Arkansas Code Annotated

Ark. Code Ann. § 9-15-101 (2026)

Purpose

✓ current as of May 2026
Find cases: SyfertCases citing this section JustiaArk. Code CornellLII Search CasesGoogle Scholar

The purpose of this chapter is to provide an adequate mechanism whereby the State of Arkansas can protect the general health, welfare, and safety of its citizens by intervening when abuse of a member of a household by another member of a household occurs or is threatened to occur, thus preventing further violence. The General Assembly has assessed domestic abuse in Arkansas and believes that the relief contemplated under this chapter is injunctive and therefore equitable in nature. The General Assembly hereby finds that this chapter is necessary to secure important governmental interests in the protection of victims of abuse and the prevention of further abuse through the removal of offenders from the household and other injunctive relief for which there is no adequate remedy in current law. The General Assembly hereby finds that this chapter shall meet a compelling societal need and is necessary to correct the acute and pervasive problem of violence and abuse within households in this state. The equitable nature of this remedy requires the legislature to place proceedings contemplated by this chapter under the jurisdiction of the circuit courts.

History. Acts 1991, No. 266, § 1.

Case Notes

Applicability.

Circuit court did not misapply the state's Domestic Abuse Act by dismissing wife's petition for an order of protection because a mutual restraining order had been entered in the parties' divorce case. Davis v. Davis, 360 Ark. 233, 200 S.W.3d 886 (2005).

Pursuant to the Arkansas Domestic Abuse Act, a court erred in granting a mother's petition for an order of protection against appellant where the only allegations that were proven were that appellant had continued to see the mother's 16-year-old daughter after the mother prohibited contact between them and that appellant had purchased the morning-after pill for the daughter; the mere fact that the parents did not like appellant was not a proper ground upon which to issue an order of protection in the absence of evidence of actual physical harm or the fear of imminent physical harm. Claver v. Wilbur, 102 Ark. App. 53, 280 S.W.3d 570 (2008).

Arkansas Domestic Abuse Act's purpose does not in any way indicate that it should be utilized only when there are no other adequate remedies or that the parties must reside together. Therefore, a case where the parties had dated for eight months, but never lived together, came within the purview of the Act, and the fact that there were other remedies available did not preclude seeking a protective order under the Act. Steele v. Lyon, 2015 Ark. App. 251, 460 S.W.3d 827 (2015).

Issuance.

Decision to enter a two-year order of protection under the Arkansas Domestic Abuse Act was not clearly erroneous based on acts causing the fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury, or assault. A former girlfriend sent 46 text messages, struck her former boyfriend, and followed him around during an event. Steele v. Lyon, 2015 Ark. App. 251, 460 S.W.3d 827 (2015).

Jurisdiction.

Argument that the statute relating to modification of orders of protection, § 9-15-209, had to be strictly complied with in order for the trial court to have jurisdiction was rejected because the trial court clearly had jurisdiction to enter the order pursuant to this section. The case did not present a question of jurisdiction where the modification of the order was challenged. Calaway v. Crotty, 2013 Ark. App. 637 (2013).

Cited: Lowry v. State, 90 Ark. App. 333, 205 S.W.3d 830 (2005); Calaway v. Crotty, 2014 Ark. App. 636, 448 S.W.3d 723 (2014); Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lovelace, 2020 Ark. 93, 594 S.W.3d 84 (2020).

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 27 cases (7 in the last 5 years), 1990–2026 · leading case: Simmons v. Dixon, 240 S.W.3d 608 (Ark. Ct. App. 2006).
Simmons v. Dixon, 240 S.W.3d 608 (Ark. Ct. App. 2006). · cites it 14× “" Ark.Code Ann. § 9-15-101 (Repl.2002). *611 The Act defines domestic abuse as "[p]hysical harm, bodily injury, assault, or the infliction of fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury, or assault between family or household members[.”
Steele v. Lyon, 460 S.W.3d 827 (Ark. Ct. App. 2015). · cites it 3× “Ark. Code Ann. § 9-15-101 . Steele contends that Lyon used an adequate remedy by calling the police on June 2, 2013 — the day of the incident.”
Bates v. Bates, 793 S.W.2d 788 (Ark. 1990). · cites it 4× “In the petition she sought an order to restrain appellee from committing future acts of domestic abuse and from entering their residence or her place of work, and to require him to pay child and housemate support. (Housemate support, not alimony or maintenance, because, pursuant…”
Brawner v. State, 428 S.W.3d 600 (Ark. Ct. App. 2013). · cites it 3× “2005) provides: (а)(1) A person commits the offense of a violation of an order of protection if: (A) A circuit court or other court with competent jurisdiction has issued a temporary order of protection or an order of protection against the person pursuant to the Domestic Abuse…”
Kevin R. Adams v. State of Arkansas, 2020 Ark. App. 107 (Ark. Ct. App. 2020). · cites it 3× “Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-53-134 provides the following in relevant part: (a)(1) A person commits the offense of violation of an order of protection if: (A) A circuit court or other court with competent jurisdiction has issued a temporary order of protection or an order…”
Standridge v. State, 2014 Ark. 515 (Ark. 2014). · cites it 10× “In describing the purpose of The Domestic Abuse Act of 1991, Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-15-101 (Repl. 2009) provides: The purpose of this chapter is to provide an adequate mechanism whereby the State of Arkansas can protect the general health, welfare, and safety of its…”
Claver v. Wilbur, 280 S.W.3d 570 (Ark. Ct. App. 2008). · cites it 2× “2008), and states: The purpose of this chapter is to provide an adequate mechanism whereby the State of Arkansas can protect the general health, welfare, and safety of its citizens by intervening when abuse of a member of a household by another member of a household occurs or is…”
Lowry v. State, 205 S.W.3d 830 (Ark. Ct. App. 2005). · cites it 2× “f conduct that harasses another person and makes a terroristic threat with the intent of placing that person in imminent fear of death or serious bodily injury or placing that person in imminent fear of the death or serious bodily injury of his or her immediate family and he:…”
In re Special Task Force, 2014 Ark. 5 (Ark. 2014). · cites it 2× “(2) (d) No other claim or counterclaim for relief, including without limitation, divorce, annulment, separate maintenance, or paternity, shall be asserted in an action filed under the Domestic Abuse Act, Ark. Code Ann. § 9-15-101 et seq., but a separate action seeking other…”
Standridge v. State, 423 S.W.3d 677 (Ark. Ct. App. 2012). · cites it 2× “2011), which provides in relevant part: (a)(1) A person commits the offense of violation of an order of protection if: (A) A circuit court or other court with competent jurisdiction has issued a temporary order of protection or an order of protection against the person pursuant…”
Lowry v. State, 216 S.W.3d 101 (Ark. 2005). “f conduct that harasses another person and makes a terroristic threat with the intent of placing that person in imminent fear of death or serious bodily injury or placing that person in imminent fear of the death or serious bodily injury of his or her immediate family and he:…”
Davis v. Davis, 200 S.W.3d 886 (Ark. 2005). · cites it 9× “Judy's petition was filed pursuant to the State's Domestic Abuse Act, codified at Ark.Code Ann. § 9-15-101 to -216 (Repl.2003).”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.