Ark. Code Ann. § 9-12-315 (2026)

Research References

ALR.

Divorce and separation: Workers' compensation benefits as marital property subject to distribution. 30 A.L.R.5th 139.

Divorce decree or settlement agreement as affecting divorced spouse's right to recover as named beneficiary on former spouse's individual retirement account. 99 A.L.R.5th 637.

Divorce and separation: Determination of whether proceeds from personal injury settlement or recovery constitute marital property. 109 A.L.R.5th 1.

Division of lottery proceeds in divorce proceedings. 124 A.L.R.5th 537.

Spouse's professional degree or license as marital property for purposes of alimony, support, or property settlement. 3 A.L.R.6th 447.

Inherited Property as Marital or Separate Property in Divorce Action. 38 A.L.R.6th 313.

Divorce and Separation: Appreciation in Value of Separate Property During Marriage with Contribution by Either Spouse as Separate or Community Property (Doctrine of “Active Appreciation”). 39 A.L.R.6th 205.

Social Security Spousal Benefits in Equitable Property Division in Divorce Proceedings. 44 A.L.R.7th Art. 1 (2019).

Ark. L. Notes.

Malone, For Richer or Poorer, 'til Decree Do Us Part — A Spouse's Entitlement to Division of Pension Funds and Professional Degrees as Marital Property, 1984 Ark. L. Notes 47.

Beard, Transfers of Property between Spouses and Former Spouses — An Overview of Income Tax Issues and a Suggested Analytical Approach to Such Issues, 1990 Ark. L. Notes 1.

Brill, Equity and the Restitutionary Remedies: Constructive Trust, Equitable Lien, and Subrogation, 1992 Ark. L. Notes 1.

Ark. L. Rev.

Valuation of Life and Remainder Interests in Property, 5 Ark. L. Rev. 373.

Domestic Relations — Restoration of Property Obtained in Consideration or by Reason of Marriage upon Divorce, 7 Ark. L. Rev. 64.

Divorce and Property Awards, 7 Ark. L. Rev. 367.

Tenancies by the Entirety — An Estate Planner's Dilemma (A Study of Unintended Result), 23 Ark. L. Rev. 44.

Ante-Nuptial Agreements in Arkansas — Divorce Provisions, 29 Ark. L. Rev. 480.

Note, Divorce and the Division of Marital Property in Arkansas — Equal or Equitable?, 35 Ark. L. Rev. 671.

Wagoner v. Wagoner: Division of Property Upon Divorce — The Classification of Returns from Separate Property, 42 Ark. L. Rev. 173.

Scott, The Revocable-Irrevocable Trust — The Way Out?, 42 Ark. L. Rev. 713.

Note, Bunt v. Bunt: Arkansas Extends the Scope of Marital Property, 42 Ark. L. Rev. 735.

Henry, Recent Developments, McDermott v. McDermott, 336 Ark. 557, 986 S.W.2d 843 (1999), 52 Ark. L. Rev. 527.

Comment, Arkansas Marriage: A Partnership Between a Husband and Wife, or a Safety Net for Support?, 61 Ark. L. Rev. 735.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Hawthorne, Note: Family Law — Divorce — Constitutionality of Arkansas Property Settlement and Alimony Statutes, 2 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 123.

Shively, Survey of Family Law, 3 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 223.

Legislative Survey, Family Law, 4 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 595.

Survey of Arkansas Law, Family Law, 5 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 143.

Survey of Arkansas Law: Family Law, 6 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 159.

Harris, The Arkansas Marital Property Statute and the Arkansas Appellate Courts: Tiptoeing Together Through the Tulips, 7 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 1.

Arkansas Law Survey, Waddell, Family Law, 7 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 229.

Notes, Domestic Relations — Arkansas Supreme Court Defines Marital Property to Include Future Pension Benefits. Day v. Day, 281 Ark. 261, 663 S.W.2d 719 (1984), 7 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 661.

Arkansas Law Survey, Price, Civil Procedure, 9 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 91.

Survey — Family Law, 10 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 207.

Survey — Family Law, 11 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 215.

Survey — Family Law, 12 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 213.

Survey — Family Law, 14 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 799.

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Survey of Legislation, 2001 Arkansas General Assembly, Family Law, 24 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 483.

Annual Survey of Caselaw, Family Law, 24 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 1021.

Annual Survey of Caselaw, Family Law, 26 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 915.

Case Notes

Note. Some of the following cases were decided prior to the 1979 amendment to this section which made the section apply equally to both husband and wife and provided for an equal division of property rather than the 1/3 of the husband's real and personal property previously allotted to the wife.

Constitutionality.

This section is not violative of the Equal Protection Clause, either facially or as applied. Hamilton v. Hamilton, 317 Ark. 572, 879 S.W.2d 416 (1994).

The classification of a pension plan as marital property does not violate the equal protection clause. Skelton v. Skelton, 339 Ark. 227, 5 S.W.3d 2 (1999).

In General.

Section 1-2-120(c) which provides that no action pending at the time any statutory provision is repealed shall be affected by the repeal was not applicable to the amendment of the section by Acts 1979, No. 705, which made this section gender-neutral, as the amendment did not repeal the prior statutes, but merely replaced statutes already clearly void for unconstitutionality. Noble v. Noble, 270 Ark. 602, 605 S.W.2d 453 (1980).

In a divorce action, the trial court is not required to divide in kind every piece of personal property. Hackett v. Hackett, 278 Ark. 82, 643 S.W.2d 560 (1982).

Although Arkansas is not truly a community property state, this section makes it so for all practical purposes when it is utilized in dissolution of marriage and distribution of assets. Potter v. Potter, 280 Ark. 38, 655 S.W.2d 382 (1983), overruled in part, Day v. Day, 281 Ark. 261, 663 S.W.2d 719 (1984), overruled in part, Meeks v. Meeks, 290 Ark. 563, 721 S.W.2d 653 (1986).

Independent action, subsequent to divorce decree, does not lie for division of marital property, for this section mandates that marital property be divided at the time the divorce is granted. Arkansas Supreme Court has carved out exceptions to the requirement that marital property be divided at the time the divorce decree is entered in cases where the parties specifically agree to postpone division of the property to a later date and where a divorce is granted by a foreign court lacking jurisdiction to divide Arkansas marital property. Mitchell v. Meisch, 22 Ark. App. 264, 739 S.W.2d 170 (1987).

This section does not compel mathematical precision in the distribution of property, rather, it simply requires that marital property be distributed equitably. Coombe v. Coombe, 89 Ark. App. 114, 201 S.W.3d 15 (2005).

Construction.

Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to reopen the record or in denying the motion for new trial, because while subdivision (a)(1) of this section required that property be valued at the time of the divorce, it did not require the trial court to reopen the record or set aside a decree and hold an additional hearing for the purpose of receiving the most up-to-date evidence. Dew v. Dew, 2012 Ark. App. 122, 390 S.W.3d 764 (2012).

Purpose.

The purpose of this section is to effect the equitable distribution of property upon divorce. Stover v. Stover, 287 Ark. 116, 696 S.W.2d 750 (1985); Canady v. Canady, 290 Ark. 551, 721 S.W.2d 650 (1986); Yockey v. Yockey, 25 Ark. App. 321, 758 S.W.2d 421 (1988).

Applicability.

Act 1979, No. 705, which made this section gender-neutral, could not be retroactively applied absent clear legislative intent to that effect, and since there was no indication of such intent, the act was only prospective in its application. Sweeney v. Sweeney, 267 Ark. 595, 593 S.W.2d 21 (1980), overruled in part, Day v. Day, 281 Ark. 261, 663 S.W.2d 719 (1984).

Acts 1979, No. 705, which amended this section, did not abolish § 9-12-317, the entirety property statute which had no constitutional infirmities as did this section; accordingly, this section does not apply to property owned as tenants by the entirety. Warren v. Warren, 273 Ark. 528, 623 S.W.2d 813 (1981) (decided prior to 1997 amendment, adding § 9-12-317(c)).

Acts 1979, No. 705, which amended this section, was applicable to property division where memorandum opinion was issued prior to amendment but final decree was issued after amendment. Chrestman v. Chrestman, 4 Ark. App. 281, 630 S.W.2d 60 (1982) (decided prior to 1997 amendment, adding § 9-12-317(c)).

This section is not applicable to property held as tenants by the entirety. Hale v. Hale, 307 Ark. 546, 822 S.W.2d 836 (1992) (decided prior to 1997 amendment, adding § 9-12-317(c)).

Although the chancellor's determinations that the houseboat purchased with husband's inheritance was marital property and the joint checking account was husband's separate property may have appeared inconsistent, they underscored the fine factual distinctions that often characterize marital-property divisions. McKay v. McKay, 340 Ark. 171, 8 S.W.3d 525 (2000).

Statute did not apply to property held as tenants by the entirety. Banks v. Evans, 347 Ark. 383, 64 S.W.3d 746 (2002).

Arkansas law was clear that the law regarding marital property did not apply in situations other than divorce; thus, defendant's wife could not rely on the law of Arkansas marital property to establish an ownership interest in the 93 weapons. United States v. One Assortment of 93 NFA Regulated Weapons, 897 F.3d 961 (8th Cir. 2018).

Adequacy of Division.

For cases discussing adequacy or appropriateness of specific divisions of property in particular circumstances, see Morgan v. Morgan, 193 Ark. 454, 100 S.W.2d 978 (1937); Coltharp v. Coltharp, 218 Ark. 215, 235 S.W.2d 884 (1951); Turner v. Turner, 219 Ark. 259, 243 S.W.2d 22 (1951); Hewitt v. Morgan, 220 Ark. 123, 246 S.W.2d 423 (1952); Brimson v. Brimson, 227 Ark. 1045, 304 S.W.2d 935 (1957); Koury v. Koury, 230 Ark. 536, 323 S.W.2d 554 (1959); Palmer v. Palmer, 238 Ark. 690, 384 S.W.2d 256 (1964); Mickle v. Mickle, 252 Ark. 468, 479 S.W.2d 563 (1972); Grant v. Grant, 254 Ark. 1060, 497 S.W.2d 255 (1973); Johnson v. Johnson, 265 Ark. 925, 582 S.W.2d 32 (1979); Gross v. Gross, 266 Ark. 186, 585 S.W.2d 14 (1979); Russell v. Russell, 275 Ark. 193, 628 S.W.2d 315 (1982); Belanger v. Belanger, 276 Ark. 522, 637 S.W.2d 557 (1982); Duncan v. Duncan, 11 Ark. App. 25, 665 S.W.2d 893 (1984).

The fact that one spouse made contributions to certain property does not necessarily require that those contributions be recognized in the property division upon divorce. Canady v. Canady, 290 Ark. 551, 721 S.W.2d 650 (1986).

Where the chancellor stated he was relying on the reasons cited in subdivision (a)(1) of this section for not equally dividing the marital property, and the main reasons were that it was the wife who contributed to their acquisition and the husband was able to support himself, he then read into the record the nine factors listed under this subdivision, and the decree stated the grounds for the unequal division were those stated orally by the court at the conclusion of the trial, the chancellor sufficiently complied with subdivision (a)(1) of this section in stating his reasons for not equally dividing the marital property at the conclusion of the trial. Jones v. Jones, 17 Ark. App. 144, 705 S.W.2d 447 (1986).

If the chancellor intended that improvements to the wife's separate property be held to be marital property, he failed to adequately explain the basis for his unequal division, as required by subdivision (a)(1) of this section; therefore, the action was remanded. Camp v. Camp, 18 Ark. App. 87, 710 S.W.2d 842 (1986).

Where appellate court was unable to determine whether it was error for the trial court to make what was essentially a grossly disproportionate distribution of the marital retirement assets remaining after the settlement in favor of a wife because the record was not fully developed, reversal of the trial court's division of the parties' retirement and pension funds was warranted; on remand, the trial court could permit the introduction of such additional evidence as was necessary to make findings regarding the valuation of all of the parties' assets and the factors to be considered, clearly articulate whether it was making an equal or unequal distribution of assets and, if unequal, the reasons why such distribution was equitable. Copeland v. Copeland, 84 Ark. App. 303, 139 S.W.3d 145 (2003).

Trial court's property distribution in divorce proceedings was not improper because, although the wife argued that the husband's explanations about undisclosed accounts were inconsistent, the trial court nonetheless clearly accepted his testimony that the funds in the accounts belonged to a company and not to him personally; the trial court's conclusions were not clearly erroneous. Conlee v. Conlee, 370 Ark. 89, 257 S.W.3d 543 (2007).

After granting a husband a divorce on the ground of general indignities, a trial court did not err in its award of rehabilitative alimony to the wife; the trial court looked at the husband's four-year income picture and considered the wife's alleged physical limitations due to a prior car accident, but noted that she had worked as a substitute teacher long after the accident and that she made approximately $50 per day doing so. Hickman v. Hickman, 2010 Ark. App. 704 (2010).

If the circuit court intended to give each party an equal share, the problem was the husband was given all income-producing assets, while the wife was forced to rely on a series of periodic payments, requiring her to wait years to receive the full value of her share, which appeared contrary to the intent of this section, and remand was required; by allowing the husband to pay the wife for her share over an extended period of time, they would be forced to maintain a connection. Moreover, the circuit court failed to consider the time value of money or order security on the award. Farrell v. Farrell, 2014 Ark. App. 601 (2014).

Ordering the husband to reimburse the wife $1,500 was not error where, despite the lack of an exacting calculation, the husband admitted taking trips and spending money on his girlfriend and her children during the marriage. Karolchyk v. Karolchyk, 2018 Ark. App. 555, 565 S.W.3d 531 (2018).

Award of the wife's moving expenses was affirmed where the wife had moved out of the marital home because of the husband's adultery, and the court had discussed in detail the wife's poor health and upcoming needs. Karolchyk v. Karolchyk, 2018 Ark. App. 555, 565 S.W.3d 531 (2018).

Trial court did not clearly err in awarding the wife compensation for the marital contributions toward the improvements made to the husband's separate property and any reduction in debt on the home; the husband put on no evidence to demonstrate that the reduction in debt was not attributable to marital funds. Karolchyk v. Karolchyk, 2018 Ark. App. 555, 565 S.W.3d 531 (2018).

Adverse Possession.

Where wife pursuant to divorce decree was granted “use and occupancy of premises during her lifetime” grantee of wife under warranty deed could not establish adverse possession as against husband, since latter was not entitled to possession until death of wife. Pierce v. Lowe, 221 Ark. 796, 256 S.W.2d 43 (1953).

Agreement of Parties.

A wife's agreement to relinquish all rights to her husband's property, if made for a wholly inadequate consideration, will be set aside on that account. Leonard v. Leonard, 101 Ark. 522, 142 S.W. 1133 (1912).

A divorce, reciting that alimony should be paid in full accord of the wife's right, title and interest in any property of the husband, was held to show that the parties agreed on a sum to be paid in lieu of the wife's right to a division of property under this section. Erwin v. Erwin, 179 Ark. 192, 14 S.W.2d 1100 (1929).

Where husband agreed that wife should have half of his property he became trustee as to wife's rights under the agreement and the court had power to compel specific performance against contention that wife was confined to an action for debt. Orr v. Orr, 206 Ark. 844, 177 S.W.2d 915 (1944).

Reconciliation agreement failed to effectively exclude the subject properties from the marital property law. Schichtel v. Schichtel, 3 Ark. App. 36, 621 S.W.2d 504 (1981).

There are two types of agreements concerning the payment of alimony: (1) the agreement on the amount of alimony which is an independent contract which cannot be modified by the court; and (2) an agreement upon an amount that the court should fix as alimony and which the court can modify. Shipley v. Shipley, 305 Ark. 257, 807 S.W.2d 915 (1991).

Trial court erred by awarding a former wife an interest in land that her former husband inherited from his mother because a postnuptial agreement was not binding since the parties' marriage was not adequate consideration; moreover, there were no mutual obligations since the wife was not required to do anything. Simmons v. Simmons, 98 Ark. App. 12, 249 S.W.3d 843 (2007).

Case law does not require a court to consider the factors in this section when deciding whether to enforce a settlement agreement. A circuit court must follow this section in dividing the marital property only if it concludes that a settlement agreement is unenforceable. Fallin v. Fallin, 2016 Ark. App. 179, 492 S.W.3d 525 (2016).

Circuit court did not err in enforcing the couple's property settlement agreement where case law did not require consideration of the factors in this section in deciding whether to enforce such an agreement; there was no requirement that the settlement agreement had to equitably divide the property. Fallin v. Fallin, 2016 Ark. App. 179, 492 S.W.3d 525 (2016).

Subdivisions (a)(1) and (b)(4) of this section provide that at the time a divorce decree is entered, all marital property shall be distributed one-half to each party unless the court finds such a division to be inequitable except property excluded by valid agreement of the parties. Thus, this section contemplates partial settlement agreements. Fallin v. Fallin, 2016 Ark. App. 179, 492 S.W.3d 525 (2016).

Circuit court did not err in enforcing the couple's property settlement agreement with respect to ownership of a tractor company where the agreement clearly contemplated only the shares of the tractor company owned by the husband. Fallin v. Fallin, 2016 Ark. App. 179, 492 S.W.3d 525 (2016).

This section did not apply to the proceeding because the parties' retirement accounts were agreed to be marital and evenly divisible, and the 2012 settlement agreement equated to a stipulation of fact between the parties; appellant entered into a binding contractual agreement that was approved by the trial court in the divorce decree, and that he found years later that the agreement appeared to be improvident was no ground for relief. Goodwin v. Goodwin, 2016 Ark. App. 233, 490 S.W.3d 661 (2016).

Authority of Court.

The chancellor is given broad powers under this section to distribute all property in divorce, nonmarital as well as marital, to achieve an equitable division; the only requirement is that if he divides marital property other than evenly, or nonmarital property other than by returning it to the original owner, he will consider the nine factors specified in the statute, and fully explain his reasons for the record. Williford v. Williford, 280 Ark. 71, 655 S.W.2d 398 (1983).

The marital-property law vests in the trial court a marked measure of flexibility in apportioning the couple's total assets. Canady v. Canady, 290 Ark. 551, 721 S.W.2d 650 (1986).

It is not an abuse of chancellor's discretion to ascertain extent of marital property as of date of the divorce, and evaluate it as of that date as well. Wilson v. Wilson, 294 Ark. 194, 741 S.W.2d 640 (1987).

Chancellor has no authority to dispose of property rights in an award of separate maintenance. Moore v. Moore, 21 Ark. App. 165, 731 S.W.2d 215 (1987).

The chancellor is given broad powers under this section to distribute all property in divorce, nonmarital as well as marital, to achieve an equitable division. Smith v. Smith, 32 Ark. App. 175, 798 S.W.2d 442 (1990).

Chancellor's award on remand need not necessarily correspond to the findings regarding the extent of the separate and marital interests of the parties. Cate v. Cate, 35 Ark. App. 79, 812 S.W.2d 697 (1991).

