Ark. Code Ann. § 5-39-201 (2026)

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Arkansas Law Survey, Hall, Evidence, 8 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 157.

Survey — Criminal Law, 11 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 175.

Case Notes

Assistance of Counsel.

Where, on the morning of the trial, the defendant's request for a change of counsel and a continuance was refused, the defendant was denied his right to counsel, as it was apparent that the defendant honestly believed, correctly or not, that his attorney was not looking out for his best interests. Parker v. State, 18 Ark. App. 252, 715 S.W.2d 210 (1986), overruled, Ferrell v. State, 305 Ark. 511, 810 S.W.2d 29 (1991), overruled, Burns v. State, 300 Ark. 469, 780 S.W.2d 23 (Ark. 1989).

The defendant did not waive his right to an attorney, because the trial judge's statement that the defendant would have to accept the consequences of representing himself did not constitute adequate warning, and the defendant did not express a clear intent to waive his right to counsel. Parker v. State, 18 Ark. App. 252, 715 S.W.2d 210 (1986), overruled, Ferrell v. State, 305 Ark. 511, 810 S.W.2d 29 (1991), overruled, Burns v. State, 300 Ark. 469, 780 S.W.2d 23 (Ark. 1989).

Considered as Aggravating Factor.

Burglary could not be considered, absent supporting proof, as a felony creating the substantial risk of death or serious physical injury to another person under § 5-4-604(3), since a burglary as defined by this section could be committed by an unlawful entry into a vacant house with no possibility of violence or injury to anyone. Williams v. State, 274 Ark. 9, 621 S.W.2d 686 (1981), cert. denied, Williams v. Arkansas, 459 U.S. 1042, 103 S. Ct. 460 (1982).

Defense.

Voluntary intoxication is an affirmative defense to a crime that requires a purposeful intent; accordingly, where there was evidence presented in a burglary prosecution that the defendant had been drinking heavily for hours just prior to the crime, the trial court should have given an instruction on the lesser included offense of criminal trespass. Brown v. State, 12 Ark. App. 132, 671 S.W.2d 228 (1984).

Due Process.

District court's grant of writ of habeas corpus on the ground that the trial court's refusal to allow defendant to inform the jury of his prior acquittal on possession charges rendered his trial fundamentally unfair. Prince v. Lockhart, 971 F.2d 118 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 964, 113 S. Ct. 1394 (1993).

Elements of Offense.

Both entry into a building and specific criminal intent are essential elements of the crime of burglary. Ward v. Lockhart, 841 F.2d 844 (8th Cir. 1988).

Defendant claimed that the trial court's description of commercial burglary was so technical that it did not provide defendant with adequate notice of the charges against him and rendered his plea involuntary; however, the judge's use of the terms “enter” and “intent” conveyed the essential elements of the burglary. Easter v. Norris, 100 F.3d 523 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1148, 117 S. Ct. 1322 (1997).

Where defendant admitted that he committed third-degree assault against victim by kicking and banging at the victim's door in an attempt to gain entry, the circuit court did not err in denying defendant's motion for directed verdict on the attempted burglary charge as defendant completed a substantial step towards entry by severely damaging victim's door and left only when the police were in the area. Davis v. State, 368 Ark. 351, 246 S.W.3d 433 (2007).

Entry.

Crime of burglary was committed though defendant was interrupted after the breaking, but before entry. Mouser v. State, 215 Ark. 131, 219 S.W.2d 611 (1949) (decision under prior law).

Both a breaking and entry need not have been shown to convict defendant of burglary since either was sufficient to constitute the crime. Thompson v. State, 252 Ark. 1, 477 S.W.2d 469 (1972) (decision under prior law).

Where defendant broke the glass in the door and stuck his hand through, the intrusion was sufficient even though the defendant could not get the door open. Thompson v. State, 252 Ark. 1, 477 S.W.2d 469 (1972) (decision under prior law).

Either the separate act of breaking or the separate act of entering either in the daytime or nighttime constituted the crime of burglary. Albright v. State, 253 Ark. 671, 488 S.W.2d 11 (1972) (decision under prior law).

Entry into a building is an essential element of the crime of burglary. Selph v. State, 264 Ark. 197, 570 S.W.2d 256 (1978).

Where defendant entered closed door which had “employees only” sign on it, defendant did not have privilege or license under § 5-39-101(3) (now § 5-39-101(4)), to enter the room since it was closed and marked for employees only. Sims v. State, 272 Ark. 308, 613 S.W.2d 820 (1981).

The defendant's license or privilege to go into one section of the courthouse for the purpose of retrieving his tools did not authorize him to go into other unauthorized areas for the purpose of committing theft. LeFlore v. State, 17 Ark. App. 117, 704 S.W.2d 641 (1986).

Where the evidence showed that the defendant attacked the victim and looked for her purse while she was on the porch of her home and escaped by running through the house and a rear window, the state failed to prove the charge of burglary, as the state did not prove an unlawful entry upon the victim's front porch, for of § 5-39-101(3) (now § 5-39-101(4)), permits an entry upon premises that are open to the public, and there was no proof that the defendant entered the house for the purpose of committing an offense in the course of his efforts to escape apprehension. Campbell v. State, 289 Ark. 454, 712 S.W.2d 302 (1986).

Evidence.

Evidence held insufficient to sustain a conviction. Minter v. State, 71 Ark. 178, 71 S.W. 944 (1903); Gunter v. State, 79 Ark. 432, 96 S.W. 181 (1906); Anderson v. State, 84 Ark. 54, 104 S.W. 1096 (1907) (preceding decisions under prior law); Norton v. State, 271 Ark. 451, 609 S.W.2d 1 (1980); Holloway v. State, 11 Ark. App. 69, 666 S.W.2d 410 (1984); Hickerson v. State, 282 Ark. 217, 667 S.W.2d 654 (1984); Ward v. Lockhart, 841 F.2d 844 (8th Cir. 1988); Swanson v. State, 308 Ark. 28, 823 S.W.2d 812 (1992).

