Ark. Code Ann. § 5-3-201 (2026)

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Case Note, Criminal Liability for Attempting to Inflict the AIDS Virus: Possibilities in Arkansas' Future, 45 Ark. L. Rev. 505.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey — Criminal Law, 10 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 137.

Case Notes

Applicability.

This section states that a person commits the criminal act of attempt when his conduct constitutes a substantial step intended to result in the commission of an offense; it does not exclude any crimes from its application, nor does it list any crimes to which it applies. Mitchell v. State, 290 Ark. 87, 717 S.W.2d 195 (1986).

Appeal.

Defendant's motion for acquittal on the attempted rape charge addressed the “substantial step” element of the crime and was therefore specific enough to preserve the issue on appeal. Daffron v. State, 318 Ark. 182, 885 S.W.2d 3 (1994).

Attempted Aggravated Robbery.

Jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of attempted aggravated robbery was not warranted because there was no evidence of the offense of attempt under subdivision (a)(2) of this section; when appellant stormed out of a retail store's stockroom brandishing a gun and pointing it employees, he actually completed the offense of aggravated robbery. Thomas v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 466, 422 S.W.3d 217 (2012).

Attempted Battery.

Attempted battery is a crime under this section. Mitchell v. State, 290 Ark. 87, 717 S.W.2d 195 (1986).

The fact that the victim was injured, but not seriously, did not preclude a charge of attempted first degree battery, even though the defendant's conduct also fit the definition of battery in the third degree. Mitchell v. State, 290 Ark. 87, 717 S.W.2d 195 (1986).

Where the defendant intended to kill or seriously injure the victim, and the defendant took a substantial step to carry out his purpose, and only because of the misfire was such a misfortune avoided, the evidence supported the charge of attempted battery in the first degree. Mitchell v. State, 290 Ark. 87, 717 S.W.2d 195 (1986).

Attempted Burglary.

Although the defendant was convicted of attempted burglary, it was nevertheless necessary to prove that he attempted to enter an occupiable structure with the purpose of committing therein an offense punishable by imprisonment. Cristee v. State, 25 Ark. App. 303, 757 S.W.2d 565 (1988).

Evidence sufficient to find appellant guilty of attempted breaking or entering. Powell v. State, 33 Ark. App. 1, 799 S.W.2d 566 (1990).

Where there was evidence that defendant made an attempt to enter a building by the use of a key, and that he had no permission to make such an entry, the evidence was sufficient to support the finding that defendant took a substantial step toward committing the offense of burglary. Ward v. State, 35 Ark. App. 148, 816 S.W.2d 173 (1991).

Where defendant attempted to enter a building at 3:00 a.m., which was closed to the public, and as there was no reasonable basis for the attempted illegal entry other than for the purpose of committing a theft therein, the evidence was sufficient to support that conviction. Ward v. State, 35 Ark. App. 148, 816 S.W.2d 173 (1991).

Evidence of breaking into a house is not evidence of intent to commit a crime therein. Tiller v. State, 42 Ark. App. 64, 854 S.W.2d 730 (1993).

Circuit court erred in convicting defendant of attempted residential burglary; even though he was caught unlawfully entering his girlfriend's former residence while holding a small bag and fled when her daughter yelled at him, there was no evidence that he did so with the purpose or specific intent of committing therein a theft of property. There was no evidence to show whether the bag was empty or contained something, defendant was not a complete stranger to the daughter or to the residence, the illegal entry was in the middle of the day, and the window was known to not close properly. Whitworth v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 462, 531 S.W.3d 407 (2017).

Attempted Capital Murder.

Evidence was sufficient to uphold conviction for attempted capital murder. Holbird v. State, 301 Ark. 382, 784 S.W.2d 171 (1990).

Under this section and § 5-10-101, premeditation and deliberation constitute the necessary mental state for the commission of attempted capital murder. Salley v. State, 303 Ark. 278, 796 S.W.2d 335 (1990).

The trial court did not err in allowing the state to amend the information charging “attempt to commit capital felony murder” by allowing the deletion of the word “felony,” after the state had rested its case in chief, and after the defendant's motion to dismiss, because allowing the state to strike the word “felony” from each information did not cause any real change in the nature or degree of the charges against the defendant. Ledguies v. State, 46 Ark. App. 144, 877 S.W.2d 946 (1994).

