Anant Kumar Tripati v. United States Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 784 F.2d 345 (10th Cir. 1986). · Go Syfert
Anant Kumar Tripati v. United States Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 784 F.2d 345 (10th Cir. 1986). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
123 citation events (57 in the last 25 years) across 33 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: John Miguel Swan v. Robert J. Troester et al. (okwd, 2025-11-20)
Treatment trajectory · 1986 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1986 2006 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 43 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited as authority (rule) John Miguel Swan v. Robert J. Troester et al. (3×) also: Cited "see", Cited "see, e.g."
W.D. Okla. · 2025 · confidence medium
Tripati v. INS, 784 F.2d 345, 346-47 (10th Cir. 1986); see Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 261-62 (2006) (noting that absolute prosecutorial immunity protects federal prosecutors facing Bivens actions).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Neill v. Hunting
D. Kan. · 2023 · confidence medium
Tripati v. INS, 784 F.2d 345, 346-47 (10th Cir. 1986); Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250 , 261–62 (2006) (noting that absolute prosecutorial immunity protects federal prosecutors facing Bivens actions).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Walker v. Clark
D. Del. · 2021 · confidence medium
The Third Circuit has extended civil damages immunity to probation officers who allegedly include false statements in reports.1 See Williams v. Hepting, 844 F.2d 138 , 142–43 (3d Cir. 1988) (citing Tripati v. INS, 784 F.2d 345, 348 (10th Cir. 1986) (immunity extended to probation officers who allegedly include false statements in pretrial bond reports and presentence reports).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Reid v. Pautler (10×)
D.N.M. · 2014 · confidence medium
MTD Memo, at 15 (quoting Tripati v. U.S.I.N.S., 784 F.2d at 348).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Johnson v. Root
N.D. Ill. · 2011 · confidence medium
Under this rationale, several circuits have held that probation officers are entitled to absolute immunity for their preparation of presentence reports (“PSRs”) because in preparing the reports, they act at the direction of the court and are therefore serving “as an arm of the court.” See Scotto, 143 F.3d at 111 (citing Dorman v. Higgins, 821 F.2d 133, 137 (2d Cir.1987)); Tripati v. INS, 784 F.2d 345, 348 (10th Cir.1986); Spaulding v. Nielsen, 599 F.2d 728, 729 (5th Cir.1979); see also Cooney v. Rossiter, 583 F.3d 967, 970 (7th Cir.2009) (“Guardians ad litem and court-appointed exper…
cited Cited as authority (rule) DeSilva v. Baker
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2004 · confidence medium
The court held that decisions on pretrial release and a proper sentence “are important parts of the judicial process” and that probation officers “perform critical roles.” Id. at 348.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rippy v. Hattaway
6th Cir. · 2001 · confidence medium
See Hili v. Sciarrotta, 140 F.3d 210, 213 (2d Cir.1998); Tripati v. INS, 784 F.2d 345, 348 (10th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1028 , 108 S.Ct. 755 , 98 L.Ed.2d 767 (1988); Maynard v. Havenstrite, 727 F.2d 439, 441 (5th Cir.1984).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Whitesel v. Jefferson County (2×) also: Cited "see"
10th Cir. · 2000 · confidence medium
“There can be no doubt that ... the decision whether to order the pretrial release of a criminal defendant ... [is an] important part[ ] of the judicial process in criminal cases.” Tripati v. INS, 784 F.2d 345, 348 (10th Cir.1986).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Hummel v. McCotter
D. Utah · 1998 · confidence medium
Tripati v. U.S. INS, 784 F.2d 345, 348 (10th Cir.1986) (granting immunity to probation officers for false statements made in a presentence report).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Chester Russ v. Paul Uppah, Rod Cozzetto, and John R. Enright
10th Cir. · 1992 · confidence medium
When performing functions that are “quasi-judicial” in nature, see, e.g., Tripati v. INS, 784 F.2d 345, 347-48 (10th Cir.1986) (per curiam), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1028 , 108 S.Ct. 755 , 98 L.Ed.2d 767 (1988), Upah is entitled to absolute immunity.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Mee v. Ortega
10th Cir. · 1992 · confidence medium
We held that probation officers performing those functions were absolutely immune from suit because they worked directly for the court and assisted it in reaching decisions regarding pretrial release and sentencing. 784 F.2d at 348.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Mee v. Ortega
10th Cir. · 1992 · confidence medium
