Weisenberger v. Huecker, 593 F.2d 49 (6th Cir. 1979). · Go Syfert
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Weisenberger v. Huecker, 593 F.2d 49 (6th Cir. 1979). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
122 citation events (35 in the last 25 years) across 27 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Roberta House-Forshee v. Benefits Committee of Western & Southern Financial Group Co. Flexible Benefits Plan, et al. (ohsd, 2025-10-23)
Treatment trajectory · 1979 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
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Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers. How cited ↗
cited Cited as authority (rule) Roberta House-Forshee v. Benefits Committee of Western & Southern Financial Group Co. Flexible Benefits Plan, et al.
S.D. Ohio · 2025 · confidence medium
The Court acknowledges that “fees for fees” under ERISA are generally recoverable, see Weisenberger v. Huecker, 593 F.2d 49, 53-54 (6th Cir. 1979).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Keith Canter v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mass., Inc.
6th Cir. · 2025 · confidence medium
Weisenberger v. Huecker, 593 F.2d 49, 53-54 (6th Cir. 1979); accord Ne.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Reece v. CArey
E.D. Ky. · 2022 · confidence medium
Weisenberger v. Huecker, 593 F.2d 49, 54 (6th Cir. 1979).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Morris v. Scenera Research, LLC
N.C. Bus. Ct. · 2017 · confidence medium
The majority of federal circuit courts have held that, where a party is entitled to a statutory award of fees, “the time expended by attorneys in obtaining a reasonable fee is justifiably included in . . . the court’s fee award,” including both the “time spent preparing the fee petition and time devoted to litigating the amount of the award at the fee hearing.” Bagby v. Beal, 606 F.2d 411, 416 (3d Cir. 1979) (quoting Prandini v. Nat’l Tea Co., 585 F.2d 47 , 53 (3d Cir. 1978)); see also Pickett, 664 F.3d at 654 (quoting Gorenstein Enters., 874 F.2d at 438 ); Consolo, 1996 U.S. App. …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Serv. Employees Int'l Union v. Jon Husted
6th Cir. · 2016 · confidence medium
Page 48 4132/ 4133/ 15-3295/ 3296/ 3380/ 3381 defend the award on appeal, the underlying Congressional purpose for the Act would be frustrated.” Weisenberger v. Huecker, 593 F.2d 49, 54 (6th Cir. 1979).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Northeast Ohio Coalition for the Homeless v. Husted
6th Cir. · 2016 · confidence medium
Indeed, in acknowledging that fees for fees are recoverable under § 1988, this court observed that “[i]f a successful party in a civil rights suit is awarded attorney’s fees under the Act and he cannot secure attorney’s fees for legal services needed to defend the award on appeal, the underlying Congressional purpose for the Act would be frustrated.” Weisenberger v. Huecker, 593 F.2d 49, 54 (6th Cir. 1979).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Adell v. John Richards Homes Building Co.
6th Cir. · 2013 · confidence medium
Weisenberger v. Huecker, 593 F.2d 49, 54 (6th Cir.1979) (“We conclude that implementation of Congressional policy requires the awarding of attorney’s fees for time spent pursuing attorney’s fees in the cases presently under review.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Adell v. John Richards Homes Building Co. (In re John Richards Homes Building Co.)
E.D. Mich. · 2012 · confidence medium
The victory would be hollow if plaintiffs were left with a paper judgment not negotiable into cash except by undertaking burdensome and uncompensated litigation.”); Weisenberger v. Huecker, 593 F.2d 49, 54 (6th Cir.1979) (reasoning, in the context of the Civil Rights Act’s fee-shifting provision, that “implementation of Congressional policy requires the awarding of attorney’s fees for time spent pursuing attorney’s fees in the cases presently under review”).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Career Agents Network, Inc. v. Careeragentsnetwork.biz
E.D. Mich. · 2010 · confidence medium
Weisenberger v. Huecker, 593 F.2d 49, 53-54 (6th Cir.1979).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jordyn Spicer, etc. v. Virginia Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Program
Va. Ct. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
Cir. 1982); Hymes v. Harnett County Bd. of Educ., 664 F.2d 410, 413-14 (4th Cir. 1981); Young v. Kenley, 641 F.2d 192, 195 (4th Cir. 1981); Bond v. Stanton, 630 F.2d 1231, 1235 (7th Cir. 1980); Weisenberger v. Huecker, 593 F.2d 49, 53-54 (6th Cir. 1979); Lund v. Affleck, 587 F.2d 75, 77 (1st Cir. 1978); Prandini v. Nat’l Tea Co., 585 F.2d 47 , 54 (3d Cir. 1978); Hairston v. R & R Apartments, 510 F.2d 1090, 1093 (7th Cir. 1975); Chmill v. Friendly Ford-Mercury of Janesville, Inc., 453 N.W.2d 197, 200 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990). -5- Nothing in the text of Code § 38.2-5009(A)(3) reveals a legislativ…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Spicer v. Virginia Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Program
