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Arkansas Code Annotated

Ark. Code Ann. § 9-9-216 (2026)

Appeal from and validation of adoption decree

✓ current as of May 2026
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  1. An appeal from any final order or decree rendered under this subchapter may be taken in the manner and time provided for appeal from a judgment in a civil action.
  2. Subject to the disposition of an appeal, upon the expiration of one (1) year after an adoption decree is issued, the decree cannot be questioned by any person including the petitioner, in any manner upon any ground, including fraud, misrepresentation, failure to give any required notice, or lack of jurisdiction of the parties or of the subject matter unless, in the case of the adoption of a minor, the petitioner has not taken custody of the minor or, in the case of the adoption of an adult, the adult had no knowledge of the decree within the one-year period.

History. Acts 1977, No. 735, § 16; A.S.A. 1947, § 56-216.

Publisher's Notes. The Arkansas Supreme Court, in its per curiam order of November 22, 1982 (277 Ark. 520), observed that some confusion exists among members of the bar as to the date of the final order for the purpose of appeal. The court stated:

“In order to put an end to the confusion, we shall prospectively construe any decree of adoption to be a final decree, no matter whether it is interlocutory or final, if no subsequent hearing is required by the terms of that decree.”

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Case Note, In re Adoption of Pollock: Arkansas Probate Court Jurisdiction — A Question of Policy, 41 Ark. L. Rev. 677.

Case Notes

Construction.

The one-year statute of limitations in subsection (b) of this section provides a special procedure which cannot be annulled by Ark. R. Civ. P. 41(a) or the savings statute, § 16-56-126, which allows an action dismissed without prejudice to be refiled within one year of the dismissal. In re Martindale, 327 Ark. 685, 940 S.W.2d 491 (1997).

This section provides a maximum one-year time limit after which any action to set aside an adoption order is barred, but does not affect the 90-day limit set forth in Ark. R. Civ. P. Rule 60(a) and only serves to limit the time in which a probate court could act to set aside an order pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. P. Rule 60(c). Mayberry v. Flowers, 69 Ark. App. 307, 12 S.W.3d 652 (2000).

Adoption After Termination of Parental Rights.

Ark. Sup. Ct. & Ct. App. R. 6-9 did not govern a post-termination adoption appeal, even though it originated from a dependency-neglect case, because the types of orders enumerated in the rule do not contemplate adoption proceedings, and this section mandates that adoption appeals may be taken in the manner and time provided for appeal from a judgment in a civil action. Canerday-Banks v. Barton, 2018 Ark. App. 523 (2018).

Collateral Attack.

In a collateral attack on a foreign adoption former section setting the time upon which an adoption becomes final did not apply; where the parent was not given notice of the adoption proceeding, the section did not begin to run until the parent discovered the identity of the adopting parties. Olney v. Gordon, 240 Ark. 807, 402 S.W.2d 651 (1966) (decision under prior law).

A petition to determine heirship filed by deceased's collateral heirs was a collateral attack on the order of adoption, which was not subject to collateral attack. Williams v. Nash, 247 Ark. 135, 445 S.W.2d 69 (1969) (decision under prior law).

Probate court, in adoption proceedings, had no authority to grant visitation rights to grandmother and hence visitation portion of the adoption decree in excess of the court's authority or subject matter jurisdiction was void and subject to collateral attack. Poe v. Case, 263 Ark. 488, 565 S.W.2d 612 (1978) (decision under prior law).

Finality of Decree.

Any decree of adoption is a final decree, no matter whether it is interlocutory or final, if no subsequent hearing is required by the terms of that decree. In re Adoption Orders, 277 Ark. 520, 642 S.W.2d 573 (1982).

Adoptive parent who did not timely appeal a temporary order of adoption did not, under Ark. R. Civ. P. 41, have an absolute right to dismiss his petition for adoption anytime prior to the entry of a final order of adoption. Toai Cong Pham v. Hanh My Truong, 291 Ark. 442, 725 S.W.2d 569 (1987).

Fraud.

Where an order for the adoption of a minor child was entered in due form, the person adopting the child and all others claiming as his heirs were estopped to question the validity of the proceedings on the ground of fraud in its procurement, not found on the face of the record. Avery v. Avery, 160 Ark. 375, 255 S.W. 18 (1923) (decision under prior law).

Where a mother of minor children alleged that she consented to adoption of her children by her former husband's second wife due to fraud, duress, and intimidation, the trial court had jurisdiction to hear her petition to set aside the interlocutory adoption decree pursuant to this section; the 90-day limitation in Ark. R. Civ. P. 60 was inapplicable based on the finding of fraud. Smith v. Smith, 2012 Ark. App. 6 (2012).

Limitation of Actions.

Former section barred plaintiff's petition to vacate a final order of adoption of his former wife's natural child on procedural grounds brought four years after the issuance of the final order. Cottrell v. Cottrell, 258 Ark. 116, 522 S.W.2d 433 (1975) (decision under prior law).

