Ark. Code Ann. § 5-54-103 (2026)

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

A reasonable and commonly understood construction of subsection (b) gives a person of ordinary intelligence fair warning that an inactive or passive form of noncompliance with the arrest process can subject one to punishment, and this section is not unconstitutionally vague. Pursley v. State, 302 Ark. 471, 791 S.W.2d 359 (1990).

Defendant failed to show that subsection (b) unconstitutionally violated his freedom of speech rights, as it is written or as it was applied to him. Williams v. State, 320 Ark. 211, 895 S.W.2d 913 (1995).

Acts Constituting Offense.

Defendant who became involved in a police station brawl should have been charged with resisting arrest or disorderly conduct, not with interfering with a police officer in the performance of his duties. Breakfield v. State, 263 Ark. 398, 566 S.W.2d 729 (1978).

Defendant's actions held not to support his conviction for interfering with a police officer in the performance of his duties, although they may have constituted the offense of resisting arrest. State v. Bocksnick, 268 Ark. 74, 593 S.W.2d 176 (1980).

Defense.

Defendant committed an assault with a deadly weapon when he shot police officer who was trying to arrest his brother for drunkenness, and it was no excuse that police officer advanced toward defendant, as police officer had a right to disarm the defendant. Ogles v. State, 214 Ark. 581, 217 S.W.2d 259 (1949) (decision under prior law).

Evidence.

Evidence held sufficient to support conviction. Williams v. State, 70 Ark. 393, 68 S.W. 241 (1902); Williams v. State, 253 Ark. 973, 490 S.W.2d 117 (1973); Hammond v. State, 255 Ark. 56, 498 S.W.2d 652 (1973) (preceding decisions under prior law).

Evidence held sufficient where it was shown that the defendant continuously struggled with the arresting officers when they attempted to place handcuffs on him and that he repeatedly swung at them and attempted to kick them. Bailey v. State, 334 Ark. 43, 972 S.W.2d 239 (1998).

In a case in which defendant appealed the revocation of her suspended sentence, defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the finding that she committed the new offense of battery in the second degree on a police officer; however, the appellate court did not address defendant's argument because the evidence introduced at the revocation hearing was sufficient to support the finding that defendant committed the offense of resisting arrest. Gasca v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 214 (2013).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of resisting arrest, where he refused to submit and engaged in an extended struggle with the trooper who arrested him, and the struggle was apparently physical enough to break the trooper's microphone clip off his utility belt. Hooten v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 519, 588 S.W.3d 829 (2019).

Trial court's revocation of defendant's suspended imposition of sentence for committing the offense of resisting arrest was not clearly against a preponderance of the evidence because, in describing defendant's resistance to the officers' efforts to arrest her, a corporal stated that defendant was wiggling around, pulling against him, not cooperating, and trying to get up and get out of the officers' grasp; he testified that he and another officer had to take defendant to the ground to get handcuffs on her; and defendant threatened to use physical force against the corporal when she said that she was going to beat him up and that she would make sure that he got to hell. Jennings v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 258, 576 S.W.3d 517 (2019).

Indictment or Information.

In drawing an indictment for obstructing or resisting an officer, it was not necessary to allege that the officer seeking to arrest certain parties had a warrant for their arrest. State v. Embrey, 135 Ark. 262, 204 S.W. 1139 (1918) (decision under prior law).

Law Enforcement Officer.

Though the patrolman was off duty at the time of arrest, defendant was guilty of resisting arrest. Meyers v. State, 253 Ark. 38, 484 S.W.2d 334 (1972) (decision under prior law).

Lesser-Included Offenses.

Aggravated and first degree assault are not lesser-included offenses of resisting arrest. Enoch v. State, 37 Ark. App. 103, 826 S.W.2d 291 (1992).

Remedies.

Consistent with the legislative purpose for this section, defendant's remedy for any violation of his constitutional rights stemming from his arrest was to submit his dispute to the impartial determination of a court of law, including, if appropriate, an action for damages; his remedy was not to refuse to submit to his arrest. Williams v. State, 320 Ark. 211, 895 S.W.2d 913 (1995).

Resistance.

The use of any means, whether threats, intimidations, or any other act willfully done, with intent to deter, hinder or prevent an officer from the performance of his duty constituted a violation of former section concerning obstructing or resisting an officer. Williams v. State, 253 Ark. 973, 490 S.W.2d 117 (1973) (decision under prior law).

Arrest was not complete at the moment handcuffs were put on defendants, who were in the process of committing the offense of criminal trespass when the officers handcuffed them, and would not move and continued to commit the trespass even after the handcuffs were secured. As a result, the arrest was not complete until the continuing trespass offense was ended, and the defendants, by refusing to move, were passively refusing to submit to arrest. Pursley v. State, 302 Ark. 471, 791 S.W.2d 359 (1990).

The use of physical force is not required to sustain a conviction; a threat of physical force is sufficient. Bailey v. State, 334 Ark. 43, 972 S.W.2d 239 (1998).

Resistance or Interference.

The distinction between resisting arrest and interference with a law enforcement officer as defined in § 5-54-104 is that resisting the officer occurs when one knowingly resists a person known by him to be a law enforcement officer attempting to effect an arrest, while the interference referred to in § 5-54-104 is designed to cover the situation where a person is interfering with an officer performing some duty other than arresting the person charged. Gilmer v. State, 269 Ark. 30, 602 S.W.2d 406 (1980).

The offense of interference with a police officer was not intended to be an alternative to charging someone with resisting arrest. Price v. State, 276 Ark. 80, 632 S.W.2d 429 (1982).

Validity of Process.

Validity of the criminal process, regular on its face, was immaterial. Crabtree v. State, 238 Ark. 358, 381 S.W.2d 729 (1964) (decision under prior law).

Cited: Delrio v. State, 263 Ark. 888, 568 S.W.2d 15 (1978); Duckins v. State, 271 Ark. 658, 609 S.W.2d 674 (Ct. App. 1980); Easterly v. State, 8 Ark. App. 135, 648 S.W.2d 843 (1983); Bell v. Lockhart, 741 F.2d 1105 (8th Cir. 1984); Cole v. State, 33 Ark. App. 98, 802 S.W.2d 472 (1991); Butler v. State, 309 Ark. 211, 829 S.W.2d 412 (1992); Williams v. State, 327 Ark. 97, 938 S.W.2d 547 (1997).