Va. Ct. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
EPA, 672 F.2d 42 , 62 (D.C.Cir.1982); Hymes v. Harnett County Bd. of Educ., 664 F.2d 410, 413-14 (4th Cir.1981); Young v. Kenley, 641 F.2d 192, 195 (4th Cir.1981); Bond v. Stanton, 630 F.2d 1231, 1235 (7th Cir.1980); Weisenberger v. Huecker, 593 F.2d 49, 53-54 (6th Cir.1979); Lund v. Affleck, 587 F.2d 75, 77 (1st Cir.1978); Prandini v. Nat’l Tea Co., 585 F.2d 47 , 54 (3d Cir.1978); Hairston v. R & R Apartments, 510 F.2d 1090, 1093 (7th Cir.1975); *620 Chmill v. Friendly Ford-Mercury of Janesville, Inc., 154 Wis.2d 407 , 453 N.W.2d 197, 200 (1990). 3 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lasswell v. City of Johnston City
S.D. Ill. · 2006 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Johnson v. Mississippi, 606 F.2d 635, 637-38 (5th Cir.1979); Bagby v. Beal, 606 F.2d 411, 415-16 (3d Cir.1979); Gagne v. Maher, 594 F.2d 336, 344 (2d Cir.1979), aff'd, 448 U.S. 122 , 100 S.Ct. 2570 , 65 L.Ed.2d 653 (1980); Weisenberger v. Huecker, 593 F.2d 49, 53-54 (6th Cir.1979); Lund v. Affleck, 587 F.2d 75, 77 (1st Cir.1978). *982 Attorneys will be less likely to take civil rights cases if they know that the time spent establishing and litigating their fees will be uncompensated.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Lamar Advertising Co. v. Charter Township of Van Buren
6th Cir. · 2006 · confidence medium
Weisenberger v. Huecker, 593 F.2d 49, 53-54 (6th Cir.1979).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jimmie Lee Riley v. David T. Kurtz
6th Cir. · 2004 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 693-98 , 98 S.Ct. 2565 , 57 L.Ed.2d 522 (1979) (affirming award of appellate fees to prevailing party as part of the costs); Weisenberger v. Huecker, 593 F.2d 49, 54 (6th Cir.1979) (stating that fees for defending a judgment supported by Congressional purpose of the Act); see also Adcockr-Ladd v. Sec’y of the Treasury, 227 F.3d 343, 351 (6th Cir.2000) (awarding reasonable appellate fees to prevailing party under Title VII).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Riley v. Kurtz
6th Cir. · 2004 · confidence medium
Under current law, appellate fees to prevailing party as part of the costs); the courts retain the discretion to award attorney fees that Weisenberger v. Huecker, 593 F.2d 49, 54 (6th Cir. 1979) greatly exceed the extent of the relief obtained by the (stating that fees for defending a judgment supported by plaintiff prisoners.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Martinka Coal Co. v. West Virginia Division of Environmental Protection
W. Va. · 2003 · confidence medium
Fee recovery has been extended, furthermore, to include the time spent in attempting to obtain the reasonable attorney fees warranted by the particular statute, as stated in Weisenberger v. Huecker, 593 F.2d 49, 54 (6th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 880 , 100 S.Ct. 170 , 62 L.Ed.2d 110 ....
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Seibel v. Paolino
E.D. Pa. · 2000 · confidence medium
Id. at 1235 (quoting Weisenberger v. Huecker, 593 F.2d 49, 53-54 (6th Cir.1979)); see also Hernandez v. Kalinowski, 146 F.3d 196, 199 (3d Cir.1998); Hernandez v. George, 793 F.2d 264, 269 (3d Cir.1986).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Harrison v. Clemente
N.D. Ohio · 2000 · confidence medium
Weisenberger v. Huecker, 593 F.2d 49, 53-54 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 880 , 100 S.Ct. 170 , 62 L.Ed.2d 110 (1979) (statutory award of legal fees should compensate for legal services incurred on appeal).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) White v. Morris
S.D. Ohio · 1994 · confidence medium
The Sixth Circuit has held otherwise, “[w]e conclude that implementation of Congressional policy requires the awarding of attorney’s fees for time spent pursuing attorney’s fees in the cases presently under review.” Weisenberger v. Huecker, 593 F.2d 49, 54 (6th Cir.1979).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Central Benefits Mutual Insurance Company, Central Benefits National Life Insurance Company, Inc., and Mid-Ohio Health Care Plan, Inc., D/B/A Health One, Plaintiffs- Appellants- Cross-Appellees v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association, Defendant-Appellee-Cross-Appellant
6th Cir. · 1992 · confidence medium
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court's order awarding fees and costs and, pursuant to Weisenberger v. Huecker, 593 F.2d 49, 53-54 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 880 (1979) (statutory award of legal fees should compensate for legal services incurred on appeal), REMAND the case for consideration of additional fees and costs incurred by Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association during this appeal. * The Honorable A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Senior Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting by designation 1 CBN and Mid-Ohio Healthcare Plan are wholly owned su…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) John v. Crestwood Local School District
