Ark. Code Ann. § 5-65-109 (2026)
Presentencing report
- The court shall immediately request and the Division of Aging, Adult, and Behavioral Health Services of the Department of Human Services or its designee shall provide a presentence screening and assessment report of the defendant who pleads guilty or nolo contendere or is found guilty of violating § 5-65-103 or § 5-65-303.
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- The presentence screening and assessment report shall be provided within thirty (30) days of the request.
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- If the defendant's sentencing is delayed by the defendant after he or she pleads guilty or nolo contendere, or if he or she is found guilty, the clerk of the court shall notify the defendant by first-class mail sent to the defendant's last known address that he or she has fifteen (15) days to appear and show cause for failing to appear for sentencing.
- The court may proceed with sentencing even in the absence of the defendant after the expiration of the fifteen (15) days under subdivision (b)(2)(A) of this section.
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The presentence screening and assessment report shall include without limitation:
- The defendant's driving record;
- An alcohol problem assessment; and
- A victim impact statement, if applicable.
History. Acts 1983, No. 549, § 6; A.S.A. 1947, § 75-2506; Acts 1991, No. 899, § 1; 1999, No. 1077, § 10; 2003, No. 129, § 1; 2007, No. 251, § 1; 2007, No. 827, § 77; 2013, No. 1107, § 3; 2015, No. 299, § 6; 2017, No. 913, § 19; 2019, No. 321, § 1.
Amendments. The 2003 amendment, in (a), inserted “violating § 5-65-103” following “nolo contendere to” and made stylistic changes; redesignated former (b) as present (b)(1); added present (b)(2); and substituted “defendant's” for “offender's” in (c).
The 2013 amendment substituted “Division of Behavioral Health Services” for “Office of Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention” in (a).
The 2015 amendment rewrote the section.
The 2017 amendment substituted “Division of Aging, Adult, and Behavioral Health Services of the Department of Human Services” for “Division of Behavioral Health Services” in (a).
The 2019 amendment deleted “and the court shall not pronounce sentence until the court receives the presentence screening and assessment report” following “request” in (b)(1).
Case Notes
Preservation for Review.
Waiting to raise the lack of a presentence report for the first time in a posttrial motion does not preserve the issue for appellate review. Lockhart v. State, 2017 Ark. 13, 508 S.W.3d 869 (2017).
Self-Incrimination.
This section does not require a defendant to take any action whatever in response to the state's proof or to the presentence report; so there is no compulsory self-incrimination. Janes v. State, 285 Ark. 279, 686 S.W.2d 783 (1985); Johnston v. City of Fort Smith, 15 Ark. App. 102, 690 S.W.2d 358 (1985).
The presentence screening and assessment report on the defendant required by this section do not violate his right against compulsory self-incrimination. Johnston v. City of Fort Smith, 15 Ark. App. 102, 690 S.W.2d 358 (1985).
The mere possibility that defendant may be asked questions, the answers to which may have the effect of causing the trial court to sentence more harshly than it otherwise might, did not excuse defendant's violation of the trial court's order that he report to the agency charged with the responsibility of conducting an evaluation. Watson v. City of Fayetteville, 322 Ark. 324, 909 S.W.2d 637 (1995).
Sentencing.
The requirement that the jury fix the sentence does not render the presentence report requirement of this section meaningless; there are situations when the report still will be of value, as when the court fixes the sentence under one of the exceptions of § 5-4-103(b). Tharp v. State, 294 Ark. 615, 745 S.W.2d 612 (1988).
Subsection (b) does not require that sentencing be delayed 30 days after a finding of guilt. Lowe v. State, 300 Ark. 106, 776 S.W.2d 822 (1989).
The trial court committed reversible error in imposing sentence in the absence of a presentence report where (1) the defendant was convicted of driving while intoxicated, (2) after the jury deadlocked in the sentencing phase, the trial court assumed the sentencing function, and (3) the defendant was given the maximum sentence of a year in jail, a $ 1,000 fine, and suspension of his driver's license for 120 days. Donald v. State, 73 Ark. App. 79, 42 S.W.3d 563 (2001).
Cited: Lovell v. State, 283 Ark. 434, 681 S.W.2d 395 (1984); Rawlings v. State, 284 Ark. 446, 683 S.W.2d 223 (1985); Price v. State, 285 Ark. 148, 685 S.W.2d 506 (1985); Hogan v. State, 289 Ark. 402, 712 S.W.2d 295 (1986); Bocksnick v. City of London, 308 Ark. 599, 825 S.W.2d 267 (1992).