We held that probation officers performing those functions were absolutely immune from suit because they worked directly for the court and assisted it in reaching decisions regarding pretrial release and sentencing. 784 F.2d at 348.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Oliver Benjamin Gerrish v. David Ockey
10th Cir. · 1991 · confidence medium
Tripati v. United States Immigration and Naturalization Service, 784 F.2d 345, 347-48 (10th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1028 (1988). 3 AFFIRMED.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Snell v. Tunnell
10th Cir. · 1990 · confidence medium
Tripati v. United States INS, 784 F.2d 345, 347-48 (10th Cir.1986) (per curiam), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1028 , 108 S.Ct. 755 , 98 L.Ed.2d 767 (1988).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Snell v. Tunnell
10th Cir. · 1990 · confidence medium
Tripati v. United States INS, 784 F.2d 345, 347-48 (10th Cir.1986) (per curiam), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1028 , 108 S.Ct. 755 , 98 L.Ed.2d 767 (1988).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Mee v. Jefferson County Sheriff's Department
D. Colo. · 1990 · confidence medium
The final question therefore is whether the defendants’ activities were “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.... ” Tripati , at 348.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Valdez v. City And County Of Denver
10th Cir. · 1989 · confidence medium
See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 635-58 , 100 S.Ct. 1398, 1407-19 , 63 L.Ed.2d 673 (1980) (municipality has no qualified immunity from liability under Sec. 1983); Monell v. Department of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 701 , 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2041 , 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) (municipality sued under Sec. 1983 is not entitled to absolute immunity) 3 In Henriksen v. Bentley, 644 F.2d 852, 855-56 (10th Cir.1981), we recognized this balancing test while noting that "[i]mmunity which derives from judicial immunity may extend to persons other than a judge where performance of judicial acts or ac…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Valdez v. City & County of Denver
10th Cir. · 1989 · confidence medium
In Tripati v. United States Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 784 F.2d 345, 347-48 (10th Cir.1986), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 755 , 98 L.Ed.2d 767 (1988), we relied on these authorities and extended absolute immunity to probation officers who purportedly made false statements in pretrial bond and presentence reports.
cited Cited as authority (rule) George Turner, II v. Marion S. Barry, Jr., Mayor
D.C. Cir. · 1988 · confidence medium
Dorman v. Higgins, 821 F.2d 133 (2d Cir.1987); Tripati v. INS, 784 F.2d 345, 348 (10th Cir.1986), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 108 S.Ct. 755 , 98 L.Ed.2d 767 (1988).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Daloia v. Rose
2d Cir. · 1988 · confidence medium
However, the Ninth Circuit recently held that there is “no principled basis for distinguishing between the [adversarial] pretrial proceedings and the trial on the merits in determining whether absolute immunity should be granted to a police officer witness.” Holt v. Castaneda, 832 F.2d 123, 125 (9th Cir.1987); see also, Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1466 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 97 , 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987); Tripati v. INS, 784 F.2d 345, 348 (10th Cir.1986).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Daloia v. Rose
2d Cir. · 1988 · confidence medium
However, the Ninth Circuit recently held that there is "no principled basis for distinguishing between the [adversarial] pretrial proceedings and the trial on the merits in determining whether absolute immunity should be granted to a police officer witness." Holt v. Castaneda, 832 F.2d 123, 125 (9th Cir.1987); see also, Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1466 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 97 , 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987); Tripati v. INS, 784 F.2d 345, 348 (10th Cir.1986).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Williams v. Hepting
3rd Cir. · 1988 · confidence medium
Finally, in Holt, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit noted that "[i]n adversarial pretrial proceedings as well as at trial, absolute witness immunity is essential if the truth-seeking function of the proceeding is to be fully served." 832 F.2d at 127 . 25 Other courts have cited Briscoe to extend civil damages immunity to guardians, therapists, and attorneys who provide reports and recommendations to the family court, Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1466 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 97 , 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987), and to probation officers who allegedly include false s…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Williams v. Hepting