N.D. Ohio · 1992 · confidence medium
Coulter, 805 F.2d at 151 (citing In re Nucorp Energy, Inc., 764 F.2d 655, 660 (9th Cir.1985) See also Weisenberger v. Huecker, 593 F.2d 49, 54 (6th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 880 , 100 S.Ct. 170 , 62 L.Ed.2d 110 (1979) (“We conclude that implementation of Congressional policy requires the awarding of attorney’s fees for time spent pursuing attorney’s fees....”) This practice, however, invites abuse by less than virtuous counsel: Although the time spent in preparing, presenting and trying attorney fee applications is compensable; some guidelines and limitations must be placed on …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kinney v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers
unknown court · 1991 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Jones v. MacMillan Bloedel Containers, Inc., 685 F.2d 236, 239 (8th Cir.1982); Hymes v. Harnett County Bd. of Education, 664 F.2d 410, 413 (4th Cir.1981); Young v. Kenley, 641 F.2d 192, 195 (4th Cir.1981); Gurule v. Wilson, 635 F.2d 782, 792 (10th Cir.1980); Bond v. Stanton, 630 F.2d 1231, 1235 (7th Cir.1980); Love v. Mayor, Cheyenne, 620 F.2d 235 , 237 (10th Cir.1980); Knighton v. Watkins, 616 F.2d 795, 801 (5th Cir.1980); Johnson v. Mississippi, 606 F.2d 635, 637-38 (5th Cir.1979); Bagby v. Beal, 606 F.2d 411, 416 (3d Cir.1979); Weisenberger v. Huecker, 593 F.2d 49, 54 (6th Cir.19…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kinney v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers
unknown court · 1991 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Jones v. MacMillan Bloedel Containers, Inc., 685 F.2d 236, 239 (8th Cir.1982); Hymes v. Harnett County Bd. of Education, 664 F.2d 410, 413 (4th Cir.1981); Young v. Kenley, 641 F.2d 192, 195 (4th Cir.1981); Gurule v. Wilson, 635 F.2d 782, 792 (10th Cir.1980); Bond v. Stanton, 630 F.2d 1231, 1235 (7th Cir.1980); Love v. Mayor, Cheyenne, 620 F.2d 235, 237 (10th Cir.1980); Knighton v. Watkins, 616 F.2d 795, 801 (5th Cir.1980); Johnson v. Mississippi, 606 F.2d 635, 637-38 (5th Cir.1979); Bagby v. Beal, 606 F.2d 411, 416 (3d Cir.1979); Weisenberger v. Huecker, 593 F.2d 49, 54 (6th Cir.197…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Muhammad Abdur-Rahman v. John Pieron, Daniel Fox, and Jerry Kunzelman
6th Cir. · 1991 · confidence medium
We conclude that implementation of Congressional policy requires the awarding of attorney's fees for time spent pursuing attorney's fees...." Weisenberger v. Huecker, 593 F.2d 49, 53-54 (6th Cir.) (emphasis supplied), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 880 (1979). 11 Under normal circumstances, we would remand the case to the district court for recalculation of the award.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Peppers v. Barry
N.D. Ohio · 1989 · confidence medium
DISCUSSION In Weisenberger v. Huecker, 593 F.2d 49, 54 (6th Cir.1979) the court reasoned: If a successful party in a civil rights suit is awarded attorneys’ fees under the act and he cannot secure attorneys’ fees for legal services needed to defend the award ..., the underlying congressional purpose for the Act would be frustrated.
cited Cited as authority (rule) In Re the Vogue
Bankr. E.D. Mich. · 1988 · confidence medium
Weisenberger v. Huecker, 593 F.2d 49, 53-54 (6th Cir.1979).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Robert W. Kelley, Cross-Appellees v. Metropolitan County Board of Education, Cross-Appellants (2×)
6th Cir. · 1985 · confidence medium
The lower court’s overall reduction of fees by 10 percent for duplication of services is justified under the holdings of Weisenberger v. Huecker, 593 F.2d 49, 54 (6th Cir.1979) and Oliver v. Kalamazoo Board of Education, 576 F.2d 714 , 715 n. 2 (6th Cir.1976) (per curiam).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Nucorp Energy, Inc., an Ohio Corporation, and Its Affiliates, Debtors. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps
9th Cir. · 1985 · confidence medium
Courts have consistently awarded such compensation in cases under: (1) the Civil Rights statutes, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (Fees Act), see, e.g., Johnson v. Mississippi, 606 F.2d 635, 637-38 (5th Cir.1979); Bagby v. Beal, 606 F.2d 411, 415-16 (3d Cir.1979); Gagne v. Maher, 594 F.2d 336, 344 (2d Cir.1979), aff'd, 448 U.S. 122 , 100 S.Ct, 2570 , 65 L.Ed.2d 653 (1980); Weisenberger v. Huecker, 593 F.2d 49, 53-54 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 880 , 100 S.Ct. 170 , 62 L.Ed.2d 110 (1979); Lund v. Affleck, 587 F.2d 75, 77 (1st Cir.1978); (2) the Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub.L.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Peter Fabrics, Inc. v. S.S. \Hermes\"