Evidence held sufficient to support conviction. Mouser v. State, 215 Ark. 131, 219 S.W.2d 611 (1949); Clay v. State, 236 Ark. 398, 366 S.W.2d 299 (1963); Williams v. State, 239 Ark. 686, 393 S.W.2d 618 (1965); Johnson v. State, 252 Ark. 50, 477 S.W.2d 196 (1972); Seals v. State, 256 Ark. 11, 505 S.W.2d 202 (1974); King v. State, 256 Ark. 778, 510 S.W.2d 876 (1974); Randle v. State, 257 Ark. 232, 516 S.W.2d 6 (1974) (preceding decisions under prior law); Hill v. State, 261 Ark. 711, 551 S.W.2d 200 (1977); Walker v. State, 262 Ark. 331, 556 S.W.2d 655 (1977); Boone v. State, 264 Ark. 169, 568 S.W.2d 229 (1978); Sims v. State, 272 Ark. 308, 613 S.W.2d 820 (1981); Small v. State, 5 Ark. App. 87, 632 S.W.2d 448 (1982); Johnson v. State, 7 Ark. App. 172, 646 S.W.2d 22 (1983); Bradley v. State, 8 Ark. App. 300, 651 S.W.2d 113 (1983); Oliver v. State, 14 Ark. App. 240, 687 S.W.2d 850 (1985), rev'd, 286 Ark. 198, 691 S.W.2d 842 (1985); Lane v. State, 288 Ark. 175, 702 S.W.2d 806 (1986); LeFlore v. State, 17 Ark. App. 117, 704 S.W.2d 641 (1986); Kinsey v. State, 290 Ark. 4, 716 S.W.2d 188 (1986); Clay v. State, 290 Ark. 54, 716 S.W.2d 751 (1986); Dillard v. State, 20 Ark. App. 35, 723 S.W.2d 373 (1987), overruled, Menard v. Carlisle, 309 Ark. 522, 834 S.W.2d 632 (Ark. 1992); Cristee v. State, 25 Ark. App. 303, 757 S.W.2d 565 (1988); Johnson v. State, 26 Ark. App. 220, 762 S.W.2d 804 (1989); Lilly v. State, 300 Ark. 53, 776 S.W.2d 347 (1989); Smith v. State, 300 Ark. 330, 778 S.W.2d 947 (1989); Forgy v. State, 302 Ark. 435, 790 S.W.2d 173 (1990); Hutcherson v. State, 34 Ark. App. 113, 806 S.W.2d 29 (1991); Ward v. State, 35 Ark. App. 148, 816 S.W.2d 173 (1991); Brown v. State, 35 Ark. App. 156, 814 S.W.2d 918 (1991); Lukach v. State, 310 Ark. 38, 834 S.W.2d 642 (1992); Franklin v. State, 311 Ark. 601, 845 S.W.2d 525 (1993); Turner v. State, 64 Ark. App. 216, 984 S.W.2d 52 (1998).

Testimony held sufficient to take case to jury as to guilt of defendant. Beasley v. State, 219 Ark. 452, 242 S.W.2d 961 (1951) (decision under prior law).

Evidence held sufficient to sustain finding that the insureds sustained their loss as a direct result of a burglary. Thomas Jefferson Ins. Co. v. Stuttgart Home Ctr., Inc., 4 Ark. App. 75, 627 S.W.2d 571 (1982).

Where state's case revealed that defendant was an accomplice in the burglary because he planned it, the trial court correctly allowed the state's witnesses to testify that defendant's role in a series of other burglaries was to plan the burglaries — not to physically enter the respective houses; the other crimes evidence also showed knowledge and lack of mistake. Bradley v. State, 8 Ark. App. 300, 651 S.W.2d 113 (1983).

Where the defendant admitted that he never asked for an attorney or for the questioning to stop and was not threatened or beaten, he was read the Miranda warnings and did not appear to be under the influence of drugs or alcohol, the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to suppress and the introduction of the statement did not constitute error. LeFlore v. State, 17 Ark. App. 117, 704 S.W.2d 641 (1986).

Although the defendant indicated that he did not want to make a statement, his statement was admissible because the police did not make any efforts to wear down his resistance nor to change his mind. Parker v. State, 18 Ark. App. 252, 715 S.W.2d 210 (1986), overruled, Ferrell v. State, 305 Ark. 511, 810 S.W.2d 29 (1991), overruled, Burns v. State, 300 Ark. 469, 780 S.W.2d 23 (Ark. 1989).

The evidence was sufficient to support the finding that defendant took a substantial step toward committing the offense of burglary. Ward v. State, 35 Ark. App. 148, 816 S.W.2d 173 (1991).

Circumstantial evidence of an unlawful entry was sufficient. Davasher v. State, 308 Ark. 154, 823 S.W.2d 863 (1992), cert. denied, Davasher v. Arkansas, 504 U.S. 976, 112 S. Ct. 2948 (1992).

Substantial evidence supported conviction for attempted burglary. Kendrick v. State, 37 Ark. App. 95, 823 S.W.2d 931 (1992).

Admission of seized drugs in prosecution of burglary and theft was not barred by collateral estoppel because defendant's prior acquittal did not determine an ultimate fact in later prosecution of defendant. Prince v. Lockhart, 971 F.2d 118 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 964, 113 S. Ct. 1394 (1993).

Insufficient evidence of burglary and theft of property was presented to corroborate the testimony of an admitted accomplice. Gibson v. State, 41 Ark. App. 154, 852 S.W.2d 326 (1993).

The testimony of witnesses, and the fact that defendant's truck was identified as the truck carrying the same brand and size of tires that were stolen, was sufficient to support convictions for burglary and theft of property. Winters v. State, 41 Ark. App. 104, 848 S.W.2d 441 (1993).

Evidence of burglary held insufficient; however, the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that defendant was guilty of the lesser included offense of attempted criminal trespass. Tiller v. State, 42 Ark. App. 64, 854 S.W.2d 730 (1993).

Circumstantial evidence of burglary and arson held sufficient to support conviction. Armstrong v. State, 45 Ark. App. 72, 871 S.W.2d 420 (1994).

Identification testimony and the physical evidence accidentally dropped at the scene by the defendant were admissible, and evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction of rape, burglary, and robbery. Monk v. State, 320 Ark. 189, 895 S.W.2d 904 (1995).

