Evans v. Jones, 366 F.2d 772 (4th Cir. 1966). · Go Syfert
Evans v. Jones, 366 F.2d 772 (4th Cir. 1966). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
65 citation events (8 in the last 25 years) across 27 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: State of Oregon v. Champion International Corporation (ca9, 1982-07-09)
Treatment trajectory · 1966 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1966 1996 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 15 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State of Oregon v. Champion International Corporation
9th Cir. · 1982 · confidence medium
In Stirling v. Chemical Bank, 511 F.2d 1030, 1032 (2d Cir. 1975), and Evans v. Jones, 366 F.2d 772, 773 (4th Cir. 1966), the Second and Fourth Circuits remanded to the respective district court for a determination whether excusable neglect was shown.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Oregon v. Champion International Corp.
9th Cir. · 1982 · confidence medium
In Stirling v. Chemical Bank, 511 F.2d 1030,1032 (2d Cir. 1975), and Evans v. Jones, 366 F.2d 772, 773 (4th Cir. 1966), the Second and Fourth Circuits remanded to the respective district court for a determination whether excusable neglect was shown.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Robert M. Hensley v. The Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company, a Corporation, Robert M. Hensley v. The Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company, a Corporation
4th Cir. · 1981 · confidence medium
See, e. g., Gooch v. Skelly Oil Co,, 493 F.2d 366, 368 (10th Cir. 1974); Winchell v. Lortscher, 377 F.2d 247, 251 (8th Cir. 1967); Evans v. Jones, 366 F.2d 772, 773 (4th Cir. 1966).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Virginia
E.D. Va. · 1981 · confidence medium
The other reported Fourth Circuit case is Evans v. Jones, 366 F.2d 772, 773 (4th Cir. 1966).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Com. of Va.
E.D. Va. · 1981 · confidence medium
The other reported Fourth Circuit case is Evans v. Jones, 366 F.2d 772, 773 (4th Cir. 1966).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Hensley v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co.
S.D.W. Va · 1980 · confidence medium
Evans v. Jones, 366 F.2d 772, 773 (4th Cir. 1966); Lord v. Helmandollar, 348 F.2d 780 , 782 (D.C.Cir.1965).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) James P. Pasquale v. Robert H. Finch, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
1st Cir. · 1969 · confidence medium
C-Thru Products, Inc. v. Uniflex, Inc., 397 F.2d 952, 954-955 (2d Cir. 1968); Evans v. Jones, 366 F.2d 772, 773 (4th Cir. 1966); Reed v. People of the State of Michigan, 398 F.2d 800, 801 (6th Cir. 1968) 1 ; see Reconstruction Finance Corp, v, Prudence Group, 311 U.S. 579, 582 , 61 S.Ci. 331, 85 L.Ed. 364 (1941).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Charlson Realty Company v. The United States (3×) also: Cited "see"
Ct. Cl. · 1967 · confidence medium
(Feb. 28, 1966); Evans v. Jones, supra, 366 F.2d at 773
cited Cited "see" Matter of Inwood Realty Co.
S.D.N.Y. · 1980 · signal: see · confidence high
See Evans v. Jones, 366 F.2d 772 (4th Cir. 1966); Reed v. People of State of Michigan, 398 F.2d 800 (6th Cir. 1968).
cited Cited "see" Dehn v. Otter Tail Power Co.
N.D. · 1976 · signal: see · confidence high
See Evans v. Jones, 366 F.2d 772 (4th Cir. 1966); Reed v. People of State of Michigan, 398 F.2d 800 (6th Cir. 1968).
cited Cited "see" Stirling v. Chemical Bank
2d Cir. · 1975 · signal: see · confidence high
See Evans v. Jones, 366 F.2d 772 (4th Cir. 1966); Reed v. People of State of Michigan, 398 F.2d 800 (6th Cir. 1968).
cited Cited "see" David Stirling, Jr., and William G. Stirling v. Chemical Bank, Individually, and as Agent, David Stirling, Jr., and William G. Stirling v. Union Planters National Bank of Memphis
2d Cir. · 1975 · signal: see · confidence high
See Evans v. Jones, 366 F.2d 772 (4th Cir. 1966); Reed v. People of State of Michigan, 398 F.2d 800 (6th Cir. 1968).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Allied Domecq Retailing USA v. Schultz (In Re Schultz)
6th Cir. BAP · 2000 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., In re Mizisin, 165 B.R. at 835 (citing Evans v. Jones, 366 F.2d 772 (4th Cir.1966)).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Carl H. Alley v. Dodge Hotel
D.C. Cir. · 1974 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Evans v. Jones, 366 F.2d 772 (4th Cir. 1966). 25 .
cited Cited "see, e.g." C-Thru Products, Inc. And Leon Laguerre v. Uniflex, Inc.
2d Cir. · 1968 · signal: compare · confidence medium
Compare Evans v. Jones, 366 F.2d 772, 773 (4 Cir. 1966). (2) Appellant argues that there are basic and material facts in dispute which make summary judgment in this case improper.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Edward D. Evans
v.
Melvin W. Jones, Isaac E. Jacobs, Deputy Sheriffs of the County of Durham, and Jennis Mangum, Sheriff of the County of Durham, Individually and as Officers of the County of Durham, Jointly and Severally, and the Glens Falls Insurance Company, Bonding Agent, and the County of Durham, N. C., and Bobbie L. Jacobs
10410_1.
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
Sep 14, 1966.
366 F.2d 772
Cited by 4 opinions  |  Published