unknown court · 1985 · confidence medium
See also Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 474 F.2d 549, 554 (9 Cir.) (Clayton Act), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 940 , 93 S.Ct. 2778 , 37 L.Ed.2d 400 , supplemented, 487 F.2d 672 (1973); Bond v. Stanton, 630 F.2d 1231, 1235 (7 Cir.1980) (Sec. 1983 action) (quoting Weisenberger v. Huecker, 593 F.2d 49, 53-54 (6 Cir.) (class action), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 880 , 100 S.Ct. 170 , 62 L.Ed.2d 110 (1979)); Spray-Rite Serv.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Peter Fabrics, Inc. v. S.S. \Hermes\""
unknown court · 1985 · confidence medium
See also Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 474 F.2d 549, 554 (9 Cir.) (Clayton Act), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 940 , 93 S.Ct. 2778 , 37 L.Ed.2d 400 , supplemented, 487 F.2d 672 (1973); Bond v. Stanton, 630 F.2d 1231, 1235 (7 Cir.1980) (§ 1983 action) (quoting Weisenberger v. Huecker, 593 F.2d 49, 53-54 (6 Cir.) (class action), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 880 , 100 S.Ct. 170 , 62 L.Ed.2d 110 (1979)); Spray-Rite Serv.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kelley v. METROPOLITAN CTY. BD. OF ED. OF NASHVILLE
M.D. Tenn. · 1983 · confidence medium
Further, defendants argue for a ten percent reduction due to duplication of effort among the several attorneys for the plaintiffs, citing Weisenberger v. Huecker, 593 F.2d 49, 54 (6th Cir.1979); Oliver v. Kalamazoo Board of Education, 576 F.2d 714 , 715 n. 2 (6th Cir.1976).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Stratos v. Department of Public Welfare
Mass. · 1982 · confidence medium
Blinzinger v. Bond, 454 U.S. 1063 (1981); Johnson v. Mississippi, 606 F.2d 635, 637-639 (5th Cir. 1979); Weisenberger v. Huecker, 593 F.2d 49, 54 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 880 (1979).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bond v. Stanton
7th Cir. · 1980 · confidence medium
Prandini v. National Tea Co., 585 F.2d 47 (3d Cir. 1978); Lund v. Affleck, 587 F.2d 75, 77 (1st Cir. 1978); Weisenberger v. Huecker, 593 F.2d 49, 53-54 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 880 , 100 S.Ct. 170 , 62 L.Ed.2d 110 (1979); Gagne v. Maher, 594 F.2d 336, 343-44 (2d Cir. 1979), aff'd, --- U.S. ----, 100 S.Ct. 2570 , 65 L.Ed.2d 653 (1980); Johnson v. State of Mississippi, 606 F.2d 635, 637-39 (5th Cir. 1979).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bond v. Stanton
7th Cir. · 1980 · confidence medium
Prandini v. National Tea Co., 585 F.2d 47 (3d Cir. 1978); Lund v. Affleck, 587 F.2d 75, 77 (1st Cir. 1978); Weisenberger v. Huecker, 593 F.2d 49, 53-54 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 880 , 100 S.Ct. 170 , 62 L.Ed.2d 110 (1979); Gagne v. Maher, 594 F.2d 336, 343-44 (2d Cir. 1979), aff’d, - U.S. -, 100 S.Ct. 2570 , 65 L.Ed.2d 653 (1980); Johnson v. State of Mississippi, 606 F.2d 635, 637-39 (5th Cir. 1979).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Orndorff v. West Virginia Department of Health
W. Va. · 1980 · confidence medium
Fee recovery has been extended, furthermore, to include the time spent in attempting to obtain the reasonable attorney fees warranted by the particular statute, as stated in Weisenberger v. Huecker, 593 F.2d 49, 54 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 880 , 62 L.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jorstad v. IDS Realty Trust
D. Minnesota · 1980 · confidence medium
Gagne v. Maher, 594 F.2d 336, 344 (2d Cir. 1979); Weisenberger v. Huecker, 593 F.2d 49, 53-54 (6th Cir. 1979); Johnson v. State of Mississippi, 606 F.2d 635, 638 (5th Cir. 1979); Lund v. Affleck, 587 F.2d 75, 77 (1st Cir. 1978); Prandini v. National Tea Co., 585 F.2d 47, 53 (3d Cir. 1978).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hanako Dennis, Arthur Schmidt, Clyde C. Teixeira, Individually and on Behalf of All Persons Similarly Situated v. Andrew Chang, in His Capacity as Director, Department of Social Services and Housing, State of Hawaii, and Department of Social Services and Housing, State of Hawaii, Mary Perez, Penelope Torres, Sharleen Lee and Danielle Von Hiram, Individually and on Behalf of All Persons Similarly Situated v. Andrew Chang, in His Capacity as Director, Department of Social Services and Housing, State of Hawaii, and Department of Social Services and Housing, State of Hawaii, Marjorie A. Lynch and Roxanne Montalvo, Individually and on Behalf of All Persons Similarly Situated v. Andrew Chang, in His Capacity as Director, Department of Social Services and Housing, State of Hawaii, and Department of Social Services and Housing, State of Hawaii, Claudia Fortucci, Individually and on Behalf of All Persons Similarly Situated v. Andrew Chang, in His Capacity as Director, Department of Social Services and Housing, State of Hawaii, and Department of Social Services and Housing, State of Hawaii
9th Cir. · 1980 · confidence medium