Fingerprints and a footprint constituted substantial evidence from which the jury could find defendant committed burglary. Tucker v. State, 50 Ark. App. 203, 901 S.W.2d 865 (1995).

Evidence of commercial burglary held sufficient where police found defendant with a cash drawer from a store that had been broken into and cash from the drawer was in defendant's pocket. Alexander v. State, 55 Ark. App. 148, 934 S.W.2d 927 (1996).

Although codefendant gave varying statements about defendant's participation and the victim was unable to identify the defendant, the identification evidence held sufficient in view of the scientific evidence and the testimony of the codefendant. Wilson v. State, 332 Ark. 7, 962 S.W.2d 805 (1998); Atkins v. State, 63 Ark. App. 203, 979 S.W.2d 903 (1998).

Evidence was sufficient to support the conclusion that the defendant unlawfully entered his ex-girlfriend's apartment where the apartment was leased in the ex-girlfriend's name only, the defendant was escorted away from the apartment by the police and was told not to return, the locks were changed so that the key in his possession would no longer work, and the defendant did not have permission from his ex-girlfriend to be in the apartment. Williams v. State, 65 Ark. App. 176, 986 S.W.2d 123 (1999).

Although there was overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt on the residential burglary charge, there was no evidence that defendant's purpose was to commit an offense in the residence punishable by imprisonment after defendant's convictions for attempted kidnapping and attempted first-degree murder were reversed; thus, defendant's conviction for residential burglary was also reversed. Proctor v. State, 349 Ark. 648, 79 S.W.3d 370 (2002).

Defendant's motion for directed verdict was properly denied where there was sufficient evidence to convict defendant of residential burglary and third degree assault, § 5-13-207(a); defendant took steps to hinder the victim's ability to summon help by turning off the power and pulling out the phone lines, and the fact that defendant had a potentially deadly weapon on his person could at least raise an inference that he intended to, at the very least, place victim in fear for her physical well-being. Diggs v. State, 93 Ark. App. 332, 219 S.W.3d 654 (2005).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's convictions for aggravated robbery, residential burglary, and felony theft of property because an accomplice testified that he and defendant had a purpose of committing theft when they went to the victim's apartment, defendant used physical force upon the victim, defendant was armed with a deadly weapon, and a witness testified that she observed defendant carry out a television and load it into the car. Navarro v. State, 371 Ark. 179, 264 S.W.3d 530 (2007).

Defendant's conviction for residential burglary was proper pursuant to subdivision (a)(1) of this section because he carried a knife made from a railroad spike with him on the night of the homicide. The jury could have inferred from that evidence defendant's intent to commit a felony at the time of entrance in to the victim's trailer. Young v. State, 371 Ark. 393, 266 S.W.3d 744 (2007).

Because there was sufficient evidence to support defendant's rape conviction, there was no merit to defendant's argument regarding the sufficiency of the evidence for defendant's residential burglary conviction, in violation of subsection (a) of this section. Young v. State, 374 Ark. 350, 288 S.W.3d 221 (2008).

Where the victim testified that he discovered that two jars of coins were missing from his house after a visit from defendant and his cohort, an employee of a grocery store saw defendant's cohort cash in the coins and then throw away a jar; the theft victim identified the jar as his. In the second case, the victim testified that someone kicked in the door to his home and a five-gallon water jug filled with coins was stolen shortly after he had spoken with defendant and his cohort at a club; based on the circumstantial evidence, defendant's possession of the coins, and his admission that he had stolen coins from the second victim before, the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for two counts of burglary in violation of subdivision (a)(1) of this section. Mathis v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 181, 314 S.W.3d 280 (2009).

Evidence was more than sufficient to prove that defendant did not have permission to be in the residence, because the victim ran from his residence yelling that he needed help and asking someone to call the police. Lewis v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 504, 323 S.W.3d 640 (2009).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for residential burglary and theft of property where defendant pawned a gun and a pendant that were stolen from the victims' home and, according to a witness, defendant admitted that he participated in the burglary and theft. Stigger v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 596 (2009).

Defendant's convictions for two counts of aggravated burglary were proper under subsection (a) of this section and § 5-39-204(a) because defendant's argument that there was no direct proof on the record of defendant holding a gun was without merit since substantial circumstantial evidence supported a finding of guilt, either as a principal or an accomplice. A neighbor verified that one of the intruders had a gun, the victim told the officers that the intruders hid their guns in the closet, where two guns were found, and both intruders were charged in the same instrument, implicating accomplice liability; that provided substantial evidence supporting the finding that the intruders at minimum represented by word or conduct that they were armed as a threat. Hinton v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 341 (2010).

Appellant's conviction for residential burglary was affirmed where (1) the evidence showed that an angry appellant attempted to “bust in” the victim's front door to “put it in the couple's face,” pushing his arm and body partially through the door and shooting his handgun into the residence; and (2) the evidence was consistent with appellant's guilt and inconsistent with any other reasonable conclusion. Stephens v. State, — Ark. App. —, — S.W.3d — , 2010 Ark. App. LEXIS 382 (Apr. 28, 2010).

Substantial evidence supported defendant's convictions for commercial burglary, criminal mischief, and breaking and entering because the testimony of defendant's accomplice, who was defendant's son, was sufficiently corroborated, as required by § 16-89-111(e)(1), by an officer's testimony as to the items he found in defendant's truck, matching the description of items stolen from a convenience store. The accomplice admitted that he and defendant entered the store by using a cable to pull open the front doors and that he and defendant used bolt cutters and a pry bar to break into gaming machines, and these items, along with packages of cigarettes stolen from the store, were found by police officers in defendant's truck. Dunlap v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 582 (2010).

Defendant's convictions for residential burglary and terroristic threatening, in violation of subsection (a) of this section and § 5-13-301(b)(1) were supported by sufficient evidence, as he entered his ex-wife residence with the intent or purpose of assaulting her or of threatening either her or her boyfriend. Cash v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 493 (2011).