3rd Cir. · 1988 · confidence medium
Other courts have cited Briscoe to extend civil damages immunity to guardians, therapists, and attorneys who provide reports and recommendations to the family court, Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1466 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 108 S.Ct. 97 , 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987), and to proba tion officers who allegedly include false statements in pretrial bond reports and pre-sentence reports, Tripati v. INS, 784 F.2d 345, 348 (10th Cir.1986), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 108 S.Ct. 755 , 98 L.Ed.2d 767 (1988).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Chauncey Marvin Holt v. Richard Modesto Castaneda
9th Cir. · 1987 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193 , 106 S.Ct. 496, 500 , 88 L.Ed.2d 507 (1985) (citing Briscoe for the proposition that “witnesses, including po *126 lice officers, who testify in judicial proceedings” enjoy absolute immunity, because they are integral parts of the judicial process); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1466 (8th Cir.1987), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 97 , 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (“the immunity [discussed in Briscoe ] extends beyond oral testimony”; it covers “reports and recommendations to the family court”); Tripati v. INS, 784 F.2d 345, 348 (10th Cir.1986) …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Frank S. Dorman v. Michael Higgins
2d Cir. · 1987 · confidence medium
Our conclusion is in accord with those of the Fifth and Tenth Circuits in Spaulding v. Nielsen, 599 F.2d 728, 729 (5th Cir.1979) (per curiam), and Tripati v. United States Immigration and Naturalization Service, 784 F.2d 345, 348 (10th Cir.1986) (per curiam), and with the similar conclusions of other circuits with respect to state probation officers operating within similar frameworks, e.g., Demoran v. Witt, 781 F.2d 155, 157-58 (9th Cir.1985); *139 Hughes v. Chesser, 731 F.2d 1489, 1490 (11th Cir.1984).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Bryant v. O'CONNOR
D. Kan. · 1986 · confidence medium
Serv., 784 F.2d 345, 348 (10th Cir.1986).
examined Cited "see" John Miguel Swan v. Robert J. Troester, et al. (3×)
W.D. Okla. · 2025 · signal: see · confidence high
See Tripati v. U.S.I.N.S., 784 F.2d 345 , 346 (10th Cir. 1986) (granting absolute immunity to prosecutors with the United States Attorney’s Office for conduct taken during the plaintiff’s prosecution).
discussed Cited "see" Watford v. Blanche
D. Maryland · 2022 · signal: see · confidence high
Asa result, several United States Courts of Appeals have held that absolute judicial immunity extends to “federal probation officers preparing and furnishing presentence reports to the court.” Jd; see Tripati □□□ U.S. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 784 F.2d 345 , 347-48 (10th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (granting absolute immunity to federal probation officers preparing a presentence report); Spaulding v. Nielsen, 599 F.2d 728, 729 (Sth Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (same).
cited Cited "see" Purcell v. Schirmer
amsamoa · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
See Tripati v. U.S.I.N.S., 784 F.2d 345 , 346 n.1 (10th Cir. 1986); Mummelthie v. Mason City, Iowa, 873 F. Supp. 1293, 1304 (N.D.
cited Cited "see" United States v. Lin Edward Davis
10th Cir. · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
See Tripati v. INS, 784 F.2d 345, 348 (10th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1028 , 108 S.Ct. 755 , 98 L.Ed.2d 767 (1988).
cited Cited "see" United States v. Davis
10th Cir. · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
See Tripati v. INS, 784 F.2d 345, 348 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1028 (1988).
discussed Cited "see" Scotto v. Almenas
2d Cir. · 1998 · signal: accord · confidence high
Accord, Tripati v. INS, 784 F.2d 345, 348 (10th Cir.1986)(per curiam); Spaulding v. Nielsen, 599 F.2d 728, 729 (5th Cir.1979)(per curiam); see also, Hili v. Sciarrotta, 140 F.3d 210, 213 (2d Cir.1998) (New York state probation officers absolutely immune for preparing and furnishing presentence reports); Anton, 78 F.3d at 396 (state parole officers receive absolute immunity for preparing equivalent ofPSR).
discussed Cited "see" Scotto v. Almenas
2d Cir. · 1998 · signal: accord · confidence high