Where evidence showed that there was a history of domestic abuse and threats, that defendant had a knife, a pair of handcuffs, duct tape, a leatherman-type tool, and gloves when he was arrested, and that defendant told the unavailable officer that defendant intended to tie the victim up and kill her, the state had no direct evidence of defendant's intent to commit murder without the improperly admitted testimony of the unavailable officer. Proctor v. State, 349 Ark. 648, 79 S.W.3d 370 (2002).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction for attempted capital murder where there was substantial evidence that defendant was not merely engaged in the “act of driving”; the victim, a police officer, testified that the driver attempted to run him over, he observed a flash from the passenger side window, he realized that he had heard a gunshot, and an officer identified defendant as the driver of the vehicle. Clark v. State, 358 Ark. 469, 192 S.W.3d 248 (2004).

Trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to supress certain statements she made during questioning regarding her missing child; although defendant claimed that she had done the best she could to convey to the officer that she was concerned about continuing to talk to him without a lawyer present, when the officer asked defendant whether she was asking for a lawyer, she did not answer that question but continued answering other questions and did not mention a lawyer again during the interview. Gilbert v. State, 88 Ark. App. 296, 198 S.W.3d 561 (2004).

Even if defendant's sufficiency of the evidence argument been preserved, the appellate court would have found that the evidence supporting the verdict of guilty of attempted first-degree murder and filing a false report was substantial where defendant reported her child as missing but later told police where they could find him. Gilbert v. State, 88 Ark. App. 296, 198 S.W.3d 561 (2004).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of criminal attempt to commit capital murder where (1) while searching for a suspect, the trooper stopped in the middle of a street and observed a vehicle 30-40 yards away; (2) the vehicle began moving towards the trooper with its headlights on; (3) the trooper then observed a flash from the passenger-side window and heard a pop, which he thought was a gunshot; (4) the trooper believed that he was shot at because he was the only person on the street at 1:30 a.m.; (5) the vehicle was later stopped and a spent shell casing that was found inside the vehicle on the passenger side matched a weapon that was found about a block and a half away from where the vehicle ultimately stopped; and (6) witnesses testified that defendant and the driver had just left the home of the suspect's aunt, whom the trooper had been previously chasing. Simmons v. State, 89 Ark. App. 34, 199 S.W.3d 711 (2004).

Aggravated robbery is not a lesser included offense of attempted capital murder because, while an aggravated-robbery charge shares the intent to rob with attempted capital murder, aggravated robbery also requires one of three other elements. Two of those elements, being armed with a deadly weapon, or representing as such, are unique to aggravated robbery, and the third possible element of aggravated robbery is having inflicted or attempted to inflict death or serious physical injury upon another, which is not equivalent to the element in attempted capital murder that a defendant, in the course of or in flight from such robbery, caused the death of a person under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life. Clark v. State, 373 Ark. 161, 282 S.W.3d 801 (2008).

Prohibition against double jeopardy was not violated when defendant was convicted of aggravated robbery and attempted capital murder because the robbery was the underlying felony, and aggravated robbery was not the lesser-included offense of attempted capital murder. Clark v. State, 373 Ark. 161, 282 S.W.3d 801 (2008).

Defendant's conviction for attempted capital murder, in violation of § 5-10-101(a)(4) and subdivision (a)(2) of this section, was supported by the evidence because the victim, defendant's wife, testified that he came into the garage demanding to talk to her, shot her, and commented that she should die; defendant's coworker testified that defendant stated that he was going to shoot his wife if she had any divorce papers. Johnson v. State, 375 Ark. 462, 291 S.W.3d 581 (2009), cert. denied, Johnson v. Arkansas, 558 U.S. 847, 130 S. Ct. 118, 175 L. Ed. 2d 77 (2009).

Where defendant picked his ex-wife up from work, drove her to a bridge, stabbed her, threw her to the ground, and pushed her into the water, the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction for attempted first-degree murder in violation of § 5-10-102(a)(2) and subdivision (a)(2) of this section. When defendant learned the police had been called, he threw the victim a rope and told her to get herself out the water. Jones v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 135 (2009).