Appellant's convictions for aggravated robbery, aggravated residential burglary, and misdemeanor fleeing were affirmed where a witness testified that appellant pointed a sawed-off shotgun at his head, which would necessarily constitute proof that appellant was “armed with a deadly weapon”; the testimony of one eyewitness was sufficient to sustain a conviction. Riley v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 511, 385 S.W.3d 355 (2011).

Where defendant was convicted for residential burglary and theft under subdivision (a)(1) of this section and § 5-36-103(a)(1), the trial court did not err by denying his motion for a directed verdict because the record showed that the victims returned from work to discover that their home had been burglarized; the back door of the residence had been kicked in and $3,000 worth of property was missing. As defendant's palm print was found on the entertainment table, the jury was not required to resort to speculation or conjecture in reaching its verdicts. Hicks v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 667 (2012).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain the revocation of defendant's suspended sentence because the victim saw where defendant had broken into his shop, noticed that tools and equipment had been gathered, discovered defendant hiding inside the shop, and the victim identified defendant in a photographic lineup. Upshaw v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 41 (2013).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain the revocation of defendant's suspended sentence because the victim saw where defendant had broken into his shop, noticed that tools and equipment had been gathered, discovered defendant hiding inside the shop, and the victim identified defendant in a photographic lineup. Upshaw v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 41 (2013).

There was substantial evidence to support a conviction for residential burglary where defendant came to the victim's home, kicked in her door, and stated “I come here to take it”; defendant then grabbed the victim by the arm, began “tussling” with her, and raped her. From this evidence, the jury could have inferred that defendant intended either to rob or rape the victim, either of which was a crime punishable by imprisonment. Burris v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 126 (2015).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for residential burglary because defendant texted the victim on the morning of the burglary to confirm the victim's whereabouts, defendant was at the victim's house around the time of the burglary later that morning, defendant was seen driving defendant's car toward a town immediately thereafter, and defendant was in possession of the victim's Xbox when defendant sold it in a pawn shop in the town. Brickey v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 175 (2015).

There was substantial evidence supporting defendant's convictions for arson and residential burglary, including testimony that the fire was not accidental, that defendant was seen coming from the direction of the apartment with a pack of cigarettes and a lighter after the fire, and that defendant sent the victim a text making references to a fire her father had started when she was younger. Fronterhouse v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 211, 463 S.W.3d 312 (2015).

Substantial evidence supported defendant's conviction for residential burglary because the circumstances were plainly sufficient to allow the trial court to reasonably infer, without resort to speculation or conjecture, that he entered the victim's home with the purpose of assaulting her; defendant violently broke into the victim's home, chased her, tried to prevent her from being able to call for help, verbally threatened her safety, and immediately thereafter physically beat her. Davis v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 234, 459 S.W.3d 821 (2015).

Evidence Insufficient.

There was insufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction for commercial burglary, because the retailer was open to the public, defendant's purpose in entering the store was not determinative, and there was no evidence that he had been banned from the premises. Todd v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 280, 494 S.W.3d 444 (2016).

Defendant's conviction for residential burglary in a bench trial was not supported by sufficient evidence, because the trial court did not find that defendant went to the residence with the purpose of committing a theft of property within the residence, as charged, but found only that he went there to commit an offense punishable by imprisonment and that he was not invited. Williams v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 349, 553 S.W.3d 753 (2018).

Harmless Error.

Although the search warrant was invalid with respect to the cigarettes, failure to suppress the cigarettes constituted harmless error. Excluding the cigarettes, the jury nevertheless had overwhelming evidence of defendant's commercial burglary and aggravated robbery offenses; in part, defendant was identified from surveillance video and a search of his vehicle revealed ammunition of the type used by the gun in the robberies, as well as a bandana that contained his DNA. Jemison v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 475, 588 S.W.3d 359 (2019).

Indictment or Information.

In an indictment for burglary, the specific felony intended to be committed by the accused had to be set out or specified but the allegation of the ulterior felony intended need not be set out specifically as would be necessary in an indictment for the actual commission of that felony, and it was sufficient to state the intended offense generally. Davis v. State, 117 Ark. 296, 174 S.W. 567 (1915) (decision under prior law).

Upon an information for burglary and grand larceny, one could not be convicted for receiving stolen property. Pickens v. State, 236 Ark. 404, 366 S.W.2d 283 (1963) (decision under prior law).

Where defendant was charged with burglary with intent to commit “a crime punishable by imprisonment,” and he was tried for burglary with intent to commit attempted theft rather than for burglary with intent to commit theft, defendant's defense was prejudiced by the information's lack of specificity, and his constitutional right to notice of the charges against him violated. If the information had specified the crime defendant allegedly intended to commit — and if that crime was indeed attempted theft — then defendant would have been able to make the legal argument that there was no such thing as an intent to attempt theft. Forgy v. Norris, 64 F.3d 399 (8th Cir. 1995).

Instructions.

Refusal to submit defendant's proffered instructions on breaking and entering held proper. Barksdale v. State, 262 Ark. 271, 555 S.W.2d 948 (1977).

Refusal to instruct on the lesser included offenses of breaking and entering or criminal trespass held proper. Grays v. State, 264 Ark. 564, 572 S.W.2d 847 (1978); Robinson v. State, 7 Ark. App. 209, 646 S.W.2d 714 (1983).

Court held to have committed prejudicial error when it refused to give the instruction requested on the lesser included offense of criminal trespass. Bongfeldt v. State, 6 Ark. App. 102, 639 S.W.2d 70 (1982).

It was not prejudicial error by the court to refuse to give the proffered instruction on criminal trespass in view of appellant's admission on the stand and in his pre-trial statement that he intended to go to the courthouse to steal the money before he actually got there. LeFlore v. State, 17 Ark. App. 117, 704 S.W.2d 641 (1986).

Where the trial court instructed the jury on the lesser included offense of criminal trespass, but refused to give the clearly inapplicable definition of “occupiable structure”, there was no error in refusing an instruction which may have misled or confused the jury. Townsend v. State, 308 Ark. 266, 824 S.W.2d 821 (1992).

Intent.

If a man burglariously entered a house with intent to have connection with a woman while she was asleep, it was burglary. Harvey v. State, 53 Ark. 425, 14 S.W. 645 (1890) (decision under prior law).

