green
Positive treatment
5.1 score
Treatment trajectory · 1968 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1968
1997
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 9 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Bissey v. Commonwealth
In Yurechko v. County of Allegheny, 430 Pa. 325, 332-33 , 243 A.2d 372, 377 (1968), our Supreme Court stated: The statute is not a sword provided to municipalities by the legislature whereby they might cut down the rights of all tardy litigants, including those whose claims are validly based upon negligence of that very municipality and whose tardiness has not caused any prejudice.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
In Re Paoli Railroad Yard Pcb Litigation
The language of subsection (a)(2) itself makes no reference to a showing of prejudice, and notes only that the court "shall excuse noncompliance ... upon a showing of reasonable excuse." However, a Pennsylvania Supreme Court case, interpreting a substantially similar predecessor to the notice statute, held that a "reasonable excuse" was established "[w]here the ignorance of a claimant or the negligence of his counsel is coupled with a determination that no undue hardship resulted to the municipality from the failure to file." Yurechko v. County of Allegheny, 430 Pa. 325, 331 , 243 A.2d 372, 37…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Brown v. Monsanto Co.
The language of subsection (a)(2) itself makes no reference to a showing of prejudice, and notes only that the court “shall excuse noncompliance ... upon a showing of reasonable excuse.” However, a Pennsylvania Supreme Court case, interpreting a substantially similar predecessor to the notice statute, held that a “reasonable excuse” was established “[wjhere the ignorance of a claimant or the negligence of his counsel is coupled with a determination that no undue hardship resulted to the municipality from the failure to file.” Yurechko v. County of Allegheny, 430 Pa. 325, 331 , 243 …
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Hoy v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority
(2×)
According to a seminal case by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in this area of the law, “[w]here the ignorance of a claimant ... is coupled with a determination that no undue hardship resulted to the municipality from the failure to file a claim within the six month period, then a ‘reasonable excuse’ has been established____” Yurechko v. County of Allegheny, 430 Pa. 325, 331-32 , 243 A.2d 372, 376-77 (1968) (emphasis added).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
James v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority
(2×)
Early notice has been recognized as a legitimate means "by which municipal governments might protect themselves against claims of those who have tarried so long that they have made it insurmountably difficult for the municipality to conduct a proper investigation into the circumstances of the accident." Yurechko v. County of Allegheny, 430 Pa. 325, 332-333 , 243 A.2d 372, 377 (1968).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Lumadue v. Cumberland Valley School District
Thus, “[a]n allegation that a claimant has failed to meet the statutory requirement of notice must be set forth as an affirmative defense under new matter in an answer to the complaint.” Yurechko v. County of Allegheny, 430 Pa. 325, 329 , 243 A.2d 372, 375 (1968).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Goad v. Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation
Yurechko v. Allegheny County, 430 Pa. 325, 329-30 , 243 A.2d 372, 375-76 (1968).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Landis v. City of Philadelphia
Our Supreme Court has said that the purpose of the statute requiring that a municipality be notified of a claim against it within six months of the date of the accident or the complained of negligence is that it “ . . . serves as a shield by which municipal governments might protect themselves against claims of those who have tar *519 ried so long that they have made it insurmountably difficult for the municipality to conduct a proper investigation into the circumstances of the accident. . . . ” Yurechko v. County of Allegheny, 430 Pa. 325, 332-33 , 243 A.2d 372, 377 (1968).
discussed
Cited "see"
Get-Set Organization v. Labor Relations Board
(2×)
See Ben Mar Mushroom Farms, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, 430 Pa. 407 , 243 A. 2d 372 (1968).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Ben-Mar Mushroom Farms, Inc.
v.
Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board
v.
Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board
Appeal, No. 148.
Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
Jul 1, 1968.
Joseph E. DeSantis, with him McGavin, DeSantis and Koch, for appellant., James F. Wildeman, Assistant Attorney General, for Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, appellee.
Bell, Brien, Cohen, Eagen, Jones, Musmanno, Roberts.
Cited by 4 opinions | Published
Opinion by
Mr. Justice Cohen,This is an appeal from an order of the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board fixing the time and place of an election for the employees of appellant. The court below determined that such an order was not final for purposes of appeal as required by the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Act, Act of June 1, 1937, P. L. 1168, as amended, .43 P.S. §211.9(b). We agree.
In Chapin v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, 356 Pa. 577, 580, 52 A. 2d 568 (1947), we indicated that ordinarily a review of the Board’s jurisdiction at this stage of the proceedings (before an election and before an order certifying a bargaining representative of the employees involved) is not a final order but interlocutory in nature. Cf. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board v. Puritan Cleaners, 376 Pa. 617, 103 A. 2d 904 (1954). Therefore, absent any statutory provision directing that such preliminary jurisdictional[*409] questions and determinations are appealable, we affirm the lower court’s action in quashing the appeal.
Order affirmed.