Although this section provides a list of factors for the court to consider in dividing the marital property, the trial court did not err in permitting the parties to equally share in the proceeds of the sale of the marital home and the equity resulting from the wife's payment of the mortgage during the divorce proceedings because a trial court has discretion to determine whether an offset is appropriate when parties to a divorce expend funds to preserve marital property during the pendency of proceedings; however, the parties were ordered to equally share expenses for repair to the marital residence that exceeded the minimum amount specified by the trial court. Cole v. Cole, 89 Ark. App. 134, 201 S.W.3d 21 (2005).

Trial court has the flexibility to distribute both marital and nonmarital property to make an equitable division of marital property. Marks v. Marks, 2014 Ark. App. 174, 432 S.W.3d 698 (2014).

Because the circuit court was required to reexamine the division of property pursuant to the mandate, it was entitled to also consider the division of debts, including the deficiency of the marital home. Kelly v. Kelly, 2014 Ark. 543, 453 S.W.3d 655 (2014).

Conflict of Laws.

Where a divorce decree rendered in another state divested the wife of all right and title in the husband's real estate, the wife was not entitled to husband's land in Arkansas since this section has no application to decrees rendered in other states. Gwynn v. Rush, 143 Ark. 4, 219 S.W. 339 (1920).

Where realty located in another state was acquired by the parties during their marriage and where the law of the other state does not recognize a wife's inchoate right of dower in her husband's separate property, the law of the other state would apply in determining the parties' rights in that property in a divorce proceeding. Strang v. Strang, 258 Ark. 139, 523 S.W.2d 887 (1975).

Contribution of Parties.

Where wife was employed during most of the time of her marriage and contributed her earnings to the acquisition of furniture and other personal property, chancellor was justified upon granting divorce to wife in holding that wife had an equal claim on the items so acquired. Carr v. Carr, 226 Ark. 355, 289 S.W.2d 899 (1956).

Article 9, § 7 of the Constitution was meant to put a wife on an equal footing with her husband in the acquisition and transfer of property, but it does not purport to clothe the wife with superior property rights in the event of a divorce; accordingly, the trial court did not err when it ordered an equal division of all the marital property despite the wife's contention that it was inequitable because her earnings had formed the greater part of the purchase price. Stuart v. Stuart, 280 Ark. 546, 660 S.W.2d 162 (1983).

When one spouse makes significant contributions of time, effort and skill which are directly attributable to the increase in value of nonmarital property, the presumption arises that such increase belongs to the marital estate. Layman v. Layman, 292 Ark. 539, 731 S.W.2d 771 (1987), overruled, Moore v. Moore, 2016 Ark. 105, 486 S.W.3d 766 (2016).

In a divorce decree, the trial court did not err under subdivision (a)(1)(B) of this section in awarding the wife a 40 percent interest in the value of improvements to a house that was built during the marriage on the husband's lot because she testified that she helped work on the house and that she paid for materials; the parties lived in her nonmarital residence while the house was under construction. Johnson v. Johnson, 2011 Ark. App. 276, 378 S.W.3d 889 (2011).

Conveyance to Spouse.

This section does not apply to property which the husband conveyed to his wife on voluntary separation. McNutt v. McNutt, 78 Ark. 345, 78 Ark. 346, 95 S.W. 778 (1906); Harbour v. Harbour, 103 Ark. 273, 146 S.W. 867 (1912); Apple v. Apple, 105 Ark. 669, 152 S.W. 296 (1912).

This section does not apply to property which the husband conveyed to his wife for love and affection. Dickson v. Dickson, 102 Ark. 635, 145 S.W. 529 (1912).

Where husband obtained a divorce for cause, it was held that the wife was not entitled to return of the land which she had deeded to husband. Price v. Price, 127 Ark. 506, 192 S.W. 893 (1917).

A decree of divorce awarding to the wife real estate conveyed to her by the defendant as a gift in consideration of love and affection, was held erroneous as depriving her of dower on account of gifts theretofore made to which this section has no application. Glover v. Glover, 153 Ark. 167, 240 S.W. 716 (1922).

This statute is not applicable to gifts or advancements made by the husband to his wife; where a husband purchases land and takes the deed therefore in the name of his wife, there is a presumption that he intends to make an advancement to her and the law does not imply a promise or obligation on her part to refund the money or to divide the property purchased, or to hold the same in trust for him. Biddle v. Biddle, 206 Ark. 623, 177 S.W.2d 32 (1944).

A conveyance by the husband in anticipation of the wife's suit for divorce, and to prevent her from recovering alimony, is fraudulent and may be set aside. Dowell v. Dowell, 207 Ark. 578, 182 S.W.2d 344 (1944).

Presumption of a gift of the money to the wife was overcome by the fact that deed to property subsequently acquired was taken in the husband's name. Angelletti v. Angelletti, 209 Ark. 991, 193 S.W.2d 330 (1946).

Deed interest in lease by husband to wife in consideration of dismissal of divorce proceeding by wife and as evidence of good faith of husband was not a deed in consideration or by reason of their marriage. Turner v. Turner, 219 Ark. 259, 243 S.W.2d 22 (1951).

In suit for divorce by wife the husband was not entitled to recover on cross-complaint for return of real estate transferred to wife during marriage, if transfer was for the purpose of defrauding the creditors of the husband. McClure v. McClure, 220 Ark. 312, 247 S.W.2d 466 (1952).

Evidence sufficient to support the trial court's finding that the transfer of money to wife was not a gift, voluntarily made, but rather was the product of a confidence betrayed or influence abused. Marshall v. Marshall, 271 Ark. 116, 607 S.W.2d 90 (1980).

Where evidence showed that after the parties separated and the husband filed for divorce the husband conveyed his interest in their home to her it was properly held that upon their subsequent divorce the home was not marital property but was the wife's separate property because the husband had freely and voluntarily executed the conveyance to her. Smith v. Smith, 6 Ark. App. 252, 640 S.W.2d 458 (1982).

House held to be wife's separate property where husband signed deed, transferring real property to wife, and filed it for record, where although he continued to reside there, wife paid all real estate and personal property taxes, insurance and the mortgage, and where there was no evidence wife said she would deed the home back. Cole v. Cole, 53 Ark. App. 140, 920 S.W.2d 32 (1996).

Trial court erred in declaring that couple's home was marital property where it had been deeded to the wife in 1982; there was no evidence that the wife agreed to do anything as an inducement or consideration for the transfer of property, the deed was immediately recorded, and there was no discussion of the wife deeding the property back to the husband. Horton v. Horton, 92 Ark. App. 22, 211 S.W.3d 35 (2005).

Debts.

Where the divided property is mortgaged, each takes subject thereto. Crosser v. Crosser, 121 Ark. 64, 180 S.W. 337 (1915).

Where debts were joint debts of marriage, wife required to share equally in income tax indebtedness on corporate fund. McMurtray v. McMurtray, 275 Ark. 303, 629 S.W.2d 285 (1982).

In a divorce action, chancellor was not required to divide the parties' debts, that is, to consider each debt and assign a party to pay; however, he was obligated to consider those debts in deciding the questions of alimony, support for the children, and perhaps the division of the property. Hackett v. Hackett, 278 Ark. 82, 643 S.W.2d 560 (1982).

A chancellor has the power to adjust marital debts as between the parties although this authority is not expressly given by the Code. Warren v. Warren, 33 Ark. App. 63, 800 S.W.2d 730 (1990).

If, during the parties' marriage, the indebtedness held against one spouse's non-marital properties was greatly reduced through payments made with marital funds, this section permits the chancellor to award the other spouse one-half of the reduction in indebtedness, either as an increase in value of non-marital property, or as a transformation of non-marital property into marital property through the investment of marital funds. Box v. Box, 312 Ark. 550, 851 S.W.2d 437 (1993).

A chancellor has no authority to determine the validity of an obligation to a third party who is not a party to the divorce. Grace v. Grace, 326 Ark. 312, 930 S.W.2d 362 (1996).

Questions about marital debts, and whether they should be “considered” as liabilities under subdivision (a)(1)(A)(vii) of this section in assigning marital property, are questions of fact. Grace v. Grace, 326 Ark. 312, 930 S.W.2d 362 (1996).

Credit card debts incurred by one party during the period of the parties' legal separation were marital debts that the chancellor had discretion to divide between the parties. Schumacher v. Schumacher, 66 Ark. App. 9, 986 S.W.2d 883 (1999).

The trial court did not err when it held each party responsible for half of a stock margin debt where the husband testified that the debt was incurred to finance cost overruns on the construction of the parties' residence, for furnishing the house, and generally to pay for the parties' lifestyle and living expenses, and the wife did not refute this in her own testimony and, indeed, confirmed the high cost of the house and the furnishings. Hunt v. Hunt, 341 Ark. 173, 15 S.W.3d 334 (2000).

Although this section did not expressly give the chancellor the power to allocate marital debts as between the parties, the power was implied and to ignore debts would nullify divorce effectiveness and leave an essential item of divorce dispute unresolved. Ellis v. Ellis, 75 Ark. App. 173, 57 S.W.3d 220 (2001).

This section does not apply to the division of marital debts, hence, in Arkansas, there is no presumption that an equal division of debts must occur; accordingly, the trial judge's unequal division of the marital debts due to the disparity between the parties' incomes and their relative abilities to pay the debts was affirmed. Williams v. Williams, 82 Ark. App. 294, 108 S.W.3d 629 (2003).

This section does not apply to the division of marital debts and there is no presumption that an equal division of debts must occur; thus, where the parties had only a brief marriage and the wife plainly had preexisting medical bills, her failure to present testimony or medical bills indicating which bills were incurred after the parties married justified the trial court's decision that the husband was not responsible for a portion of those bills. Weatherly v. Weatherly, 87 Ark. App. 291, 190 S.W.3d 294 (2004).

Trial court abused its discretion in ordering the parties to each pay one-half of the marital debt in a divorce proceeding as it was not economically feasible for the wife to use the property awarded to her as half of the marital property in order to pay half of the debt; the husband had the ability to earn substantially more income than she did. Bailey v. Bailey, 97 Ark. App. 96, 244 S.W.3d 712 (2006).

Trial court did not err in not awarding a husband interest accrued on a credit card after holding that the husband was entitled to a payment from his former wife in the amount of $1,413 because the husband admitted that he had charged additional items on the credit card, which were included in the payoff, although he did not have any documentation of the amounts that he charged. Lyons v. McInvale, 98 Ark. App. 433, 256 S.W.3d 512 (2007).

Trial court erred in finding that a wife owed a husband for expenditures he made to the wife's duplex, which was nonmarital property, because the amount the wife allegedly owed the husband included a sum for a bedroom suite and mortgage payments made to the wife's mortgagee, while husband's daughter and her family were living in the duplex. Wise v. Wise, 2010 Ark. App. 12, 371 S.W.3d 718 (2010).

Trial court did not err in finding that 85 percent of a wife's student loan was a marital debt because it was used to pay household debts when the parties' income was insufficient to support them, nor in finding that the husband should pay 40 percent of that debt and the wife 60 percent, using the factors set out in subdivision (a)(1)(A) of this section. Easley v. Easley, 2010 Ark. App. 73 (2010).

In a divorce and property distribution action, the trial court did not err in refusing to give a husband credit for payments he claimed to have made on marital debts during the divorce proceedings to preserve the marital estate as the trial court's allocation of the marital debt was supported by the husband's admission that the only marital debt he paid was the mortgage on property that the parties owned in Alabama. Friend v. Friend, 2010 Ark. App. 525, 376 S.W.3d 519 (2010).

Because the circuit court was required to reexamine the division of property pursuant to the mandate, it was entitled to also consider the division of debts, including the deficiency of the marital home. Kelly v. Kelly, 2014 Ark. 543, 453 S.W.3d 655 (2014).

Trial court was not clearly erroneous in finding that credit-card debt was marital to be equally divided between the parties because its findings were primarily credibility findings, which the court of appeals did not disturb; the trial court credited the wife's testimony that the husband knew about the credit cards, that he occasionally made payments on them, and that she only used them to pay for marital items. Fell v. Fell, 2015 Ark. App. 590, 473 S.W.3d 578 (2015).

One store debt was incurred solely to pay for repairs and improvements to the husband's premarital property that he retained after the divorce, and thus he would be the only beneficiary, while the wife only lived briefly in the home and did not take any of the items purchased at the store when she left, and there was no evidence or argument that the windows she purchased were a gift; the division of the store debt, requiring the husband to pay the debt and reimburse the wife for the amount she spent, was not clearly erroneous. Fields v. Fields, 2015 Ark. App. 143, 457 S.W.3d 301 (2015).

Circuit court did not clearly err by finding that the husband was solely responsible for a lease arrearage because the wife testified that, pursuant to an agreed temporary order, the wife paid a portion of the lease directly to the husband, who was responsible for paying the leasing agent, but the husband did not make the lease payments and could not explain where the money went. In addition, the appellate court could not say that the circuit court erred in allotting the husband's personal tax debt to the husband, given the parties' conflicting testimony and the circuit court's superior position to determine the credibility of witnesses. Rawls v. Yarberry, 2018 Ark. App. 536, 564 S.W.3d 537 (2018).

Husband's student-loan debt was properly divided where past student-loan repayment, the allocation of retirement accounts, and current student-loan debt were considered in determining how to apportion the debt. Friedly v. Friedly, 2020 Ark. App. 167, 597 S.W.3d 135 (2020).

Designation by Decree.

This section will not affect a husband's ownership of property, upon a divorce being granted to his wife, until the property is designated by the decree. Hix v. Sun Ins. Co., 94 Ark. 485, 127 S.W. 737 (1910).

A decree of divorce which provides that “all property not disposed of at the commencement of this action which either party hereto obtained from or through the other during the marriage” shall be restored, refers only to the separate property of the parties. Dawson v. Mays, 159 Ark. 331, 252 S.W. 33 (1923).

Division by Summary Judgment.

Without evidence of whether property and debts were marital or nonmarital and without a hearing on the statutory factors to be considered for an inequitable division of marital property, the division of property and debt by an order of summary judgment was both an abuse of discretion and an error of law. White v. Shepard, 2015 Ark. App. 223, 459 S.W.3d 333 (2015).

Division Inadequate.

While a husband was assessed the bulk of the parties' marital debt, pursuant to subdivision (a)(1) of this section, reversal was necessary as his continued receipt of his entire military retirement benefits would result in a substantial windfall to him. Bellamy v. Bellamy, 2011 Ark. App. 433 (2011).

Dower and Curtesy.

Divorce bars dower. Wood v. Wood, 59 Ark. 441, 27 S.W. 641 (1894).

The purpose of this statute was to put an end to all controversies as to dower rights. Beene v. Beene, 64 Ark. 518, 43 S.W. 968 (1898); Kendall v. Crenshaw, 116 Ark. 427, 173 S.W. 393 (1915).

Generally a divorce by a court having jurisdiction terminates all obligations of either party to the other, cutting off the wife's right of dower and the husband's tenancy by the curtesy. Biddle v. Biddle, 206 Ark. 623, 177 S.W.2d 32 (1944).

Wife who obtained a divorce could not claim dower for the first time on appeal. Orr v. Orr, 206 Ark. 844, 177 S.W.2d 915 (1944).

In considering who is the injured party under § 9-12-301(5) (subsequently amended in 1991), the court is not required to make a full award of dower but may reduce the dower in keeping with the equities of the case. Narisi v. Narisi, 233 Ark. 525, 345 S.W.2d 620 (1961).

The statutory property division is considered as dower. Alston v. Bitely, 252 Ark. 79, 477 S.W.2d 446 (1972).

Election of Remedy.

Where wife brought an action for annulment of the marriage and for establishment of a constructive trust and reformation of a deed in her favor and where the proof was insufficient to support the equitable lien theory, she could not then attempt to claim any of the benefits available to divorced persons under this section either directly or indirectly. McIntire v. McIntire, 270 Ark. 381, 605 S.W.2d 474 (1980).

Equal Division.

Husband failed in his burden to present sufficient evidence to divide the marital accounts in any other manner than one-half to each party; the two factors that supported his request did not convince the trial court that equity required an unequal division or that it would be justifiable, and he failed to demonstrate that the trial court clearly erred. Barron v. Barron, 2015 Ark. App. 215 (2015).

Circuit court did not err on remand in ordering the same equal division it had ordered in the parties' divorce decree for every item of marital property because the order was not in derogation of the appellate court's earlier decision and was in keeping with this section. The circuit court did not exceed the appellate mandate on remand by determining the issue initially presented to it — the division of marital property — which remained unresolved, and its finding that an equal division would not be inequitable did not require consideration of the statutory factors for an inequitable distribution. Bradford v. Isom, 2015 Ark. App. 278 (2015).

Even if there was an unequal distribution, it was clear that the circuit court at least considered the relevant statutory factors for distribution of marital property, specifically discussing factors such as the length of the marriage, sources of income, contribution to the marriage, and the circuit judge did not clearly err. Fry v. Fry, 2015 Ark. App. 339, 463 S.W.3d 738 (2015).

This section did not compel mathematical precision in the distribution of property, but nevertheless, a study of the property values distributed in the instant case, which had to be accepted as correct, showed near mathematical precision. Accepting the figures as true, the net value received by appellant was $434,839.26, and by appellee, $436,312.73, the difference in awards was almost nominal, and thus there was an equal distribution of the parties' property. Fry v. Fry, 2015 Ark. App. 339, 463 S.W.3d 738 (2015).

Circuit court's division of marital property was affirmed as there was no requirement that marital debt be equally divided, the marital assets were equally divided, and the husband had not pointed to any evidence of fraud that would have warranted a reduction in the wife's share of the marital assets to compensate for the value of the Goldendoodle dog or the money that she gave to one of her paramours. Goodson v. Bennett, 2018 Ark. App. 444, 562 S.W.3d 847 (2018).

Trial court's division of marital property was not clearly erroneous where it divided the property and debt in an effort to make as equal an overall division of the marital estate as possible, and the net value of the parties' property after the division left the husband with approximately 48% of the net value. Banks v. Banks, 2019 Ark. App. 166, 574 S.W.3d 187 (2019).

Even though the marriage was very short and each party requested an unequal division, the circuit court's decision to equally divide the marital assets was not clearly erroneous because it clearly considered the factors listed in this section and determined that an equal distribution of marital assets would be equitable; and the circuit court awarded the wife only a fraction of the rehabilitative alimony that she requested. Chekuri v. Nekkalapudi, 2020 Ark. 74, 593 S.W.3d 467 (2020).

Findings Required.

Divorce case was remanded in part because the trial court did not specify whether assets, including the investment interests and household furnishings, were marital property or nonmarital property, and it did not state its reasons for every unequal division of marital property or any distribution of nonmarital property to the non-owning spouse. Wilson v. Wilson, 2016 Ark. App. 256, 492 S.W.3d 534 (2016).

