Martinez v. Winner, 800 F.2d 230 (1986). · Go Syfert
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Martinez v. Winner, 800 F.2d 230 (1986). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
54 citation events (22 in the last 25 years) across 17 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Goldin v. Bartholow (ca5, 1999-01-26)
Treatment trajectory · 1986 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1986 2006 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 20 distinct citers. How cited ↗
cited Cited as authority (rule) Goldin v. Bartholow
5th Cir. · 1999 · confidence medium
It is a standard truism that “[t]here can be no live controversy without at least two active combatants.” See Martinez v. Winner, 800 F.2d 230, 231 (10th Cir.1986).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Dion R. McPherson v. Michigan High School Athletic Association, Inc., Board of Education of the Public Schools of the City of Ann Arbor (2×)
6th Cir. · 1997 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Ellis, 421 U.S. at 434 , 95 S.Ct. at 1696 (stating that, because the plaintiffs no longer showed any visible interest in the litigation, “it is highly doubtful that a case or controversy could be held to exist”); Jordan, 16 F.3d at 788-89 (dismissing case as moot when plaintiff had only argued for a finding of mootness and had not dismissed the matter); Martinez v. Winner, 800 F.2d 230, 231 (10th Cir.1986) (“The plaintiff has directed his counsel to withdraw from active participation and to conduct no additional business on his behalf in this case____ There can be no live cont…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Franklin Savings Ass'n v. Office of Thrift Supervision
10th Cir. · 1994 · confidence medium
Martinez v. Winner, 800 F.2d 230, 231 (10th Cir.1986) (the court of appeals’s order to vacate and dismiss will remove the res judicata and the stare decisis effect of the vacated judgments); cf. Johnson v. Chicago Board of Educ., 457 U.S. 52, 53-54 , 102 S.Ct. 2223, 2224 , 72 L.Ed.2d 668 . (1982) (“Because we have vacated the Court of Appeals judgments in this case, the doctrine of the law of the case does not constrain either the District Court or, should an appeal subsequently be taken, the Court of Appeals.”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Franklin Savings Association v. Office Of Thrift Supervision
10th Cir. · 1994 · confidence medium
Martinez v. Winner, 800 F.2d 230, 231 (10th Cir.1986) (the court of appeals's order to vacate and dismiss will remove the res judicata and the stare decisis effect of the vacated judgments); cf. Johnson v. Chicago Board of Educ., 457 U.S. 52, 53-54 , 102 S.Ct. 2223, 2224 , 72 L.Ed.2d 668 (1982) ("Because we have vacated the Court of Appeals' judgments in this case, the doctrine of the law of the case does not constrain either the District Court or, should an appeal subsequently be taken, the Court of Appeals.").
discussed Cited "see" Richard McMahon v. City of Broken Arrow, Oklahoma, a municipal corporation; Broken Arrow Police Department; Michael Ferguson; Unknown Broken Arrow Police Officers
N.D. Okla. · 2025 · signal: see · confidence high
See Martinez v. Winner, 771 F.2d 424, 444 (10th Cir. 1985) (finding the “City of Denver Police Department” was not a separate suable entity), judgment vacated as moot, 800 F.2d 230 (10th Cir. 1986); Lindsey v. Thomson, 275 F. App’x 744, 747 (10th Cir. 2007) (finding “Healdton Police Department” and “Wilson Police Department” were not legally suable entities); Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210, 1214 (11th Cir. 1992) (“[P]olice departments are not usually considered legal entities subject to suit”).
discussed Cited "see" Colorado Springs Fellowship Church v. City of Colorado Springs
D. Colo. · 2022 · signal: see · confidence high
See Martinez v. Winner, 771 F.2d 424, 444 (10th Cir. 1985) (dismissing § 1983 claims against Denver Police Department because it is not a separate suable entity), remanded to consider mootness, 475 U.S. 1138 (1986), on remand, 800 F.2d 230 (10th Cir. 1986); Boren v. City of Colo. Springs, 624 F.Supp. 474, 479 (D.
discussed Cited "see" Moore v. Diggins
10th Cir. · 2015 · signal: see · confidence high
See Martinez v. Winner, 771 F.2d 424, 444 (10th Cir.1985) (dismissing § 1983 claims against the City of Denver Police Department because it was not a separate suable entity), remanded to consider mootness, 475 U.S. 1138 , 106 S.Ct. 1787 , 90 L.Ed.2d 333 (1986), on remand, 800 F.2d 230 (10th Cir.1986).
