South Gwinnett Venture, a P'ship Composed of South Gwinnett Apts., Inc. v. W. R. (Dudge) Pruitt, Rockbridge Assocs., Ltd., a Georgia Ltd. P'ship v. W. R. (Dudge) Pruitt, 491 F.2d 5 (5th Cir. 1974). · Go Syfert
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South Gwinnett Venture, a P'ship Composed of South Gwinnett Apts., Inc. v. W. R. (Dudge) Pruitt, Rockbridge Assocs., Ltd., a Georgia Ltd. P'ship v. W. R. (Dudge) Pruitt, 491 F.2d 5 (5th Cir. 1974). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 2× by 2 distinct cases, last quoted 1989 · …local zoning is a quasi-legislative procedure, not subject to federal juridical consideration in the absence of arbitrary action at p. 7 ✓
167 citation events (12 in the last 25 years) across 35 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Greenbriar, Ltd. v. City of Alabaster (ca11, 1989-09-01)
Treatment trajectory · 1974 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1974 2000 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 49 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Greenbriar, Ltd. v. City of Alabaster (4×) also: Cited as authority (rule)
11th Cir. · 1989 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
local zoning is a quasi-legislative procedure, not subject to federal juridical consideration in the absence of arbitrary action
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Greenbriar, Ltd. v. City Of Alabaster (4×) also: Cited as authority (rule)
11th Cir. · 1989 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
local zoning is a quasi-legislative procedure, not subject to federal juridical consideration in the absence of arbitrary action
cited Cited as authority (rule) Watson Construction Co. v. City of Gainesville
N.D. Fla. · 2006 · confidence medium
Id. (citing Peterman v. Coleman, 764 F.2d 1416, 1419 (11th Cir.1985); Couf v. DeBlaker, 652 F.2d 585, 590 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981); 7 South Gwinnett Venture v. Pruitt, 491 F.2d 5, 7 (5th Cir.1974)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) 75 Acres, LLC v. Miami-Dade County
11th Cir. · 2003 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Peterman v. Coleman, 764 F.2d 1416, 1419 (11th Cir.1985); Couf v. DeBlaker, 652 F.2d 585, 590 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981); South Gwinnett Venture v. Pruitt, 491 F.2d 5, 7 (5th Cir.1974) (en banc). 8 Mindful of the important distinction between legislative action and adjudicative action in evaluating a procedural due process claim, we now turn to the hotly disputed issue of whether the imposition of a building moratorium under § 33-319(k) of the County Code is a legislative act.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Homeowner/Contractor Consultants, Inc. v. Ascension Parish Planning & Zoning Commission
M.D. La. · 1999 · confidence medium
South Gwinnett, 491 F.2d at 7, citing Shenk v. Zoning Comm'n of the Dist. of Columbia, 440 F.2d 295 (D.C.Cir.1971). 35 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) MONT BELVIEU SQUARE v. City of Mont Belvieu, Tex.
S.D. Tex. · 1998 · confidence medium
Zoning reclassification, normally not subject to federal court scrutiny, may violate due process where “the action of the zoning commission is arbitrary and capricious.” South Gwinnett Venture v. Pruitt, 491 F.2d 5, 7 (5th Cir.1974) (en bane).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Colorado Manufactured Housing Ass'n v. Board of County Commissioners of Pueblo
D. Colo. · 1996 · confidence medium
It is “not the function of federal district courts to serve as zoning appeal boards ..." Nasser v. City of Homewood, 671 F.2d 432, 440 (11th Cir.1982) (citing South Gwinnett Venture v. Pruitt, 491 F.2d 5, 6 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 837 , 95 S.Ct. 66 , 42 L.Ed.2d 64 (1974)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Colo. Manufactured Housing v. BD. OF COUNTY COM'RS
D. Colo. · 1996 · confidence medium
It is "not the function of federal district courts to serve as zoning appeal boards ...." Nasser v. City of Homewood, 671 F.2d 432, 440 (11th Cir.1982) (citing South Gwinnett Venture v. Pruitt, 491 F.2d 5, 6 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 837 , 95 S.Ct. 66 , 42 L.Ed.2d 64 (1974)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) New Port Largo, Inc. v. Monroe County (2×) also: Cited "see"