Circuit court erred in ordering the husband to maintain a survivor benefit plan where it did so without providing a justification for why the husband had to shoulder a share of the costs when he received none of the benefits. Pelts v. Pelts, 2017 Ark. 98, 514 S.W.3d 455 (2017).

Because a divorce decree did not set forth a circuit court's reasoning for the unequal division of marital property, the case had to be remanded for the circuit court to enter an order that satisfied the statutory requirements. Chambers v. Chambers, 2017 Ark. App. 429, 527 S.W.3d 1 (2017).

Trial court erred in its property distribution because the court did not address the distribution of numerous items of personal property requested in a husband's pretrial contempt motion and testified to at trial, some of which were of significant value, making it impossible for an appellate court to determine if marital property was equally distributed. Garcia v. Garcia, 2018 Ark. App. 146, 544 S.W.3d 96 (2018).

In dividing marital property, the trial court clearly erred in failing to place a value on an LLC where the court awarded the LLC to the husband to offset the award to the wife of the parties' home and the proceeds from the sale of another marital asset. Steeland v. Steeland, 2018 Ark. App. 551, 562 S.W.3d 269 (2018).

Fraud.

Though this section does not authorize a division of personal property fraudulently removed from the state by the husband, a court of equity has power to declare the lien under its general power to grant relief from fraud. Austin v. Austin, 143 Ark. 222, 220 S.W. 46 (1920).

Where a husband, in contemplation of his wife's suit for divorce, fraudulently conveyed his land and departed from the state, taking his personal property with him, the value of the personal property should be considered in determining her share of his property and the value of the real property declared to be a lien on the land. Wilson v. Wilson, 163 Ark. 294, 259 S.W. 742 (1924).

Evidence did not clearly show a fraudulent plan or scheme on part of the wife to obtain husband's property and was not sufficient to support a finding of fraud authorizing cancellation of deed to property voluntarily conveyed to wife. Biddle v. Biddle, 206 Ark. 623, 177 S.W.2d 32 (1944).

Where testimony supported finding that chattel mortgage was executed in fraud of and to defeat the wife's marital rights, the wife was entitled to her interest in the personalty free from the mortgage. Dowell v. Dowell, 207 Ark. 578, 182 S.W.2d 344 (1944).

In a federal diversity action by a judgment creditor to recover fraudulently transferred assets, the district court was under no obligation to consider that a state court approved a property settlement agreement as equally dividing the divorcing parties' assets. FDIC v. Bell, 106 F.3d 258 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1022, 118 S. Ct. 1304, 140 L. Ed. 2d 470 (1998).

Given the paucity of evidence of any intent by appellee to defraud appellant, and the trial court's superior position to assess credibility, the trial court did not clearly err in making an equal division of the marital property. Wainwright v. Merryman, 2014 Ark. App. 156 (2014).

In a divorce case, where a husband argued for an unequal division of marital property because of the wife's alleged fraudulent dissipation of assets, there was no error because a $67,000 payment that a wife made to her mother was legitimate compensation for her participation in the wife's business, there was evidence that the business was not successful, and the husband waived his argument relating to the statutory factors. The fact that the wife's mother then lent the daughter $50,000 to purchase a home and new business one month before the divorce was granted did not alter this result. Davis v. Davis, 2016 Ark. App. 210, 489 S.W.3d 195 (2016).

Circuit court's award to wife of one-half of the marital funds the husband spent during the parties' separation was not clearly erroneous under the facts of the case because the husband's cash withdrawals increased after the separation and the cash balance in his accounts decreased by the time of the divorce hearing, and there was evidence from which the circuit court could conclude that the husband spent the funds with the intent to defraud the wife because he had no documentation to support the majority of his expenses. Chekuri v. Nekkalapudi, 2020 Ark. 74, 593 S.W.3d 467 (2020).

Jurisdiction.

The filing of a complaint describing real property gives the court jurisdiction over it for the purpose of making an award in accordance with the statute; no attachment or other method of sequestration is necessary in order for the court to acquire jurisdiction. Allen v. Allen, 126 Ark. 164, 189 S.W. 841 (1916).

Description of property in pleadings is unnecessary to confer jurisdiction. Hegwood v. Hegwood, 133 Ark. 160, 202 S.W. 35 (1919).

Where a wife's complaint for divorce asked a division of property, the court acquired jurisdiction in rem of the husband's property, though there was no personal service on the defendant nor seizure of the property under attachment or otherwise. Austin v. Austin, 143 Ark. 222, 220 S.W. 46 (1920).

A chancellor loses the authority to distribute property not mentioned in the original decree after the decree has become final. Jones v. Jones, 26 Ark. App. 1, 759 S.W.2d 42 (1988).

This section does not authorize a division of marital property after the divorce decree has been entered, in the absence of fraud or other grounds for relief from the original judgment. Jones v. Jones, 26 Ark. App. 1, 759 S.W.2d 42 (1988).

To the extent a spouse acquires an enforceable right during the marriage to recover fees under a contingency fee contract, the spouse acquired marital property; any difficulty in valuing contingency fee contracts may be solved by reserving jurisdiction in the trial court in order to await the outcome of the underlying actions. McDermott v. McDermott, 336 Ark. 557, 986 S.W.2d 843 (1999).

Legislative Intent.

Nothing in this section suggests the legislature intended this provision to have any effect except with respect to divorce. Ellis v. Ellis, 315 Ark. 475, 868 S.W.2d 83 (1994).

Specific enumeration of the factors in subdivision (a)(1) of this section does not preclude a trial court from considering other relevant factors where exclusion of other factors would lead to absurd results or deny the intent of the legislature to allow the court to make an equitable division of property. Coombe v. Coombe, 89 Ark. App. 114, 201 S.W.3d 15 (2005).

Loan or Gift Between Spouses.

Wife failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that she rebutted the presumption that her payments to the husband were gifts; therefore, the trial court erred in finding that the wife had loaned the husband money for his law firm where the only evidence of a loan was the wife's testimony and there was no evidence she had demanded repayment during the marriage. Sanders v. Passmore, 2016 Ark. App. 370, 499 S.W.3d 237 (2016).

Marital Property.

Increase in value of the husband's limited partnership's stock brokerage accounts was not his separate property where the husband's efforts, which resulted in the increase in the value of the accounts, caused the increase to be classified as marital property. Brown v. Brown, 373 Ark. 333, 284 S.W.3d 17 (2008), overruled in part, Moore v. Moore, 2016 Ark. 105, 486 S.W.3d 766 (2016).

Circuit court complied with this section when it stated the factors it considered in concluding that the division of the parties' personal property was equitable where (1) there was scant evidence in the record as to the value of the personal property; and (2) the circuit court was not required in every case to mechanically divide the marital property in kind. Gilliam v. Gilliam, 2010 Ark. App. 137, 374 S.W.3d 108 (2010).

Trial court erred in finding that a hunting club membership was nonmarital property as: (1) the husband's self-serving testimony did not rebut the presumption under this section that the property was marital property; (2) the property was purchased two years after the parties were married, and marital funds were used to pay the annual fees; and (3) the origination of the funds used for the purchase was not evidenced by the fact that the partnership document named the husband as a limited partner, or by a check from the husband's mother dated well after the purchase. Carroll v. Carroll, 2011 Ark. App. 356, 384 S.W.3d 50 (2011).

Property that was given to the husband as a gift prior to marriage was not marital property and it would have qualified as an exception in any event; the trial court clearly believed the husband's testimony, the wife's name was not on the deed, and the trial court did not clearly err in awarding the property to the husband. Baker v. Baker, 2013 Ark. App. 543, 429 S.W.3d 389 (2013).

Reversal of a circuit court's finding that the funds in a brokerage account held as tenants by the entirety were the separate property of the husband was appropriate because the court erred in failing to recognize the rights of the husband and wife as tenants by the entirety in the account held as joint tenants with right of survivorship. The circuit court, on remand, was to consider whether an equal distribution of the funds was inequitable. Bradford v. Bradford, 2013 Ark. App. 615 (2013).

In a divorce action, the court did not err under subdivision (b)(1) of this section in finding that a promissory note for the sale of the husband's Nevada law firm was marital property because the record showed that he was only able to devote the majority of his time and energy to the success of the law practice because the wife was taking care of the children and the home. Blalock v. Blalock, 2013 Ark. App. 659 (2013).

In a property division case in which a husband argued that the circuit court erred by not awarding him an interest in a home that was nonmarital property, he failed to show marital contributions and an increase in value. Jones v. Jones, 2014 Ark. 96, 432 S.W.3d 36 (2014).

Trial court erred when it refused to consider appellee's testimony that no money had been exchanged and the property was a gift because to do so would have contradicted the recitation in the deed that the property had been sold for a few dollars; the case was remanded for the trial court to consider the matter in light of the holding in case law that recitation in a deed of consideration did not preclude a finding of a gift. Wainwright v. Merryman, 2014 Ark. App. 156 (2014).

Trial court did not err in its division of property, given that the parties' verbal agreement did not constitute a valid agreement to exclude the properties at issue from marital property, and the facts surrounding the placement of both names on the deeds were more convincing that joint ownership was intended rather than providing clear and convincing evidence that it was not; titling the properties jointly was sufficient in itself to raise the presumption that a gift was thereby made to the other spouse, and the wife's own testimony that it was done in anticipation of death supported that presumption. Robinson v. Lindsey, 2015 Ark. App. 148 (2015).

When a husband and his father jointly opened certificates of deposit (CDs) during the husband's marriage, the circuit court did not clearly err in finding that the CDs were marital property because nothing conclusively established that the CDs were property acquired by gift or by reason of the death of another under subsection (b) of this section. McGahhey v. McGahhey, 2018 Ark. App. 597, 567 S.W.3d 522 (2018).

—In General.

Marital property is marital property whether it is voluntarily or involuntarily acquired. Morrison v. Morrison, 286 Ark. 353, 692 S.W.2d 601 (1985).

This section requires that marital property be divided at the time the divorce is granted. Jones v. Jones, 26 Ark. App. 1, 759 S.W.2d 42 (1988).

Where transactions result in great difficulty in tracing the manner in which nonmarital and marital property have been commingled, the property acquired in the final transaction may be declared marital property. Boggs v. Boggs, 26 Ark. App. 188, 761 S.W.2d 956 (1988).

Contribution of each party in the acquisition of marital property is a factor to be considered by the trial judge in making a division of marital property, however, it should not be the sole factor considered; thus, the court stated that, to the extent that Stout v. Stout, 4 Ark. App. 266, 630 S.W.2d 53 (1982), was in conflict with this opinion, it was overruled. Baxley v. Baxley, 92 Ark. App. 247, 212 S.W.3d 8 (2005).

Nonmarital Property.

The fact that this section provides that the increase in value of property acquired by one party prior to the marriage is nonmarital property does not mean that the chancellor must award the entire amount of the increase to the party that acquired the property prior to the marriage; instead, subdivision (a)(2) of this section expressly provides that the court may make some other division that it deems equitable. If the trial court does determine that it is equitable to divide nonmarital property between the parties, however, this section requires that the court take into consideration those factors listed in subdivision (a)(1)(A) of this section and that the court state in writing its reasons. Yockey v. Yockey, 25 Ark. App. 321, 758 S.W.2d 421 (1988).

Husband claimed the trial court clearly erred in awarding the wife his nonmarital property because they lived together as a married couple for only a few months, but the record showed they had a much longer and more involved history, plus subdivision (a)(2) of this section authorized the trial court to distribute the husband's nonmarital property to the wife based on the equities of the situation, and the trial court did not clearly err in awarding the wife the husband's nonmarital real property, where she had lived for 20 years. Marks v. Marks, 2014 Ark. App. 174, 432 S.W.3d 698 (2014).

Husband cited no authority for his argument that subdivision (a)(2) of this section did not apply when there was no marital property to be divided, and the statute instead authorized the trial court to do what it did, plus in distributing the husband's nonmarital property, the trial court complied with the statute by taking into consideration the factors enumerated in subdivision (a)(1) and stating in writing the basis and reasons for not returning the property to him. Marks v. Marks, 2014 Ark. App. 174, 432 S.W.3d 698 (2014).

Although the trial court incorrectly declared that a home was marital property, it did not equally divide the $35,000 equity in the home and it treated the home as nonmarital property. Under subdivision (a)(2) of this section, and consistent with the correct conclusion that the home was nonmarital property, the trial court awarded husband his $11,000 down payment on the home, made prior to the marriage, and then equally divided the remaining $24,000 between the husband and wife. Fell v. Fell, 2015 Ark. App. 590, 473 S.W.3d 578 (2015).

Trial court did not clearly err in awarding the wife a $12,000 interest in the equity of the nonmarital home because marital funds were used to pay the mortgage and make improvements on the husband's house; thus, the wife was entitled to some benefit. Fell v. Fell, 2015 Ark. App. 590, 473 S.W.3d 578 (2015).

“Active appreciation” rule conflicts with the plain language of subdivision (b)(5) of this section, which provides that the “increase in value of property acquired prior to marriage” is nonmarital; therefore, Layman v. Layman, 292 Ark. 539, 731 S.W.2d 771 (1987), Farrell v. Farrell, 365 Ark. 465, 231 S.W.3d 619 (2006), and Brown v. Brown, 373 Ark. 333, 284 S.W.3d 17 (2008), are overruled to the extent they redefine marital property through the “active appreciation” rule. Moore v. Moore, 2016 Ark. 105, 486 S.W.3d 766 (2016).

Because the husband's interest in his company was acquired before his marriage to the wife, it was a nonmarital asset, and the trial court erred in considering it marital property and awarding the wife half of the growth of the business. The trial court did not make findings under subdivision (a)(2) of this section to justify a distribution of nonmarital property. Moore v. Moore, 2016 Ark. 105, 486 S.W.3d 766 (2016).

Trial court erred in finding that a certain investment was a marital asset because it was acquired prior to the marriage. Although the wife testified that it was the intent of the parties to make a joint investment, the husband purchased the interest by himself prior to the marriage; the stock-purchase agreement reflected that the husband purchased the interest in his name, and the evidence showed that the initial capital contribution came from his checking account. Wilson v. Wilson, 2016 Ark. App. 256, 492 S.W.3d 534 (2016).

Husband had acquired the home before the marriage, and there was no evidence that it was purchased with the intent to make it the couple's marital home; the circuit court erred in treating the house as marital property, no reason was provided why the house should not be returned to the husband, and remand was required. Thurmon v. Thurmon, 2016 Ark. App. 497, 504 S.W.3d 675 (2016).

In dividing marital property, the trial court clearly erred in awarding the marital home to the wife where the husband had acquired the home prior to the marriage, and the property was not transformed into marital property by its use as collateral for loans. On remand, the trial court was to make findings concerning the benefit that the wife may be entitled to if marital funds were expended to pay off debt on the property or to pay for improvements on the property that increased its value. Steeland v. Steeland, 2018 Ark. App. 551, 562 S.W.3d 269 (2018).

Circuit court's award to wife of $100,000 from husband's separate nonmarital medical practice was affirmed; the wife had worked for the medical practice before the parties were married and during the marriage as the office manager and marital funds were used to pay debts of the medical practice. Perser v. Perser, 2019 Ark. App. 467, 588 S.W.3d 395 (2019).

Circuit court properly awarded the wife $52,000 from the home, which the parties agreed was the husband's separate property, where marital funds and funds from the sale of the wife's premarital home were used to pay the debt on the husband's separate property; in this case, the circuit court ordered an equitable distribution to the wife of the husband's nonmarital business and home, as well as alimony, and the court specifically stated in making the award that it had considered that the husband retained the home. Perser v. Perser, 2019 Ark. App. 467, 588 S.W.3d 395 (2019).

Pleadings.

Chancellor erred in dividing the marital property under this section where only separate maintenance was sought in amended pleading. Spencer v. Spencer, 275 Ark. 112, 627 S.W.2d 550 (1982).

Chancellor is not required to divide any asset equally between the parties if reasons for not doing so are stated. Bunt v. Bunt, 294 Ark. 507, 744 S.W.2d 718 (1988).

Property.

—Accounts.

There was no error in the division of accounts, given that one account bore both parties’ names and the wife had also made deposits to and withdrawals from the account, and the accounts the wife claimed as nonmarital property were held in her name only; the trial court’s decision complied with the statutory requirement that all marital property be equally divided. Walls v. Walls, 2014 Ark. App. 729, 452 S.W.3d 119 (2014).

Trial court did not clearly err in deeming certain accounts to be marital property, as the husband did not rebut the presumption that the accounts, which were held in the parties' joint names during the marriage, were marital; the source of the funds was of minimal value because the monies were converted into marital funds by virtue of their placement into joint accounts and by virtue of their joint access and usage. Barron v. Barron, 2015 Ark. App. 215 (2015).

Imputing income of $2,500 to the wife's bank account on the entry date of the divorce decree was clear error where the wife had simply taken the money from the account prior to the divorce decree, as was permitted, the money she spent from the account was used to pay bills, and thus, depositing the money into the account following the entry of the divorce decree was not evasive and was irrelevant. Langston v. Brown, 2016 Ark. App. 535, 506 S.W.3d 261 (2016).

Circuit court did not err by failing to equally divide a bank account because the court's order acknowledged that the sole purpose of the account on the advice of a financial advisor was to pay income tax for the wife, whose employer did not make tax deductions, and the decision effected an equitable distribution of marital property. Rawls v. Yarberry, 2018 Ark. App. 536, 564 S.W.3d 537 (2018).

—Accounts Receivable.

Accounts receivable are marital property. Meeks v. Meeks, 290 Ark. 563, 721 S.W.2d 653 (1986).

Husband's investment in a business operated by his sons was marital property because the money came from a joint account and the wife could be awarded portion of accounts receivable from the sons' failed business venture as it was not equitable to the wife to have the classification of this asset turn on the enmity between the parties, and the fact that a receivable may not be collectable reduced its net value but did not make it non-marital property. Farr v. Farr, 89 Ark. App. 196, 201 S.W.3d 417 (2005).

—Bonus.

Where husband's bonus accrued and, therefore, was acquired during his marriage to wife, chancellor abused his discretion in finding that none of bonus was marital property. Wilson v. Wilson, 294 Ark. 194, 741 S.W.2d 640 (1987).

Bonus which accrued during the parties' marriage is marital property subject to division. Tortorich v. Tortorich, 50 Ark. App. 114, 902 S.W.2d 247 (1995).

—Business.

There was evidence that the husband's sweat equity was his consideration for his interest in a company, and the trial court did not clearly err in determining that he gave consideration for his interest in the company, and thus the property was not a gift excepted from the parties' marital assets. Massey v. Massey, 2014 Ark. App. 111, 432 S.W.3d 134 (2014).