discussed Cited "see" Boyce v. Ashcroft (2×)
10th Cir. · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
See Martinez v. Winner, 800 F.2d 230, 231 (10th Cir.1986) (denying request to vacate published opinions, noting that “the opinions may be useful to someone in the future simply as a description of the course of this case”).
discussed Cited "see" Boyce v. Ashcroft (2×)
10th Cir. · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
See Martinez v. Winner, 800 F.2d 230, 231 (10th Cir. 1986) (denying request to vacate published opinions, noting that "the opinions may be useful to someone in the future simply as a description of the course of this case").
discussed Cited "see" BAUCHMAN, BY AND THROUGH BAUCHMAN v. West High
D. Utah · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See Martinez *264 v. Winner, 771 F.2d 424, 444 (10th Cir.1985) (dismissing § 1983 claims against City of Denver Police Department because department was not a suable entity separate from the city itself), remanded to consider mootness, 475 U.S. 1138 , 106 S.Ct. 1787 , 90 L.Ed.2d 333 (1986), on remand, 800 F.2d 230 (10th Cir.1986); Stump v. Gates, 777 F.Supp. 808, 815-16 (D.Colo.1991), aff'd, 986 F.2d 1429 (10th Cir.1993).
discussed Cited "see" Bauchman ex rel. Bauchman v. West High School
D. Utah · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See Martinez v. Winner, 771 F.2d 424 , 444 (10th Cir.1985) (dismissing § 1983 claims against City of Denver Police Department because department was not a suable entity separate from the city itself), remanded to consider mootness, 475 U.S. 1138 , 106 S.Ct. 1787 , 90 L.Ed.2d 333 (1986), on remand, 800 F.2d 230 (10th Cir.1986); Stump v. Gates, 777 F.Supp. 808, 815-16 (D.Colo.1991), aff'd, 986 F.2d 1429 (10th Cir.1993).
cited Cited "see" Ricky Williams Sharon Williams Bonnie (Williams) Gilbert Delavah Williams Johnie Williams, Ronnie Williams, Emogene Williams Cobin Ernestine Williams Webb Caroline Williams Giles Verna Williams Hammond Barbara Williams Guinn Donna Williams Lockhart, the Survivors of Marvin Williams v. George F. Hartje, Jr., (Two Cases) Ricky Williams Sharon Williams Bonnie (Williams) Gilbert Delavah Williams Johnie Williams, Ronnie Williams, Emogene Williams Cobin Ernestine Williams Webb Caroline Williams Giles Verna Williams Hammond Barbara Williams Guinn Donna Williams Lockhart, the Survivors of Marvin Williams v. Faulkner County, Arkansas and Joe Martin, Ricky Williams Sharon Williams Bonnie (Williams) Gilbert Delavah Williams Johnie Williams, Ronnie Williams, Emogene Williams Cobin Ernestine Williams Webb Caroline Williams Giles Verna Williams Hammond Barbara Williams Guinn Donna Williams Lockhart, the Survivors of Marvin Williams v. James T. Castleberry and Jocile C. Perry, Co-Executors of the Estate of Joe L. Castleberry, Deceased, Ricky Williams Sharon Williams Bonnie (Williams) Gilbert Delavah Williams Johnie Williams, Ronnie Williams, Emogene Williams Cobin Ernestine Williams Webb Caroline Williams Giles Verna Williams Hammond Barbara Williams Guinn Donna Williams Lockhart, the Survivors of Marvin Williams v. Faulkner County, Arkansas James T. Castleberry and Jocile C. Perry, Co- Executors of the Estate of Joe L. Castleberry, Deceased Joe Martin City of Conway, Arkansas Marvin Iberg O.H. (Bill) Mullenax and George F. Hartje, Jr.