11th Cir. · 1996 · confidence medium
South Gwinnett Venture v. Pruitt, 491 F.2d 5, 7 (5th Cir.1974) (en banc), quoted in Greenbriar, 881 F.2d at 1577 n. 14.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Executive 100, Inc. v. Martin County (2×)
11th Cir. · 1991 · confidence medium
Accordingly, this argument lacks merit 1 Stansberry v. Holmes, 613 F.2d 1285, 1288 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 886 , 101 S.Ct. 240 , 66 L.Ed.2d 112 (1980) 2 Nasser v. Homewood, 671 F.2d 432 , 440 (11th Cir.1982) (citing South Gwinnett Venture v. Pruitt, 491 F.2d 5, 6 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied 419 U.S. 837 , 95 S.Ct. 66 , 42 L.Ed.2d 64 (1974)) 3 Scudder v. Greendale, 704 F.2d 999, 1003 (7th Cir.1983) (citation omitted) 4 See MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340, 351 , 106 S.Ct. 2561, 2567 , 91 L.Ed.2d 285 (1986) 5 As our court in Eide v. Sarasota County not…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Executive 100, Inc. v. Martin County (2×)
11th Cir. · 1991 · confidence medium
Nasser v. Homewood, 671 F.2d 432 , 440 (11th Cir.1982) (citing South Gwinnett Venture v. Pruitt, 491 F.2d 5, 6 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied 419 U.S. 837 , 95 S.Ct. 66 , 42 L.Ed.2d 64 (1974)). .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Smithfield Concerned Citizens for Fair Zoning v. The Town of Smithfield, Etc.
1st Cir. · 1990 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 11 , 108 S.Ct. 849, 857 , 99 L.Ed.2d 1 (1988) (A state price-control regulation is unconstitutional under the due process clause only if “ ‘arbitrary, discriminatory, or demonstrably irrelevant to the policy the legislature is free to adopt.’ ” [quoting Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 769-70 , 88 S.Ct. 1344, 1361 , 20 L.Ed.2d 312 (1968) (quoting Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 539 , 54 S.Ct. 505, 516 , 78 L.Ed. 940 (1934))]); Roberts v. City of Woonsocket, 575 F.2d 339, 340-41 (1st Cir.1978) (The only federal issue in a…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jackson Court Condominiums, Inc. v. City of New Orleans (2×)
5th Cir. · 1989 · confidence medium
South Gwin-nett, 491 F.2d at 7.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Baytree of Inverrary Realty Partners v. The City of Lauderhill
11th Cir. · 1989 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Hernandez v. City of Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188, 1193-94 (5th Cir.1981) (mayor’s veto of zoning ordinance passed by city’s legislative body), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 907 , 102 S.Ct. 1251 , 71 L.Ed.2d 444 (1982); Bruce v. Riddle, 631 F.2d 272, 280 (4th Cir.1980) (local council members held to have acted within scope of legislative activities when they voted on zoning ordinance); South Gwinnett Venture v. Pruitt, 491 F.2d 5, 7 (5th Cir.) (en banc) (local zoning is quasi-legislative procedure, not subject to federal juridical consideration absent arbitrary action), cert. denied, 419 U…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) DeSisto College, Inc. v. Town of Howey-In-The-Hills (2×)
M.D. Fla. · 1989 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 , 97 S.Ct. 555 , 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977) (legislative model applied to denial of a zoning change from single family to multiple-family dwelling); South Gwinnett Venture v. Pruitt, 491 F.2d 5, 7 (5th Cir.) *1500 (en banc), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 837 , 95 S.Ct. 66 , 42 L.Ed.2d 64 (1974) (denial of application for rezoning of building from part commercial, part residential to apartment zone).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Brady v. Town of Colchester
2d Cir. · 1988 · confidence medium