By not requiring the husband to buy the wife's interest in the marital business at the value assigned by the circuit court and allowing a reverse auction between the parties, the circuit court awarded an unequal distribution, yet did not state its basis for doing so; if the circuit court intended this unequal distribution, its basis for the award had to be stated. Ballegeer v. Ballegeer, 2019 Ark. App. 269, 577 S.W.3d 66 (2019).

Funds deposited into the corporate account during the pendency of the divorce action were not funds belonging to the martial business, and many funds were payments for services rendered, equipment, and materials that were filtered through the business; if the corporate accounts had been divided, the marital business would have been insolvent, and thus the circuit court's decision to keep the corporate account intact was not clearly erroneous. Ballegeer v. Ballegeer, 2019 Ark. App. 269, 577 S.W.3d 66 (2019).

Circuit court did not clearly err when it found that a portion of a partnership was marital property, when the husband owned the business before the marriage with his brother and father, and subsequently, during the marriage, the husband and his brother signed a promissory note for $275,000 to buy out their father's interest, and the husband failed to put on proof in the divorce action concerning the value of the interest. Perry v. Perry, 2020 Ark. App. 63, 594 S.W.3d 126 (2020).

—Capital Accounts.

Where there was no evidence that the former husband had a vested interest in the capital account with his employer that was fully distributive upon the date of the parties' divorce, the former wife was not entitled to any portion of that account. Hackett v. Hackett, 278 Ark. 82, 643 S.W.2d 560 (1982).

—Coins.

Testimony regarding a gold coin was conflicting, and the trial court believed the husband, and there was no clear error in finding that it was marital property. Baker v. Baker, 2013 Ark. App. 543, 429 S.W.3d 389 (2013).

—Commissions.

Insurance policy renewal commissions were income generated by corporation which was nonmarital property, and thus, the corporation's insurance policy renewal commissions were themselves, pursuant to subdivision (b)(7) of this section, exempt from the definition of marital property. Dalrymple v. Dalrymple, 74 Ark. App. 372, 47 S.W.3d 920 (2001).

—Disability Income.

Disability payments received by the husband did not lose their status as separate property when they were deposited in a joint checking account where the husband testified that the wife only wrote checks on the joint checking account after first discussing it with him, that the parties understood the separate nature of their checking accounts, and that he had not intended to give the wife an interest in the funds in the joint checking account. McKay v. McKay, 66 Ark. App. 268, 989 S.W.2d 560 (1999).

Where monthly disability income benefits had accrued to former husband, the benefits were a marital asset subject to division, and trial court erred in finding they had no cash value and awarding the asset solely to former husband. Frigon v. Frigon, 81 Ark. App. 314, 101 S.W.3d 879 (2003).

—Employment Compensation.

A cash advance paid to husband by husband's employer, acquired after the parties separated, was compensation for future services and contingent upon husband's future performance; thus, it was not earned during the marriage and was not marital property. O'Neal v. O'Neal, 55 Ark. App. 57, 929 S.W.2d 725 (1996).

When husband was awarded Federal Employee Liability Act proceeds as a result of permanent disabilities he suffered as a railroad engineer, the chancery court did not err in determining that these proceeds were non-marital property, and that husband was entitled to all the proceeds. Collins v. Collins, 347 Ark. 240, 61 S.W.3d 818 (2001).

Money accumulated in the husband's Deferred Retirement Option Plan during the parties' marriage constituted marital property of which the wife was entitled to a 50 percent interest. Dial v. Dial, 74 Ark. App. 30, 44 S.W.3d 768 (2001).

—Enhanced Business Career.

A husband's enhanced business career did not qualify as marital property subject to distribution. Meinholz v. Meinholz, 283 Ark. 509, 678 S.W.2d 348 (1984).

Medical degree, license or increased earnings capacity did not qualify as marital property. Wilson v. Wilson, 294 Ark. 194, 741 S.W.2d 640 (1987).

—Estates by Entirety.

Where wife's property prior to the marriage was conveyed to husband and wife after marriage as tenants by the entirety but not in consideration of the act of marriage, the wife was not entitled to be restored as sole owner. Phillips v. Phillips, 236 Ark. 225, 365 S.W.2d 261 (1963).

Where promissory notes arising out of the sale of a farm were payable to both parties and thus were entireties property, it was error for the chancery court to award the husband a greater share of the notes than the wife as a means of equalizing differences in value of real property awarded the parties. Ramsey v. Ramsey, 259 Ark. 16, 531 S.W.2d 28 (1975).

Where the chancellor set aside the conveyance by husband which created an estate by the entirety in certain property, the property reverted to ownership by husband individually and the trial court could properly determine that the property was not “marital property” and that the wife should not share in it. Chrestman v. Chrestman, 4 Ark. App. 281, 630 S.W.2d 60 (1982).

This section is not applicable to property owned as tenants by the entirety. Bramlett v. Bramlett, 5 Ark. App. 217, 636 S.W.2d 294 (1982) (decided prior to 1997 amendment, adding § 9-12-317(c)).

This section does not require that a home owned as an estate by the entirety be sold at the time of the divorce. Bratcher v. Bratcher, 5 Ark. App. 250, 635 S.W.2d 278 (1982).

The division of property held as tenants by the entirety is governed by § 9-12-317 rather than this section; § 9-12-317 is the only statutory authority for the division of tenancies by the entirety, and it provides for an equal division of the property without regard to gender or fault. Therefore chancellor erred in dividing property pursuant to this section. Lyle v. Lyle, 15 Ark. App. 202, 691 S.W.2d 188 (1985) (decision under prior law).

When property, personal or real, is placed in the names of a husband and wife, the presumption arises that they own the property as tenants by the entirety, and thus clear and convincing evidence is required to overcome the presumption that a spouse depositing money in joint account did not intend a gift or one-half interest to the other spouse. Boggs v. Boggs, 26 Ark. App. 188, 761 S.W.2d 956 (1988).

Where parties' residence is held as a tenancy by the entirety, that estate is automatically dissolved when the final decree is rendered, unless the chancellor specifically provides otherwise, pursuant to § 9-12-317. Creson v. Creson, 53 Ark. App. 41, 917 S.W.2d 553 (1996).

Bank account held not to be owned as tenants by the entirety. Cole v. Cole, 53 Ark. App. 140, 920 S.W.2d 32 (1996).

—Exchange for Property.

In considering subdivision (b)(2) of this section, the “exchange” provision, only that portion of the property acquired during marriage in exchange for the nonmarital property should be set aside as nonmarital property. An exchange of a nonmarital interest for other property after marriage will yield only a nonmarital interest proportionate in value in the newly acquired property. Jackson v. Jackson, 298 Ark. 60, 765 S.W.2d 561 (1989).

—Farm Equipment.

Farm equipment was separate property of the husband where he either owned it prior to the marriage or acquired it in exchange for other equipment owned prior to the marriage. Thomas v. Thomas, 68 Ark. App. 196, 4 S.W.3d 517 (1999).

—Furniture.

Where, in a divorce suit, it was shown that the wife with her own means paid half of the price of furniture, a decree awarding the furniture to the husband was erroneous, the wife being entitled to an equal interest therein. McIlroy v. McIlroy, 191 Ark. 45, 83 S.W.2d 550 (1935).

Trial court did not clearly err in concluding that the husband gifted the furniture and firearm to the wife; she presented evidence that the husband voluntarily transferred the items to her and ceased to exercise control over them, the trial court found her testimony credible, and the court deferred to that credibility finding. Marks v. Marks, 2014 Ark. App. 174, 432 S.W.3d 698 (2014).

—Gifts.

Where a husband advances money to improve his wife's separate property there is a rebuttable presumption that a gift was intended. Carrick v. Carrick, 13 Ark. App. 42, 679 S.W.2d 800 (1984).

A gift acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage is excluded from the definition of marital property which is subject to division upon divorce. Lyons v. Lyons, 13 Ark. App. 63, 679 S.W.2d 811 (1984).

Evidence insufficient to find that property acquired by husband was anything other than a gift. Layman v. Layman, 292 Ark. 539, 731 S.W.2d 771 (1987), overruled, Moore v. Moore, 2016 Ark. 105, 486 S.W.3d 766 (2016).

This section does not authorize a chancellor to divide gift property received by one spouse during marriage. Hale v. Hale, 307 Ark. 546, 822 S.W.2d 836 (1992).

Where husband received gift property during marriage, which he volunteered as security for a loan consolidation, it was appropriate for the chancellor to apply the gift property to satisfy the loan consolidation debt, but not to pay any other marital debts. Hale v. Hale, 307 Ark. 546, 822 S.W.2d 836 (1992).

Where it was clear from the facts and circumstances that husband had made some sort of gift to wife of a ring, valued at $1,105, before the marriage, he divested himself of any interest in the ring; thus, the trial court erred in awarding the ring to the husband. Weatherly v. Weatherly, 87 Ark. App. 291, 190 S.W.3d 294 (2004).

Ex-husband's real property was properly considered nonmarital property where although the trial court erred in relying on the fact that the property was never titled in the wife's name, the testimony supported the finding that the property was a gift from his parents, and thus, was excepted under subdivision (b)(1) of this section. Dozier v. Dozier, 2014 Ark. App. 78, 432 S.W.3d 82 (2014).

—Goodwill.

For goodwill to be marital property, it must be a business asset with value independent of the presence or reputation of a particular individual — an asset which may be sold, transferred, conveyed, or pledged. Whether goodwill is marital property is a fact question, and to establish goodwill as marital property and divisible as such, a party must produce evidence establishing salability or marketability of that goodwill as a business asset of a professional practice. Wilson v. Wilson, 294 Ark. 194, 741 S.W.2d 640 (1987).

Husband's professional association had no goodwill value independent of husband's presence and reputation. A solo professional practice may have business goodwill independent of the personal goodwill of the practitioner. Wife had the burden of proving that husband's professional association had business goodwill independent of husband's personal goodwill if it was to be considered a marital asset. Tortorich v. Tortorich, 50 Ark. App. 114, 902 S.W.2d 247 (1995).

—Homestead.

The court in granting a divorce may treat the homestead as any other property. Biddle v. Biddle, 206 Ark. 623, 177 S.W.2d 32 (1944).

In the absence of statutory provisions to the contrary, the wife has no homestead rights in the husband's property after a divorce unless the right thereto is reserved to her by the decree and it makes no difference whether the decree was obtained by the husband or by the wife. Biddle v. Biddle, 206 Ark. 623, 177 S.W.2d 32 (1944).

Courts granting decrees of divorce may award the possession of the homestead to either of the parties for such time and upon such terms and conditions as appear to be equitable and just. Orr v. Orr, 206 Ark. 844, 177 S.W.2d 915 (1944); Schaefer v. Schaefer, 235 Ark. 870, 362 S.W.2d 444 (1962).

Decree allowing homestead to husband was proper. Orr v. Orr, 206 Ark. 844, 177 S.W.2d 915 (1944).

A divorce decree giving a wife homestead rights to lands and personal property did not violate section. Whaley v. Whaley, 224 Ark. 632, 275 S.W.2d 634 (1955); Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 227 Ark. 1063, 303 S.W.2d 577 (1957).

Portion of divorce decree refusing to award alimony and ordering sale of homestead was against the preponderance of the evidence, and wife would be permitted to maintain residence until children were older with husband paying alimony which would be used to make partial mortgage payments on home. Warren v. Warren, 270 Ark. 163, 603 S.W.2d 472 (Ct. App. 1980).

—Identification.

The trial court had authority to identify and determine what was marital property and, therefore, properly required that the landlords of a store operated by the husband be made parties to the divorce action and that they be enjoined from selling the inventory of the store in order to recover rent due from the husband. Arnold v. Spears, 343 Ark. 517, 36 S.W.3d 346 (2001).

—Improvements.

A spouse is entitled to improvements made during the marriage on nonmarital property if the spouse can prove he or she helped make them. Camp v. Camp, 18 Ark. App. 87, 710 S.W.2d 842 (1986).

The improvements made to the wife's house and yard, whether paid for by the joint tax refund checks or by the wife's income earned during the marriage, were marital property. Camp v. Camp, 18 Ark. App. 87, 710 S.W.2d 842 (1986).

It would be inequitable to give the husband an interest in the improvements to the wife's separate property because, while the wife continued to make the mortgage payments thereon, the husband did not contribute to these payments although he was saving approximately $250 in rent each month. Camp v. Camp, 18 Ark. App. 87, 710 S.W.2d 842 (1986).

A co-owner who makes improvements to the property is generally awarded the resulting increase in the value of the property, and not the actual costs of the improvements. Flucht v. Villareal, 28 Ark. App. 1, 770 S.W.2d 187 (1989).

Where parties were only married three years before separating, the husband was entitled to some benefit by reason of marital funds having been used to improve the wife's property that she brought into the marriage. Weatherly v. Weatherly, 87 Ark. App. 291, 190 S.W.3d 294 (2004).

Trial court did not err in finding that a 60-acre tract that had been conveyed to a husband by his mother, while originally nonmarital property, had lost its status as nonmarital property because of the substantial improvements made to the property with marital funds and the wife's nonmarital funds and in equitably dividing the tract. Coatney v. Coatney, 2010 Ark. App. 262, 377 S.W.3d 381 (2010).

—Income.

Any accumulation of income during the marriage from the husband's nonmarital property constituted marital property; thus, the rental income on the husband's farmland the year after his separation from his wife was not an increase in value of his nonmarital property under subdivision (b)(5) of this section. Speer v. Speer, 18 Ark. App. 186, 712 S.W.2d 659 (1986) (decision prior to 1989 amendment).

“Active appreciation” rule conflicts with the plain language of subdivision (b)(5) of this section, which provides that the “increase in value of property acquired prior to marriage” is nonmarital; therefore, Layman v. Layman, 292 Ark. 539, 731 S.W.2d 771 (1987), Farrell v. Farrell, 365 Ark. 465, 231 S.W.3d 619 (2006), and Brown v. Brown, 373 Ark. 333, 284 S.W.3d 17 (2008), are overruled to the extent they redefine marital property through the “active appreciation” rule. Moore v. Moore, 2016 Ark. 105, 486 S.W.3d 766 (2016).

Income accumulated from nonmarital certificate of deposit accounts held to be marital property. Wagoner v. Wagoner, 294 Ark. 82, 740 S.W.2d 915 (1987); Boggs v. Boggs, 26 Ark. App. 188, 761 S.W.2d 956 (1988) (decisions prior to 1989 amendment).

Wife's salary check and stipend, earned subsequent to the marriage, are clearly marital property, and should be divided pursuant to this section as the chancellor believes the equities require. Reed v. Reed, 24 Ark. App. 85, 749 S.W.2d 335 (1988).

“Active appreciation” rule conflicts with the plain language of subdivision (b)(5) of this section, which provides that the “increase in value of property acquired prior to marriage” is nonmarital. Moore v. Moore, 2016 Ark. 105, 486 S.W.3d 766 (2016).

—Inheritance.

There was no transfer to the husband of an interest in a money market certificate purchased with proceeds from inheritance so as to make the certificate subject to division upon divorce. Hayse v. Hayse, 4 Ark. App. 160, 630 S.W.2d 48 (1982).

Tract of land inherited by the husband during the marriage was not subject to division in a divorce action. Busby v. Busby, 39 Ark. App. 108, 840 S.W.2d 195 (1992).

Husband failed to produce clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption that inheritance money placed in joint account was separate property where the records showed that although wife did not deposit or withdraw funds from the joint account, husband engaged in several actions that support a finding that he either bestowed a gift of the money to wife, or created a tenancy by the entirety in it. Creson v. Creson, 53 Ark. App. 41, 917 S.W.2d 553 (1996).

The chancellor's finding that the husband gave the wife an interest in a houseboat was not clearly erroneous, notwithstanding the husband's contention that he used the proceeds of an inheritance to purchase the houseboat and did not intend to make a gift of an interest in it to the wife, where the husband testified that, after he talked with the seller of the houseboat, the seller prepared the bill of sale in both parties' names and that he did not object because “she was my wife.” McKay v. McKay, 66 Ark. App. 268, 989 S.W.2d 560 (1999).

Although the houseboat was purchased from inheritance, it was held jointly and the court found that a gift had been made. McKay v. McKay, 340 Ark. 171, 8 S.W.3d 525 (2000).

Circuit court did not err in finding that the wife's inheritance money was not separate property and in allocating the inheritance account as marital property and dividing it equally between the parties because the wife failed to produce clear and convincing evidence that she did not intend to bestow a gift of the inheritance money to rebut the presumption of gift that arose when she placed the husband's name on her inheritance account. Adams v. Adams, 2014 Ark. App. 67, 432 S.W.3d 49 (2014).

Trial court erred in awarding the husband an investment account as his nonmarital property because: (1) although the evidence showed that the account was funded by the husband with proceeds from an inheritance from his father, the account was maintained in both parties' names; (2) although the husband stated that he never contributed any marital funds to the account, the wife stated that she handled the parties' finances and used the account to pay bills during the marriage and that they would use the account to pay for anything that had been purchased if the balance on a certain credit card was too high; and (3) the husband did not present distinct and detailed information about the account and how it was used to rebut the presumption that the account was marital property when it was maintained in both parties' names. Mason v. Mason, 2017 Ark. App. 683, 536 S.W.3d 657 (2017).

—Insurance Proceeds.

Where wife received proceeds of her son's insurance policy after her marriage took place but the son had died before the marriage took place, insurance proceeds were the separate property of the wife. Wright v. Wright, 29 Ark. App. 20, 779 S.W.2d 183 (1989).

Where defendant's employer during the marriage provided a long-term disability insurance plan for its executives; where these benefits were in lieu of workers' compensation, and were not awarded as benefits for a permanent disability or for future medical costs; and where the disability entitling the defendant to collect the benefits provided by the plan occurred during the marriage, the property was acquired during the marriage and was marital property as defined by statute. Dunn v. Dunn, 35 Ark. App. 89, 811 S.W.2d 336 (1991).

Appellant's disability benefits did not meet one of the statutory exceptions contained in this section and were therefore marital property. Scott v. Scott, 86 Ark. App. 120, 161 S.W.3d 307 (2004).

Although the court concluded that an insured and her ex-husband were equal co-owners of a fire-destroyed house, it exercised its discretion under subdivision (a)(1)(A) of this section and awarded the insured 69% of the funds deposited by an insurance company with the court: (1) the insured sued the insurance company after it refused to pay her claim under her property insurance policy; (2) the ex-husband intervened in the suit after the judgment entered against the company was affirmed on appeal; (3) the insured was entitled to a credit for the post-fire mortgage payments that she made because she was not legally obligated to make those payments and they benefitted the ex-husband, as those payments increased the amount of insurance policy proceeds available after the mortgage balance was paid off; (4) the insured was entitled to receive $15,000 to compensate her for her time and expense in suing the insurance company; (5) the insured was also entitled to recover the entire 12% penalty paid by the company under § 23-79-208(a)(1), given the fact that the ex-husband had not actively participated in attempting to obtain payment from the insurance company; and (6) the insured could not recover attorney's fees from the ex-husband pursuant to § 23-79-208(a)(1) or § 23-79-209(a) because those statutes allowed the recovery of fees from insurance companies. Tweedle v. State Farm Fire Cas. Co., No. 4:04-CV-608, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63324 (E.D. Ark. July 22, 2008).

