Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-618 (2026)

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Article, Ethical and Effective Representation in Arkansas Capital Trials, 60 Ark. L. Rev. 1.

Case Notes

Applicability.

Where there had previously been a judicial determination that defendant was not mentally retarded, this section did not apply. Fairchild v. Norris, 314 Ark. 221, 861 S.W.2d 111 (1993).

Where the question of defendant's mental retardation was addressed and resolved by the federal courts before this section's prohibition was enacted, the mere passage of Acts 1993, No. 420 does not require a new resolution of this issue. Fairchild v. Norris, 317 Ark. 166, 876 S.W.2d 588, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 974, 115 S. Ct. 448 (1994).

Whether defendant was mentally retarded was a question of fact for the jury to decide in the sentencing phase of his trial where the trial court found the evidence to be inconsistent, based on the records and two mental evaluations, including evidence suggesting that defendant was malingering. Weston v. State, 366 Ark. 265, 234 S.W.3d 848 (2006).

State inmate was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a federal habeas claim that the inmate's Arkansas death sentence violated the Eighth Amendment because of the inmate's mental retardation. The inmate's failure to present a mental retardation defense at trial pursuant to this section did not preclude the separate and previously unavailable federal claim. Simpson v. Norris, 490 F.3d 1029 (8th Cir. 2007), rehearing denied, 499 F.3d 874 (8th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1224, 128 S. Ct. 1226, 170 L. Ed. 2d 140 (2008).

Prisoner who had filed a federal habeas petition after being sentenced to death in state court for capital murder was entitled to have the district court's finding that the prisoner was not mentally retarded vacated because the district court's misconceptions about the Arkansas mental retardation legal standard led it to answer the wrong factual questions, and the legal errors were not harmless since it would not be unreasonable for a factfinder to find the prisoner mentally retarded. Sasser v. Hobbs, 735 F.3d 833 (8th Cir. 2013).

Appellate Review.

The standard for reviewing a trial court's determination that a defendant is not mentally retarded under this section will be affirmed if it is supported by substantial evidence. Rankin v. State, 329 Ark. 379, 948 S.W.2d 397 (1997).

In a criminal prosecution for capital murder, where the circuit court determined that defendant was not mentally retarded, he was permitted to raise the question of mental retardation to the jury for determination de novo during the sentencing phase of the trial, pursuant to subdivision (d)(2)(A) of this section. Anderson v. State, 357 Ark. 180, 163 S.W.3d 333 (2004).

Petitioner's claim that he was unable to raise the defense that he was mentally retarded and that his execution violated U.S. Const. amend. VIII in state court prior to the United States Supreme Court's decision that the execution of mentally retarded individuals violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment was meritless because petitioner failed to avail himself of subsection (b) of this section, which prohibited the execution of defendants with mental retardation and which satisfied the Eighth Amendment. Engram v. State, 360 Ark. 140, 200 S.W.3d 367 (2004), cert. denied, Engram v. Arkansas, 125 S. Ct. 2965, 162 L. Ed. 2d 893 (U.S. 2005).

Determinative Factors.

Although a defendant is entitled under subdivision (a)(2) to a rebuttable presumption of mental retardation if his intelligence quotient (I.Q.) is 65 or below, the definition of “mental retardation” encompasses more than an I.Q. score. Rankin v. State, 329 Ark. 379, 948 S.W.2d 397 (1997).

Term “adaptive behavior” under subdivision (a)(1)(B) of this section encompasses the same skill areas as adaptive functioning, but there is no age requirement on the evidence used to establish limitations in adaptive behavior. Jackson v. Norris, 615 F.3d 959 (8th Cir. 2010).

Prisoner was entitled to a hearing on a claim that carrying out the death penalty would violate the Eighth Amendment because the prisoner was mentally retarded. Fact issues existed as to whether the prisoner was mentally retarded under the definition set forth in subsection (a) of this section; tests administered prior to the prisoner's 18th birthday allegedly indicated an IQ of 70, and the prisoner offered evidence of a deficit in adaptive functioning prior to age 18 and a deficit in adaptive behavior with no age limit. Jackson v. Norris, 615 F.3d 959 (8th Cir. 2010).

Evidence supported trial court's finding that defendant was not mentally retarded, despite the fact that he had been in special education classes since elementary school, because experts testified that he had an intelligence quotient within the range of 71 to 84, low average, that he had been employed, and that while incarcerated he kept up with financial transactions, wrote letters, and held telephone conversations. Miller v. State, 2010 Ark. 1, 362 S.W.3d 264 (2010), rehearing denied, — Ark. —, — S.W.3d —, 2010 Ark. LEXIS 95 (Feb. 12, 2010).

Denial of appellant's, an inmate's, petition for postconviction relief was appropriate because he alleged only bare conclusions and had not overcome the presumption of trial counsel's competence by identifying specific acts and omissions that could not have been the result of reasonable professional judgment. Counsel's testimony established that, because the inmate's IQ fell at the pivotal point of 65, that was a strategic decision not to pursue further the issue of the inmate's IQ and mental retardation. Anderson v. State, 2011 Ark. 488, 385 S.W.3d 783 (2011).

Rebuttable Presumption.

Scores of 66 and 72 on two I.Q. tests did not entitle defendant to the rebuttable presumption under subdivision (a)(2). Rankin v. State, 329 Ark. 379, 948 S.W.2d 397 (1997).

Murder defendant's motion to recall mandate and reopen his case was denied as defendant should have obtained a ruling on his retardation issue before trial; defendant failed to file a motion under subsection (b) of this section, which prevented a mentally retarded defendant from being sentenced to death, or to request a ruling on the retardation issue, and, at a competency hearing, a forensic psychologist for the state concluded defendant was not retarded. Engram v. State, 360 Ark. 140, 200 S.W.3d 367 (2004), cert. denied, Engram v. Arkansas, 125 S. Ct. 2965, 162 L. Ed. 2d 893 (U.S. 2005).

Where a forensic psychologist testified that defendant's IQ score would likely fall between the scores of 76 and 86, defendant was not entitled to the rebuttable presumption of mental retardation under subdivision (a)(2) of this section and, thus, the trial court had no duty to raise sua sponte the issue of whether defendant was not eligible for the death penalty. Engram v. State, 360 Ark. 140, 200 S.W.3d 367 (2004), cert. denied, Engram v. Arkansas, 125 S. Ct. 2965, 162 L. Ed. 2d 893 (U.S. 2005).

Appellate court rejected inmate's motion to recall the mandate in his appeal and reopen his case as inmate never raised a claim of mental retardation until his federal habeas corpus petition, which was filed 10 years after his petition for post-conviction relief, and did not meet the presumption of retardation in subdivision (2) of this section as the inmate had an IQ of 94, which was far above the IQ of 65 that entitled a person to a presumption. Coulter v. State, 365 Ark. 262, 227 S.W.3d 904 (2006), cert. denied, Coulter v. Arkansas, 549 U.S. 858, 127 S. Ct. 138, 166 L. Ed. 2d 101 (2006).

Cited: Reams v. State, 322 Ark. 336, 909 S.W.2d 324 (1995); Jones v. State, 340 Ark. 390, 10 S.W.3d 449 (2000); Sanford v. State, 342 Ark. 22, 25 S.W.3d 414 (2000); Dimas-Martinez v. State, 2011 Ark. 515, 385 S.W.3d 238 (2011).