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267 , 97 S.Ct. 555 , 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977); Burrell v. City of Kankakee, 815 F.2d 1127 (7th Cir.1987); Scott v. Greenville County, 716 F.2d 1409 (4th Cir.1983); Scudder v. Town of Greendale, 704 F.2d 999, 1002 (7th Cir.1983); South Gwinnett Venture v. Pruitt, 491 F.2d 5, 7 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 837 , 95 S.Ct. 66 , 42 L.Ed.2d 64 (1974); Hope Baptist Church v. City of Bellefontaine Neighbors, 655 F.Supp. 1216, 1218 (E.D.Mo.1987).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Brady v. Town of Colchester
1st Cir. · 1988 · confidence medium
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267 , 97 S.Ct. 555 , 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977); Burrell v. City of Kankakee, 815 F.2d 1127 (7th Cir.1987); Scott v. Greenville County, 716 F.2d 1409 (4th Cir.1983); Scudder v. Town of Greendale, 704 F.2d 999, 1002 (7th Cir.1983); South Gwinnett Venture v. Pruitt, 491 F.2d 5, 7 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 837 , 95 S.Ct. 66 , 42 L.Ed.2d 64 (1974); Hope Baptist Church v. City of Bellefontaine Neighbors, 655 F.Supp. 1216, 1218 (E.D.Mo.1987).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Jackson Court Condominiums, Inc. v. City of New Orleans
E.D. La. · 1987 · confidence medium
See, Shelton, 780 F.2d 475, 480 (5th Cir.1986) (en banc); South Gwinnett Venture, 491 F.2d 5, 7 (5th Cir.1974) (en banc).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) James W. Grant and Delores Grant, Stairs Manufactured Housing, Inc. v. County of Seminole, Florida
11th Cir. · 1987 · confidence medium
It is “not the function of federal district courts to serve as zoning appeal boards....” Nasser v. City of Homewood, 671 F.2d 432, 440 (11th Cir.1982) (citing South Gwinnett Venture v. Pruitt, 491 F.2d 5, 6 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 837 , 95 S.Ct. 66 , 42 L.Ed.2d 64 (1974)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Carroll v. City of Prattville
M.D. Ala. · 1987 · confidence medium
Though it is beyond doubt that the substantive due process clause protects the right of an individual to be free from the abuse of governmental power, federal review of zoning decisions under the arbitrary and capricious standard is extremely narrow. “[T]he only question which federal district courts may consider [in reviewing zoning decisions] is whether the action of the zoning commission is arbitrary and capricious, having no substantial relation to the general welfare.” Nasser, supra, 671 F.2d at 441 [citing South Gwinnett Venture v. Pruitt, 491 F.2d 5, 7 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 419 …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lemke ex rel. Estate of Lemke v. Cass County
8th Cir. · 1987 · confidence medium
Little-field holds that federal courts may, under the rubric of substantive due process, consider whether actions of zoning commissions are “ ‘arbitrary and capricious, having no substantial relation to the general welfare.’ ” Id. at 607 , quoting South Gwinnett Venture v. Pruitt, 491 F.2d 5, 7 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 901 , 94 S.Ct. 1625 , 40 L.Ed.2d 119 (1974).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lemke v. Cass County
8th Cir. · 1987 · confidence medium
Littlefield holds that federal courts may, under the rubric of substantive due process, consider whether actions of zoning commissions are " 'arbitrary and capricious, having no substantial relation to the general welfare.' " Id. at 607 , quoting South Gwinnett Venture v. Pruitt, 491 F.2d 5, 7 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 901 , 94 S.Ct. 1625 , 40 L.Ed.2d 119 (1974).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Horizon Concepts, Inc., a Texas Corporation v. City of Balch Springs
5th Cir. · 1986 · confidence medium
Couf v. DeBlaker, 5 Cir.1981, 652 F.2d 585, 588 , cert. denied, 1982, 455 U.S. 921 , 102 S.Ct. 1278 , 71 L.Ed.2d 462 ; South Gwinnett Venture v. Pruitt, 5 Cir.1974, 491 F.2d 5, 7 (en banc), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 837 , 95 S.Ct. 66 , 42 L.Ed.2d 64 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Littlefield v. City Of Afton
8th Cir. · 1986 · confidence medium
