Ark. Code Ann. § 5-54-110 (2026)
First degree escape
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A person commits the offense of first degree escape if:
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At any time, including from the point of departure from confinement to the return to confinement, aided by another person actually present, he or she uses or threatens to use physical force in escaping from:
- Custody;
- A correctional facility;
- A juvenile detention facility; or
- A youth services program; or
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At any time, including from the point of departure from confinement to the return to confinement, he or she uses or threatens to use a deadly weapon in escaping from:
- Custody;
- A correctional facility;
- A juvenile detention facility; or
- A youth services program.
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At any time, including from the point of departure from confinement to the return to confinement, aided by another person actually present, he or she uses or threatens to use physical force in escaping from:
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First degree escape is a Class A felony if, at the time of the escape, the person is in the custody of:
- The Division of Correction;
- The Division of Community Correction; or
- A law enforcement agency.
- Otherwise first degree escape is a Class C felony.
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First degree escape is a Class A felony if, at the time of the escape, the person is in the custody of:
History. Acts 1975, No. 280, § 2810; A.S.A. 1947, § 41-2810; Acts 1997, No. 1229, § 3; 1997, No. 1299, § 3; 2003, No. 1348, § 1; 2005, No. 1994, § 254; 2009, No. 478, § 1; 2019, No. 910, § 676.
Amendments. The 2003 amendment added “At anytime from the point of departure from confinement to the return to confinement” in (a)(1) and (2); and made minor stylistic changes.
The 2005 amendment inserted “including” in (a)(1) and (a)(2); and substituted “program” for “facility” in (a)(1)(D) and (a)(2)(D).
The 2009 amendment rewrote (b).
The 2019 amendment substituted “Division of Correction” for “Department of Correction” in (b)(1)(A), and “Division of Community Correction” for “Department of Community Correction” in (b)(1)(B).
Research References
Ark. L. Rev.
Manslaughter: The Resting Place of Several Former Statutes, 30 Ark. L. Rev. 213.
Case Notes
Accomplice.
A prisoner who aided others to escape, and escaped himself by the same means, was an accomplice to such escape. Hillian v. State, 50 Ark. 523, 8 S.W. 834 (1888) (decision under prior law).
Evidence held sufficient to support conviction as an accomplice. Shinsky v. State, 250 Ark. 620, 466 S.W.2d 911 (1971) (decision under prior law); Ruiz v. State, 5 Ark. App. 151, 633 S.W.2d 399 (1982).
To convict one as an accomplice to first degree escape, the state is required to prove he aided, agreed to aid or attempted to aid another person to escape as that crime is defined in this section. Ruiz v. State, 5 Ark. App. 151, 633 S.W.2d 399 (1982).
Custody.
A person confined in jail was “in custody” within former section which penalized anyone who rescued a felon. Hillian v. State, 50 Ark. 523, 8 S.W. 834 (1888) (decision under prior law).
The mere fact of physical custody or imprisonment was not sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction for escape or attempt to escape, but the burden was upon the state to prove that such custody or imprisonment was lawful. Harding v. State, 248 Ark. 1240, 455 S.W.2d 695 (1970) (decision under prior law).
Evidence held sufficient to establish that defendant was lawfully imprisoned. Brown v. State, 252 Ark. 846, 481 S.W.2d 366 (1972) (decision under prior law).
State held to have failed to show that the defendant was in lawful custody at the time he ran away from the presence of the officers, so as to constitute offense of escape under former section concerning escape from penitentiary. Akins v. State, 253 Ark. 273, 485 S.W.2d 535 (1972) (decision under prior law).
Furnishing Implements for Escape.
A person guilty of furnishing implements for the escape of county prisoners was liable to be punished under former section concerning penalty for those conveying disguised instruments into jail and not under former section concerning penalty for anyone setting at liberty a prisoner who has been lawfully arrested. Autrey v. State, 155 Ark. 546, 244 S.W. 711 (1922) (decision under prior law).
Indictment or Information.
Indictment held sufficient. Dickens v. State, 109 Ark. 425, 160 S.W. 218 (1913) (decision under prior law).
Jury Question.
Whether the defendant jumped in front of the arresting officer to prevent him from shooting his brother, or whether he did so to rescue his brother, was for the jury to decide. Bowlin v. State, 175 Ark. 1047, 1 S.W.2d 546 (1928) (decision under prior law).
Sentencing.
Circuit court did not err in denying petitioner postconviction relief because he failed to show he was prejudiced when trial counsel stated during his opening statement that petitioner escaped from jail while awaiting trial; during sentencing at petitioner's capital-murder trial, the State could have moved to introduce his conviction for escape to be used as an aggravating circumstance in the jury's weighing of the death penalty because the prior felony involved the use or threat of violence. Sales v. State, 2014 Ark. 384, 441 S.W.3d 883 (2014).
Separate Offenses.
Since kidnapping, theft, and escape involve proof of different elements and are punishable as separate crimes, the defendant was not subjected to double jeopardy due to the multiple sentences imposed by the trial court. Matthews v. Lockhart, 726 F.2d 394 (8th Cir. 1984).
Defendant did not commit first-degree escape when he hid in a hog-slop tank in a prison that was hauled from the prison, jumped from the tank once it was outside the prison, walked five miles to the victim's home, and killed and robbed the victim more than three hours after he had escaped from prison; defendant had already completed his escape from prison, by leaving the bounds within which he was required to remain, when he killed and robbed the victim. Williams v. State, 347 Ark. 728, 67 S.W.3d 548 (2002).
Cited: Wright v. State, 270 Ark. 78, 603 S.W.2d 408 (1980); Hawksley v. State, 276 Ark. 504, 637 S.W.2d 573 (1982).