Life insurance proceeds did not constitute marital property that were subject to division in a divorce case; pursuant to this section, life insurance proceeds were property acquired by reason of the death of another and were exempt from the definition of “marital property” for purposes of division of assets. Hargrove v. Hargrove, 2015 Ark. App. 45, 453 S.W.3d 683 (2015).

—Joint Enterprise.

Wife is entitled to half interest in real estate and business where she paid portion of consideration, regardless as to who held the legal title. Price v. Price, 217 Ark. 6, 228 S.W.2d 478 (1950).

Where it was obvious from the evidence that it was the joint efforts of the parties which acquired property, it would be inequitable to deprive the wife of the legal and equitable ownership of one-half interest in the property. Nelson v. Nelson, 267 Ark. 353, 590 S.W.2d 293 (1979).

—Livestock.

It was error for the chancellor to award $50,000 in an investment account, which represented the proceeds from a sale of cattle which occurred after the parties' marriage, to the husband since there was no proof that the cattle were the same as owned by the husband prior to the marriage and since the wife actively assisted the husband in his cattle farming operation. Thomas v. Thomas, 68 Ark. App. 196, 4 S.W.3d 517 (1999).

In a divorce action, the court erred in determining that cattle were not marital assets because the cattle were purchased by the husband during the parties' marriage and while they were separated; the court should have divided the value of the cattle equally pursuant or provided an explanation why such a division would not be equitable under the circumstances. Coombe v. Coombe, 89 Ark. App. 114, 201 S.W.3d 15 (2005).

Circuit court did not err in awarding the wife half the value of the presumed offspring of marital animals under the circumstances of the case, as the husband violated an order to sell the marital animals within 60 days. Moore v. Moore, 2019 Ark. 216, 576 S.W.3d 15 (2019).

—Marital Home.

In the property division following a divorce, the couple's marital residence was the wife's separate property because the husband deeded the house to her and there was nothing to indicate that the husband would regain an interest in the house or that the wife agreed to do anything in consideration for the transfer. Horton v. Horton, 92 Ark. App. 22, 211 S.W.3d 35 (2005).

Trial court's finding that a husband and wife intended to create a tenancy by the entirety when property was purchased was not clearly erroneous because the husband used his non-marital funds to purchase the property and to build a home, but the warranty deed conveyed title to both parties as husband and wife; in finding that the husband made a gift to the wife of the property and funds used to construct the home, the trial court expressly rejected the husband's claim that the parties intended the land and home to remain his separate property. McCracken v. McCracken, 2009 Ark. App. 758, 358 S.W.3d 474 (2009).

Trial court's valuation for property distribution purposes of a marital home, which was built during the parties' marriage upon the wife's non-marital land, was not clearly erroneous where there was no evidence of the before-and-after value of the property to show the existence and extent of any increase in the value of non-marital property. Poole v. Poole, 2009 Ark. App. 860, 372 S.W.3d 420 (2009).

Trial court did not clearly err in failing to make an unequal division of the equity in the divorcing parties' house due to a home equity loan that was received almost a year before the parties separated pursuant to this section, as the wife provided testimony that the money had already been spent and that she used it for extra nursing school expenses, her own medical expenses, and various living expenses. Grantham v. Lucas, 2011 Ark. App. 491, 385 S.W.3d 337 (2011).

In this divorce action, the order finding that the parties' home was marital property was affirmed because while the wife might have intended to maintain the status of her separate property, she did not; the deed to the house was to the parties jointly, as husband and wife. McClure v. Schollmier-McClure, 2011 Ark. App. 681 (2011).

In a divorce action, the trial court did not err under subsection (a) of this section in awarding the husband the first $90,000 from the sale of the marital home and equally dividing the remaining proceeds because the parties had received a credit of $90,000 toward the property's purchase price when they traded a property the husband owned prior to the marriage for the marital property. McCormick v. McCormick, 2012 Ark. App. 318, 416 S.W.3d 770 (2012).

Trial court did not clearly err in awarding the husband the marital home, along with its debt; the property was given to him as a gift prior to marriage, and the court found the omission of a directive for refinancing was inadvertent, as the wife should not have been obligated to repay the mortgage on the home awarded to the husband. Baker v. Baker, 2013 Ark. App. 543, 429 S.W.3d 389 (2013).

Circuit court did not err in denying the mother's petition to order a sale of the marital home because the father never ceased living in the former marital residence with the children and did not abandon it; and the residence was being used “in a manner for the children” under the settlement agreement and previous modification order. Neumann v. Smith, 2016 Ark. App. 14, 480 S.W.3d 197 (2016).

Circuit court did not abuse its discretion in equally dividing the marital home and then giving the wife a credit for the time she alone made the mortgage payments after the parties separated, and in giving the wife a credit for the five-acre lot proceeds that the husband used to pay his personal debts. Holloway v. Holloway, 2019 Ark. App. 375, 586 S.W.3d 173 (2019).

Although the wife used nonmarital funds toward the construction of the marital home, the appellate court did not find clear error in the circuit court's award of equal division of the marital home given the statutory presumption favoring equal division of marital property and the husband had countered that he made substantial contributions in the form of “sweat equity” toward the home's construction. Holloway v. Holloway, 2019 Ark. App. 375, 586 S.W.3d 173 (2019).

—Miscellaneous Personal Property.

In a divorce action, a trial court erred when it found that a travel trailer in which a former husband lived with his girlfriend was marital property under subsection (b) of this section when there was no evidence that indicated that the husband had any ownership interest in the trailer. Taylor v. Taylor, 369 Ark. 31, 250 S.W.3d 232 (2007).

Appellee left the box springs and mattress when she entered the marital home, and took objects she thought were hers, and under the circumstances, the trial court's conclusion that she abandoned her claim to the box springs and mattress was reasonable. Wainwright v. Merryman, 2014 Ark. App. 156 (2014).

Where husband contended that at least some of the guns in the large gun collection were his separate property, the conflicting proof on this issue was for the trial court to resolve and the trial court expressly found that the husband's testimony on this matter was not credible. Davis v. Davis, 2016 Ark. App. 210, 489 S.W.3d 195 (2016).

Circuit court erred in finding that a tractor was the husband's separate nonmarital property where it was purchased during the marriage with the parties' credit card, and the husband had submitted no evidence supporting the assertion that the tractor was purchased with funds from his mother. Moody v. Moody, 2017 Ark. App. 582, 533 S.W.3d 152 (2017).

Husband claimed that nothing in the record indicated that the “Can Am” and the “ATV” were one and the same; because there was no proof in the record to settle the matter, the circuit court's ultimate decision to award the husband the Can Am as he requested was neither unreasonable nor clearly erroneous. Ballegeer v. Ballegeer, 2019 Ark. App. 269, 577 S.W.3d 66 (2019).

—Partnership Assets.

Where husband and wife operated store as partners during the marriage the husband was not entitled to the sole ownership of the store. Phillips v. Phillips, 236 Ark. 225, 365 S.W.2d 261 (1963).

In awarding a divorce to the wife, the chancellor should determine the value of a husband's interest in a partnership, treating accounts receivable as assets having a provable fair net present value, resulting in a monetary decree in the wife's favor, to be enforced if necessary by a charging order. Riegler v. Riegler, 243 Ark. 113, 419 S.W.2d 311 (1967); Warren v. Warren, 12 Ark. App. 260, 675 S.W.2d 371 (1984).

The trial court clearly erred when it ordered a former wife's interest in the parties' marital home to be applied to the net worth of a partnership, a business in which she had a lesser interest. Glover v. Glover, 4 Ark. App. 27, 627 S.W.2d 30 (1982).

A former wife's interest in a partnership and its assets, acquired during her marriage, constituted marital property, despite the wife's contention that she owned no property used in the partnership but instead only had a right to half the earnings of the partnership. Richardson v. Richardson, 280 Ark. 498, 659 S.W.2d 510 (1983).

Circuit court properly awarded a wife half of the husband's one-third interest in a family limited partnership because the partnership was created during the parties' marriage and the husband used marital funds to invest in the partnership. Jez v. Jez, 2016 Ark. App. 594, 509 S.W.3d 1 (2016).

Finding that a wife's law firm partnership interest was marital property was affirmed where the wife cited no authority for her argument that the partnership interest, acquired during the marriage, was not marital property, and she provided no authority that, as a matter of law, the use of nonmarital funds to satisfy the debt obligation on a marital asset converted the asset from marital to nonmarital. Grimsley v. Drewyor, 2019 Ark. App. 218, 575 S.W.3d 636 (2019).

—Personal Injury Claims.

The $110,000.00 certificate of deposit, which represented a lump-sum payment for injury to the husband and which was titled in the names of both the husband and wife, should have been divided equally between the husband and wife upon divorce. McDonald v. McDonald, 19 Ark. App. 75, 716 S.W.2d 788 (1986).

The two future installments of the husband's personal injury settlement were properly classified as marital property. McDonald v. McDonald, 19 Ark. App. 75, 716 S.W.2d 788 (1986).

The chancellor's refusal to award the wife any portion of the two future installments of the husband's personal injury settlement was not against the preponderance of the evidence, where the chancellor recited the factors set forth in subdivision (a)(1) of this section and particularly mentioned the severity of the husband's injury and the likelihood he would not work again, while the wife maintained her ability to work. McDonald v. McDonald, 19 Ark. App. 75, 716 S.W.2d 788 (1986).

To the extent spouse acquired an enforceable right during the marriage to recover for personal injury, he acquired marital property. Bunt v. Bunt, 294 Ark. 507, 744 S.W.2d 718 (1988).

Except for those benefits from an unliquidated personal injury claim that would be for any degree of permanent disability or future medical expenses, the remaining benefits or elements of damage from one's personal injury claim are subject to division as marital property pursuant to subdivision (a)(1)(A) of this section. Clayton v. Clayton, 297 Ark. 342, 760 S.W.2d 875 (1988).

Wife's claim, that settlement proceeds of a personal injury to her late husband were marital property, held without merit; the funds belonged to his estate, to be distributed pursuant to probate law. Ellis v. Ellis, 315 Ark. 475, 868 S.W.2d 83 (1994).

Although former husband was permanently impaired from any type of gainful employment, since the ultimate source of his disability could have been traced back to the wounds he suffered in World War II rather than to a specific “personal injury” sustained while employed or in consequence of a tortious act, his claim for his physical condition did not constitute a claim for “personal injury” as contemplated by subdivision (b)(6) of this section and therefore did not fall within the statutory marital-property exemption. Mason v. Mason, 319 Ark. 722, 895 S.W.2d 513 (1995).

Trial court did not err in a divorce action in awarding the husband all of a $1.6 million settlement from his FELA personal injury claim because the FELA proceeds were not marital property, as defined under subdivision (b)(6) of this section; the trial court found that the entire settlement was for a degree of permanent disability and future medical expenses. Palmer v. Palmer, 2012 Ark. App. 607 (2012).

—Presumption.

Property acquired by either spouse during the marriage carries the presumption of being marital property; the date of the acquisition is the key factor, and property acquired separately or jointly remains as such and must be divided accordingly at the time of divorce, unless the court finds it is not equitable. Lofton v. Lofton, 23 Ark. App. 203, 745 S.W.2d 635 (1988).

Once property, whether personal or real, is placed in the names of persons who are husband and wife, without specifying the manner in which they take, there is a presumption that they own the property as tenants by the entirety and it takes clear and convincing evidence to overcome that presumption. Lofton v. Lofton, 23 Ark. App. 203, 745 S.W.2d 635 (1988).

Once property is placed equally, in the names of both husband and wife, such property is presumed to be held by them as tenants by the entirety and, thus, marital property. Thomas v. Thomas, 68 Ark. App. 196, 4 S.W.3d 517 (1999).

—Property Acquired After Separation.

Wife could not exclude properties deeded to her after temporary order as marital property acquired by a spouse after a legal separation, since there is no authority to hold that a temporary order is equivalent to legal separation. Schichtel v. Schichtel, 3 Ark. App. 36, 621 S.W.2d 504 (1981).

Where husband purchased a home while separated from his wife, but before any divorce or maintenance decree had been entered, the house was marital property subject to division. Lee v. Lee, 12 Ark. App. 226, 674 S.W.2d 505 (1984).

Where trial court had entered a temporary order prior to divorce action and that order did not deal with or affect the distribution of the parties' properties, subdivision (b)(3) of this section was not applicable and property acquired by the spouse after the order was marital property to be distributed one-half to each party, unless the court found the division inequitable. Allen v. Allen, 17 Ark. App. 38, 702 S.W.2d 819 (1986).

Assets acquired after separation and prior to a grant of divorce are marital property and are to be divided giving due consideration to the factors enunciated in subdivision (a)(1)(A) of this section. Franklin v. Franklin, 25 Ark. App. 287, 758 S.W.2d 7 (1988); Cavin v. Cavin, 308 Ark. 109, 823 S.W.2d 843 (1992).

When a chancellor declines to award a divorce and enters nothing more than a support order necessitated by a family breakup, there is no divorce from bed and board, and there is no basis for holding that property acquired by the parties thereafter is other than marital property unless it falls within some other exception found in this section. Hadden v. Hadden, 320 Ark. 480, 897 S.W.2d 568 (1995).

Funds acquired by one party and deposited into the parties' joint checking account prior to their divorce are marital property subject to division by the court. Schumacher v. Schumacher, 66 Ark. App. 9, 986 S.W.2d 883 (1999).

There was no error in the trial court's failure to award the husband an interest in the home and business that the wife purchased shortly before the divorce trial where she used money borrowed from her mother; although assets acquired after separation but before divorce are marital assets, there was no divisible equity in either property, they were purchased with borrowed funds, and the wife was held responsible for all indebtedness. Davis v. Davis, 2016 Ark. App. 210, 489 S.W.3d 195 (2016).

—Property Acquired Before Marriage.

In the division of property on granting a divorce to the wife, it was error to award to the wife sum as restoration of a sum received from her by her husband in consideration of marriage under this section where the sum was obtained before marriage. Oliphant v. Oliphant, 177 Ark. 613, 7 S.W.2d 783 (1928).

Although this section provides that the increase in value of property acquired prior to the marriage remains that party's sole and separate property, the chancellor may make some other division that he deems equitable. Smith v. Smith, 32 Ark. App. 175, 798 S.W.2d 442 (1990).

Although the increase in value in property acquired prior to marriage is not marital property, it is appropriate to recognize a spouse's contributions toward that increase in value when making a property division. Smith v. Smith, 32 Ark. App. 175, 798 S.W.2d 442 (1990).

—Real Property.

Finding that wife was entitled to receive one-half of husband's equitable interest amount, was not clearly erroneous or clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Warren v. Warren, 270 Ark. 163, 603 S.W.2d 472 (Ct. App. 1980).

Chancellor was correct in finding that wife had a marital interest in one half of “marital profit,” or appreciated value, of house, but erred in failing to give her credit for that part of the purchase price which she contributed through the use of a joint down payment. Williford v. Williford, 280 Ark. 71, 655 S.W.2d 398 (1983).

Where husband owned house, prior to marriage, which was destroyed and rebuilt during marriage, the lot remained his separate property and was not “marital property”; the rebuilt dwelling did constitute marital property to the extent that joint funds were used to acquire the property. Williford v. Williford, 280 Ark. 71, 655 S.W.2d 398 (1983).

Where the former wife acquired property from her mother during the existence of the marriage for which the wife paid consideration, and where after acquiring title to the land the wife sold the timber thereon and handed the proceeds over to her mother, the chancellor did not err in treating the transaction as a loan and partial repayment and holding the acreage was marital property subject to division. Richardson v. Richardson, 280 Ark. 498, 659 S.W.2d 510 (1983).

Where the court found that the husband had made an original investment in a home prior to marriage, the division of the proceeds of the home was modified to allow him credit for his investment. Marshall v. Marshall, 285 Ark. 426, 688 S.W.2d 279 (1985).

Proceeds inherited under the contracts for the sale of real properties are not marital property as defined in this section, nor were they held as tenants by the entirety since wife did not deposit them into an account so held; therefore, this amount is the sole and separate property of the wife. Reed v. Reed, 24 Ark. App. 85, 749 S.W.2d 335 (1988).

Without evidence of the before-and-after value of the property to show the existence and extent of any increase in the value of the nonmarital property, any reduction in debt on nonmarital property was not considered to be marital property to be divided equally; instead, the non-owning spouse was simply entitled to have the marital contribution considered in balancing the equities involved in the property division. Powell v. Powell, 82 Ark. App. 17, 110 S.W.3d 290 (2003).

Trial court did not err in a divorce action in equally dividing, as marital property, 20 acres of land between the parties where a quitclaim deed executed by the husband's father to the parties, as husband and wife, was presumed delivered because it was recorded. The husband failed to rebut the presumption of delivery. Baldridge v. Baldridge, 100 Ark. App. 148, 265 S.W.3d 146 (2007).

There was no clear error in the trial court's determination that the property of a husband and wife had already passed out of the marital estate and had been gifted to their sons because two sons had moved onto the property, and at least one son had paid for the improvements on the property; the trial court had authority to decide the parties' rights to the three six-acre parcels, which were determined to be out of the marital estate as the result of gifting the property to the sons several years earlier. Wise v. Wise, 2010 Ark. App. 12, 371 S.W.3d 718 (2010).

Trial court had no authority to order a husband and wife to deed property to their sons without making them parties to the divorce action. Wise v. Wise, 2010 Ark. App. 12, 371 S.W.3d 718 (2010).

There was considerable evidence relied on by the trial court tending to show that the farm was not a gift to the husband, but instead constituted marital property. given in part that there was a loan to purchase the farm, the husband and wife signed a mortgage on the property, and tax returns showed note payments produced mortgage deductions claimed by the husband and wife; the court found no error. Massey v. Massey, 2014 Ark. App. 111, 432 S.W.3d 134 (2014).

Circuit court did not clearly err by failing to provide a basis for its order that the house be sold and the proceeds divided equally where the house was clearly acquired during the parties' marriage, and thus, it met the definition of marital property. Branch v. Branch, 2016 Ark. App. 613, 508 S.W.3d 911 (2016).

—Retirement Plans, Pensions, Etc.

A husband's interest in the retirement plan sponsored by his employer is marital property subject to allocation under this section in a divorce action. Day v. Day, 281 Ark. 261, 663 S.W.2d 719 (1984).

Earnings or other property acquired by each spouse must be treated as marital property, unless falling within one of the statutory exceptions, and neither one can deprive the other of any interest in marital property by putting it temporarily beyond his or her own control, as by the purchase of annuities, participation in a retirement plan, or other device for postponing full enjoyment of the property. Day v. Day, 281 Ark. 261, 663 S.W.2d 719 (1984).