Holley v. Lavine, 605 F.2d 638, 646 (2d Cir. 1979); Weisenberger v. Huecker, 593 F.2d 49, 54 (6th Cir. 1979); Lund v. Affleck, 587 F.2d 75, 76 (1st Cir. 1978); Perez v. Bou, 575 F.2d 21, 24 (1st Cir. 1978).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Dennis v. Chang
9th Cir. · 1980 · confidence medium
Holley v. Lavine, 605 F.2d 638, 646 (2d Cir. 1979); Weisenberger v. Huecker, 593 F.2d 49, 54 (6th Cir. 1979); Lund v. Affleck, 587 F.2d 75, 76 (1st Cir. 1978); Perez v. Bou, 575 F.2d 21, 24 (1st Cir. 1978).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Northcross v. Board of Education (3×) also: Cited "see"
6th Cir. · 1979 · confidence medium
This Court held that “[s]ince the Act was in existence at the time the district court made the fee awards, it is applicable to the instant cases.” Id. at 53.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rita Johnson, Plaintiffs-Appellees-Cross v. The State of Mississippi, Defendants-Appellants-Cross
5th Cir. · 1979 · confidence medium
The Sixth Circuit agreed that the district court abused its discretion in refusing fees for time spent pursuing recovery of attorney’s fees in Weisenberger v. Huecker, 593 F.2d 49, 53-54 (6th Cir. 1979), petition for cert. filed, --- U.S. ---, 100 S.Ct. 170 , 62 L.Ed.2d 110 (1979).
cited Cited "see" Shana Perry v. Autozone Stores, Inc.
6th Cir. · 2015 · signal: see · confidence high
See Weisenberger v. Huecker, 593 F.2d 49, 54 (6th Cir.1979).
discussed Cited "see" Occupy Nashville v. Haslam
Or. Ct. App. · 2013 · signal: accord · confidence high
See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 693 , 98 S.Ct. 2565 , 57 L.Ed.2d 522 (1978) (holding that § 1988 authorizes federal courts to award attorney's fees against state for a successful suit under § 1983 against state officers acting in official capacity); accord Weisenberger v. Huecker, 593 F.2d 49 , 52 n. 7 (6th Cir.1979).
cited Cited "see" Harper v. BP Exploration & Oil, Inc.
6th Cir. · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
See Weisenberger v. Huecker, 593 F.2d 49, 54 (6th Cir.1979).
discussed Cited "see" Mayer v. Executive Telecard, Ltd.
Del. Ch. · 1997 · signal: see · confidence high
See Weisenberger v. Huecker, 593 F.2d 49, 53-54 (6th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 880 . 100 S.Ct. 170 . 62 L.Ed.2d 110 (1979) (finding fees for fees included under the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976 because ”[w]hen Congress passed the Act its basic purpose was to encourage the private prosecution of civil rights suits through the transfer of the costs of litigation to those who infringe upon basic civil rights”); Pitchford Scientific Instruments Corp. v. Pepi, Inc., 440 F.Supp. 1175 (W.D.Pa.1977), aff'd, 582 F.2d 1275 (3d Cir.1978), ce rt. denied, 440 U.S. 981 , 99 …
cited Cited "see" James v. Runyon
S.D. Ohio · 1994 · signal: see · confidence high
See Weisenberger v. Huecker, 593 F.2d 49 (6th Cir.1979).
cited Cited "see" Reed v. Rhodes
N.D. Ohio · 1981 · signal: see · confidence high
See, Weisenberger v. Huecker, 593 F.2d 49 (6th Cir. 1979), Prandini v. National Tea Co., 585 F.2d 47 (3d Cir. 1978).
cited Cited "see" Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 97,545 Ohio Drill & Tool Company, Cross-Appellants v. Fred H. Johnson, Cross-Appellees
6th Cir. · 1980 · signal: see · confidence high
See Monroe v. County Board of Education, 583 F.2d 263, 265 (6th Cir. 1978), Weisenberger v. Huecker, 593 F.2d 49 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 880 , 100 S.Ct. 170 , 62 L.Ed.2d 110 (1979).
discussed Cited "see" Deborah A. Northcross, Cross-Appellees v. Board of Education of the Memphis City Schools, Cross-Appellants, and City of Memphis, Added Cross-Appellants. Deborah A. Northcross, Cross-Appellees v. Board of Education of the Memphis City Schools, Cross-Appellants (2×)
6th Cir. · 1980 · signal: see · confidence high
See Weisenberger, supra, 593 F.2d at 54 . 72 Before entering into a discussion of the amount of the fees to be awarded, and laying aside for the moment challenges which have been made concerning such issues as duplication of services, we first observe that with one possible exception there can be no question concerning the essential nature of the services at issue.
cited Cited "see" Johnson v. Snyder
N.D. Ohio · 1979 · signal: see · confidence high
See, Weisenberger, et al. v. Huecker, et al., 593 F.2d 49 (6th Cir. 1979).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Auto Alliance International, Inc. v. United States Customs Service
6th Cir. · 2005 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Weisenberger v. Heucker, 593 F.2d 49 , 53-54 (6th Cir.1979).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Marianne Weisenberger, Elizabeth Milburn, Ronald Dellinger, Plaintiffs- Cross-Appellants
v.
Gail S. Huecker, Daniel Tierney, C. Lester Dawson (Now Peter Conn), Secretary of the Kentucky Department for Human Resources, Cross-Appellees
78-3008.
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
Feb 27, 1979.
593 F.2d 49
Cited by 16 opinions  |  Published