The Fifth Circuit reversed the summary judgment and remanded to the district court for a determination whether "the action of the zoning commission is arbitrary and capricious, having no substantial relation to the general welfare." Id., citing South Gwinnett Venture v. Pruitt, 491 F.2d 5, 7 (5th Cir.) (en banc) (zoning reclassification, normally not subject to federal court scrutiny, may violate due process where "the action of the zoning commission is arbitrary and capricious"), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 901 , 94 S.Ct. 1625 , 40 L.Ed.2d 119 (1974). 39 The Seventh Circuit has likewise recognized…
examined Cited as authority (rule) Fred B. Shelton Iii, and John Paul Jones, Cross v. City of College Station, Cross-Appellants (13×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
5th Cir. · 1986 · confidence medium
Our characterization of zoning decisions as "quasi-legislative," South Gwinnett Venture v. Pruitt, 491 F.2d 5, 7 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 837 , 95 S.Ct. 66 , 42 L.Ed.2d 64 (1974), might suggest ambivalence in our choice between these two tracks.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Littlefield v. City of Afton
8th Cir. · 1986 · confidence medium
The Fifth Circuit reversed the summary judgment and remanded to the district court for a determination whether “the action of the zoning commission is arbitrary and capricious, having no substantial relation to the general welfare.” Id., citing South Gwinnett Venture v. Pruitt, 491 F.2d 5, 7 (5th Cir.) (en banc) (zoning reclassification, normally not subject to federal court scrutiny, may violate due process where “the action of the zoning commission is arbitrary and capricious”), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 901 , 94 S.Ct. 1625 , 40 L.Ed.2d 119 (1974).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Habersham at Northridge v. Fulton County, Ga.
N.D. Ga. · 1985 · confidence medium
South Gwinnett Venture v. Pruitt, 491 F.2d 5, 7 (5th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 837 , 95 S.Ct. 66 , 42 L.Ed.2d 64 (1974).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Fred B. Shelton, Iii, Cross-Appellees v. City of College Station, Cross-Appellants
5th Cir. · 1985 · confidence medium
Before so holding, however, South Gwinnett stated, preliminarily thereto, that “upon a factual showing of arbitrariness there must be [shown] some basis in fact or law to justify the zoning action as consistent with reasonableness.” South Gwinnett, 491 supra at 7.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) G.T. Scott v. Greenville County
4th Cir. · 1983 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Id.; cf. South Gwinnett Venture v. Pruitt, 491 F.2d 5, 7 (5 Cir.1974) (in banc) (dictum) (zoning reclassification, normally not subject to federal court scrutiny, may violate due process where "the action of the zoning commission is arbitrary and capricious"), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 837 , 95 S.Ct. 66 , 42 L.Ed.2d 64 (1974).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Scott v. Greenville County
4th Cir. · 1983 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Id.; cf. South Gwinnett Venture v. Pruitt, 491 F.2d 5, 7 (5 Cir.1974) (in banc) (dictum) (zoning reclassification, normally not subject to federal court scrutiny, may violate due process where “the action of the zoning commission is arbitrary and capricious”), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 837 , 95 S.Ct. 66 , 42 L.Ed.2d 64 (1974).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Millard Scudder v. Town of Greendale, Indiana
7th Cir. · 1983 · confidence medium
It is well settled that enforcement of an otherwise valid zoning ordinance violates the Constitution only if: (1) the decision of the particular zoning body is arbitrary, South Gwinnett Venture v. Pruitt, 491 F.2d 5, 7 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 837 , 95 S.Ct. 66 , 42 L.Ed.2d 64 (1974); or (2) if the ordinance is applied or enforced with a discriminatory intent or purpose.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Altaire Builders, Inc. v. Village of Horseheads (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
W.D.N.Y. · 1982 · confidence medium