366 F.2d 772

Edward D. EVANS, Appellant,
v.
Melvin W. JONES, Isaac E. Jacobs, Deputy Sheriffs of the County of Durham, and Jennis Mangum, Sheriff of the County of Durham, individually and as Officers of the County of Durham, Jointly and Severally, and the Glens Falls Insurance Company, bonding agent, and the County of Durham, N. C., and Bobbie L. Jacobs, Appellees.

No. 10410.

United States Court of Appeals Fourth Circuit.

Argued February 7, 1966.

Decided September 14, 1966.

M. C. Burt, Jr., Durham, N. C., for appellant.

Jerry L. Jarvis, Durham, N. C. (A. H. Borland, Durham, N. C., for Isaac E. Jacobs; James L. Newsom, Durham, N. C., for Jennis M. Mangum; Marshall T. Spears, Durham, N. C., for Glens Falls Insurance Company, and Robert D. Holleman, Durham, N. C., for County of Durham, on motion), for appellees.

Before HAYNSWORTH, Chief Judge, SOBELOFF and J. SPENCER BELL, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

1

This is an appellee's motion to dismiss an appeal in a civil case for appellant's failure to file a timely notice of appeal.

2

The judgment of the District Court was entered on October 30, 1965, and the last day for noticing an appeal was Monday, November 29, 1965. In response to the appellee's motion to dismiss, appellant's lawyer has filed in this court an affidavit stating that he deposited the notice in the mail box at the corner of Main and Corcoran Streets, Durham, North Carolina, on Saturday, November 27, about 2:00 p. m., fully expecting that it would be delivered in due course to the clerk of the District Court at Greensboro, North Carolina, the following Monday, November 29. The envelope in which the notice of appeal was mailed was not preserved, so that the postmark is unavailable. The clerk's stamp indicates receipt of the notice at 11:45 a. m. on Tuesday, November 30, thirty-one days from the entry of judgment.

3

Rule 73(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 28 U.S.C.A. § 2107 provide that an appeal from a judgment of a district court in a case like this to a court of appeals shall be filed within thirty days of the entry of judgment. This circuit has held that the court of appeals is without power to relieve the appellant from the consequences of his failure to observe this requirement. Gunther v. E. I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 255 F.2d 710, 715 (4th Cir. 1958).

4

However, the Rule authorizes the district court, though not the appellate court, "upon a showing of excusable neglect * * * [to] extend the time for filing the notice of appeal not exceeding 30 days from the expiration of the original time * * *." Of course, if no notice of appeal had been given until after thirty days following the expiration of the original period, the district court would be without jurisdiction to excuse the delay. But here the filing was only one day late, well within the permissible extension of thirty days if the district court determines that the neglect, if any, was excusable. As Chief Judge Bazelon of the District of Columbia Circuit has emphasized,

5

"The purpose of the provision authorizing extensions is to relieve a party who, for the reason specified in the rule, has neglected to file his notice of appeal within the 30 days allowed." Conway v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 100 U.S.App.D.C. 95, 243 F.2d 39, 41 (1957).[1]

6

This purpose has been highlighted and the discretion of the district court expanded by the recent amendment of Rule 73(a), to permit a finding of excusable neglect on any ground, not, as heretofore, only if noncompliance stemmed from failure to learn of the entry of judgment. H.R. Doc. 391, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (Feb. 28, 1966). A finding by the District Judge that the delay in filing was excusable will validate a late filing provided the effect is not to extend the time for filing more than thirty days from the expiration of the original thirty-day period. The case will therefore be remanded to determine whether there was excusable neglect. If there is a finding of excusable neglect the appeal will proceed; otherwise it will be dismissed. In the meantime, action on the motion to dismiss will be suspended.

7

Remanded.

Notes:

1

In that case the court indicated that, in appropriate instances, a notice of appeal might be held timely even if filed after the expiration of the permissible extension of thirty days. 243 F.2d at 41. But we need not go this far in the present case