A pension is the result of direct or indirect efforts expended by one or both parties to the marriage; it is additional compensation for services rendered for the employer and a right acquired during the marriage. Hence, equitable considerations mandate its inclusion for distribution, where the employee has already qualified for benefits, and the other spouse, during the marriage, has foregone enjoyment of that additional compensation represented by the cost of the plan, whether or not it requires employee contributions. Meinholz v. Meinholz, 283 Ark. 509, 678 S.W.2d 348 (1984).

Disability retirement benefits are marital property. Morrison v. Morrison, 286 Ark. 353, 692 S.W.2d 601 (1985).

The fact that disability retirement benefits are paid out of one's own contributions plus the contributions of all others who are not disabled does not mean they are not marital property. Morrison v. Morrison, 286 Ark. 353, 692 S.W.2d 601 (1985).

Since the decision in Day v. Day, 281 Ark. 261, 663 S.W.2d 719 (1984), which held that husband's interest in retirement plan sponsored by his employer is marital property subject to allocation under this section, military retirement benefits payable in the future may be considered marital property and subject to division under this section. Womack v. Womack, 16 Ark. App. 139, 698 S.W.2d 306 (1985).

Vested retirement benefits not yet due and payable are marital property subject to division on divorce when based on contributions made or services rendered during the marriage; thus, retirement benefits based on service of the husband prior to the marriage were his separate property, and those benefits based on service after marriage were not mere increase in value of separate property, but were marital property subject to division. Womack v. Womack, 16 Ark. App. 139, 698 S.W.2d 306 (1985).

Although husband's military pension plan was noncontributory, the pension was nevertheless, in effect, part of the consideration of husband's employment contract with the military, i.e., a wage substitute. As it was consideration earned during the marriage, it constituted marital property. Young v. Young, 288 Ark. 33, 701 S.W.2d 369 (1986).

Although husband entered military service prior to his marriage, subsequent military pension benefits accrued during marriage were marital property. Young v. Young, 288 Ark. 33, 701 S.W.2d 369 (1986).

It was not an abuse of the chancellor's discretion to award the wife one-half of a fractional interest in the husband's retirement pay, the fraction having a numerator of the number of years the parties were married during his military service and the denominator being the number of years the husband had served upon retirement. Askins v. Askins, 288 Ark. 333, 704 S.W.2d 632 (1986).

Nonvested right in military retirement did not constitute property under this section. Durham v. Durham, 289 Ark. 3, 708 S.W.2d 618 (1986).

The decisions in Day v. Day, 281 Ark. 261, 663 S.W.2d 719 (1984) and Young v. Young, 288 Ark. 33, 701 S.W.2d 369 (1986), which held that military retirement benefits constitute marital property to be equally distributed upon divorce, would not be applied retroactively to a divorce decree which became final four years prior to those decisions, because it would work a great hardship on the parties and would defeat the purposes underlying the doctrine of res judicata. Wiles v. Wiles, 289 Ark. 340, 711 S.W.2d 789 (1986).

Federal law did not permit state courts to divide military retirement pensions pursuant to a divorce settlement until the Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act in 1983; however, this act was retroactive only to June 26, 1981. Where the parties were divorced in February, 1981, the chancellor was not in error in dismissing the portion of the wife's petition concerning the military retirement pension, because the decree reflected the law as it existed at the time of the divorce. Hendricks v. Hendricks, 18 Ark. App. 41, 709 S.W.2d 827 (1986).

Contributions by employer were not marital property when made to ex-spouse's profit sharing and pension plans after the date of divorce. Wilson v. Wilson, 294 Ark. 194, 741 S.W.2d 640 (1987).

Spouse's interest in a Major Needs Fund, in which all contributions were made by his employer, was vested and marital property. Guinn v. Guinn, 35 Ark. App. 199, 816 S.W.2d 629 (1991).

A spouse upon divorce is entitled to share in cost of living adjustments in retirement benefits applicable to the percentage of retirement benefits awarded to the spouse in the divorce decree. Brown v. Brown, 38 Ark. App. 99, 828 S.W.2d 601 (1992).

The language of this section does not include nonvested military benefits. Burns v. Burns, 312 Ark. 61, 847 S.W.2d 23 (1993).

Wife who remarried her first husband was entitled to a percentage of the military retirement pay based upon the total number of years she was married to husband, not just for the number of years of the second marriage. Christopher v. Christopher, 316 Ark. 215, 871 S.W.2d 398 (1994).

Where husband placed pension funds in the parties' joint account, the presumption imposed by law was that he intended to create a true joint tenancy with wife, which presumption was not overcome by his subsequent withdrawal of funds and placement of them in IRA accounts in his individual name. Mathis v. Mathis, 52 Ark. App. 155, 916 S.W.2d 131 (1996).

For a case showing a detailed account of how to calculate wife's share of husband's military retirement pay, see Cherry v. Cherry, 55 Ark. App. 178, 934 S.W.2d 936 (1996).

Enhancements to a retirement often increase in the later years and it might be inequitable to allow a person who had supported the spouse through the lean years to be deprived of those later awards, and the chancellor has considerable discretion to divide marital property other than one-half to each party when it is equitable to do so; thus the chancellor properly considered the increases in wife's salary following the separation and divorce in deciding that they constituted legitimate adjustments for retirement benefits in which husband could participate. Brown v. Brown, 332 Ark. 235, 962 S.W.2d 810 (1998).

Where the parties were married for the last seven of the 33 years that the wife was employed, the husband was entitled to half of seven thirty-third's of the wife's monthly pension benefit. Thomas v. Thomas, 68 Ark. App. 196, 4 S.W.3d 517 (1999).

Where the parties were married for the last seven of the 33 years that the wife was employed, the increase in value of the wife's pre-marriage contributions to her 401(k) plan did not constitute marital property. Thomas v. Thomas, 68 Ark. App. 196, 4 S.W.3d 517 (1999).

Where the wife's pension plan was a contribution plan, the court properly used the total contribution method to divide the plan, keeping in mind the difference in ages between the two parties. Gray v. Gray, 352 Ark. 443, 101 S.W.3d 816 (2003).

Pension-plan benefits are marital property to the extent that a spouse had a vested interest in those benefits; non-vested pension plans are not marital property. Delacey v. Delacey, 85 Ark. App. 419, 155 S.W.3d 701 (2004).

Court erred in awarding both retirement accounts to the wife where the wife's disability and need for financial security was not more pressing than the husband's disability and similar need simply because she was the “primary breadwinner” and made contributions to the retirement accounts. Baxley v. Baxley, 92 Ark. App. 247, 212 S.W.3d 8 (2005).

Property owned individually by a debtor and co-owned with his non-debtor wife became part of the bankruptcy estate; accordingly, where a debtor's non-debtor wife had filed for divorce post-petition and the state court had not entered a divorce decree and divided the marital property, the wife could not claim any rights or “exemptions” to the debtor's retirement funds as the wife's rights to the retirement funds were inchoate at best. In re Thomas, 331 B.R. 798 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 2005).

Trial court erred in holding that a wife had no marital interest in her former husband's full retirement benefits that had vested during marriage because the decree provided that the parties were to “divide equally the retirement which accrued during the marriage” and the wife was entitled to share in all of the husband's retirement benefits that accrued prior to the date the decree was filed, not as of the date of the hearing as the husband claimed. Allen v. Allen, 99 Ark. App. 292, 259 S.W.3d 480 (2007).

In a divorce action, the trial court did not err in determining that the wife was entitled to one-half of the husband's civil service retirement benefits; the trial court was not required to consider the amount the husband might have drawn if participating in the Social Security system. Jackson v. Jackson, 2009 Ark. App. 238, 303 S.W.3d 460 (2009).

Trial court properly ruled that a wife was not entitled to a husband's funds because they were disability income rather than retirement income; the wife's entitlement to retirement benefits, as contemplated under the divorce decree, would occur when the husband was paid benefits that were vested, irrevocable, or permanent in nature instead of tied to whether or not he could work. Hatch v. Hatch, 2009 Ark. App. 337, 308 S.W.3d 174 (2009).

Division of a retirement account between the husband and wife was appropriate pursuant to subdivision (b)(1) of this section because the formula used by the trial court took the premarital contribution into account. The appellate court was not left with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court made a mistake in dividing the retirement account and the sums that were withdrawn from that account. Atchison v. Atchison, 2012 Ark. App. 572 (2012).

Associated gain or loss of marital contributions is marital property. Where the trial court awarded the husband only half of the contributions made to the wife's 401(k) during the marriage and the husband contended he was also entitled to any associated gain or loss, the trial court on remand was to either divide the entire marital interest equally or state its basis for some other division. Wilson v. Wilson, 2016 Ark. App. 256, 492 S.W.3d 534 (2016).

Circuit court did not specify whether all, or part, of the 401(k)'s assets were marital property, and it could not be determined from the decree whether the circuit court equally divided marital property or distributed nonmarital property to a nonowning spouse for some reason; given this uncertainty, remand was ordered. Thurmon v. Thurmon, 2016 Ark. App. 497, 504 S.W.3d 675 (2016).

Award to a former wife of a portion of the former husband's active-duty retirement could not stand because the husband's active-duty retirement was not vested at the time of the divorce; reserve-duty and active-duty retirement are not unified retirement systems but should be viewed separately for purposes of marital-property division. Myers v. Ridgley, 2017 Ark. App. 411 (2017).

Trial court erred in its property distribution because the court did not make an unequivocal finding that a wife had a vested interest in a pension plan or designate the portion to which each party was entitled. Garcia v. Garcia, 2018 Ark. App. 146, 544 S.W.3d 96 (2018).

Circuit court's equal distribution of the retirement accounts was not clearly erroneous where it divided the retirement accounts equally as of the date of divorce rather than on the date of separation; although the husband argued that the wife did not make any contributions to the accounts after the separation, there was no indication that the husband could not have filed for divorce sooner. Dac Tat Pham v. Anh Thuy Nguyen, 2019 Ark. App. 500, 588 S.W.3d 427 (2019).

In a divorce case, the circuit court did not clearly err by failing to award the ex-wife a portion of the ex-husband's military retirement benefits because she failed to present evidence to support a finding that the husband was vested in his military retirement at the time of the divorce. Tompkins v. Tompkins, 2020 Ark. App. 122 (2020).

—Stock.

Stock acquired with funds from joint account held to be marital property where evidence did not permit having of funds. Boggs v. Boggs, 26 Ark. App. 188, 761 S.W.2d 956 (1988).

Sale of stock is not authorized by this section. Hodges v. Hodges, 27 Ark. App. 250, 770 S.W.2d 164 (1989).

Where stock, acquired before marriage was exchanged for the balance existing in a profit sharing trust on the date of the plaintiff's retirement, and there were substantial increases in the value of both the profit sharing account prior to distribution and the stock obtained at the time of distribution, the chancellor erred in ruling that all of the stock was marital property under Arkansas law. Cate v. Cate, 35 Ark. App. 79, 812 S.W.2d 697 (1991).

It was error for the chancellor to find that shares of stock and certificates of deposit were separate nonmarital property where they were held jointly by the parties and there was no evidence to rebut the presumption that they were held as tenants by the entirety. Thomas v. Thomas, 68 Ark. App. 196, 4 S.W.3d 517 (1999).

Husband's stock in corporation he obtained in exchange for assets of his sole proprietorship, which he had operated for nearly 30 years before marrying the wife, was nonmarital property under subdivision (b)(2) of this section, as husband testified that strictly nonmarital property, the sole proprietorship's assets, was used to acquire the stock and the wife did not dispute that assertion. Dalrymple v. Dalrymple, 74 Ark. App. 372, 47 S.W.3d 920 (2001).

Trial judge did not err in crediting the value of the husband's appraiser over the wife's appraiser in determining the fair market value of the husband's medical clinic and surgery center. Williams v. Williams, 82 Ark. App. 294, 108 S.W.3d 629 (2003).

Trial court did not err in valuing stock for the purpose of distribution by including a minority discount by taking the price per share that had been used in a previous sale and used in other offers and sales of the company's stock. Farrell v. Farrell, 365 Ark. 465, 231 S.W.3d 619 (2006), overruled in part, Moore v. Moore, 2016 Ark. 105, 486 S.W.3d 766 (2016).

Although stock the wife acquired before the marriage was not marital property, the increase in value of the stock was a marital asset and an unequal distribution of that asset of 20 percent to the husband was equitable because the initial $25,000.00 for the purchase of the stock was paid from marital funds subsequent to the parties' marriage, and the increase in the value of the stock was not totally attributable to the efforts of the wife but was due in large part to her efforts. Farrell v. Farrell, 365 Ark. 465, 231 S.W.3d 619 (2006), overruled in part, Moore v. Moore, 2016 Ark. 105, 486 S.W.3d 766 (2016).

Where wife had acquired stock before the marriage, under the “source of funds” rule, it was not marital property even though marital funds had been used to repay the loan from her grandparents for the purchase of the stock. Farrell v. Farrell, 365 Ark. 465, 231 S.W.3d 619 (2006), overruled in part, Moore v. Moore, 2016 Ark. 105, 486 S.W.3d 766 (2016).

Trial court erred in a divorce action in finding that a wife's stock interest in a family company was nonmarital property because the stock was marital property under subsection (b) of this section; the wife received the stock during the marriage. The stock was not acquired in exchange for nonmarital property or income; instead, it was exchanged for a note receivable. Kelly v. Kelly, 2011 Ark. 259, 381 S.W.3d 817 (2011).

Subdivision (a)(4) of this section requires the trial court to determine the fair market value of securities if the trial court awards money or other property in lieu of a division of stocks, bonds, and other securities; although the value of the businesses was within the range provided by expert testimony, this section requires the trial court to expressly find the value of this type of property, and it was necessary to remand this question for such a finding. Farrell v. Farrell, 2013 Ark. App. 23, 425 S.W.3d 824 (2013).

Trial court erred in dividing the parties' marital property because it did not assign a value to the shares of a golf course in accordance with subdivision (a)(4) of this section when it awarded the stock to the husband. Brown v. Brown, 2016 Ark. App. 172 (2016).

Circuit court did not err in awarding each party one-half of the stock in each of the four corporations given the options provided in subdivision (a)(4) of this section. Sherman v. Boeckmann, 2016 Ark. App. 567, 506 S.W.3d 899 (2016).

Circuit court erred in allowing the husband to pay a substantial portion of the wife's share of marital property over a multi-year period. Although the parties' stock was held in closely held corporations with limited marketability, the circuit court was not relieved of its obligation to make an equitable division at the time of the divorce by its finding that the husband lacked the ability to borrow sufficient funds with which to pay the wife for her interest; under subdivision (a)(4) of this section, the court on remand should order an immediate equal division of the stock. Farrell v. Farrell, 2017 Ark. App. 7, 510 S.W.3d 787 (2017).

Portion of the stock that was purchased during the marriage was marital property; the stock was acquired in exchange for a note, and paying for the property with nonmarital funds did not change the character of the property. McGahhey v. McGahhey, 2018 Ark. App. 597, 567 S.W.3d 522 (2018).

—Stock Options.

Where a former husband held options to purchase shares of stock the chancellor properly found that the value of the options was the difference between the cost of exercising them and the worth of the stock, and he properly awarded the former wife one-half of that amount as marital property. Richardson v. Richardson, 280 Ark. 498, 659 S.W.2d 510 (1983).

Trial court did not err in ruling that a husband's vested stock options were marital property subject to division between the husband and his wife because its application of a North Carolina case, which held that stock options that were not exercisable as of the date of separation and that could be lost as a result of an event occurring thereafter were not vested and had to be treated as the separate property of the spouse for whom they could vest at some time in the future, was not clearly erroneous; however, the wife was not entitled to half of the proceeds from the sale of the options subsequent to the dissolution of the marriage because she was entitled to half of what the trial court determined to be “vested” or “marital” property but only as to that percentage determined to be marital as described by the trial court's order. Pianalto v. Pianalto, 2010 Ark. App. 80, 374 S.W.3d 67 (2010).

Circuit court did not err in its division of husband's stock options because the court found that the wife's interest in the stock awards was a quantifiable, proportional percentage of the deferred payment for the husband's past performance for his employer during the marriage. The court's percentage-based division of the property was appropriate and necessary as the value of the property was not immediately ascertainable at the time of the divorce. Nauman v. Nauman, 2018 Ark. App. 114, 542 S.W.3d 212 (2018).

Stock options were divisible marital property in part even though husband's right to the options was dependent on his continued employment; the husband's estate would receive the awards should he die and he acquired the right to the stock options from his employer when he began employment. The circuit court's 2016 division was upheld, which allocated as marital property 80% of awards exercisable in 2016, 40% of awards exercisable in 2017, and none of the awards exercisable in later years. Nauman v. Nauman, 2018 Ark. App. 114, 542 S.W.3d 212 (2018).

—Trust Property.

The chancellor was correct in refusing to award the wife one-third of the corpus of the trust from which the husband was entitled only to monthly payments. Kroha v. Kroha, 265 Ark. 170, 578 S.W.2d 10 (1979).

The wife was entitled to one-third absolutely of the husband's interest in a trust, since his interest was viewed as being personal property due to its alienability. Gross v. Gross, 266 Ark. 186, 585 S.W.2d 14 (1979).

It was improper for court to deny wife interest in husband's vested rights in a profit-sharing trust agreement. Bachman v. Bachman, 274 Ark. 23, 621 S.W.2d 701 (1981).

—Valuation.

The chancellor's use of a “fair market value” standard for valuing the parties' interest in an ongoing business was not clearly erroneous. Crismon v. Crismon, 72 Ark. App. 116, 34 S.W.3d 763 (2000).

In a divorce action, the trial court erred by valuing the former husband's 50 percent interest in a surgery center based on his buy-sell agreement with another shareholder instead of by determining the fair market value as required by this section; hence, on appeal the court reversed the decree as to the division of the marital estate and remanded the case for a proper valuation of the surgery center followed by redistribution of the marital estate in compliance with this section. Cole v. Cole, 82 Ark. App. 47, 110 S.W.3d 310 (2003).

Trial court did not err by refusing to award a former wife any interest in a limited liability company founded by a former husband and others because the valuation of the husband's interest was merely speculative; the company had no operational history or goodwill. Adametz v. Adametz, 85 Ark. App. 401, 155 S.W.3d 695 (2004).

Trial court erred by deducting overhead expenses from accounts receivable in order to determine the valuation of a surgical practice because it amounted to a double deduction from the same asset; moreover, while the trial court was permitted to impose a tax rate on the receivables, it erred by applying a higher rate than the former husband was required to pay. Adametz v. Adametz, 85 Ark. App. 401, 155 S.W.3d 695 (2004).