In order to convict for burglary, evidence had to show that defendant entered building with intent to commit a felony. Sanders v. State, 198 Ark. 880, 131 S.W.2d 936 (1939) (decision under prior law).

Evidence held insufficient to show the requisite intent. Hicks v. State, 231 Ark. 52, 328 S.W.2d 265 (1959) (decision under prior law); Washington v. State, 268 Ark. 1117, 599 S.W.2d 408 (Ct. App. 1980); Norton v. State, 271 Ark. 451, 609 S.W.2d 1 (1980); Wortham v. State, 5 Ark. App. 161, 634 S.W.2d 141 (1982).

Evidence that defendant had previously cut a window screen in an effort to effect entry for some unknown purpose was inadmissible to show intention of defendant for the unlawful entries upon trial. Hicks v. State, 231 Ark. 52, 328 S.W.2d 265 (1959) (decision under prior law).

Where the requisite intent could not be incontrovertibly established by defendant's actions in entries with which he was charged, evidence of a similar offense was admissible to show intent. Hicks v. State, 231 Ark. 52, 328 S.W.2d 265 (1959) (decision under prior law).

While it was not necessary in a prosecution to show that accused had tools with intent to commit a particular burglary, it was nevertheless proper in all cases to show felonious intent and any evidence legally bearing on felonious intent was admissible. Randall v. State, 239 Ark. 312, 389 S.W.2d 229 (1965) (decision under prior law).

Evidence held sufficient to show requisite intent. Scates v. State, 244 Ark. 333, 424 S.W.2d 876 (1968); Swanson v. State, 251 Ark. 147, 471 S.W.2d 351 (1971), cert. denied, Swanson v. Arkansas, 405 U.S. 996, 92 S. Ct. 1272 (1972) (preceding decisions under prior law); Parris v. State, 270 Ark. 269, 604 S.W.2d 582 (Ct. App. 1980); Johnson v. State, 7 Ark. App. 172, 646 S.W.2d 22 (1983); Moore v. Lockhart, 740 F.2d 14 (8th Cir. 1984); Jimenez v. State, 12 Ark. App. 315, 675 S.W.2d 853 (1984); Holmes v. State, 288 Ark. 72, 702 S.W.2d 18 (1986).

Where there was sufficient evidence of the requisite intent it was reversible error to permit evidence of other burglaries to show defendant's criminal intent. Swanson v. State, 251 Ark. 147, 471 S.W.2d 351 (1971), cert. denied, Swanson v. Arkansas, 405 U.S. 996, 92 S. Ct. 1272 (1972) (decision under prior law); Golden v. State, 10 Ark. App. 362, 664 S.W.2d 496 (1984), overruled, Bledsoe v. State, 344 Ark. 86, 39 S.W.3d 760 (Ark. 2001).

To constitute the offense of burglary the accused must not only enter or remain unlawfully in an occupiable structure of another but such action must be accompanied with the purpose of committing therein an offense punishable by imprisonment, and purpose can be established by circumstantial evidence since often this is the only type of evidence available to show intent; however, the circumstances established by the evidence must be such that the requisite purpose of the accused can reasonably be inferred, and the evidence must be consistent with the guilt of the accused and inconsistent with any other reasonable conclusion. Washington v. State, 268 Ark. 1117, 599 S.W.2d 408 (Ct. App. 1980).

Offense of burglary was complete even though intention to commit a felony was not consummated. Sanders v. State, 198 Ark. 880, 131 S.W.2d 936 (1939); Mouser v. State, 215 Ark. 131, 219 S.W.2d 611 (1949); Pope v. State, 216 Ark. 314, 225 S.W.2d 8 (1949); King v. State, 256 Ark. 778, 510 S.W.2d 876 (1974) (preceding decisions under prior law); Washington v. State, 268 Ark. 1117, 599 S.W.2d 408 (Ct. App. 1980).

The facts proven incident to an unlawful entry must show circumstances of such probative force as to reasonably warrant the inference of the purpose on the part of the accused to commit an offense punishable by imprisonment, other than the entry itself. Washington v. State, 268 Ark. 1117, 599 S.W.2d 408 (Ct. App. 1980).

A specific criminal intent, which is an essential element of the crime of burglary, cannot be presumed from a mere showing of illegal entry of an occupiable structure; the prosecution must prove each and every element of the offense of burglary beyond a reasonable doubt and cannot shift to the defendant the burden of explaining his illegal entry by merely establishing it. Norton v. State, 271 Ark. 451, 609 S.W.2d 1 (1980).

In a prosecution for burglary the flight of an accused to avoid arrest is evidence of his felonious intent. Oliver v. State, 14 Ark. App. 240, 687 S.W.2d 850 (1985), rev'd, 286 Ark. 198, 691 S.W.2d 842 (1985).

Where the defendant admitted entering the victim's home and taking the items, but testified that he entered the house through a partially opened door and had no intention of stealing anything when he entered, the jury could reasonably infer that the unlawful entry was accompanied with the intent to commit theft. Henry v. State, 18 Ark. App. 115, 710 S.W.2d 849 (1986).

Burglary committed when defendant chased the victim into the victim's home before killing him could not serve as the underlying felony under § 5-10-101(a)(1), since the intent to kill is what made the entry into the victim's home a burglary, and the burglary was no more than one step toward the commission of the murder and was not to facilitate the murder. Parker v. State, 292 Ark. 421, 731 S.W.2d 756 (1987).

Specific criminal intent and illegal entry are both elements of the crime of burglary, and existence of the intent cannot be presumed from a mere showing of the illegal entry. Cristee v. State, 25 Ark. App. 303, 757 S.W.2d 565 (1988).

Criminal intent cannot be presumed from the mere showing of illegal entry. Rudd v. State, 308 Ark. 401, 825 S.W.2d 565 (1992).

In absence of evidence of other intent or explanation for breaking or entering an occupiable structure at night, the usual object or purpose of burglarizing an occupiable structure at night is theft. Kendrick v. State, 37 Ark. App. 95, 823 S.W.2d 931 (1992).