The distinction was rejected by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in South Gwinnett Venture v. Pruitt, 491 F.2d 5, 7 (1974).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Glassman v. Township of Falls
E.D. Pa. · 1982 · confidence medium
Plaintiff has surely alleged such intentional infringement of her right to fair treatment at defendants’ hands; she has alleged malicious treatment meted out for impermissible purposes unrelated to “the general welfare.” See South Gwinnet Venture, supra at 7; Block v. Potter, supra at 236 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Giuliano v. Town of Edgartown (2×) also: Cited "see"
D. Mass. · 1982 · confidence medium
Our sole *1081 function in this case is to determine whether the Planning and Appeals Boards’ decision denying plaintiff Giuliano’s application for a special permit was “clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare.” Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 1926, 272 U.S. 365, 395 , 47 S.Ct. 114, 121 , 71 L.Ed. 303 ; Blackman v. City of Big Sandy, 5 Cir. 1975, 507 F.2d 935 ; South Gwinnett v. Pruitt, supra, 491 F.2d at 7; Cowart v. City of Ocala, D.C.Fla.1979, 478 F.Supp. 774 ; Sixth Camden Corp. v. Evesham, supra at p. …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Robert M. Couf, Mary A. Brown, and Development Finance, Inc. v. Karleen Deblaker (2×)
5th Cir. · 1981 · confidence medium
South Gwinnett Venture v. Pruitt, 491 F.2d 5, 7 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 837 , 95 S.Ct. 66 , 42 L.Ed.2d 64 (1974).
cited Cited as authority (rule) James E. Hernandez v. City of Lafayette
5th Cir. · 1981 · confidence medium
South Gwinnett Venture v. Pruitt, 491 F.2d 5, 6 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 901 , 94 S.Ct. 1625 , 40 L.Ed.2d 119 (1974). 16 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Stansberry v. Holmes
5th Cir. · 1980 · confidence medium
Since 1928, the Supreme Court has never held that a zoning measure exceeded the police power. 7 In Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 , 75 S.Ct. 98, 102 , 99 L.Ed. 27 (1954), the Court held that land use regulations may promote "values (which) are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary." In Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 , 94 S.Ct. 1536, 1541 , 39 L.Ed.2d 797 (1974), the Court said that zoning could be used to create and promote living areas that protect "family values (and) youth values." Given these pronouncements and the importance of zoning as an instr…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Stansberry v. Holmes
5th Cir. · 1980 · confidence medium
Since 1928, the Supreme Court has never held that a zoning measure exceeded the police power. 7 In Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 , 75 S.Ct. 98, 102 , 99 L.Ed. 27 (1954), the Court held that land use regulations may promote “values [which] are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary.” In Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 , 94 S.Ct. 1536, 1541 , 39 L.Ed.2d 797 (1974), the Court said that zoning could be used to create and promote living areas that protect “family values [and] youth values.” Given these pronouncements and the importance of zoning as …
cited Cited as authority (rule) Cowart v. City of Ocala, Fla.
M.D. Fla. · 1979 · confidence medium
South Gwinett Venture v. Pruitt, supra at 7.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Miller & Son Paving, Inc. v. Wrightstown Township Civic Ass'n
E.D. Pa. · 1978 · confidence medium
The only question I am empowered to re *1273 view is “whether the action of the zoning commission [supervisors] is arbitrary and capricious, having no substantial relation to the general welfare.” South Gwinnett Venture v. Pruitt, 491 F.2d 5, 7 (5th Cir.) cert. denied 419 U.S. 837 , 94 S.Ct. 1625 , 40 L.Ed.2d 119 (1974).
examined Cited as authority (rule) 6th Camden Corp. v. Evesham Tp., Burlington Cty. (3×)
D.N.J. · 1976 · confidence medium
The zoning ordinance in Higginbotham had involved the adoption of a “comprehensive zoning plan,” South Gwinnett Venture at 7; by contrast, South Gwinnett Venture involved a request to rezone a specific landowner’s property.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Clint C. Blackman, Jr., E. B. Yale and Thrifty-Man No. 4, Ltd. v. The City of Big Sandy, Texas, and Steve Prociw, Etc.