In a case in which defendant was found guilty on three counts of attempted first-degree murder, of being a felon in possession of a firearm, and three counts of committing a terroristic act, he unsuccessfully argued that substantial evidence did not support his convictions; while the evidence was circumstantial, substantial evidence supported the conclusion that defendant committed the crimes in question. Moments after the shooting, a dark-colored car was observed speeding away from the area without its lights on even though it was dark outside, that car crashed into another vehicle five blocks from the shooting, a witness positively identified defendant as the person who emerged from the driver's side of the car carrying a long rifle, shell casings from a rifle were recovered from the scene of the shooting, defendant's DNA was found on the driver's side airbag of the car, and the car contained a letter addressed to defendant. Smith v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 216 (2010).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's attempted capital murder convictions because, after shooting the officer in the shoulder, defendant fired five additional shots at the fleeing officers; the officer's pat-down of defendant showed that he was unarmed, but he had the wherewithal to run into the apartment and retrieve his gun. Inthisone v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 482 (2013).

Even assuming the witness was an accomplice, there was independent evidence tending to connect defendant with attempted capital murder, unlawful discharge of a firearm from a vehicle, and fleeing, as his letters and call to the witness were consistent with testimony that defendant was the shooter, and the jury could have found that defendant's alleged actions in firing the assault rifle at the officer and telling the driver to go aided and encouraged the driver in fleeing from the officer. Farmer v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 331 (2019).

Attempted Kidnapping.

The crime of attempted kidnapping is encompassed in this section and § 5-11-102. Green v. State, 313 Ark. 87, 852 S.W.2d 110 (1993).

Where the evidence displayed defendant's impulse to kidnap the victim and additional impulses to batter and threaten to kill her when she resisted the kidnapping, convictions for the separate offenses of first degree terroristic threatening (§ 5-13-301), second degree battery (§ 5-13-202), and attempted kidnapping were upheld because defendant's criminal acts were not all part of the attempted kidnapping and were not a continuing course of conduct. Hagen v. State, 318 Ark. 139, 883 S.W.2d 832 (1994).

Although defendant had a knife, a pair of handcuffs, duct tape, a leatherman-type tool, and gloves when he was arrested, the circumstantial evidence of defendant's intent to restrain the victim's liberty for the purpose of terrorizing or harming the victim was not overwhelming and defendant's conviction for attempted kidnapping, pursuant to § 5-11-102(a) and subdivision (a)(2) of this section, was reversed. Proctor v. State, 349 Ark. 648, 79 S.W.3d 370 (2002).

Attempted Murder.

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for attempted first-degree murder under subdivision (a)(2) of this section and § 5-10-102(a)(1) as the evidence demonstrated that defendant, in the process of fleeing a store that he had just robbed at gunpoint, shot at a police officer two times. A jury could reasonably conclude that the act of shooting at someone was a substantial step toward causing that person's death. Lambert v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 258 (2011).

Defendant's convictions for first-degree murder and aggravated robbery, in violation of this § 5-10-102(a), this section, and § 5-12-103(a), were supported by sufficient evidence, as the evidence showed that defendant was armed with a deadly weapon for the purpose of committing the theft of a cab driver, that defendant threatened the driver, and that the driver was shot in the struggle over the gun. Garr v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 509 (2011).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's attempted first-degree murder conviction because defendant knocked on a door and fired a gun at the victim when he opened the door. The jury could reasonably have inferred that defendant purposely engaged in conduct that constituted a substantial step in a course of conduct known to cause death to another person, regardless of that person's identity. Wells v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 596, 424 S.W.3d 378 (2012).

There was sufficient evidence to convict defendant of attempted capital murder, where the evidence showed defendant threatened to kill the victim and made the conscious decision to attack him with a semiautomatic gun, but the weapon jammed when defendant pointed it at the victim in order to shoot and kill him, and the victim escaped before defendant could attempt to fire again. Hill v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 700, 478 S.W.3d 225 (2015).

Attempted Possession of Controlled Substance.

Evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for criminal attempt to possess crack cocaine where (1) the defendant approached an undercover officer posing as a street-level crack cocaine dealer and asked for a “thirty,” (2) the defendant was thereafter arrested and found to have $30 in his possession, and (3) the officer testified that, based on his experience in the area, the term “thirty” meant $30 of crack cocaine. Barnett v. State, 68 Ark. App. 38, 3 S.W.3d 344 (1999).

Attempted Rape.

A person attempts the offense of rape if he purposely engages in conduct that constitutes a substantial step in a course of conduct intended to culminate in the commission of rape whether or not the attendant circumstances are as he believes them to be. Summerlin v. State, 296 Ark. 347, 756 S.W.2d 908 (1988).