Evidence of breaking into a house is not evidence of intent to commit a crime therein. Tiller v. State, 42 Ark. App. 64, 854 S.W.2d 730 (1993).

There was sufficient evidence that defendant entered victim's home for the purpose of taking her property where defendant stated during a lie detector test that he went over to the victim's to burglarize the house. Sanford v. State, 331 Ark. 334, 962 S.W.2d 335 (1998).

Circuit court erred in convicting defendant of attempted residential burglary; even though he was caught unlawfully entering his girlfriend's former residence while holding a small bag and fled when her daughter yelled at him, there was no evidence that he did so with the purpose or specific intent of committing therein a theft of property. There was no evidence to show whether the bag was empty or contained something, defendant was not a complete stranger to the daughter or to the residence, the illegal entry was in the middle of the day, and the window was known to not close properly. Whitworth v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 462, 531 S.W.3d 407 (2017).

Lesser Included Offenses.

The offense of knowingly receiving stolen property was not a lesser offense of burglary. Pickens v. State, 236 Ark. 404, 366 S.W.2d 283 (1963) (decision under prior law).

Breaking and entering is a lesser included offense for burglary. Selph v. State, 264 Ark. 197, 570 S.W.2d 256 (1978).

Criminal trespass meets all of the requirements of being a lesser included offense of burglary. Bongfeldt v. State, 6 Ark. App. 102, 639 S.W.2d 70 (1982).

None of the crimes of rape, burglary or kidnapping is necessarily a lesser included offense of the other, since all involve separate elements, and it is not necessary to prove one offense in order to prove another. Hickerson v. State, 282 Ark. 217, 667 S.W.2d 654 (1984).

Aggravated robbery is not a lesser included offense of burglary, as aggravated robbery requires some type of serious force or threat of force used with the purpose of committing a theft, none of which is required to commit burglary, and burglary requires only that the defendant enters or remains unlawfully in an occupiable structure with the purpose of committing any offense punishable by imprisonment. Kinsey v. State, 290 Ark. 4, 716 S.W.2d 188 (1986).

A person may be convicted of the offense of breaking or entering, as a lesser offense of burglary, whether a building is “occupiable” or not. Stultz v. State, 20 Ark. App. 90, 724 S.W.2d 189 (1987).

Misdemeanor Theft.

In a case involving stolen university exams, the trial court did not err in finding that the requirements of subsection (b) of this section were met because misdemeanor theft is punishable by one year imprisonment; no minimum value was required to be shown, and the testimony supported the State's assertion that the exams had inherent value to the students, to the professors themselves, and to the university as an academic institution. Gillean v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 698, 478 S.W.3d 255 (2015).

Occupiable Structure.

Any house came within former section defining burglary; an outhouse was not necessarily within the curtilage. Shotwell v. State, 43 Ark. 345 (1884) (preceding decisions under prior law).

To constitute burglary, a house or other building had to be entered. Harvick v. State, 49 Ark. 514, 6 S.W. 19 (1887); Shaeffer v. State, 61 Ark. 241, 32 S.W. 679 (1895) (preceding decisions under prior law).

The student union building at a university is an “occupiable structure.” Barksdale v. State, 262 Ark. 271, 555 S.W.2d 948 (1977).

Where the defendant entered a place of business at one time and lifted a pin from the door, then returned later, he entered an “occupiable structure.” Grays v. State, 264 Ark. 564, 572 S.W.2d 847 (1978).

A building where people assemble for purposes of education is an occupiable structure regardless of whether it was occupied at the time of the crime. Oliver v. State, 14 Ark. App. 240, 687 S.W.2d 850 (1985), rev'd, 286 Ark. 198, 691 S.W.2d 842 (1985).

A building where people assembled for social activities, religious sessions, and classroom meetings has been held to be an occupiable structure regardless of whether anyone was occupying it at the time. Cristee v. State, 25 Ark. App. 303, 757 S.W.2d 565 (1988).

Although the defendant was convicted of attempted burglary, it was nevertheless necessary to prove that he attempted to enter an occupiable structure with the purpose of committing therein an offense punishable by imprisonment. Cristee v. State, 25 Ark. App. 303, 757 S.W.2d 565 (1988).

Trailer or mobile home was an occupiable structure within the meaning of this section. Julian v. State, 298 Ark. 302, 767 S.W.2d 300 (1989).

Just as the definition of “occupiable” does not depend on the presence of a person in a building, it does not depend on whether a building is being used for some other purpose as long as the nature of the premise is that it is occupiable. Julian v. State, 298 Ark. 302, 767 S.W.2d 300 (1989).

Defendant's appeal of a residential burglary conviction was frivolous because, inter alia, defendant entered an occupiable structure, even though the cabin did not have running water at the time of defendant's entry. Guthrie v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 681 (2017).

Ownership.

In prosecution for crime of burglary, it was not necessary to prove the ownership of the property burglarized. Pope v. State, 216 Ark. 314, 225 S.W.2d 8 (1949) (decision under prior law).

Possession of Stolen Property.

The possession of recently stolen property is a proper circumstance to consider on the charge of burglary. Small v. State, 5 Ark. App. 87, 632 S.W.2d 448 (1982).

Possession of recently stolen property is prima facie evidence of the guilt of the party in whose possession the property is found in cases of burglary, larceny and possession of stolen property, unless satisfactorily accounted for by the evidence. Ward v. State, 280 Ark. 353, 658 S.W.2d 379 (1983).

Possession of recently stolen property is prima facie evidence of guilt of burglary of the party in whose possession the property is found, unless it is satisfactorily accounted for to the jury. This is so even if there is no direct evidence of breaking or entering by the defendant, and, when there is no other evidence to show the defendant had committed the crimes with felonious intent. Stout v. State, 304 Ark. 610, 804 S.W.2d 686 (1991).

Evidence showing defendant was in possession of recently stolen property coupled with the proof of his proximity to the scene of the crime constituted substantial evidence of burglary. Prince v. State, 304 Ark. 692, 805 S.W.2d 46 (1991).

Prejudicial Exclusion of Evidence.