5th Cir. · 1975 · confidence medium
This Court has noted previously that our review of zoning decisions is limited, and that in cases challenging the propriety of property classifications “[t]he only question which federal district courts may consider is whether the action ... is arbitrary and capricious, having no substantial relation to the general welfare.” South Gwinnett Venture v. Pruitt, 5 Cir., 1974, 491 F.2d 5, 7 (en banc); see also Higginbotham v. Barrett, 5 Cir., 1973, 473 F.2d 745, 747 .
cited Cited "see" Earle B. Lewis v. Clarence Brown
11th Cir. · 2005 · signal: see · confidence high
See id.
discussed Cited "see" Gochman v. Oakley
5th Cir. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
See Jackson Court Condominiums, Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 874 F.2d 1070, 1074 (5th Cir. 1989), citing South Gwinnett Venture v. Pruitt, 491 F.2d 5,7 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied. 95 S.Ct. 66 (1974).7 The 7 Although Jackson Court footnotes a caveat as to whether the exemption from procedural due process is a “flat rule,” Id. at 1074 n.3, this court’s en banc decision in Shelton v. City of 6 Gochmans’ state law arguments for quasi-judicial characterization are unpersuasive in light of our uniform caselaw to the contrary.
discussed Cited "see" Mount Sinai Medical Center of Greater Miami, Inc. v. City of Miami Beach
S.D. Fla. · 1989 · signal: see · confidence high
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development, 429 U.S. 252, 263 , 97 S.Ct. 555, 562 , 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 , 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2709 , 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972); see South Gwinnett Venture v. Pruitt, 491 F.2d 5, 7 (5th Cir.1974) (en banc).
discussed Cited "see" County Line Joint Venture v. The City of Grand Prairie, Texas
5th Cir. · 1988 · signal: see · confidence high
See Developments, supra. As a preliminary matter to resolving whether the city council acted in an administrative or legislative capacity in enacting the ordinance, we review this court’s decisions in South Gwinnett Venture v. Pruitt, 491 F.2d 5 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 901 , 94 S.Ct. 1625 , 40 L.Ed.2d 119 , cert. denied, 419 U.S. 837 , 95 S.Ct. 66 , 42 L.Ed.2d 64 (1974); Couf v. DeBlaker, 652 F.2d 585 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 921 , 102 S.Ct. 1278 , 71 L.Ed.2d 462 (1982); and Shelton v. City of College Station, 780 F.2d 475 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied…
cited Cited "see" Abraham v. City of Mandeville
E.D. La. · 1986 · signal: see · confidence high
See South Gwinnett Venture v. Pruitt, 491 F.2d 5 (5th Cir.1974) (en banc), cert. denied 419 U.S. 837 , 95 S.Ct. 66 , 42 L.Ed.2d 64 (1974).
discussed Cited "see" Cloutier v. Town of Epping
D.N.H. · 1982 · signal: see · confidence high
See South Gwinnett Venture v. Pruitt, 491 F.2d 5, 7 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 419 U.S. 837 , 95 S.Ct. 66 , 42 L.Ed.2d 64 (1974) (“[Ljocal zoning is a quasi-legislative function, not subject to federal judicial consideration in the absence of arbitrary action.”).
discussed Cited "see" Stratford v. State-House, Inc.
E.D. Ky. · 1982 · signal: see · confidence high
Village of Bell Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 7-8 , 94 S.Ct. 1536, 1540 , 39 L.Ed.2d 797 (1974); see South Gwinnett Venture v. Pruitt, 491 F.2d 5 (5th Cir. 1974) (en banc); Higginbotham v. Barrett, 473 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1973); City of Ann Arbor, Mich. v. Northwest Park Construction Corp., 280 F.2d 212 (6th Cir. 1960). 28 .
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
South Gwinnett Venture, a Partnership Composed of South Gwinnett Apartments, Inc.
v.
W. R. (Dudge) Pruitt, Rockbridge Associates, Ltd., a Georgia Limited Partnership v. W. R. (Dudge) Pruitt
71-3420.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
Apr 1, 1974.
491 F.2d 5
Published