Accord, Tripati v. INS, 784 F.2d 345, 348 (10th Cir.1986)(per curiam); Spaulding v. Nielsen, 599 F.2d 728, 729 (5th Cir.1979)(per curiam); see also, Hili v. Sciarrotta, 140 F.3d 210, 213 (2d Cir.1998) (New York state probation officers absolutely immune for preparing and furnishing presentence reports); Anton, 78 F.3d at 396 (state parole officers receive absolute immunity for preparing equivalent of PSR). 21 However, "[t]he more distant a function is from the judicial process, the less likely absolute immunity will attach." Snell v. Tunnell, 920 F.2d 673, 687 (10th Cir.1990).
discussed Cited "see" Duffy v. County of Bucks
E.D. Pa. · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
See Tripati v. United States INS, 784 F.2d 345, 348 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1028 , 108 S.Ct. 755 , 98 L.Ed.2d 767 (1988); Demoran v. Witt, 781 F.2d 155, 158 (9th Cir.1985); Hughes v. Chesser, 731 F.2d 1489, 1490 (11th Cir.1984); Spaulding v. Nielsen, 599 F.2d 728 , 729 & 729 n. 2 (5th Cir.1979).
discussed Cited "see" Duffy v. County of Bucks
E.D. Pa. · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
See Tripati v. United States INS, 784 F.2d 345, 348 (10th Cir.1986), ce rt. denied, 484 U.S. 1028 , 108 S.Ct. 755 , 98 L.Ed.2d 767 (1988); Demoran v. Witt, 781 F.2d 155, 158 (9th Cir.1985); Hughes v. Chesser, 731 F.2d 1489, 1490 (11th Cir.1984); Spaulding v. Nielsen, 599 F.2d 728 , 729 & 729 n. 2 (5th Cir.1979).
discussed Cited "see" Wesley v. Don Stein Buick, Inc.
D. Kan. · 1997 · signal: see · confidence high
See Tripati v. INS, 784 F.2d 345 , 346 n. 1 (10th Cir.1986) (pro se plaintiff incorrectly asserting subject matter jurisdiction over claims against federal defendants under section 1343 nevertheless entitled to proceed on basis of section 1331 jurisdiction). 17 .
cited Cited "see" Oltremari Ex Rel. McDaniel v. Kansas Social & Rehabilitative Service
D. Kan. · 1994 · signal: see · confidence high
See Tripati v. United States Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 784 F.2d 345 , 346 n. 1 (10th Cir.1986) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1028 , 108 S. Ct. 755 , 98 L.Ed.2d 767 (1988).
discussed Cited "see" Ziegler v. Hamm
10th Cir. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See Tripati v. INS, 784 F.2d 345, 348 (10th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1028 (1988). 3 10 Like the district court, we conclude, however, that Ziegler's claims for injunctive and declaratory relief survive both the individual defendants' Eleventh Amendment immunity, see Committee for the First Amendment v. Campbell, 962 F.2d 1517 , 1519 n.1 (10th Cir.1992), and their absolute immunity, See Russ, 972 F.2d at 302 n.4 (citing Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 541-42 (1984)).
discussed Cited "see" Robert Carl Anthony v. Daniel G. Baker, Individually and as Deputy Sheriff of the County of El Paso, Colorado (2×)
10th Cir. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
See Tripati v. United States Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 784 F.2d 345, 348 (10th Cir.1986) (absolute immunity extends to probation officer who allegedly made false statements in pretrial bond report and presentence report), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1028 , 108 S.Ct. 755 , 98 L.Ed.2d 767 (1988).
discussed Cited "see" Chitty v. Walton
D. Vt. · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
See, Tripati v. U.S.I.N.S., 784 F.2d 345 , 348 (10th Cir.1986); Demoran v. Witt, 781 F.2d 155, 157-58 (9th Cir.1986); Hughes v. Chesser, 731 F.2d 1489, 1490 (11th Cir.1984); Spaulding v. Nielsen, 599 F.2d 728 (5th Cir.1979); Crosby-Bey v. Jansson, 586 F.Supp. 96, 99 (D.D.C.1984); Friedman v. Younger, 282 F.Supp. 710, 716 (C.D.Cal.1968).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Eric Terrell Porch v. Melissa Meyer, et al.
D. Kan. · 2026 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Tripati v. U.S.I.N.S., 784 F.2d 345 , 348 (10th Cir. 1986); Martinez v. Roth, No. 94-2206, 1995 WL 261127, at *3 (10th Cir. 1995); Mayhew v. W.-Watt, No. 09- CV-02684-PAB-CBS, 2011 WL 3236061 , at *9–10 (D.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Charles Hili v. Joseph L. Sciarrotta, Dir. Of Probation, Diane Eich, Probation Officer
2d Cir. · 1998 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See, e.g., Dorman v. Higgins, 821 F.2d 133, 136-39 (2d Cir.1987); see also Tripati v. INS, 784 F.2d 345, 347-48 (10th Cir.1986) (per curiam), ce rt. denied, 484 U.S. 1028 , 108 S.Ct. 755 , 98 L.Ed.2d 767 (1988); Spaulding v. Nielsen, 599 F.2d 728, 729 (5th Cir.1979) (per curiam).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Anant Kumar Tripati
v.
United States Immigration and Naturalization Service Kent E. Lindgren Holland & Hart Law Firm Jerry Brimmer Clarence A. Brimmer Richard A. Stacy Darrell Mills D.J. Fisher and Ewing T. Kerr
85-1316.
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
Feb 20, 1986.
784 F.2d 345
Cited by 43 opinions  |  Published