Trial court incorrectly applied Ark. R. Evid. 613 and abused its discretion in excluding questions during the cross-examination of the investigating detective; defense counsel was not attempting to impeach the detective with a prior inconsistent statement but instead the purpose of the questions was to show that the homeowner got so poor a look at the intruder that she could not identify him as older than age 16 and that her state of mind was prejudicially influenced by the media coverage. The exclusion of the evidence required reversal. Brigance v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 213, 548 S.W.3d 147 (2018).

Proof.

In a prosecution for burglary in which it was charged that the defendant entered a building with intent to commit grand larceny, it was not necessary that the state show that the defendant stole and carried away money of the owner. Thompson v. State, 177 Ark. 1, 5 S.W.2d 355 (1928) (decision under prior law).

State had the burden of proving by circumstances or direct evidence that defendant made the unlawful entries charged in the information, with the specific intention of committing an assault with intent to rape. Hicks v. State, 231 Ark. 52, 328 S.W.2d 265 (1959) (decision under prior law).

The prosecution bore the burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that every element of the crime charged, including the alleged entries, were made with the specific purpose (or intent) of committing an offense punishable by imprisonment. Varnedare v. State, 264 Ark. 596, 573 S.W.2d 57 (1978), overruled in part, White v. State, 290 Ark. 130, 717 S.W.2d 784 (1986).

Relationship to Other Laws.

United States Supreme Court vacated the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit's judgment that a defendant who was convicted of unlawfully possessing a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922, was not subject to a minimum sentence of 15 years' imprisonment under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) because his conviction under § 5-39-201 did not fall within the ACCA's definition of “burglary”; however, the case was remanded because lower courts had not addressed the defendant's claim that the Arkansas residential burglary statute was too broad to count as generic burglary because it covered burglary of vehicles. United States v. Stitt, 139 S. Ct. 399, 202 L. Ed. 2d 364 (2018).

Sentence.

Because the sentence of 20 years' imprisonment with a 10-year suspended imposition of sentence, while falling within the statutory-sentencing range for Class A arson under §§ 5-38-301(b)(5), 5-4-401(a)(2), exceeded the range for Class B residential burglary and Class C theft of property, under subdivision (a)(2) of this section, and §§ 5-36-103(b)(2), 5-4-401(a)(3), (4), the residential-burglary and theft-of-property sentences were illegal, and the case was remanded for resentencing. Wakeley v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 231 (2013).

Where defendant's conviction for aggravated residential burglary under § 5-39-204 was reversed because there was insufficient evidence that defendant attempted to inflict a serious physical injury and defendant did not dispute that residential burglary was proven, his 40-year sentence was modified to the maximum allowed for residential burglary, a Class B felony, which was 20 years' imprisonment. Inskeep v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 135, 484 S.W.3d 709 (2016).

Separate Offenses.

Where defendant charged with both grand larceny (now theft) and burglary, was found guilty only of burglary, conviction of burglary would be affirmed, as it was not necessary for conviction of burglary that he also be found guilty of grand larceny. Jackson v. State, 216 Ark. 341, 225 S.W.2d 522, 15 A.L.R.2d 484 (1949) (decision under prior law).

Since burglary is a separate offense from theft by receiving, a defendant who had been convicted of burglary was not twice placed in jeopardy by being convicted of theft by receiving property stolen at the time of the burglary. King v. State, 262 Ark. 342, 557 S.W.2d 386 (1977), overruled in part, State v. Brown, 356 Ark. 460, 156 S.W.3d 722 (2004).

Counts charging arson and burglary are two independent charges and a verdict in one would not be res judicata as to the other, even though based upon the same evidence, so consistency in the verdicts is unnecessary; accordingly, defendant could be acquitted of burglary and convicted of arson. Riddick v. State, 271 Ark. 203, 607 S.W.2d 671 (1980).

Convictions for burglary and breaking or entering were proper. Ward v. State, 20 Ark. App. 172, 726 S.W.2d 289 (1987).

Structure.

A fence comes within the meaning of the word “structure,” as used in § 5-39-202. Townsend v. State, 308 Ark. 266, 824 S.W.2d 821 (1992).

Sufficient Evidence.

Even though defendant was not convicted of second-degree assault, there was sufficient evidence that he entered the owner's home to commit that offense, as the owner saw defendant swinging at his wife inside the home after he chased her there with a knife, and thus there was a substantial risk of injury to the wife, which showed defendant's intent; defendant's residential burglary conviction was supported by substantial evidence. Whitfield v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 380, 438 S.W.3d 289 (2014).

Substantial evidence demonstrated that defendant entered or remained unlawfully on a commercial retailer's property, in violation of this section, where there was no evidence that the retailer expressly or impliedly rescinded a notification banning defendant from its property. Brasuell v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 559, 472 S.W.3d 499 (2015).

Defendant entered the victim's home while he was asleep and then pointed the gun at him, telling him to prepare to die; thus, there was substantial evidence to support a finding that defendant unlawfully entered or remained in the victim's home and defendant's conviction for aggravated residential burglary was affirmed. Although defendant testified that the victim had sent her a text stating that she was always welcome in his home, she did not introduce the text message into evidence, the jury was not required to believe her self-serving testimony, and the jury could have found that defendant no longer had a license or privilege to enter the victim's home on the night of the shooting. Rose v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 563, 472 S.W.3d 167 (2015).

Denying a directed verdict motion on a residential burglary charge was not error as the testimony showed that a neighbor left her door unlocked for her boyfriend or defendant's wife, not for defendant, and thus, the evidence showed that defendant had entered the neighbor's home unlawfully even though he and his wife had keys to the home. Holly v. State, 2017 Ark. 201 (2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of residential burglary because, regardless of whether the victim or her son denied defendant entry or told him to leave, defendant's license or privilege to enter the home was revoked once he inflicted injury upon the victim; and the jury could have inferred that defendant intended to sexually assault the victim, which was a felony, as, upon learning the victim was in the bath, he entered the bathroom, opened the shower curtain, touched her breast, and touched her vagina. Holland v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 49, 510 S.W.3d 311 (2017).

Defendant's residential-burglary conviction was affirmed where the victim's testimony that her home had been broken into, jewelry was missing, and she was emotionally affected as a result made clear that defendant and his accomplices were not authorized to take or exercise control over the victim's property. Hubbard v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 93, 513 S.W.3d 289 (2017).

