Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-317 (2026)

Research References

ALR.

Validity and efficacy of minor's waiver of right to counsel — cases decided since application of Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1967). 101 A.L.R.5th 351.

Ark. L. Rev.

Comment: The Perpetuation of Illusory Rights in the Arkansas Juvenile Code, 57 Ark. L. Rev. 275 (2004).

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Survey of Legislation, 2001 Arkansas General Assembly, Family Law, 24 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 483.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

This section is not arbitrary and capricious; rather, the legislature, in enacting the section, acknowledged that an older juvenile who commits a serious crime may not receive the protection of juvenile proceedings, but will face the consequences as an adult and, accordingly, a juvenile over the age of 16 who commits a crime that would subject him to adult punishment will not be accorded the protection of full parental involvement in the interrogation process. Misskelley v. State, 323 Ark. 449, 915 S.W.2d 702 (1996).

In General.

A 13-year-old juvenile can make a knowing and intelligent waiver of rights without the presence of an adult. Matthews v. State, 67 Ark. App. 35, 991 S.W.2d 639 (1999).

Where a law enforcement officer read juvenile defendant his rights and obtained a signed waiver form before each interview with defendant, and defendant was tried as an adult, the interview procedures applicable to juvenile courts did not apply. Shields v. State, 357 Ark. 283, 166 S.W.3d 28 (2004).

Because subdivisions (i)(2)(A) and (B) of this section had not yet been enacted at the time defendant was questioned, defendant's reliance upon the statute was misplaced; the appellate court has a duty to construe statutes as having only a prospective operation unless the purpose and intention of the legislature to give them a retroactive effect is expressly declared or necessarily implied from the language used and, since the statute in question contained neither an emergency clause nor any language indicating that it was to be applied retroactively, it could only be applied prospectively. Jackson v. State, 359 Ark. 87, 194 S.W.3d 757 (2004).

Pursuant to Ark. R. Crim. P. 3, the state's interlocutory appeal was dismissed because it failed to comply with the rule; the state's argument about whether defendant's grandmother was a “custodian” under subdivision (h)(2)(A) of this section was a question of fact not subject to appeal by the state under Rule 3. State v. S.G., 373 Ark. 364, 284 S.W.3d 62 (2008).

Communication with Parent or Guardian.

There was no violation of a juvenile's right to speak to his mother during his questioning by police where there was evidence in the record that his mother requested to speak to him, but there was no evidence that the juvenile himself invoked his statutory right to have a parent or guardian present during questioning. Conner v. State, 334 Ark. 457, 982 S.W.2d 655 (1998).

Officers are not required to inform juveniles of their right to speak to their parent or guardian or to have one present during questioning. Miller v. State, 338 Ark. 445, 994 S.W.2d 476 (1999).

The right of a juvenile to speak to a parent or guardian does not apply where the juvenile is tried as an adult, since the procedures and penalties prescribed for adults apply in such a circumstance. Ray v. State, 65 Ark. App. 209, 987 S.W.2d 738 (1999).

A police officer is not required to inform a juvenile of his or her right to have a parent or guardian present during questioning. Matthews v. State, 67 Ark. App. 35, 991 S.W.2d 639 (1999).

It is unnecessary for a juvenile's parent, guardian, or custodian to consent to his or her waiver of the right to counsel in connection with a custodial statement. Matthews v. State, 67 Ark. App. 35, 991 S.W.2d 639 (1999).

Subdivision (i)(2)(C)(ii) of this section, which requires that a law enforcement officer not question a juvenile who wishes to speak with a parent or guardian or to have a parent or guardian present, does not apply to a juvenile whom the prosecuting attorney has exercised his discretion to charge as an adult. Ray v. State, 344 Ark. 136, 40 S.W.3d 243 (2001).

As the felony information charging defendant with capital murder was not filed in juvenile court, defendant had no right to assert that defendant's mother should have been present during defendant's questioning by detectives. Jenkins v. State, 348 Ark. 686, 75 S.W.3d 180 (2002).

Appellee juvenile's statements were properly suppressed in his delinquency action because although police detectives read him his Miranda rights and appellee understood those rights, the authorities failed to notify appellee's parent that he had been taken into custody as required by subdivision (h)(2)(A) of this section. State v. L.P., 369 Ark. 21, 250 S.W.3d 248 (2007).

