and order a competency evaluation. Thus, defendant could not avail himself of the exception to the rule that a court would not address arguments raised for the first time on appeal, and as he failed to raise the issue below, and the trial court was not obligated to raise it sua sponte, the revocation of probation was affirmed. Lewis v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 503, 505 S.W.3d 725 (2016).

There was no abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of defendant's request for a second mental evaluation; in the first evaluation conducted by a doctor at the state hospital, defendant was found to be competent to stand trial, and the doctor testified at trial that after talking with defendant that day his opinion had not changed. Hamilton v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 447, 526 S.W.3d 859 (2017) (decision under prior law).

Due Process.

The conviction of an accused while he is legally incompetent to stand trial violates due process. Addison v. State, 298 Ark. 1, 765 S.W.2d 566 (1989), overruled, State v. Bell, 329 Ark. 422, 948 S.W.2d 557 (1997).

Where evidence showed that defendant was delusional while on trial, the trial judge should have halted the trial and made a new determination of competency; while the failure to hold a further competency hearing violated due process, the proper remedy was not to grant the writ of habeas corpus, but to conduct a post-conviction competency hearing. Reynolds v. Norris, 86 F.3d 796 (8th Cir. 1996).

Evidence.

Trial court did not err by finding defendant competent to stand trial where an uncontradicted report stated defendant was able to understand the proceedings against him and assist in his own defense. Mask v. State, 314 Ark. 25, 869 S.W.2d 1 (1993).

Despite conflicting expert testimony, trial court's determination of defendant's competency stands if there is substantial evidence to support the court's finding. Mauppin v. State, 314 Ark. 566, 865 S.W.2d 270 (1993).

Evidence supported the court's ruling of competency. Mitchell v. State, 323 Ark. 116, 913 S.W.2d 264 (1996), overruled, MacKintrush v. State, 334 Ark. 390, 978 S.W.2d 293 (1998).

Intoxication.

A person who is so intoxicated as to be unable to understand the proceedings or effectively participate in his defense ought not to be tried until that incapacity has been removed. Meekins v. State, 34 Ark. App. 67, 806 S.W.2d 9 (1991).

Although defendant's blood alcohol level registered at a level higher than that required to presume intoxication when tested before entering the court room for trial, neither a continuance nor mistrial were required where defendant appeared to be coherent and able to assist counsel, and where defense counsel failed to renew motion for a continuance at any time during the trial after having full opportunity to observe and confer with his client. Meekins v. State, 34 Ark. App. 67, 806 S.W.2d 9 (1991).

Jurisdiction.

Where the accused was never acquitted by the circuit court, but was found to be unable to cooperate effectively with his attorney in the preparation of his defense and the proceedings against him were suspended, the circuit court never lost jurisdiction to the probate court. Mauppin v. State, 309 Ark. 235, 831 S.W.2d 104 (1992).

Circuit court did not have jurisdiction to reconsider its decision dismissing the charges against defendant and to set the case for a status hearing on defendant's fitness for trial where the State filed neither a motion nor an appeal within 30 days of entry of the order of dismissal. Rosales-Almenar v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 678 (2017).

Review.

On review of a finding of fitness to stand trial, the appellate court will affirm if there is substantial evidence to support the trial court's finding. Key v. State, 325 Ark. 73, 923 S.W.2d 865 (1996).

Trial court did not err by failing to sua sponte order a competency hearing because both the State’s expert and defendant’s expert agreed prior to trial that defendant had no mental defect and was fit to stand trial, the defense never requested that defendant be reevaluated, the trial court was not unreasonable in believing that defendant had the capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings despite exhibiting some bizarre behavior, and there was not evidence that defendant was unable to consult with counsel. Britton v. State, 2014 Ark. 192, 433 S.W.3d 856 (2014).

Circuit court order denying appellant's motion for mental evaluation was reversed where the original record contained only the circuit court's orders that did not include any findings, the recollections of what had taken place were not definitive, and a filed, written order was not provided; thus, there was nothing in the record or supplemented record to determine on what basis the circuit court had made its decision to deny the mental evaluation and find appellant competent to proceed. Watson v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 169, 547 S.W.3d 89 (2018).

Cited: Branham v. State, 274 Ark. 109, 623 S.W.2d 1 (1981); Jacobs v. State, 294 Ark. 551, 744 S.W.2d 728 (1988); Rankin v. State, 329 Ark. 379, 948 S.W.2d 397 (1997); Smith v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 104, 380 S.W.3d 524 (2011).