In a divorce action, the trial court did not err in awarding the wife half of the value of the husband's construction business because the trial court's valuation of the business was within the range of expert testimony; the trial court did not assign any goodwill to the value it found for the business. Cummings v. Cummings, 104 Ark. App. 315, 292 S.W.3d 819 (2009).

Valuation of the shares of the husband's business, including consideration of the prior owner's goodwill, was not clearly contrary to the preponderance of the evidence in the parties' divorce action; the appellate court defers to the superior position of the circuit judge to determine the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. Russell v. Russell, 2013 Ark. 372, 430 S.W.3d 15 (2013).

Husband failed to preserve any objection to the valuation date, so that issue could not be addressed. Walls v. Walls, 2014 Ark. App. 729, 452 S.W.3d 119 (2014).

—Work in Progress.

“Work in progress” is marital property subject to division in a divorce action. Meeks v. Meeks, 290 Ark. 563, 721 S.W.2d 653 (1986).

Redivision of Property.

Wife's false statement during the course of negotiation concerning marital property that she had spent money her husband had given her for living expenses when in fact she had used it to make an interest-free loan to a third party in return for which she received a promissory note should not have been considered by the trial court as a significant factor in the redivision of the parties' property and doctrine of unclean hands should not have been applied. Estate of Houston v. Houston, 31 Ark. App. 218, 792 S.W.2d 342 (1990).

Chancellor should not have considered the fact that wife's needs had diminished because of her death as a significant factor in redistributing the parties' property. Estate of Houston v. Houston, 31 Ark. App. 218, 792 S.W.2d 342 (1990).

Relationship to Alimony.

Division of marital property and the award of alimony are complementary devices that a circuit judge may employ to make the dissolution of a marriage as equitable as possible. Russell v. Russell, 2013 Ark. 372, 430 S.W.3d 15 (2013).

Under the unique facts of this case, the circuit court did not err in ordering temporary alimony payments as a complementary device to offset the unequal distribution of marital property. The husband’s business was a ready source of income (circuit court awarded entire 33% interest in business to husband and ordered alimony payments of $11,370 per month for 24 months to wife, a sum that on full payment was approximately equal to the value of the wife’s share of the business). Russell v. Russell, 2013 Ark. 372, 430 S.W.3d 15 (2013).

In the parties' divorce action, an award of alimony was not in actuality a “forced buy” of stock because the alimony and division of marital property were not the same thing. Russell v. Russell, 2013 Ark. 372, 430 S.W.3d 15 (2013).

Remarriage.

Chancellor's finding that the parties intended to abrogate the property settlement which they had made in at the time of their first divorce upon their remarriage was not clearly erroneous; thus, all of the property involved in the first property settlement was marital property which was subject to an equal division at the time of their second divorce. McMurtray v. McMurtray, 275 Ark. 303, 629 S.W.2d 285 (1982).

Where parties had been married and divorced twice, it was not error for the chancellor to find that wife was entitled to some benefit by reason of marital funds having been used to pay off debts on two nonmarital farms; however, her interest should be limited to the amounts paid on the farms subsequent to the second marriage because she had been paid for her interest at the time of the first divorce. Bagwell v. Bagwell, 282 Ark. 403, 668 S.W.2d 949 (1984).

Where the parties settled the case after the trial had commenced and advised the chancellor of the terms of their property settlement as well as the terms of their alimony and child support settlement; but no formal agreement was dictated into the record, they did not state that they intended to create an independent contract for alimony, and the chancellor did not treat it as an independent contract, the chancellor could modify the decree ten years later and cease payments as a result of the wife's remarriage. Shipley v. Shipley, 305 Ark. 257, 807 S.W.2d 915 (1991).

Res Judicata.

This section contemplated a division of the husband's property when a decree of divorce was granted and that, if the wife failed to ask for and obtain the relief when the decree was granted, the matter became res judicata. Taylor v. Taylor, 153 Ark. 206, 240 S.W. 6 (1922).

Where husband and wife both sued for divorce and the wife asked for a division of the property the court should have heard the evidence and decided the question of property rights, but having failed to do so Supreme Court would affirm decree for the wife without prejudice to her right to maintain a suit for any interest she may have in property. Parrish v. Parrish, 195 Ark. 766, 114 S.W.2d 29 (1938).

Divorce decree was not res judicata of suit for possession of personal property. Swanson v. Johnson, 212 Ark. 340, 212 Ark. 349, 205 S.W.2d 702 (1947).

Denial of former wife's motion for a portion of her former husband's military retirement was proper because the parties had been divorced and their property had been divided in a final manner; thus, res judicata was applicable because the division of military retirement could have been litigated at the divorce hearing. Foster v. Foster, 96 Ark. App. 109, 239 S.W.3d 1 (2006).

Return of Nonmarital Property.

If there is any deviation from returning nonmarital property to the original owner the reasons given by the trier of fact must be sufficiently specific. Canady v. Canady, 285 Ark. 378, 687 S.W.2d 833 (1985).

Wife owned the windows that were installed in the husband's home, and it was not practical to return them to her, nor did she request such; the circuit court ordered the husband to pay the wife a certain amount, which represented the amount she spent from her personal funds for the windows placed in his house, and this division complied with the requirements of this section. Fields v. Fields, 2015 Ark. App. 143, 457 S.W.3d 301 (2015).

Sale of Lands.

Where divorce is granted to wife and if it is necessary that real estate in which she was granted a life estate be sold, the value of the life estate should be ascertained and that amount turned over to the wife from the proceeds of the sale; it is improper to turn one-third of the proceeds over to the wife. Allen v. Allen, 126 Ark. 164, 189 S.W. 841 (1916).

Where husband had title to certain lands in fee and he and his wife had only a life estate in other lands and lands were not susceptible of division in kind, it was proper to order the lands sold but it was error to direct the sale of the lands in solido. Dowell v. Dowell, 207 Ark. 578, 182 S.W.2d 344 (1944).

In a divorce settlement of property rights the trial court is not bound to order immediate sale of land purchased by the husband during coverture, so that it was not abuse of discretion where the court awarded exclusive possession of the land to the wife for three years subject to taxes and retained jurisdiction to effect sale of the property, division of proceeds and enforcement of property rights and alimony award. Jarrett v. Jarrett, 226 Ark. 933, 295 S.W.2d 323 (1956).

Tract of land which was purchased after 1947 but which formed only connection between tract of land purchased prior to 1947 and highway, would not be ordered sold by court, since both parcels should be handled together and land purchased prior to 1947 could not be sold. Brimson v. Brimson, 227 Ark. 1045, 304 S.W.2d 935 (1957).

Separate Property.

Husband provided clear and convincing evidence that the checking account funds remained his separate property despite the account existing in both names. McKay v. McKay, 340 Ark. 171, 8 S.W.3d 525 (2000).

A home owned by the husband prior to the parties' marriage was his separate property where both parties owned homes prior to their marriage. Dial v. Dial, 74 Ark. App. 30, 44 S.W.3d 768 (2001).

In a dissolution of marriage case, the court properly awarded the interest in a condominium to the husband where: (1) the condominium was acquired by the sole contribution of the husband, (2) he was the only party at risk on the purchase of the condominium, (3) he did not use undisclosed marital funds to purchase the condominium, (4) he did not take title to it until after the divorce was final, and (5) he intended to use the condominium as his post-marital residence. Page v. Anderson, 85 Ark. App. 538, 157 S.W.3d 575 (2004).

In a divorce action, the trial court did not err under subdivision (a)(2) of this section in not awarding the husband an interest in properties that the wife owned prior to their marriage because the decree awarded the husband full ownership in an entity that was titled in both parties' names, and awarded him full ownership of an investment account that he created with pre-divorce income. Ransom v. Ransom, 2009 Ark. App. 273, 309 S.W.3d 204 (2009).

Circuit court did not err in awarding the wife $20,000 for a down payment on a home where the money was the wife's separate property from her inheritance, and there was no difficulty in tracing the use of that nonmarital money to help with the down payment on the marital home. Karolchyk v. Karolchyk, 2018 Ark. App. 555, 565 S.W.3d 531 (2018).

Social Security Benefits.

State courts are without power to take any action to enforce a private agreement dividing future payments of Social Security benefits; such an agreement violates the federal statutory prohibition, 42 U.S.C. § 407(a), against transfer or assignment of future benefits. Gentry v. Gentry, 327 Ark. 266, 938 S.W.2d 231 (1997).

Standard of Review.

Overall distribution of the parties' property in the divorce proceeding was not clearly erroneous, because the wife erroneously included the children's money and the 2008 tax overpayment in her list of assets purportedly awarded to the husband, the wife did not account for the businesses' liabilities, and the testimony and exhibits introduced by the husband more than adequately demonstrated that the court equally distributed the marital estate. Dew v. Dew, 2012 Ark. App. 122, 390 S.W.3d 764 (2012).

While the ex-husband claimed that the circuit court should have considered his ability to pay any amount due before directing the payment thereof, he cited to no authority for his proposition, which was sufficient reason not to address his ability-to-pay claim. Kelly v. Kelly, 2014 Ark. 543, 453 S.W.3d 655 (2014).

Issue of attorney's fees had to be viewed in light of the alimony and property distribution issues in order to determine whether the circuit court achieved a fair and equitable result; the ex-wife received permanent alimony and an equal share of the substantial marital property, and it was equitable and within the circuit court's broad discretion to order each party to pay for their own attorney's fees. Webb v. Webb, 2014 Ark. App. 697, 450 S.W.3d 265 (2014).

Tax Consequences.

The tax consequences which subsequently evolve from a property division should not be permitted to operate inequitably, and where there were doubts as to fairness of imposition on husband of tax liability on sales of property, court should retain jurisdiction until tax results could be ascertained. Bagwell v. Bagwell, 282 Ark. 403, 668 S.W.2d 949 (1984).

Where there was no demonstrable federal income tax consequence resulting from the division of the property, the decree did not require a sale, and there was no evidence that a sale was imminent, the Chancellor erred in subtracting from the value of a business asset the amount of federal tax that would have to be paid in the event the asset were sold. Grace v. Grace, 326 Ark. 312, 930 S.W.2d 362 (1996).

Circuit court should have considered the federal income-tax consequences of the court's division of property, and by calling the payments to the wife alimony, the circuit court potentially saddled her with additional tax liabilities; equitable distribution is merely a division of the marital property of each spouse and does not constitute income to either party, and the matter was remanded for the trial court to comply with this section's requirements. Farrell v. Farrell, 2014 Ark. App. 601 (2014).

Timing.

A portion of a divorce decree which permitted a husband to delay payment of his wife's share of property until the sale of the home following their minor child's attaining majority or graduation from high school was not consistent with the requirement of this section that property be distributed at the time the decree is entered; therefore, the decree was modified to require the husband to pay the wife's share within a reasonable period of time. Russell v. Russell, 275 Ark. 193, 628 S.W.2d 315 (1982).

Where the parties in a divorce action specifically agreed that no property division was to be made at the time the limited divorce decree was entered, the trial court did not err in not ordering a property division at the time he granted the limited divorce, despite the language of this section to the effect that all marital property is to be distributed at the time the divorce decree is entered. Forrest v. Forrest, 279 Ark. 115, 649 S.W.2d 173 (1983).

It was not an abuse of the chancellor's discretion to ascertain the extent of marital property and evaluate it as of the date of the divorce. Askins v. Askins, 288 Ark. 333, 704 S.W.2d 632 (1986).

To the extent the Chancellor may have divided marital property as of the date the first divorce complaint was denied, it was error to do so; the marital property should have been divided and distributed at the time the divorce decree was entered as provided in subsection (a) of this section. Hadden v. Hadden, 320 Ark. 480, 897 S.W.2d 568 (1995).

The chancellor acted correctly in using the date of divorce, rather than the date of a remand hearing, as the date on which to value marital property. Skokos v. Skokos, 344 Ark. 420, 40 S.W.3d 768 (2001).

Husband's failure to object to the trial court's use of a later valuation date for the parties' assets, contrary to this section, at either his divorce hearing or a later contempt hearing, precluded appellate review of his objection. Roberts v. Yang, 2010 Ark. 55, 370 S.W.3d 170 (2010).

When a husband raised the issue of valuation of a joint account in a motion for a new trial, the trial court correctly ordered the account be divided as of the date of the divorce, pursuant to subdivision (a)(1)(A) of this section, and the date of the entry of the divorce decree be used for valuation of the account. Barnes v. Barnes, 2010 Ark. App. 822, 378 S.W.3d 766 (2010).

Circuit court did not err in failing to divide the marital property when a divorce was granted where the husband and wife had agreed to delay the disposition of their property, the court was not at liberty to overrule Forest v. Forest, 279 Ark. 115, 649 S.W.2d 173 (1983), and alleged error had been invited by both parties. Wyatt v. Wyatt, 2018 Ark. App. 177, 545 S.W.3d 796 (2018).

Circuit court did not err in valuing the property as of the parties' separation date given that the husband's unilateral actions of disposing of property were done specifically with the wife's detriment in mind. Wyatt v. Wyatt, 2018 Ark. App. 177, 545 S.W.3d 796 (2018).

Tort Action.

A spouse involved in a divorce, having a cause of action in tort against his or her spouse, is not required to bring that action in the divorce case and can pursue the claim in circuit court. Cater v. Cater, 311 Ark. 627, 846 S.W.2d 173 (1993).

Undue Influence.

Record contained testimony that the ex-husband commanded a dominating influence over the ex-wife and that he badgered, threatened, and belittled her to accede to his demand for an interest in the ex-wife's property at a time when she was in a weakened condition, both physically and emotionally, due to the illness of her father and the death of her son; the trial court's findings of undue influence were not clearly erroneous and the court affirmed the setting aside of the deed, and the court noted that a review of case law did not reveal any time restraints for seeking to set aside a transaction that was not freely made. Young v. Young, 101 Ark. App. 454, 278 S.W.3d 603 (2008).

Unequal Division.

Trial judge did not abuse its discretion in denying the husband's request for an unequal division of the marital property in his favor and instead, distributing the marital property unevenly in the wife's favor because this section did not compel mathematical precision in the distribution of property; this section simply required that marital property be distributed equitably and the trial judge could consider whether the parties to the divorce needed to use marital funds to meet necessary expenses incurred during the pendency of the action, and whether the amount used was reasonable, whether fraud or overreaching occurred, and whether an offset was appropriate. Williams v. Williams, 82 Ark. App. 294, 108 S.W.3d 629 (2003).

Circuit court did not err in unequally dividing the stock proceeds where the order showed that both the length of the marriage and the contribution of the parties to the acquisition of the stock proceeds formed the basis for its decision to divide the property unequally; the lower court was not required to list all the factors and was entitled to weigh the factors differently in reaching its decision. Hernandez v. Hernandez, 371 Ark. 323, 265 S.W.3d 746 (2007).

Trial court properly considered the factors in this section when it declined to award a former wife an unequal division of marital property because the wife had deposited her large personal injury settlement into a joint account, and she used the proceeds to make purchases of property titled in both parties' names. Moreover, equity did not compel a different result since the wife used the proceeds to purchase non-essential items, despite knowing that she was uninsurable and that she had suffered business losses over the past three years. Singleton v. Singleton, 99 Ark. App. 371, 260 S.W.3d 756 (2007).

Circuit court, in reaching a determination as to the equitable division of marital property under subdivision (a)(1)(A) of this section, was free to consider the husband's interest in the limited partnership, and his opportunity to double the size of his estate upon the death of his mother, and the limitation on the husband's interest in the partnership, in the form of the usufruct, was of no relevance, as the opportunity to add to his estate was a proper consideration. Brown v. Brown, 373 Ark. 333, 284 S.W.3d 17 (2008), overruled in part, Moore v. Moore, 2016 Ark. 105, 486 S.W.3d 766 (2016).

Trial court considered the factors in subdivision (a)(1)(A) of this section in making an unequal distribution of marital assets, and while the ex-husband was correct that simply reciting the statutory factors did not satisfy the requirement of the statute, the trial court covered this issue in detail in its oral ruling from the bench, and this met the requirements of the statute. Young v. Young, 101 Ark. App. 454, 278 S.W.3d 603 (2008).

Trial court did not err by considering the husband's actions in making an unequal division of marital property, because the trial court considered the wife's diminished state of health after the husband shot her and found that the husband's violent attack left the wife without the ability to earn a living, and the husband dissipated marital assets by twice setting fire to the marital home and by transferring items of marital property, namely the tractor and vehicle, to the parties' son. Frost v. Frost, 2009 Ark. App. 290, 307 S.W.3d 41 (2009).

Evidence of record showed that the husband's ability to pay far exceeded that of the wife; therefore, the trial court's allocation of marital debt was not clearly erroneous and its assignment of tax liability was not arbitrary or groundless. Rudder v. Hurst, 2009 Ark. App. 577, 337 S.W.3d 565 (2009).

Circuit court had to make additional findings regarding whether it considered a four-wheeler marital or nonmarital property under this section, and had to recite its basis and reasons for the unequal division of property in its order, under subdivision (a)(1)(B) of this section; the circuit court did not state why it considered the four-wheeler nonmarital or why it did not divide the stimulus check equally between the parties. Whitehead v. Whitehead, 2009 Ark. App. 593 (2009).

Upon disposing of the parties' real property in a marital dissolution proceeding, the trial court did not err by awarding the husband no financial benefit from the residence. It was the wife's separate property, and she testified that she paid 99.9% of the bills. Rasberry v. Rasberry, 2009 Ark. App. 594, 331 S.W.3d 231 (2009).

Trial court did not clearly err under this section by making an unequal division and allowing a wife to keep all of her retirement benefits in the parties' divorce action, as such was an equitable distribution because during their 10-year marriage, the husband had purposely worked below his full earning capacity and remained purposely, chronically underemployed. Grantham v. Lucas, 2011 Ark. App. 491, 385 S.W.3d 337 (2011).

In a divorce proceeding, the trial court erred under subdivision (a)(1)(A) of this section in failing to award the husband any portion of the value of the wife's gift-store inventory; while the court attempted to make as close to a 50/50 distribution of the entire marital estate as possible, the distribution of business assets was uneven, depriving the husband of $9,000. Bamburg v. Bamburg, 2011 Ark. App. 546, 386 S.W.3d 31 (2011).

Division of property was proper, because the court considered all of the relevant statutory factors under this section, and made specific findings concerning its reason for the unequal division of property; the husband acknowledged that the court was correct to consider the contributions of each party in deciding how to divide property. Waggoner v. Waggoner, 2012 Ark. App. 286, 423 S.W.3d 117 (2012).

Inequitable division of the property was permitted under this section, given evidence of the husband's arrests, dissipation of assets, and assault of the wife causing her to lose income. Freeman v. Freeman, 2013 Ark. App. 693, 430 S.W.3d 824 (2013).