Where a petition challenging an adoption was filed before this subchapter became effective, the trial court erred in applying the one-year statute of limitations under this section to the action rather than the two-year limitation under former section. Allton v. Sumter, 274 Ark. 448, 625 S.W.2d 502 (1981).

Where natural father was given no notice of the pending adoption, it would be a denial of due process to hold that the adoption decree was protected from challenge after one year from its issuance. McKinney v. Ivey, 287 Ark. 300, 698 S.W.2d 506 (1985).

The maternal grandmother was not entitled to visitation with two children adopted by the natural father's new wife under § 9-9-215(a)(1), because she was barred from filing her custody/visitation action by the one-year statute of limitations found in subsection (b) of this section as she clearly was challenging the effect of the adoption decree by claiming visitation rights. Tate v. Bennett, 341 Ark. 829, 20 S.W.3d 370 (2000).

It was error for the trial court to deny a motion to dismiss a petition for adoption without a hearing on the merits, notwithstanding that the motion was filed more than one year after the grant of a temporary order of adoption, since there was a question of fact as to whether the petitioner had taken custody of the child. Coker v. Child Support Enforcement Unit, 69 Ark. App. 293, 12 S.W.3d 669 (2000).

Failure to give a natural parent the required notice of an adoption proceeding in which the parent's parental rights were terminated allowed the parent to have the decree set aside after the expiration of the limitations period in subsection (b) of this section, even though the parent gained actual knowledge of the termination, albeit after the fact, before expiration of the limitations period. Mayberry v. Flowers, 347 Ark. 476, 65 S.W.3d 418 (2002).

Trial court correctly focused on whether an adoptive father had taken custody of the children and found that, in addition to physical custody being with the adoptive father and biological mother, the adoptive father also assumed parental duties; thus, the biological father's petition to set aside the adoption decree, which was filed more than one year after the decree was entered, was time-barred under subsection (b) of this section. Carr v. Millar, 86 Ark. App. 292, 184 S.W.3d 470 (2004).

Trial court did not err in finding that a mother's petition to set aside the interlocutory adoption decree with respect to her minor children was not barred by the one-year limitation period in this section, as the action was commenced within that time period; once the action was commenced, the limitation period was tolled. Smith v. Smith, 2012 Ark. App. 6 (2012).

Notice.

Circuit court erred in granting the grandparents' motion to dismiss the biological parents' motion to set aside an adoption decree where there was no evidence that the parents received any notice of the adoption proceedings before the entry of the decree, and a dependency-neglect proceeding merely provided notice that the parents needed to comply with the case plan to regain custody of their daughter. Clark v. Clark, 2017 Ark. App. 612, 535 S.W.3d 282 (2017).

Res Judicata.

In the father's second appeal seeking to set aside the adoption, it was clear that res judicata was applicable where: (1) the judgment entered by the trial court and subsequently affirmed by the appellate court finding no fraud and applying former statute of limitations was a final judgment on the merits; (2) there was no dispute that the circuit court had jurisdiction over the petition to annul the adoption; (3) the suit was fully contested and resulted in a final judgment that was appealed to the appellate court; (4) both suits involved the same issue, namely the annulment of the adoption decree; (5) both suits involved the exact same parties; and (6) there could have been no doubt that the father had every opportunity to challenge the adoption based on the mental-defect claim in the father's first petition to annul the adoption. McAdams v. McAdams, 357 Ark. 591, 184 S.W.3d 24 (2004).

Standing to Appeal.

State agency did not have the exclusive right to file an action for annulment of adoption proceeding, but the mother had an equal right to file suit. Gillen v. Edge, 214 Ark. 776, 217 S.W.2d 926 (1949) (decision under prior law).

An outsider or stranger could not maintain a petition to annul an order of adoption, but where petitioners occupied loco parentis relationship to the children, they could maintain the petition. Cotten v. Hamblin, 234 Ark. 109, 350 S.W.2d 612 (1961) (decision under prior law).

Petitioner had no standing to set aside the adoption decree and was procedurally barred from proceeding where he waited more than four years to file his motion to set aside the decree. Summers v. Griffith, 317 Ark. 404, 878 S.W.2d 401 (1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1065, 115 S. Ct. 1696, 131 L. Ed. 2d 559 (1995).

Cited: Martin v. Martin, 316 Ark. 765, 875 S.W.2d 819 (1994).