Under subdivision (h)(2)(A) of this section, authorities must notify a parent when his or her child has been taken into custody; the parent can then go to the place where the juvenile is being held and under subdivision (i)(2)(C) of this section, if the juvenile requests to speak to a parent that parent will be present. If, on the other hand, the parent chooses not to go to the place where the juvenile is being detained, counsel is appointed to represent the juvenile, and again, if the juvenile invokes his right to speak to an attorney, then one has already been appointed to represent him. State v. L.P., 369 Ark. 21, 250 S.W.3d 248 (2007).

Confession Held Admissible.

Defendant's confession was admissible where defendant and his mother signed the requisite rights waiver forms and both acknowledged that they understood that defendant did not have to give a statement and that anything he said could be used against him in court, both defendant and his mother agreed that his statement was not coerced, but was given because defendant's mother advised him to tell the truth, and where the evidence showed that defendant and his mother were repeatedly informed of his right to an attorney, and that if this right was invoked the questioning would stop. Ingram v. State, 53 Ark. App. 77, 918 S.W.2d 724 (1996).

Court.

The term “court” as used in this section means “the juvenile division of circuit court” under § 9-27-303(8) (now (12)). Boyd v. State, 313 Ark. 171, 853 S.W.2d 263 (1993).

Duty of Juvenile.

Subsection (g) (now subdivision (i)(2)(C)(ii)) of this section places the burden on the child to ask to consult with a parent. Isbell v. State, 326 Ark. 17, 931 S.W.2d 74 (1996).

Parental Consent.

This section's requirement that the custodial parent consent to a waiver does not apply to proceedings in circuit court; equally important, this section's requirement of parental consent to a waiver is limited to proceedings in the juvenile division of chancery court. Boyd v. State, 313 Ark. 171, 853 S.W.2d 263 (1993).

Where a prosecutor chooses to prosecute a juvenile in circuit court as an adult, the juvenile becomes subject to the procedures and penalties prescribed for adults; thus, when a juvenile is charged in circuit court, the requirement in subsection (f) of this section that the juvenile's parents consent to the juvenile's waiver of right to counsel, is not applicable. Ring v. State, 320 Ark. 128, 894 S.W.2d 944 (1995).

When a person under age 18 is charged as an adult in circuit court, failure to obtain a parent's signature on a waiver form does not render a confession inadmissible; rather, when a juvenile is charged as an adult, he becomes subject to the procedures applicable to adults. Misskelley v. State, 323 Ark. 449, 915 S.W.2d 702 (1996).

Where the defendant was charged as an adult in circuit court, the police were not required to obtain parental consent to his waiver of his right to counsel. Conner v. State, 334 Ark. 457, 982 S.W.2d 655 (1998).

Right to Counsel.

After trial court entered order finding that child was a member of a family in need of services the father attempted to appeal on the child's behalf but he was not a licensed attorney who could represent the child on an appeal, and the matter was not a final order. Bass v. State, 93 Ark. App. 411, 219 S.W.3d 697 (2005).

Waiver of Right to Counsel.

Motion to suppress should not have been granted based on subsection (g) of this section, which disallows waiver of right to counsel by juveniles in DHS custody, because subsection (g) is only applicable in juvenile proceedings; in this case, appellee, a juvenile, was charged as an adult after making the statement. It is the court in which the juvenile is ultimately charged and tried that determines whether the statutory protections apply. State v. Griffin, 2017 Ark. 67, 513 S.W.3d 828 (2017).

Cited: Mulling v. Mulling, 323 Ark. 88, 912 S.W.2d 934 (1996); Kennedy v. State, 325 Ark. 3, 923 S.W.2d 274 (1996); Carter v. State, 326 Ark. 497, 932 S.W.2d 324 (1996); McClure v. State, 328 Ark. 35, 942 S.W.2d 243 (1997); Jordan v. State, 356 Ark. 248, 147 S.W.3d 691 (2004); Holland v. State, 365 Ark. 55, 225 S.W.3d 353 (2006).