Where defendant had taken sexual liberties with his twelve-year-old daughter, even though he had not forced intercourse or prevented her from leaving the bedroom, the evidence of criminal attempt to rape was sufficient. Daffron v. State, 318 Ark. 182, 885 S.W.2d 3 (1994).

Attempted removal of the victim's clothing is not essential to a finding of attempted rape; defendant's words and actions constituted substantial evidence that he intended to rape the victim and that he took a substantial step towards raping her. Hagen v. State, 47 Ark. App. 137, 886 S.W.2d 889 (1994).

There was sufficient evidence to convict defendant of attempted rape against an 11-year old fictional girl, who was a product of an internet email sting operation by police, because there was no defense of impossibility to attempt crimes, pursuant to subsection § 5-3-201(a)(2) of this section, and the fact that defendant drove from his home state to the alleged home state of the girl with sexual accessories and photographic equipment represented a substantial step towards completing the commission of the crime, pursuant to § 5-14-103(a)(1)(C)(i). Kirwan v. State, 351 Ark. 603, 96 S.W.3d 724 (2003).

District court properly denied a habeas petition alleging violation of due process where substantial evidence supported attempted rape as the underlying felony for capital felony murder; review of the historical facts showed that the inmate unbuckled the victim's belt, unzipped her jeans, and removed her shirt and socks, and the inmate was seen by other witnesses in a state of partial undress. Nance v. Norris, 392 F.3d 284 (8th Cir. 2004), rehearing denied, — F.3d —, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 3898 (8th Cir. Mar. 8, 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 133, 163 L. Ed. 2d 136 (U.S. 2005).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain an attempted rape conviction where defendant initiated a call to the 13 year old victim, picked her up under false pretenses, isolated her in a motel room, told her that he and his girlfriend intended to engage in sexual intercourse with her, and he returned to the motel room with his girlfriend; those steps went beyond mere planning and preparation. Mitchem v. State, 96 Ark. App. 78, 238 S.W.3d 623 (2006).

Defendant's conviction for attempted rape of his 13-year-old stepdaughter, in violation of § 5-14-103(a)(3)(A) and subsection (b) of this section, was supported by the evidence because the victim testified that defendant, who wanted oral sex from her, thrust himself upon her while she was in the shower until her grandmother, who lived next door, appeared at the front door. Forrest v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 686 (2010).

Conviction for aggravated residential burglary was reversed because there was insufficient evidence that defendant attempted to inflict a serious physical injury under § 5-39-204(a)(2). Serious physical injury could be inflicted during a sexual assault, but under current Arkansas law, a sexual assault does not necessarily constitute a serious physical injury; even assuming that defendant did intend to sexually assault the victim, defendant's intention, combined with his grabbing her shoulder and causing a minor scratch to her baby's face, did not constitute a substantial step toward inflicting a serious physical injury, as defined by § 5-1-102. Inskeep v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 135, 484 S.W.3d 709 (2016).

Attempted Reckless Manslaughter.

Trial court did not err by failing to instruct on attempted reckless manslaughter as a lesser-included offense of attempted second-degree murder because the crime of attempted reckless manslaughter is inherently contradictory. The attempted offense involved an intentional act, and it would have been illogical to ask the jury to find that defendant intended to act recklessly or that he purposely engaged in conduct that was a substantial step in a course of conduct intended to culminate in acting recklessly. Even if the instruction was based on sound law, there was no rational basis for giving it in this case where defendant's actions in running over people were intentional, regardless of whether he intended to bring about the particular result of death. Allen v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 360, 465 S.W.3d 9 (2015).

Attempted Robbery.

Substantial evidence supported defendant's capital murder conviction under § 5-10-101, as there was sufficient evidence that defendant committed the underlying felony of attempted robbery under § 5-12-102 and this section; defendant approached the victim with a weapon, demanded his phone, and pointed the weapon at the victim at point-blank range. Hicks v. State, 2017 Ark. 262, 526 S.W.3d 831 (2017).

Attempted Sexual Assault.

Defendant was charged with second-degree sexual assault but convicted of the lesser-included offense of attempted second-degree sexual assault and his sufficiency argument was not preserved for review; defendant's directed-verdict motion, which the trial court denied, pertained to the completed offense of second-degree sexual assault, and not its attempt, and to the extent the “mens rea” argument was even preserved, the jury could assume that defendant's purposeful acts of touching the 16-year-old victim's vagina and attempting to lift her shirt, combined with the questions he was asking her, were attempts to have sexual contact with her for his sexual gratification. Perea v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 426, 586 S.W.3d 690 (2019).