491 F.2d 5

SOUTH GWINNETT VENTURE, a Partnership composed of South
Gwinnett Apartments, Inc., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
W. R. (Dudge) PRUITT et al., Defendants-Appellees.
ROCKBRIDGE ASSOCIATES, LTD., a Georgia Limited Partnership,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
W. R. (Dudge) PRUITT et al., Defendants-Appellees.

Nos. 71-3420, 71-3421.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

March 14, 1974, Certiorari Denied April 1, 1974, See 94
S.Ct. 1625.

Robert F. Cook. Dean Booth, Atlanta, Ga., for plaintiffs-appellants.

Homer M. Stark, Lawrenceville, Ga., for defendants-appellees.

Before BROWN, Chief Judge, and WISDOM, GEWIN, BELL, THORNBERRY, COLEMAN, GOLDBERG, AINSWORTH, GODBOLD, DYER, SIMPSON, MORGAN, CLARK, INGRAHAM,[*] RONEY and GEE, Circuit Judges.

COLEMAN, Circuit Judge:

[*~5]1

In 1970, plaintiffs-appellants were the owners of land in Gwinnett County, Georgia, zoned partly residential and partly commercial. They applied to the Gwinnett County Planning Commission to have the property rezoned to an apartment classification. The Planning Commission recommended the change, but the Gwinnett County Commissioners denied it. Suit was brought, alleging that the action of the County Commissioners violated equal protection and due process rights guaranteed the plaintiffs by the Fourteenth Amendment; that is, the decision was arbitrary, capricious, and without due process.

2

After a hearing, the District court dismissed the complaint on the ground that it presented no substantial federal question, Rockbridge Associates, Ltd. v. Pruitt N.D.Ga., 1971), 341 F.Supp. 703. The District Court specifically held that it was not the function of federal district courts to serve as zoning appeal boards; that the decision of local zoning authorities is an exercise of judgment legislative in character; and that these decisions are subject to judicial control 'only if arbitrary or if interested parties have been denied procedural due process', 341 F.Supp. at 705. In its reported opinion, the District Court held that the County Commissioners had assigned reasons for the denial of the zoning change, that the reasons were consistent with the objectives of the zoning resolution, and that the action taken was not arbitrary because there was evidence to support it.

[*~6]3

Upon appeal, a Panel of this Court, by a divided vote, reversed the District Court, South Gwinnett Venture v. Pruitt and Rockbridge Associates, Ltd. v. Pruitt, 5 Cir., 1973, 482 F.2d 389. It was the opinion of the Panel majority that the denial of the rezoning application without a statement of reasons and by recourse to evidence which was not in the record was invalid for failure to adhere to concepts of minimal due process. The Panel duly noted the opinion of this Court in Higginbotham v. Barrett, 5 Cir., 1973, 473 F.2d 745, which held 'that the zoning of property, including the preparation of comprehensive land use plans, involves the exercise of judgment which is legislative in character and is subject to judicial control only if arbitrary and without a rational basis'. The Panel sought to distinguish Higginbotham, however, by saying that the adoption of a legislative plan for the entire community differs from a petition for reclassification under such a plan. Consideration of rezoning petitions was described as 'an exercise of legislative power in a case by case adjudicative setting', therefore, rezoning decisions require an adherence 'to concepts of minimal due process', citing Hornsby v. Allen, 5 Cir., 1964, 326 F.2d 605.[1] The judgment of the District Court was reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent therewith.