784 F.2d 345

Anant Kumar TRIPATI, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE; Kent
E. Lindgren; Holland & Hart Law Firm; Jerry Brimmer;
Clarence A. Brimmer; Richard A. Stacy; Darrell Mills;
D.J. Fisher; and Ewing T. Kerr, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 85-1316.

United States Court of Appeals,
Tenth Circuit.

Feb. 20, 1986.

Anant Kumar Tripati, pro se.

Robert N. Miller, U.S. Atty., and Nancy E. Rice, Asst. U.S. Atty., Denver, Colo., for defendants-appellees.

Before LOGAN, MOORE and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

[*~345]1

In accordance with 10th Cir.R. 9(e) and Fed.R.App.P. 34(a), this appeal came on for consideration on the briefs and record on appeal.

2

Plaintiff sued nine defendants pro se for alleged violations of his civil rights, abuse of process and malicious prosecution, judicial misconduct, and illegal deportation. He sought damages and release from custody. All of the defendants were involved in plaintiff's prior criminal conviction in United States District Court for the District of Wyoming; the suit against them was dismissed on various grounds, some raised by plaintiff's own motion.

3

Plaintiff now challenges only the dismissal under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) of four of the defendants: The United States attorney in charge of his prosecution, an officer of the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service, and two federal probation officers.[1]

1. United States Attorney

4

The district court dismissed the U.S. attorney because he was shielded by absolute immunity while acting within the course of his duties in initiating prosecution and presenting the government's case. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427-31, 96 S.Ct. 984, 993-95, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976) (42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 case against prosecutor); Dohaish v. Tooley, 670 F.2d 934, 938 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826, 103 S.Ct. 60, 74 L.Ed.2d 63 (1982) (42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 case against prosecutor); see also Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 496, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 2905, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978) (42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 cases instructive when considering immunity of federal officials); id. at 498-99 and nn. 25 and 26, 98 S.Ct. at 2906-07 and nn. 25 and 26 (immunity available to federal defendants equivalent to that available to state defendants); id. at 504, 98 S.Ct. at 2909 (untenable to distinguish immunity law between 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 suits and those brought directly under the Constitution). We agree with the district court. All of plaintiff's allegations against the U.S. attorney involved either the initiation or presentation of the government's case.

2. Immigration Officer

5

The district court dismissed the immigration officer after noting that he acted within the scope of his duties as a public official and finding that none of his actions deprived plaintiff of constitutional rights. The officer had claimed qualified immunity. Again, we agree. "[G]overnment officials performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982).

6

Plaintiff is a resident alien. His complaint alleged only that the immigration officer reported plaintiff's conviction to the Immigration and Naturalization Service as a deportable offense. This report caused placement of a detainer against plaintiff in federal custody until the deportation issue could be resolved. This routine practice did not result in a clear violation of plaintiff's constitutional rights of which a reasonable person should have known.

3. Probation Officers

7

Plaintiff alleged that the two probation officers made false statements in a pretrial bond report and a presentence report. The district court ruled that: (1) the probation officers were performing their official duties, (2) their actions required judgment or discretion, and (3) qualified immunity would further policies underlying the official immunity doctrine. Relying on this test from Strothman v. Gefreh, 739 F.2d 515, 518-19 (10th Cir.1984), the court granted the probation officers qualified immunity and dismissed the case against them. We agree that these defendants are immune from suit on the facts alleged, but we arrive at that conclusion in a different way.