Attempted Theft by Deception.

For the offense of attempted theft by deception, the issues are the defendant's state of mind and his belief as to what the facts are, not whether an item taken has actual value or whether the defendant actually deceived the victim. Wilson v. State, 56 Ark. App. 47, 939 S.W.2d 313 (1997).

Evidence of attempted theft by deception held sufficient. Wilson v. State, 56 Ark. App. 47, 939 S.W.2d 313 (1997).

Commission of the Principal Offense.

Although defendant was obliged to abort his robbery of a small store, the evidence of kidnapping, aggravated robbery, and attempted murder held sufficient. Durham v. State, 320 Ark. 689, 899 S.W.2d 470 (1995).

Conduct Intended to Culminate in Crime.

To warrant a conviction of attempt to commit offense it had to appear not only that defendant intended to commit the offense, but that he did some overt act toward accomplishment of his purpose. Priest v. State, 204 Ark. 490, 163 S.W.2d 159 (1942); Boyd v. State, 207 Ark. 830, 182 S.W.2d 937 (1944) (preceding decisions under prior law).

Evidence sufficient to show that defendant had taken a substantial step intended to culminate in the offense. White v. State, 266 Ark. 499, 585 S.W.2d 952 (1979); Berry v. State, 278 Ark. 578, 647 S.W.2d 453 (1983).

Evidence held insufficient to support the conviction. White v. State, 266 Ark. 499, 585 S.W.2d 952 (1979); Mills v. State, 270 Ark. 141, 603 S.W.2d 416 (1980); Abdullah v. State, 301 Ark. 235, 783 S.W.2d 58 (1990).

Criminal Purpose.

Premeditation, deliberation, and intent may be inferred from the circumstances, such as the character of the weapon used, the manner in which it is used, the nature, extent and location of the wounds inflicted, the conduct of the accused, etc. Davis v. State, 115 Ark. 566, 173 S.W. 829 (1914); Nunley v. State, 223 Ark. 838, 270 S.W.2d 904 (1954); Turner v. State, 258 Ark. 425, 527 S.W.2d 580 (1975) (preceding decisions under prior law); Stout v. State, 263 Ark. 355, 565 S.W.2d 23 (1978).

The intent to commit a crime could be inferred from acts and circumstances of the incident, but it could not be implied as a matter of law. Ward v. State, 208 Ark. 602, 186 S.W.2d 950 (1945) (decision under prior law).

It was not essential that intent should have existed for any particular length of time before the crime, as it could be conceived in a moment. Nunley v. State, 223 Ark. 838, 270 S.W.2d 904 (1954) (decision under prior law); Stout v. State, 263 Ark. 355, 565 S.W.2d 23 (1978).

Premeditation and deliberation held established. Clay v. State, 262 Ark. 285, 556 S.W.2d 137 (1977).

Premeditation and deliberation can be instantaneous. Stout v. State, 263 Ark. 355, 565 S.W.2d 23 (1978).

Evidence held sufficient to show premeditation and deliberation supporting a conviction. Hamilton v. State, 262 Ark. 366, 556 S.W.2d 884 (1977); Salley v. State, 303 Ark. 278, 796 S.W.2d 335 (1990).

Whether criminal intent may be reasonably inferred from the evidence is a question of fact to be determined by the trier of fact who resolves any conflicts in testimony and determines the credibility of the witnesses, and its conclusion on credibility is binding on the appellate court. Kendrick v. State, 37 Ark. App. 95, 823 S.W.2d 931 (1992).

Since intent cannot be proven by direct evidence (intent or purpose, being a state of mind, can seldom be positively known to others), the factfinder is allowed to draw upon his own common knowledge and experience, and the presumption that a person intends the natural and probable consequences of his acts, to infer intent from the circumstances. Kendrick v. State, 37 Ark. App. 95, 823 S.W.2d 931 (1992).

Evidence.

Uncorroborated testimony of the minor victims was sufficient evidence to support convictions of rape and attempted rape. Winfrey v. State, 293 Ark. 342, 738 S.W.2d 391 (1987).

Identifications of defendant from two photographic spreads upheld. Jackson v. State, 318 Ark. 39, 883 S.W.2d 466 (1994).