593 F.2d 49

Marianne WEISENBERGER, Elizabeth Milburn, Ronald Dellinger,
et al., Plaintiffs- Appellees, Cross-Appellants,
v.
Gail S. HUECKER, Daniel Tierney, C. Lester Dawson (now Peter
Conn), Secretary of the Kentucky Department for
Human Resources, et al.,
Defendants-Appellants, Cross-Appellees.

Nos. 78-3008, 78-3009, 78-3012, 78-3013 and 78-3018.

United States Court of Appeals,
Sixth Circuit.

Argued Nov. 30, 1978.
Decided Feb. 27, 1979.

Robert W. Riley, Gen. Counsel, Ann T. Hunsaker, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Dept. For Human Resources, Frankfort, Ky., for defendants-appellants, cross-appellees.

Henry B. Hinton, Jr., Lawrence S. Elswit, Legal Aid Society of Louisville, Inc., Louisville, Ky., for plaintiffs-appellees, cross-appellants in Nos. 78-3008, 78-3009 and 78-3018.

Lawrence S. Elswit, Legal Aid Society of Louisville, Inc., Louisville, Ky., for plaintiffs-appellees, cross-appellants in Nos. 78-3012, 78-3013 and 78-3018.

Before EDWARDS, Chief Circuit Judge, and WEICK and CELEBREZZE, Circuit Judges.

CELEBREZZE, Circuit Judge.

[*~49]1

Defendants, administrators of the Kentucky welfare and unemployment insurance programs, appeal from an award of attorney's fees in three cases arising from the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky. Plaintiffs have cross-appealed in two of the cases from the district court's denial of attorney's fees for legal services performed in pursuit of fees. These appeals present three basic issues: whether the district court properly relied upon the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976[1] (hereinafter Act) as a basis for awarding attorney's fees; whether the district court properly exercised its discretion in computing and awarding the fees; and whether attorney's fees may be awarded for legal services performed in pursuit of attorney's fees. For the reasons stated below, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with directions.

2

* A. Milburn v. Huecker

Weisenberger v. Huecker

3

This is the third opportunity this court has had to review these appeals. These cases were originally brought as class actions by plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and all recipients of benefits under the Aid to Permanently and Totally Disabled program (APTD) and the Aid To Families with Dependent Children program (AFDC), welfare programs jointly administered by the state and federal governments. Plaintiffs claimed that the state had violated their due process rights by failing to process applications and award benefits within the prescribed time limits. Plaintiffs sought declaratory relief, an order enjoining the defendants from not acting within the appropriate time periods, an award of all benefits wrongfully withheld, and reasonable costs and attorney's fees. The district court found the state's practices violative of federal law and granted prospective relief. The court denied, however, the demands for retroactive payment of welfare benefits wrongfully withheld, holding they were barred by the eleventh amendment. The district court also refused requests for costs and attorney's fees.

4

On the first appeal presented to this court, 500 F.2d 1279 (6th Cir. 1974), we affirmed the district court's grant of prospective relief and affirmed, on the basis of Edelman v. Jordon, 415 U.S. 651, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974),[2] the denial of retroactive relief. We reversed the failure to award costs and attorney's fees and remanded the cases for further finding of facts to permit meaningful appellate review.

5

On remand the district court in each case abandoned its previous position and awarded attorney's fees to plaintiffs. The district court awarded attorney's fees in the amount of $2,500 in Milburn and $2,000 in Weisenberger. Both awards were to be paid by the defendants in their individual capacities.[3]

6

On our second review of these cases we only reviewed the attorney's fee award in Weisenberger.[4] 538 F.2d 1241 (6th Cir. 1976). We held the eleventh amendment did not constitute a bar to an award of attorney's fees against state officials individually since such awards would not be paid out of the state's treasury. We were required, however, to remand the case a second time. An intervening decision of the Supreme Court, Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 95 S.Ct. 1612, 44 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975), held that the private attorney general theory relied upon by the district court in making the award was an inappropriate basis upon which to award attorney's fees. We instructed the district court to make specific findings of fact on the issue of whether defendants exhibited "bad faith." Under Alyeska only a finding of "bad faith" could justify a fee award in the present cases.

[*~50]7

In the interim between our second remand of these cases and the district court award of fees presently under review, the Supreme Court decided the case of Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 96 S.Ct. 2666, 49 L.Ed.2d 614 (1976). The Court held in Fitzpatrick that the eleventh amendment and the principle of state sovereignty it embodies are limited by the enforcement provisions of § 5 of the fourteenth amendment. Section 5 grants Congress authority to enforce "by appropriate legislation" the substantive provisions of the fourteenth amendment.[5] The Court stated in Fitzpatrick :

8

When Congress acts pursuant to § 5, not only is it exercising legislative authority that is plenary within the terms of the constitutional grant, it is exercising that authority under one section of a constitutional Amendment whose other sections by their own terms embody limitations on state authority. We think that Congress may, in determining what is "appropriate legislation" for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, provide for private suits against States or state officials which are constitutionally impermissible in other contexts.

9

Id. at 456, 96 S.Ct. at 2671 (footnote omitted).