[*~346]8

In Strothman, we granted absolute immunity to federal officials sued on common-law tort theories. We recognized the Supreme Court's distinction between cases like Strothman and those that accuse federal officials of violating the Constitution or of acting outside federal statutory authority. See id. at 520; see also Economou, 438 U.S. at 495, 98 S.Ct. at 2905. In the second type of suit, the officials "in general are not absolutely immune ... unless they are performing a narrowly defined judicial, executive, or legislative function." Strothman, 739 F.2d at 520 (emphasis added). See Economou, 438 U.S. at 508-17, 98 S.Ct. at 2911-16 (granting absolute immunity to federal agency hearing examiners and officials responsible for initiating and prosecuting enforcement actions); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 1106, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978) (granting absolute 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 immunity to judge); Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430, 96 S.Ct. at 994 (granting absolute 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 immunity to prosecutor whose activities "were intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process"); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 1217, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967) (granting absolute 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 immunity to judge); cf. Cleavinger v. Saxner, --- U.S. ----, ----, 106 S.Ct. 496, 501-04, 88 L.Ed.2d 507, (1985) (granting qualified immunity to prison disciplinary committee members). We have granted absolute and qualified immunity to government officials under the same exception. See Wilhelm v. Continental Title Co., 720 F.2d 1173, 1177-78 (10th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1103, 104 S.Ct. 1601, 80 L.Ed.2d 131 (1984) (absolute immunity to director of civil rights agency); Johnston v. Herschler, 669 F.2d 617, 620 (10th Cir.1982) (absolute immunity to governor); Henriksen v. Bentley, 644 F.2d 852, 854-56 (10th Cir.1981) (absolute or qualified immunity to clerk of court).

9

Other circuits have extended absolute immunity to probation officers in situations similar to the one at bar, based on the officers' performance of "quasi-judicial" functions. Hughes v. Chesser, 731 F.2d 1489, 1490 (11th Cir.1984) (granting absolute 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 immunity); Spaulding v. Nielsen, 599 F.2d 728, 729 (5th Cir.1979) (granting absolute immunity to federal probation officers); Burkes v. Callion, 433 F.2d 318, 319 (9th Cir.1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 908, 91 S.Ct. 2217, 29 L.Ed.2d 685 (1971) (granting "similar, if not the same," 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 immunity given judges). We agree with this conclusion.

10

There can be no doubt that both the decision whether to order the pretrial release of a criminal defendant and the selection of an appropriate sentence after his conviction are important parts of the judicial process in criminal cases. Probation officers who assist in these determinations perform critical roles. See Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 336, 103 S.Ct. 1108, 1116, 75 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983) (police officer witness with "critical role" immune). Indeed, this court has said that, when preparing a presentence report under Fed.R.Crim.P. 32, "it is evident ... that the probation service is an arm of the court. It is not an investigative arm for the prosecution. A presentence report is prepared exclusively at the discretion of and for the benefit of the court." United States v. Dingle, 546 F.2d 1378, 1380-81 (10th Cir.1976). The same can be said of preparation of a pretrial release report.

11

We therefore hold that when, as here, the challenged activities of a federal probation officer are intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process, he or she is absolutely immune from a civil suit for damages. The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Colorado is AFFIRMED. See 10th Cir.R. 17(b).

[*~347]12

The mandate shall issue forthwith.

1

We note initially that plaintiff's invocation of the court's jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1343 and 42 U.S.C. Secs. 1981, 1983, 1985, 1986, and 1988 is incorrect as to the four federal employee defendants before us. Plaintiff's additional assertion of general federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1331 is correct as a basis for an implied federal cause of action alleging deprivation of constitutional rights by persons acting under color of federal law. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 486, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 2900, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978); Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 395-97, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 2004-05, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971); id. at 398 and n. 1, 91 S.Ct. at 2006 and n. 1 (Harlan, J., concurring). Although plaintiff's complaint does not cite Bivens or related cases, we recognize the general principle of affording pro se litigants' pleadings liberal construction. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 292, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). We therefore find the complaint's invocation of jurisdiction satisfactory and proceed to the issue of whether these four defendants had immunity. Such immunity can halt the progress of a plaintiff pursuing a private cause of action for damages implied directly from the Constitution