Evidence held sufficient to support conviction. Britt v. State, 344 Ark. 13, 38 S.W.3d 363 (2001).

Sufficient evidence supported the conclusion that a defendant intended to kill a victim: a witness testified that the witness gave defendant a gun, other witnesses testified that defendant shot the victim with that gun, defendant's girlfriend testified that while waiting for defendant in a car, the girlfriend heard two or three shots, and then defendant ran to the car, and inconsistent witness statements regarding whether the shooting occurred inside or outside the victim's apartment were not relevant to the conviction; therefore, defendant's motion for a directed verdict was properly denied. Hawkins v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 675 (2009).

Denial of appellant's, an inmate's, petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1 was appropriate because the evidence demonstrated that he was not prejudiced by his trial counsel's failure to properly renew his motion for directed verdict at the close of all the evidence. While the inmate was unable to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence in his direct appeal, there was substantial evidence to support the verdicts, including the inmate himself admitting to hitting his wife's car from behind and then getting out of his truck and shooting her; the surviving victim testified that after falling in an attempt to run away from the scene, she looked up and saw the inmate over her smiling and holding a shotgun. Davis v. State, 2011 Ark. 493 (2011).

Instructions.

Where act of defendant constituted crime, the trial court properly refused to instruct the jury on attempt. Mallett v. State, 17 Ark. App. 29, 702 S.W.2d 814 (1986).

Lesser Included Offenses.

Sexual abuse in the first degree is a lesser included offense of attempted rape. Speer v. State, 18 Ark. App. 1, 708 S.W.2d 94 (1986).

Where defendant was charged under § 5-37-207 for fraudulent use of a credit card but he never obtained property as required by the section, the case was remanded for judgment of conviction to be entered for the lesser included offense of attempted fraudulent use of credit cards. Davidson v. State, 305 Ark. 592, 810 S.W.2d 327 (1991).

During defendant's trial for attempted murder, the court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of attempted extreme-emotional-disturbance manslaughter, in violation of § 5-10-104(a)(1)(A) and subsection (b) of this section, because defendant's self-serving testimony was the only evidence of provocation presented; the evidence corroborated the victim's testimony that defendant stabbed the victim with a knife. Townsell v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 754 (2010).

In a theft trial, it was not necessary to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of attempted theft because defendant clearly exercised unauthorized control over a store's property when he threw it over a fence into an area off the store's parking lot; it was not necessary that defendant also “take” the property to complete the crime. Cole v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 492 (2013).

Cited: McGee v. State, 262 Ark. 473, 557 S.W.2d 885 (1977); Barnum v. State, 268 Ark. 141, 594 S.W.2d 229 (1980); Glenn v. United States Dep't of Labor, Occupational Safety & Health Admin., 517 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1981); Rowe v. State, 271 Ark. 20, 607 S.W.2d 657 (1980); Glason v. State, 272 Ark. 28, 611 S.W.2d 752 (1981); Swaite v. State, 272 Ark. 128, 612 S.W.2d 307 (1981); Sutton v. State, 1 Ark. App. 58, 613 S.W.2d 399 (1981); Wilson v. State, 272 Ark. 361, 614 S.W.2d 663 (1981); Rowe v. State, 275 Ark. 37, 627 S.W.2d 16 (1982); Fisk v. State, 5 Ark. App. 5, 631 S.W.2d 626 (1982); Barnum v. State, 276 Ark. 477, 637 S.W.2d 534 (1982); Wilson v. State, 277 Ark. 219, 640 S.W.2d 440 (1982); Moore v. State, 280 Ark. 222, 656 S.W.2d 698 (1983); James v. State, 280 Ark. 359, 658 S.W.2d 382 (1983); Rowe v. Lockhart, 736 F.2d 457 (8th Cir. 1984); Avery v. State, 15 Ark. App. 134, 690 S.W.2d 732 (1985); Weddle v. State, 15 Ark. App. 402, 695 S.W.2d 840 (1985); Muck v. State, 292 Ark. 310, 730 S.W.2d 214 (1987); Thompson v. State, 27 Ark. App. 164, 768 S.W.2d 39 (1989); Pharo v. State, 30 Ark. App. 94, 783 S.W.2d 64 (1990); Thomas v. State, 315 Ark. 79, 864 S.W.2d 835 (1993); Watkins v. State, 320 Ark. 163, 895 S.W.2d 532 (1995).