10

On October 19, 1976, also between our second remand and the district court awards presently before us, Congress enacted, pursuant to its § 5 power, the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976.[6] The Act provides that in certain civil rights suits a court may in its discretion award attorney's fees to prevailing parties as part of the costs of the litigation. The Supreme Court in the recent case of Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 57 L.Ed.2d 522 (1978), held that the Act is a clear exercise of the § 5 power of Congress to set aside a state's eleventh amendment immunity and "to authorize fee awards payable by the States when their officials are sued in their official capacities." Id. at 693, 98 S.Ct. at 2575.[7]

11

On the second remand, the district court in each case specifically relied upon the Act to support the awards of attorney's fees. The district court made no findings on the issue of "bad faith." Defendants assert on this third appeal that it was improper for the district court to rely on the Act. Plaintiffs in Weisenberger but not Milburn have cross-appealed from the district court's denial of attorney's fees for time spent pursuing attorney's fees.

B. Dellinger v. Dawson

[*~51]12

This case is before this court for the first time. In May, 1975, plaintiffs filed a complaint on behalf of a statewide class alleging defendants denied them constitutional and statutory rights by failing to process unemployment insurance benefit claims within specific statutory time limits. On January 17, 1977, the district court entered judgment requiring that payment of unemployment insurance benefits be made within twenty-four days of application on all claims uncontested by the former employer. The court further ordered that replacement checks be delivered to claimants within fourteen days of receipt of an affidavit stating that a claimant's due and owing benefit check is lost, stolen, or missing.

13

Plaintiffs subsequently moved the district court to alter and amend its previous order to allow reasonable attorney's fees. On September 13, 1977, the district court awarded $2,912.50 in attorney's fees to plaintiffs. The district court refused to allow fees for time spent litigating the attorney's fee issue. Defendants have appealed from only the part of the final judgment which awarded attorney's fees.[8] Plaintiffs have cross-appealed from that portion of the final judgment which denied an award of attorney's fees for time spent pursuing attorney's fees.

II

14

" A court is to apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision, unless doing so would result in manifest injustice or there is statutory direction or legislative history to the contrary." Bradley v. Richmond School Board, 416 U.S. 696, 711, 94 S.Ct. 2006, 2016, 40 L.Ed.2d 476 (1974); Thorpe v. Housing Authority of the City of Durham, 393 U.S. 268, 89 S.Ct. 518, 21 L.Ed.2d 474 (1969); United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 2 L.Ed. 49 (1801); Republic Steel Corp. v. Costle, 581 F.2d 1228, 1233 (6th Cir. 1978). Since the Act was in existence at the time the district court made the fee awards, it is applicable to the instant cases.[9] The Supreme Court in Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 57 L.Ed.2d 522, specifically held that the Act is applicable to cases that were pending when the statute was enacted. Id. at 694 n. 23, 98 S.Ct. at 2576 n. 23. See also Monroe v. County Board of Education, 583 F.2d 263 (6th Cir. 1978). The legislative history of the Act evidences a clear Congressional intent that the Act be applied to pending cases. See S.Rep.No.94-1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., Reprinted in (1976) U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, p. 5908; H.R.Rep.No.94-1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 4 n. 6. Further, defendants have made no showing to this court that "manifest injustice" would result upon application of the Act to the present cases. Accordingly, the district court properly determined that the Act was applicable since the plaintiffs were prevailing parties and the cases were pending when the Act became law.[10]

15

Our review of the records in these cases also leads us to conclude that the amount of the awards in each case was appropriate and a proper exercise of discretion.[11] The district court appropriately determined the amount of time plaintiffs' counsel spent on these cases and utilized a reasonable hourly rate of compensation in arriving at a reasonable award. Defendants have failed to display any evidence that would lead us to conclude the district court abused its discretion in this regard.

III

[*~52]16

On cross-appeal in Weisenberger and Dellinger, plaintiffs allege that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to award attorney's fees for counsel time spent pursuing the recovery of attorney's fees. We agree.

17

When Congress passed the Act its basic purpose was to encourage the private prosecution of civil rights suits through the transfer of the costs of litigation to those who infringe upon basic civil rights. If a successful party in a civil rights suit is awarded attorney's fees under the Act and he cannot secure attorney's fees for legal services needed to defend the award on appeal, the underlying Congressional purpose for the Act would be frustrated. We conclude that implementation of Congressional policy requires the awarding of attorney's fees for time spent pursuing attorney's fees in the cases presently under review. This award should also include amounts for legal time spent defending and prosecuting the instant appeals. The Supreme Court in Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 57 L.Ed.2d 522, upheld the authority of the court of appeals under the Act to award attorney's fees for legal services rendered in the presentation of an appeal before the court of appeals.

18

In Monroe v. County Board of Education, 583 F.2d 263, 265 (6th Cir. 1978), a case dealing with attorney's fee awards, we stated:

19

Under other circumstances the action would be remanded for a determination of such reasonable amount, but we do not choose to follow that course for two reasons. First, the additional delay which would be occasioned by such a remand would further postpone the award of compensation which has already lingered in the courts for an unconscionable time, and this Court's long and detailed familiarity with what has transpired during the history of this protracted litigation make it possible for a determination of reasonable compensation to be made at this judicial level.

