Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-614 (2026)

Case Notes

Administration of Force.

Where defendant acted too hastily and without due care in killing one whom he thought was about to assault him, he was guilty of manslaughter, and not justifiable or excusable homicide. Bruder v. State, 110 Ark. 402, 161 S.W. 1067 (1913) (decision under prior law).

One who slew another under the honest belief that his life or limb was in imminent peril and committed the act to prevent the apprehended danger was in the exercise of a lawful act, but unless he acted with due caution and circumspection, he was guilty of manslaughter. Deatherage v. State, 194 Ark. 513, 108 S.W.2d 904 (1937) (decision under prior law).

The actor must have a “reasonable belief” that the situation necessitates the defensive force employed; in addition, the defense in available only to one who acts reasonably in administering such force. Kendrick v. State, 6 Ark. App. 427, 644 S.W.2d 297 (1982).

Instructions.

It was proper for court to give instruction which was practically in language of former section which precluded bare fear of offenses from justifying a homicide. Lamb v. State, 218 Ark. 602, 238 S.W.2d 99 (1951) (decision under prior law).

Instruction based on § 5-2-607 rather than defendant's proffered instruction based on this section held proper. Kendrick v. State, 6 Ark. App. 427, 644 S.W.2d 297 (1982).

Where proffered instruction omitted the phrase “is necessary for any of the purposes justifying that use of force under this subchapter,” which appears in subsection (a), such instruction did not correctly state the law, the trial court did not err in refusing to give it. Kemp v. State, 324 Ark. 178, 919 S.W.2d 943, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 982, 117 S. Ct. 436, 136 L. Ed. 2d 334 (1996).

Based upon the evidence presented at trial, there was no rational basis for the “imperfect self-defense” instruction where defendant left the residence, armed himself with a gun, returned to the residence, and opened fire upon entering the front door; therefore, defendant could not rationally argue that he recklessly or negligently formed the belief that the use of deadly force was necessary to protect himself. Kemp v. State, 348 Ark. 750, 74 S.W.3d 224 (2002).

While §§ 5-2-606 and 5-2-607 stated that the defendant was justified in using force or deadly force only if he reasonably believed that the situation necessitated the defensive force employed, both first-degree and second-degree assault were committed if defendant acted recklessly, under §§ 5-13-205 and 5-13-206, and this section provided that justification was not available as a defense to an offense for which recklessness suffices to establish culpability; therefore, defendant was not entitled to self-defense or justification instructions with regard to his charges for first and second-degree assault. Merritt v. State, 82 Ark. App. 351, 107 S.W.3d 894 (2003).

There was no abuse of discretion in a trial court's refusal of defendant's proffered imperfect self-defense jury instruction because there was no rational basis for the instruction where the only basis for the instruction was defendant's self-serving statements or testimony, contradicted by other witnesses. Norris v. State, 2010 Ark. 174, 368 S.W.3d 52 (2010), rehearing denied, — Ark. —, — S.W.3d —, 2010 Ark. LEXIS 292 (May 20, 2010).

Circuit properly refused to give an instruction based on imperfect self-defense where there was no evidence that the victim appeared to be armed or that he had made any threats to indicate that he was armed, and defendant denied that the victim had threatened him with bodily harm. Schnarr v. State, 2017 Ark. 10 (2017).

Circuit court properly denied appellant's petition for postconviction relief because trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to request a non-model jury instruction on imperfect self-defense pursuant to this section. Nelson v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 583, 566 S.W.3d 530 (2018).

Reasonable Belief.

It must have appeared that the circumstances were sufficient to have excited the fears of a reasonably prudent person; a bare fear that deceased would commit the act, to prevent which the homicide was committed, was not sufficient. Plumley v. State, 116 Ark. 17, 171 S.W. 925 (1914) (decision under prior law).

Where the defendant fired the fatal shot under the belief that it was necessary in order to protect himself from great harm, and he fired the shot for that purpose, he should be acquitted, although the jury believed that the accused was mistaken in his conclusion as to the danger to himself. Biddle v. State, 131 Ark. 537, 199 S.W. 913 (1917) (decision under prior law).

Instruction regarding fear sufficient to justify killing was not improper nor in conflict with instruction on self-defense. Young v. State, 206 Ark. 19, 176 S.W.2d 151 (1943) (decision under prior law).

In murder prosecution, trial court did not err in refusing to give requested jury instruction that the degree of force used in self-defense is presumed reasonable when a person is in his own home and, instead, submitting to the jury AMCI 4105 concerning reasonable belief. Jewell v. State, 38 Ark. App. 254, 832 S.W.2d 856 (1992).

In a trial for manslaughter under § 5-10-104, the circuit court erred when it did not instruct the jury on justification because, under this section, if defendant was reckless or negligent in forming the belief that force was necessary, then, and only then, was the defense unavailable; however, if defendant was not reckless or negligent in forming his belief, the defense was available, and that was a decision for the jury. Schnarr v. State, 2018 Ark. 333, 561 S.W.3d 308 (2018).

Denial of the justification is not triggered until culpability is determined. Prohibiting a justification defense because the charged offense involves recklessness would be premature as it is for the jury to determine culpability. Schnarr v. State, 2018 Ark. 333, 561 S.W.3d 308 (2018).

Plain language of this section provides that once the jury determines whether a defendant has been reckless or negligent in forming the belief that force is necessary, then the applicability of the justification defense is determined. Schnarr v. State, 2018 Ark. 333, 561 S.W.3d 308 (2018).

Justification is not an affirmative defense that must be pleaded but becomes a defense when any evidence tending to support its existence is offered to support it; a justification, such as self-defense, is considered an element of the offense under § 5-1-102(5)(C), and once raised, it must be disproved by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt. Schnarr v. State, 2018 Ark. 333, 561 S.W.3d 308 (2018).