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 18 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1988–2026 · leading case: Mayberry v. Flowers, 65 S.W.3d 418 (Ark. 2002).
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Mayberry v. Flowers, 65 S.W.3d 418 (Ark. 2002). · cites it 12× “For reversal, Kevin argues that Michael’s petition to set aside the adoption was untimely under Ark. Code Ann. § 9-9-216 (b) (Repl. 1998), because it was not brought within one year from the date of the adoption decree.”
Tate v. Bennett, 20 S.W.3d 370 (Ark. 2000). · cites it 18× “1998) was barred by the one-year statute of limitations in Ark. Code Ann. § 9-9-216 (b) (Repl. 1998).”
Wunderlich v. Alexander, 92 S.W.3d 715 (Ark. Ct. App. 2002). · cites it 14× “For reversal, appellants contend that the trial court erred in setting aside the decree past the one-year period set out in Ark. Code Ann. § 9-9-216 (b) (Repl. 2002); that the trial court’s finding of fraud is clearly erroneous; and that the trial court erred in proceeding…”
Martin v. Martin, 875 S.W.2d 819 (Ark. 1994). · cites it 10× “62 (1988), which is comparable to § 9-9-216 of the Arkansas Adoption Act. In conclusion, we note that the adoptive parents now have had custody of the infant involved here for two years and four months.”
Matter of Adoption of Martindale, 940 S.W.2d 491 (Ark. 1997). · cites it 4× “Ark. Code Ann. § 9-9-216 (b)(l) (1993 & Supp.”
Parker v. Sebourn, 95 S.W.3d 762 (Ark. 2003). · cites it 4× “This court held: "In addition, Summers did not allege that extrinsic fraud occurred which is required in these circumstances in order to vacate or modify a decree which had been entered for more than ninety days.”
Carr v. Millar, 184 S.W.3d 470 (Ark. Ct. App. 2004). · cites it 10× “Appellant Gregory Carr appeals the dismissal of his petition to set aside the adoption of his two biological children, arguing that the trial court erred (1) in ruling that he was barred from seeking to set aside the adoption decree because the one-year time period set forth in…”
Larscheid v. Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs., 36 S.W.3d 308 (Ark. 2001). · cites it 2× “Ark. Code Ann. § 9-9-216 (a) (Repl. 1998) provides that an appeal can be taken from any final order or decree rendered under this subchapter.”
Summers v. Griffith, 878 S.W.2d 401 (Ark. 1994). · cites it 5× “In denying appellant’s motion, the trial court relied on Ark. Code Ann. § 9-9-216 (1987): (a) An appeal from any final order or decree rendered under this subchapter may be taken in the manner and time provided for appeal from a judgment in a civil action.”
Mayberry v. Flowers, 12 S.W.3d 652 (Ark. Ct. App. 2000). · cites it 6× “The supreme court applied Rule 81(a) of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides in pertinent part that the rules of civil procedure apply to probate court proceedings “except in those instances where a statute which creates a right, remedy or proceeding…”
Miller v. Moore, 2017 Ark. App. 619 (Ark. Ct. App. 2017). · cites it 2× “3d 418, 424 (2002), our supreme court addressed the issue of a one-year limitation period, and the court balanced the need for finality in adoptions with our basic notion of due process, explaining: In holding as we do in this case, we are not unmindful of the need for finality…”
Coker v. Child Support Enf't Unit, 12 S.W.3d 669 (Ark. Ct. App. 2000). · cites it 4× “In part, he relies on Ark. Code Ann. § 9-9-216 (b) (Repl. 1998) and contends that a hearing should have been held because a material issue existed as to whether he ever had custody of the minor child.”
Show all 18 citing cases →
Ark. Code Ann. § 9-9-216(a): 2 cases
Martin v. Martin, 875 S.W.2d 819 (Ark. 1994). “62 (1988), which is comparable to § 9-9-216 of the Arkansas Adoption Act. In conclusion, we note that the adoptive parents now have had custody of the infant involved here for two years and four months.”
Morse v. Austin, 2017 Ark. App. 257 (Ark. Ct. App. 2017).
Ark. Code Ann. § 9-9-216(b): 8 cases
Mayberry v. Flowers, 65 S.W.3d 418 (Ark. 2002). “For reversal, Kevin argues that Michael’s petition to set aside the adoption was untimely under Ark. Code Ann. § 9-9-216 (b) (Repl. 1998), because it was not brought within one year from the date of the adoption decree.”
Wunderlich v. Alexander, 92 S.W.3d 715 (Ark. Ct. App. 2002). “For reversal, appellants contend that the trial court erred in setting aside the decree past the one-year period set out in Ark. Code Ann. § 9-9-216 (b) (Repl. 2002); that the trial court’s finding of fraud is clearly erroneous; and that the trial court erred in proceeding…”
Tate v. Bennett, 20 S.W.3d 370 (Ark. 2000). “1998) was barred by the one-year statute of limitations in Ark. Code Ann. § 9-9-216 (b) (Repl. 1998).”
Martin v. Martin, 875 S.W.2d 819 (Ark. 1994). “62 (1988), which is comparable to § 9-9-216 of the Arkansas Adoption Act. In conclusion, we note that the adoptive parents now have had custody of the infant involved here for two years and four months.”
Carr v. Millar, 184 S.W.3d 470 (Ark. Ct. App. 2004). “Appellant Gregory Carr appeals the dismissal of his petition to set aside the adoption of his two biological children, arguing that the trial court erred (1) in ruling that he was barred from seeking to set aside the adoption decree because the one-year time period set forth in…”
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