20

We feel this statement is equally applicable here. Based upon all of the factors and circumstances which we deem to be relevant, and the affidavits of plaintiffs' counsel submitted to this court, we conclude that the additional sum of $5,096.00 would provide reasonable compensation for plaintiffs' counsel and properly vindicate Congressional policy underlying the Act.[12]

[*~53]21

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court in Milburn and the portions of the judgments in Weisenberger and Dellinger awarding attorneys' fees, as construed by this court against defendants in their official capacities, are affirmed. The portions of the judgments in Weisenberger and Dellinger which denied plaintiffs attorney's fees for time spent pursuing attorney's fees are reversed. Weisenberger and Dellinger are remanded to the district court with directions to enter judgment for an additional $5,096.00, divided equally between each case, as attorney's fees for plaintiffs' counsel to be assessed against the defendants in their official capacities as part of the costs of this case.

1

Pub.L. 94-559 (Oct. 19, 1976), Codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1988:

In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318, or in any civil action or proceeding, by or on behalf of the United States of America, to enforce, or charging a violation of, a provision of the United States Internal Revenue Code, or title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.

2

In Edelman v. Jordon, 415 U.S. 651, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974), the Supreme Court held that the eleventh amendment deprived federal courts of jurisdiction to award past due welfare benefits payable from a state's treasury, and that a state's participation in a federal welfare program does not, without more, constitute an implied waiver of eleventh amendment immunity

3

These awards were made against defendants in their individual capacities since the then prevailing view in our circuit was that the eleventh amendment barred the award of attorney's fees against an unconsenting state or against state officials acting in their official capacities. See Jordon v. Gilligan, 500 F.2d 701, 705 (6th Cir. 1974), Cert. denied, 420 U.S. 991, 95 S.Ct. 1996, 44 L.Ed.2d 481 (1975); Taylor v. Perini, 503 F.2d 899, 901 (6th Cir. 1974), Vacated on other grounds, 421 U.S. 982, 95 S.Ct. 1985, 44 L.Ed.2d 474 (1975). Other circuits espoused the contrary position. See Heucker v. Milburn, 538 F.2d 1241, 1244 n. 5 (6th Cir. 1976) (collecting cases). This conflict has been resolved in civil rights cases against the prior position of this circuit. See note 7, Infra

4

We lacked jurisdiction to review the Milburn award because no separate order was entered by the district court pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 58. 538 F.2d 1241, 1243 (6th Cir. 1976)

5

The Court held in Fitzpatrick that the eleventh amendment does not bar an award of backpay benefits in a Title VII suit against a state employer in light of the fact that the 1972 Amendments to Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, Et seq., which made Title VII applicable to state employers, were enacted pursuant to Congress' § 5 power to enforce the fourteenth amendment

6

See note 1, Supra

7

The Court in Hutto discussed another rationale in support of the power of Congress to authorize such an award against state officials acting in their official capacities. The Court stated:

The Act imposes attorney's fees "as a part of the costs." Costs have traditionally been awarded without regard for the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity. The practice of awarding costs against the States goes back to 1849 in this Court. See Missouri v. Iowa, 7 How. 660, 681, 12 L.Ed. 861, 870; North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 583, 44 S.Ct. 208, 68 L.Ed. 461 (Collecting cases). The Court has never viewed the Eleventh Amendment as barring such awards, even in suits between States and individual litigants.

Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. at 695, 98 S.Ct. at 2576 (footnote omitted but commended to the reader).

The prior decisions of this court in the present cases and in others which held the eleventh amendment constituted a bar to an award of attorney's fees against state officials acting in their official capacities, See note 3, Supra, are no longer good law in suits within the purview of the Act.

8

Defendants did not appeal from the district court judgment with respect to the merits of the case

9

All three of the present cases were originally brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Act by its terms applies to § 1983 suits

10

When the Act became law only the attorney's fee issue remained undecided in Milburn and Weisenberger. We do not agree with defendant's argument that such cases cannot be regarded as pending cases. See King v. Greenblatt, 560 F.2d 1024 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 916, 98 S.Ct. 3146, 57 L.Ed.2d 1161 (1978)

11

The original attorney's fee awards in Weisenberger and Milburn were made against the defendants in their individual capacities. See 538 F.2d at 1243. The awards were made in that manner because of the then current status of eleventh amendment jurisprudence in our circuit. See note 3, Supra. It is clear that the Act currently permits an award of attorney's fees against state officials in their official capacities. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 57 L.Ed.2d 522. The awards currently under review were made under the auspices of the Act. Accordingly, we construe the awards to be against defendants in their official capacities. No findings of "bad faith" are needed to support an award of attorney's fees against state officials acting in their official capacities under the Act. Id. at 700, 98 S.Ct. at 2579. The same reasoning applies to the award in Dellinger

12

Counsel for plaintiffs submitted affidavits before the district court and this court relating the number of hours expended before the district court since the original fee awards and in our court prosecuting the present appeals. We have taken the number of hours submitted by plaintiffs' counsel, 113.25 hours, and reduced it by 10% To account for duplication of efforts among the respective attorneys. See Oliver v. Kalamazoo Bd. of Educ., 576 F.2d 714, 715 n. 2 (6th Cir. 1978). In arriving at the total amount awarded we multiplied the reduced number of hours by a rate of $50 per hour, a rate of hourly compensation found to be reasonable by the district court