Ark. Code Ann. § 7-6-102 (2026)

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Michael K. Goswami, Comment: High Crimes, Treason, and Chicken Theft: “Infamous Crimes” in Arkansas and Disqualification from Political Office, 67 Ark. L. Rev. 653 (2014).

Case Notes

Certificate of Expunction.

Because the reference in subsection (d) is to a “certificate of expunction” from Arkansas or another state, a federal certificate may be regarded as the equivalent of such a document. Tyler v. Shackleford, 303 Ark. 662, 799 S.W.2d 789 (1990).

The setting aside of the conviction of a youthful offender under former 18 U.S.C. § 5201(b) meant that it were as if the conviction had never been, and a judge who had had a conviction set aside was never obligated under this section to produce his federal Certificate of Vacation of Conviction with his political practices pledges because, legally, his conviction never occurred and the documentation was “a ministerial act” that simply certified what had already been accomplished. Tyler v. Shackleford, 303 Ark. 662, 799 S.W.2d 789 (1990).

Costs.

Former law providing for pledge of compliance by candidate did not contemplate that the county pay the costs of filing pledges, but the costs must be borne by those seeking office. State for use and benefit of Independence County v. Baker, 197 Ark. 1075, 126 S.W.2d 937 (1939) (decision under prior law).

Exceptions.

Candidates for board of directors or municipal judge in cities operating under the city manager form of government are not required to file a political practice pledge as provided in this section. Williams v. Pulaski County Election Comm'n, 249 Ark. 309, 459 S.W.2d 52 (1970).

Filing.

Nowhere in this section is there a requirement that candidates file their political practice pledges in person. Ridgeway v. Ray, 297 Ark. 195, 760 S.W.2d 848 (1988).

Inaccuracy in Pledge.

Although, contrary to § 7-10-103, an appointed district court judge who had filed as a candidate for the Court of Appeals erroneously used the title “Judge” in her signature of the political practices pledge, section 7-10-103 did not restrict courts from ordering a change on the ballot and curent law only sanctioned those who did not sign the pledge; there was no penalty for those found to have included inaccurate information on the pledge. Barrett v. Thurston, 2020 Ark. 36 (2020).

Independent Candidates.

The concept of “independent candidates” does not include candidates for board of directors or municipal judge in a city having a city manager form of government, since all such candidates run without political affiliation. Williams v. Pulaski County Election Comm'n, 249 Ark. 309, 459 S.W.2d 52 (1970).

Substantial Compliance.

A candidate's pledge that he was familiar with former corrupt practices laws, without more, was substantial compliance with former similar statute especially where it was not contended that the corrupt practices laws had been violated. Taaffe v. Sanderson, 173 Ark. 970, 294 S.W. 74 (1927) (decision under prior law).

Where a candidate for state senator, in good faith, intended to comply with prior law, and by mistake filed his pledge with the secretary of the Democratic Central Committee instead of with the Secretary of State, he should not be denied the right to have his name placed on the ticket. Spence v. Whittaker, 178 Ark. 51, 9 S.W.2d 769 (1928) (decision under prior law).

Surname.

Appointed district court judge who had filed as a candidate for the Court of Appeals was not disqualified because she used her maiden surname on the political practices pledge rather than her married surname. The record indicated that the candidate was known professionally by her maiden name, and her use of her maiden name on the ballot title did not serve to undermine the spirit of the political practices pledge by obfuscating her true identity, nor did it run afoul of this section, which requires only that a candidate use their “surname”. Barrett v. Thurston, 2020 Ark. 36 (2020).

Time of Filing.

Although the filing of the pledge was only two days late and might have been considered a substantial compliance with former similar statute if no objection had been raised until after the election, where enforcement of the provisions of the law was sought before the election, the provision in the law as to the time for filing was considered mandatory. Wright v. Sullivan, 229 Ark. 378, 314 S.W.2d 700 (1958) (decision under prior law).

This section is mandatory and not directory where enforcement is sought before the election, and it was error for the trial court to direct the commissioners to place on the general election ballots the names of candidates who filed their political practices pledges after the filing deadline. Stillinger v. Rector, 253 Ark. 982, 490 S.W.2d 109 (1973).

Failure to timely file a political practice pledge with the Secretary of State as required by subdivision (e)(2)(B) of this section is reason enough to prevent a candidate's name from appearing on the ballot. Lewis v. West, 318 Ark. 334, 885 S.W.2d 663 (1994).