4

Pursuant to an appropriate order the case has been reheard en banc. We affirm the judgment of the District Court.

[*~7]5

We adhere to the teachings of Higginbotham v. Barrett, 5 Cir., 1973, 473 F.2d 745, in which it was held that local zoning is a quasi-ligislative procedure, not subject to federal juridical consideration in the absence of arbitrary action.

6

Moreover, we see no viable distinction between zoning board functions involved in the adoption of a comprehensive zoning plan and those exercised in the reclassification of a piece of property under an existing plan, see Shenk v. Zoning Commission of the District of Columbia, 1971, 142 U.S.App.D.C. 267, 440 F.2d 295, cited in Higginbotham, supra.

7

In Shenk, the landowners wanted to rezone property from 'single family' to 'small apartments'. Litigation ultimately led to the enunciation of principles to be applied to federal court review of rezoning cases. A zoning commission is a quasi-legislative body. It is not required to make findings of fact or state the reasons for the action taken. Its actions are entitled to a presumption of validity. The only question which federal district courts may consider is whether the action of the zoning commission is arbitrary and capricious, having no substantial relation to the general welfare. It necessarily follows that upon a factual showing of arbitrariness there must be some basis in fact and law to justify the zoning action as consistent with reasonableness.

8

In the cases presently before us, the County Commissioners did state the reasons for refusing the application to rezone, which were the inadequacy of sewage facilities, roads and schools in the area, plus the adverse affect on existing residential areas.

9

We agree with the District Court that the plaintiffs simply failed to present a substantial federal question and that the complaints should have been dismissed. In reaching this conclusion, we see no constitutional significance in the consultations between the county commissioners and the county engineer or other public officials. We accordingly decline, in the context of this litigation, to apply the 'secret' label to any information thus obtained.

10

The judgment of the District Court is Affirmed.

11

WISDOM and INGRAHAM, Circuit Judges (dissenting):

12

We respectfully dissent for the reasons stated in the panel majority opinion. South Gwinnett Venture v. Pruitt and Rockbridge Associates, Ltd. v. Pruitt, 5 Cir., 1973, 482 F.2d 389.

RONEY, Circuit Judge (specially concurring):

13

I concur in the result reached by the majority for what may be a slightly different reason. Although I am not sure of the legal difference between arbitrary and capricious conduct and the denial of certain elements of due process, I agree with Judges Wisdom and Ingraham as to a distinction between the necessary action for adoption of a comprehensive zoning plan and the treatment that must be accorded a landowner in consideration of his petition to reclassify a specific tract of land under an existing plan. For want of better words, it seems appropriate to say that in the latter instance, the decision maker must accord the petitioner minimal due process.

14

As revealed, however, by the opinion of Judge Edenfield in the trial court, the dissenting opinion of Judge Bootle sitting with the panel on our court, and the opinion of Judge Coleman for the en banc court, the plaintiffs were accorded minimal due process in this case.

15

I concur, therefore, in the dismissal of the cause by the trial court not because plaintiffs were entitled to no more than if a comprehensive plan were being adopted, but because they received the more to which they were entitled.

*

Judge Ingraham sat as a member of the original panel in this case and thus was a member of the en banc court, Allen v. Johnson, 5 Cir., 1968, 391 F.2d 527

1

Whatever vitality remains in Hornsby for licensing cases, cf. Atlanta Bowling Center, Inc. v. Allen, 5 Cir., 1968, 389 F.2d 713, its holding will not be extended to zoning cases