There was evidence and argument on all factors to be considered in an unequal division, and the trial court discussed most of those factors in its divorce decree; the unequal division of real property gave the wife, who was within two years of retirement, a house to reside in and a means of generating income from rental property, and the trial court did not clearly err in the findings that supported awarding the wife three of the four houses. Colquitt v. Colquitt, 2013 Ark. App. 733, 431 S.W.3d 316 (2013).

Circuit court may order an unequal distribution of marital property if the court finds an equal division to be inequitable; in such cases, the court shall recite its basis and reasons for not dividing the marital property equally. Colquitt v. Colquitt, 2013 Ark. App. 733, 431 S.W.3d 316 (2013).

Ex-wife, as the prevailing party on the issue of certain stock, was not required to assert alternatively to the circuit court or the court on appeal that were the stock marital, an unequal distribution should be made, and she was not barred by the law of the case doctrine from seeking an unequal distribution after the holding in the case on the first time on appeal that the stock was marital property. Kelly v. Kelly, 2014 Ark. 543, 453 S.W.3d 655 (2014).

—In General.

Where chancellor's order said alimony award was not a distribution of marital property or given in lieu of such a distribution, but it then referred to the discrepancy in income which would result from the difference in profit potential between two properties, reversal of the award gave the chancellor appropriate flexibility in reconsidering the distribution of marital property, if he chose to do so, rather than readopt the unequal distribution with an explanation as this section requires. Harvey v. Harvey, 295 Ark. 102, 747 S.W.2d 89 (1988).

Where the chancellor awarded wife a share of various retirement benefits of husband, but stated that if she predeceased husband her share was to revert back to the husband, in effect, she was given only a life estate in the benefits, but there was no error in awarding such a life estate as part of an unequal distribution. Franklin v. Franklin, 25 Ark. App. 287, 758 S.W.2d 7 (1988).

Default judgment was set aside under Ark. R. Civ. P. 55(c)(3) where a former husband deceived his former wife into thinking a compromise had been reached and procured her non-attendance and failure to answer a complaint; the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic fraud had been abolished. Moreover, her assertion that she received nothing in a property distribution was sufficient to raise a meritorious defense due to the presumptions under subdivision (a)(1)(A) and subsection (b) of this section. West v. West, 103 Ark. App. 269, 288 S.W.3d 680 (2008).

Circuit court erred in ordering an unequal division of the parties' marital property because it did not consider the statutory factors; the court’s written order, which controlled over its oral pronouncements from the bench, found the property to be marital property. Tipton v. Tipton, 2017 Ark. App. 601 (2017).

—Factors Considered.

The specific enumeration of certain factors for the chancellor to consider in distributing the marital property other than equally should not prevent consideration of the fact that one spouse has been convicted of conspiring to kill the other. Stover v. Stover, 287 Ark. 116, 696 S.W.2d 750 (1985).

Support of an adult, college student child does not fall directly within any of the nine items listed in this section to be considered in reaching an unequal distribution of a marital asset. Hadden v. Hadden, 320 Ark. 480, 897 S.W.2d 568 (1995).

In a divorce case, the trial court did not err in the division of the couple's property; the wife was awarded the entire value of her retirement account and one-half of her husband's business interests due to her husband's superior earning ability. Delacey v. Delacey, 85 Ark. App. 419, 155 S.W.3d 701 (2004).

Division of property and debt after a divorce was affirmed because the circuit court complied with this section when it discussed the factors that went into its decision to make an unequal division of the marital property; by awarding the wife 58% of the retirement and bank accounts instead of a specific sum, the circuit court was taking into consideration any fluctuations in the market. Horton v. Horton, 2011 Ark. App. 361, 384 S.W.3d 61 (2011).

That the circuit court on remand found it appropriate to award stock to the ex-wife as an unequal distribution following the previous unequal award in the ex-husband's favor failed to show that a mistake was made, nor did he demonstrate error by showing that the circuit court's decision was arbitrary or groundless. Kelly v. Kelly, 2014 Ark. 543, 453 S.W.3d 655 (2014).

While the ex-wife sought an unequal distribution of marital assets, the circuit court found that an unequal division was not appropriate under this section, and the decisions regarding alimony and property division were to be reviewed together because ultimately the circuit court is to make a just allocation to achieve an equitable distribution; the distribution was not clear error, as the ex-wife was not responsible for certain debts, she had a place to live rent-free, and the ex-husband acknowledged withdrawing funds but did so to pay off marital debt, a plan with which the ex-wife was in agreement at the time. Webb v. Webb, 2014 Ark. App. 697, 450 S.W.3d 265 (2014).

Trial court did not clearly err in awarding the wife all of a wealth management account that she jointly owned with her now-deceased mother where it did not base the division solely on the fact that the wife was the sole contributor, but considered many of the subdivision (a)(1)(A) factors and explained why they supported awarding the wife full interest in the account. Sanders v. Passmore, 2016 Ark. App. 370, 499 S.W.3d 237 (2016).

—Motor Vehicles.

There was no error in the chancellor's decision awarding to wife a vehicle that was debt-free, while awarding to husband a vehicle with indebtedness; this section does not compel mathematical precision in property distribution, only that marital property be distributed equitably. Creson v. Creson, 53 Ark. App. 41, 917 S.W.2d 553 (1996).

In a property division case, a husband unsuccessfully argued that the circuit court erred in its division of the marital vehicles because the Mercedes was worth $22,000 while the two trucks had a combined value of $13,000. The circuit court gave the wife the vehicle that she drove, and it awarded the husband the two trucks that he used in the heating-and-air business. Jones v. Jones, 2014 Ark. 96, 432 S.W.3d 36 (2014).

—Reversed.

A division of marital property was improper and would be reversed where the chancellor intended to divide the property 60/40, but the actual division was much more unequal because he failed to reduce the worth of a business awarded to the husband by a substantial debt owed to a bank and because he arbitrarily added a 50 percent enhancement to the value of the business. Hoover v. Hoover, 70 Ark. App. 215, 16 S.W.3d 560 (2000).

—Statement of Reasons.

Appellate court would not review the alleged trial court error in the division of the marital property until the trial court complied with the requirement to state the basis and reasons for not dividing the property equally. Davis v. Davis, 270 Ark. 180, 603 S.W.2d 900 (Ct. App. 1980).

Where an equal division of property was made, there was no necessity for the chancellor to state his reasons for not so dividing the property. Ausburn v. Ausburn, 271 Ark. 330, 609 S.W.2d 14 (1980).

Where the trial court failed to provide any reasons in its order dividing the marital property that indicated the bases for awarding the former wife's one-fourth marital property interest in a partnership to her former husband, and there was nothing in the record which showed that the former wife received anything in return for the partnership interest taken from her by the court, the former wife's one-fourth interest in the partnership would be reinstated. Glover v. Glover, 4 Ark. App. 27, 627 S.W.2d 30 (1982).

Any exception to the rule of equal distribution will always depend upon the specific facts as reflected by the trial court's findings and conclusions. Gentry v. Gentry, 282 Ark. 413, 668 S.W.2d 947 (1984); Cavin v. Cavin, 308 Ark. 109, 823 S.W.2d 843 (1992).

If the chancellor had specific reasons for not equally dividing the parties' marital savings, he failed to state those reasons in compliance with this section. Duncan v. Duncan, 11 Ark. App. 25, 665 S.W.2d 893 (1984).

The trial court sufficiently stated its reasons for an unequal distribution of the parties' premarital and marital property pursuant to the issuance of a divorce decree. Pennybaker v. Pennybaker, 14 Ark. App. 251, 687 S.W.2d 524 (1985).

Where appellant maintained that there was an unequal division of marital property and that the court failed to state the basis for the unequal division, the burden was upon the appellant to bring up a record sufficient to demonstrate that the trial court was in error. Young v. Young, 288 Ark. 33, 701 S.W.2d 369 (1986).

Where the trial court failed to award wife her interest in two notes which husband owned or in which he had an ownership interest, and wife clearly had a right to her marital interest in those notes, the trial court should have given its basis and reasons for not having awarded her one-half interest pursuant to subdivision (a)(1) of this section; therefore, the trial court's action was reversed. Allen v. Allen, 17 Ark. App. 38, 702 S.W.2d 819 (1986).

Where chancellor stated that he found an unequal division to be “appropriate” rather than “equitable,” the appellate court could find no such significance in his choice of words and could not say that the chancellor's findings that the circumstances warranted an unequal division of property were clearly erroneous. Franklin v. Franklin, 25 Ark. App. 287, 758 S.W.2d 7 (1988).

Where the trial court allowed wife to keep investment accounts as the wife's sole and separate property because they were from her sole earnings, while some evidence may have supported an unequal division of marital property, the trial judge failed to state reasons in the written order supporting the unequal division; the written order listed the factors to be considered such as length of marriage and the age and health of the parties, however, the order failed to include findings explaining why such factors supported an unequal division of marital property and reversal and remand was required. Baxley v. Baxley, 86 Ark. App. 200, 167 S.W.3d 158 (2004).

It was necessary to remand a divorce case because the trial court failed to comply with subdivision (a)(1)(B) of this section by giving a comprehensive explanation of why it divided the parties' marital property unequally; the trial court did not address the wife's claim that the husband took marital funds for his personal use and that she should be compensated for her share. Watkins v. Watkins, 2012 Ark. App. 27, 388 S.W.3d 53 (2012).

In a marital dissolution action, the court erred under subdivision (a)(1)(B) of this section in not dividing the marital equity in a certificate of deposit held in the husband's name; the court did not recite any reasons in its decree as to why its decision was equitable. Wadley v. Wadley, 2012 Ark. App. 208, 395 S.W.3d 411 (2012).

Trial court did explain its division in the letter opinion, but the trial court did not incorporate that opinion in the decree, and thus the court had to remand this issue for the trial court to satisfy subdivision (a)(1)(B) of this section. Farrell v. Farrell, 2013 Ark. App. 23, 425 S.W.3d 824 (2013).

Circuit court specifically stated that the ex-wife was entitled to an award of all of certain stock as an unequal distribution and that this award was equitable and warranted, and this explanation was not insufficient or inadequate, as the circuit court was not required to list each factor in its order; this section requires the circuit court to explain its reasons for not dividing the marital property equally, and the circuit court did just that. Kelly v. Kelly, 2014 Ark. 543, 453 S.W.3d 655 (2014).

There was uncertainty as to whether the circuit court's order requiring the husband to pay the wife $13,000 per month was a payment for her share of marital property or was a payment of alimony to equalize an unequal distribution of the marital estate, and the circuit court was to clarify on remand; the circumstances left the husband with approximately 90 percent of the marital estate and the wife with approximately 10 percent, and such an unequal division required an explanation. Farrell v. Farrell, 2014 Ark. App. 601 (2014).

While the trial court set forth in detail its reasoning for making the distribution in its letter opinion, the letter opinion was not incorporated into the divorce decree, and the decree did not repeat the trial court's detailed findings for the division of the marital property that had been stated in the trial court's letter opinion; therefore, the case was remanded. Brown v. Brown, 2016 Ark. App. 172 (2016).

In a divorce case, the circuit court's order distributing the parties' marital property was entered in error because it failed to consider or recite any of the factors in subdivision (a)(1)(A) of this section when it did not equally divide the ex-husband's military retirement as such benefits were marital property; the circuit court's distribution of the ex-wife's 401(k) account was unclear as the decree first stated that the parties would split the account equally, but then stated that all 401(k) accounts would be the parties' separate property; and, although the decree stated that the parties would each be responsible for debts in their individual names, no findings were made concerning joint debt, and the circuit court did not distribute the joint debt. Hayden v. Hayden, 2020 Ark. App. 152, 594 S.W.3d 912 (2020).

—Tax Consequences.

The court rejected the husband's argument that the chancellor found the marital property to be unequally divided but failed to take tax consequences into account; although the chancellor declined to require the wife to share in the tax consequences, neither the court's findings nor its order reflected that the chancellor failed to consider such tax consequences; rather, they reflected only that he decided that the wife did not have to share in them. Skokos v. Skokos, 344 Ark. 420, 40 S.W.3d 768 (2001).

—Upheld.

Where the trial judge, in a divorce action, based the unequal property distribution upon the fact that the husband was blind and unemployable, while the wife was employable and had always worked outside the home, and the judge further found that the wife had not contributed to the home expenses or payments and had not used her money for the family's benefit, the evidence supported unequal division of property. Forsgren v. Forsgren, 4 Ark. App. 286, 630 S.W.2d 64 (1982); Cantrell v. Cantrell, 10 Ark. App. 357, 664 S.W.2d 493 (1984).

The wife was properly awarded more than half of the marital estate where (1) the parties were married for 17 years, (2) the husband earned significantly more money than did the wife, and (3) the husband was vested one-third beneficiary of an undistributed trust worth $250,000, and was the sole heir to his mother's one-million-dollar estate. Atkinson v. Atkinson, 72 Ark. App. 15, 32 S.W.3d 41 (2000).

Circuit court's unequal distribution of property was affirmed where the circuit court considered the amount of money from marital assets the husband had spent on a girlfriend, in addition to the great disparity in the parties' incomes, the wife's reliance on food stamps, the parties' levels of education, and their respective roles in the marriage. Nelson v. Nelson, 2016 Ark. App. 416, 501 S.W.3d 875 (2016).

In dividing marital property, the circuit court adequately weighed the factors listed in this section where it explained its reasoning for the unequal division, noted the court's ability to award alimony but that the husband's ability to pay was unclear, and rather than awarding alimony, found that the wife's need was met by an unequal distribution of the marital assets and debts in order to balance the equities between the parties. Doss v. Doss, 2018 Ark. App. 487, 561 S.W.3d 348 (2018).

Unequal division of marital property on remand did not violate the appellate court's mandate as the appellate court's opinion invited a division and nothing in the opinion barred an unequal distribution if the lower court made the requisite statutory findings; and, under the circumstances of the case, the lower court did not clearly err in distributing the marital property unequally on remand, as the wife was disabled while the value of the husband's nonmarital property increased greatly and consideration of the husband's postdivorce income increase was statutorily allowed. Moore v. Moore, 2019 Ark. 216, 576 S.W.3d 15 (2019).

Trial court's unequal distribution of the parties' marital property was not clearly erroneous because the court considered the four-year duration of the marriage and the contributions of each party, the court stated that it could not determine whether the improvements to the marital residence and lot caused a corresponding increase in the value of the property of the same amount, and the court considered the fact that the wife earned 75% of the parties' combined income and used that percentage in dividing the bank accounts. Pratt v. Pratt, 2019 Ark. App. 264, 576 S.W.3d 511 (2019).

It was not clear error for the circuit court to make an unequal distribution by awarding the wife $167,236 out of the husband's share of his 401k, this representing one-half of the parties' marital interest in a partnership. It was not clear error to find that there was some portion of the partnership that was marital, nor was it error to consider that marital portion when making an unequal distribution by awarding the husband all the marital interest in the partnership and awarding the wife a portion of the husband's 401k, as the circuit court considered the statutory factors in writing. Perry v. Perry, 2020 Ark. App. 63, 594 S.W.3d 126 (2020).

Waiver.

Wife waived any rights she may have had in retirement fund by failing either to assert those rights in divorce action or to appeal from court's failure to effect the statutorily mandated property division in the divorce decree. Mitchell v. Meisch, 22 Ark. App. 264, 739 S.W.2d 170 (1987); Jones v. Jones, 26 Ark. App. 1, 759 S.W.2d 42 (1988).

Husband's claim that a business was not subject to division by the trial court was moot because the husband waived the claim by voluntary payment of the judgment prior to his appeal; the husband's payment to the wife of the entire amount was voluntary and constituted a waiver of the issue on appeal because he did not file a supersedeas bond or make an attempt to stay the judgment until an appeal could be made. Beck v. Beck, 2017 Ark. App. 311, 521 S.W.3d 543 (2017).

Cited: Biddle v. Biddle, 206 Ark. 623, 177 S.W.2d 32 (1944); Alexander v. Alexander, 227 Ark. 938, 302 S.W.2d 781 (1957); Brimson v. Brimson, 227 Ark. 1045, 304 S.W.2d 935 (1957); White v. White, 228 Ark. 732, 310 S.W.2d 216 (1958); Horn v. Horn, 232 Ark. 723, 339 S.W.2d 852 (1960); Wood v. Wright, 238 Ark. 941, 386 S.W.2d 248 (1965); Ashley v. Eisele, 247 Ark. 281, 445 S.W.2d 76 (1969); Walker v. Walker, 248 Ark. 93, 450 S.W.2d 1 (1970); Law v. Law, 248 Ark. 894, 455 S.W.2d 854 (1970); McNew v. McNew, 262 Ark. 567, 559 S.W.2d 155 (1977); Milne v. Milne, 266 Ark. 900, 587 S.W.2d 229 (Ct. App. 1979); Pendergist v. Pendergist, 267 Ark. 1114, 593 S.W.2d 502 (1980); Godwin v. Godwin, 268 Ark. 364, 596 S.W.2d 695 (1980); Barron v. Barron, 1 Ark. App. 323, 615 S.W.2d 394 (1981); Pinkston v. Pinkston, 278 Ark. 233, 644 S.W.2d 930 (1983); Mitchell v. Mitchell, 278 Ark. 619, 648 S.W.2d 51 (1983); Wagh v. Wagh, 7 Ark. App. 122, 644 S.W.2d 630 (1983); Coleman v. Coleman, 7 Ark. App. 280, 648 S.W.2d 75 (1983); Callaway v. Callaway, 8 Ark. App. 129, 648 S.W.2d 520 (1983); Boyle v. Donovan, 724 F.2d 681 (8th Cir. 1984); Bennett v. McGough, 281 Ark. 414, 664 S.W.2d 476 (1984); Carrick v. Carrick, 13 Ark. App. 42, 679 S.W.2d 800 (1984); Woods v. Woods, 285 Ark. 175, 686 S.W.2d 387 (1985); Farris v. Farris, 287 Ark. 479, 700 S.W.2d 371 (1985); Glover v. Glover, 15 Ark. App. 79, 689 S.W.2d 592 (1985); Potter v. Easley, 288 Ark. 133, 703 S.W.2d 442 (1986); Harvey v. Harvey, 298 Ark. 308, 766 S.W.2d 935 (1989); Layman v. Layman, 300 Ark. 583, 780 S.W.2d 560 (1989); Crowder v. Crowder, 303 Ark. 562, 798 S.W.2d 425 (1990); Nowell v. Nowell, 31 Ark. App. 78, 787 S.W.2d 698 (1990); Bolan v. Bolan, 32 Ark. App. 65, 796 S.W.2d 358 (1990); Mulling v. Mulling, 323 Ark. 88, 912 S.W.2d 934 (1996); Grider v. Grider, 62 Ark. App. 99, 968 S.W.2d 653 (1998); Dunavant v. Dunavant, 66 Ark. App. 1, 986 S.W.2d 880 (1999); Cooper v. Cooper, 2013 Ark. App. 748, 431 S.W.3d 349 (2013).