Trial court did not err in denying defendant's directed verdict motions, as evidence that defendant was seen leaving the victim's residence and was found 30 minutes later in possession of recently stolen property taken from the residence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for residential burglary and theft of property. Owens v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 353 (2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of residential burglary where the apartment door was damaged and the mother asked defendant to stop disciplining the child and asked her father to come check things out; the evidence was sufficient to show that defendant did not have permission to enter. Jefferson v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 492, 532 S.W.3d 75 (2017).

State presented sufficient evidence as to both elements of residential burglary where the homeowner testified about the circumstances surrounding the unlawful entry, firing her gun at appellant, and appellant running away, appellant was treated for a gunshot wound mere hours after the intrusion, and his jacket was found with a bullet hole and blood stains that matched his DNA. Brigance v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 213, 548 S.W.3d 147 (2018).

Substantial evidence supported defendant's conviction for residential burglary because defendant was seen in the area where the burglary had occurred wearing clothes like those worn by one of the burglars and driving an SUV that matched the description of the SUV seen by a witness and a detective; defendant was in possession of the flat-screen television that was stolen, and he was in possession of tools that would be helpful to commit a burglary. Nelson v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 454, 558 S.W.3d 894 (2018).

Circuit court did not err in denying defendant's motions for directed verdict on a residential burglary count and six other counts even though all the evidence was circumstantial; given the entirety of the circumstantial evidence, the jury could conclude without resorting to speculation or conjecture that defendant committed the offenses. Defendant had bypassed a locked gate to enter the victim's property and fled when confronted by the police, his explanation as to why he was on the property was improbable, and he had a backpack and ratchet in his hand that looked like the victim's property. Cobb v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 434, 585 S.W.3d 196 (2019).

Evidence supported a juvenile's residential burglary conviction where the victim testified that a hoverboard was stolen from his home and he had not given anyone permission to be inside his home on the day of the burglary, and the juvenile admitted possession (but claimed he borrowed the hoverboard). B.T. v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 471, 588 S.W.3d 387 (2019).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of residential burglary as defendant entered or remained unlawfully in the house with the purpose to commit a third-degree battery because defendant's former spouse testified that, before defendant entered the house, she had asked him to leave but that he shoved her out of the way and entered the house uninvited before immediately attacking the battery victim; and the former spouse further testified that, during defendant's attack on the battery victim inside the house, she again told defendant to leave but he refused. Williams v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 602, 591 S.W.3d 376 (2019).

Evidence supported defendant's convictions for residential burglary and theft of property because the victim testified that defendant, whom the victim had never seen before, was walking down the driveway away from the victim's house when the victim returned after a short errand and that the victim discovered items were taken from the house. Defendant also gave a police detective an inconsistent explanation as to why defendant was in the victim's neighborhood and attempted to flee when officers arrived at the house where defendant was located (no-merit brief). Sanford v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 10, 567 S.W.3d 553 (2019).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's residential burglary and interference with custody convictions given the trial testimony that he forced open the victim's apartment door and took her child against her will (no-merit brief). Kelley v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 71, 568 S.W.3d 801 (2019).

Cited: Hunter v. State, 264 Ark. 195, 570 S.W.2d 267 (1978); White v. State, 266 Ark. 499, 585 S.W.2d 952 (1979); Conley v. State, 267 Ark. 713, 590 S.W.2d 66 (Ct. App. 1979); Elmore v. State, 267 Ark. 952, 592 S.W.2d 124 (Ct. App. 1980); Gustafson v. State, 267 Ark. 278, 590 S.W.2d 853 (1979); Klimas v. Mabry, 599 F.2d 842 (8th Cir. 1979); Schwindling v. State, 269 Ark. 388, 602 S.W.2d 639 (1980); Miller v. State, 269 Ark. 409, 601 S.W.2d 845 (1980); Plummer v. State, 270 Ark. 11, 603 S.W.2d 402 (1980); Parris v. State, 270 Ark. 269, 604 S.W.2d 582 (Ct. App. 1980); Thrasher v. State, 270 Ark. 322, 604 S.W.2d 931 (1980); Hammon v. State, 270 Ark. 307, 605 S.W.2d 6 (1980); Morrow v. State, 271 Ark. 806, 610 S.W.2d 878; Glason v. State, 272 Ark. 28, 611 S.W.2d 752 (1981); Conley v. State, 272 Ark. 33, 612 S.W.2d 722 (1981); Tillman v. State, 275 Ark. 275, 630 S.W.2d 5 (1982); Hawksley v. State, 276 Ark. 504, 637 S.W.2d 573 (1982); Pickens v. State, 279 Ark. 457, 652 S.W.2d 626 (Ark. 1983); Brown v. State, 12 Ark. App. 132, 671 S.W.2d 228 (1984); Moser v. State, 287 Ark. 105, 696 S.W.2d 744 (1985); Wing v. State, 286 Ark. 494, 696 S.W.2d 311 (1985); Harrison v. State, 287 Ark. 102, 696 S.W.2d 501 (1985); Sellers v. State, 295 Ark. 489, 749 S.W.2d 669 (1988); Smith v. Lockhart, 882 F.2d 331 (8th Cir. 1989); Perkins v. State, 298 Ark. 322, 767 S.W.2d 514 (1989); Bussard v. State, 300 Ark. 174, 778 S.W.2d 213 (1989); Bates v. Bates, 303 Ark. 89, 793 S.W.2d 788 (1990); Parker v. Lockhart, 797 F. Supp. 718 (E.D. Ark. 1992); Shibley v. State, 324 Ark. 212, 920 S.W.2d 10 (1996); Avett v. State, 325 Ark. 320, 928 S.W.2d 326 (1996); Mackey v. State, 56 Ark. App. 164, 939 S.W.2d 851; Booker v. State, 335 Ark. 316, 984 S.W.2d 16 (1998); Haynes v. State, 354 Ark. 514, 127 S.W.3d 456 (2003); Isom v. State, 356 Ark. 156, 148 S.W.3d 257 (2004); Walker v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 63 (2010).