8th Cir. · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
See Martinez v. Winner, 771 F.2d 424, 437-38 (10th Cir.1985), vacated as moot after remand by Supreme Court, 800 F.2d 230 (10th Cir.1986).
cited Cited "see" Williams v. Hartje
8th Cir. · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
See Martinez v. Winner, 771 F.2d 424, 437-38 (10th Cir.1985), vacated as moot after remand by Supreme Court, 800 F.2d 230 (10th Cir.1986).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Lindsey v. Thomson
10th Cir. · 2007 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210, 1214 (11th Cir.1992) (“Sheriffs departments and police departments are not usually considered legal entities subject to suit[.]”), citing Martinez v. Winner, 771 F.2d 424, 444 (10th Cir.1985) (“The ‘City of Denver Police Department’ is not a separate suable entity, and the complaint will be dismissed as to it.”), vacated as moot, 800 F.2d 230 (10th Cir.1986).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Lindsey v. Thompson
E.D. Okla. · 2006 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210, 1214 (11th Cir.1992) (“Sheriff’s departments and police departments are not usually considered legal entities subject to suit[.]”), citing Martinez v. Winner, 771 F.2d 424, 444 (10th Cir.1985) (“The ‘City of Denver Police Department’ is not a separate suable entity, and the complaint will be dismissed as to it.”), vacated as moot, 800 F.2d 230 (1986).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Bell v. Manspeaker
10th Cir. · 2002 · signal: see also · confidence low
We agree with the district court that Mr. Manspeaker’s role in controlling access to the courtroom during the McVeigh trial was an integral part of the judicial process deserving the protection of absolute immunity. “[T]he courtroom and courthouse premises are subject to the control of the court.” Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 358 , 86 S.Ct. 1507 , 16 L.Ed.2d 600 (1966); see also Martinez v. Winner, 771 F.2d 424, 434 (10th Cir.1985) (noting judge’s responsibility for security during trial), judgment vacated as moot, 800 F.2d 230 (1986); Snow v. Oklahoma, 489 F.2d 278, 280 (10th Ci…
cited Cited "see, e.g." Hawkins v. Comparet-Cassani
C.D. Cal. · 1999 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Martinez v. Winner, 771 F.2d 424, 434-35 (10th Cir.), modified, 778 F.2d 553 (10th Cir.1985), action found moot, 800 F.2d 230 (10th Cir.1986). 3 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Wesley v. Don Stein Buick, Inc.
D. Kan. · 1997 · signal: see also · confidence low
See Renalde v. City and County of Denver, 807 F.Supp. 668, 675 (D.Colo.1992); see also Martinez v. Winner, 771 F.2d 424, 444 (10th Cir. 1985) vacated on other grounds, 800 F.2d 230 , 231 (10th Cir.1986).
cited Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Richard Ray Lacey, American Bankers Insurance Company
10th Cir. · 1992 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 0.416[2], at 517 (2d ed. 1992) [hereinafter Moore’s] (footnote omitted); see also Martinez v. Winner, 800 F.2d 230, 231 (10th Cir.1986).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Stump v. Gates
D. Colo. · 1991 · signal: see also · confidence low
See, e.g., Boren v. City of Colorado Springs, 624 F.Supp. 474, 479 (D.Colo.1985) (city’s police department, as merely the vehicle through which city fulfills its policing functions, not a proper party); Stratton v. Boston, 731 F.Supp. 42, 46 (D.Mass.1989) (action dismissed as against city police department that is not an independent legal entity); Reese v. Chicago Police Dept., 602 F.Supp. 441, 443 (N.D.Ill.1984) (Chicago Police Department and Cook County Attorney’s Office have no legal existence independent of city and county, and therefore are not suable entities); see also Martinez v. W…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Francisco Eugenio Martinez
v.
Fred M. Winner, Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, Individually and in His Official Capacity Joseph M. Dolan, United States Attorney for the District of Colorado, Individually and in His Official Capacity Susan Roberts, Assistant United States Attorney, Individually and in Her Official Capacity John R. Barksdale, Assistant United States Attorney, Individually and in His Official Capacity Dan Christopher, Assistant United States Attorney, Individually and in His Official Capacity Jan Chapman, Assistant United States Attorney, Individually and in Her Official Capacity United States Department of Justice, a Governmental Entity Federal Bureau of Investigation, a Governmental Entity \John Doe\" and Other Unnamed and Unknown Agents in the Denver Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
Aug 29, 1986.
800 F.2d 230
Individually and in His Official Capacity City and County of Denver
Individually and in His Official Capacity Robert Nicoletti  |  a Governmental Entity Dale A. Tooley

800 F.2d 230

Francisco Eugenio MARTINEZ, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Fred M. WINNER, Chief Judge of the United States District
Court for the District of Colorado, individually and in his
official capacity; Joseph M. Dolan, United States Attorney
for the District of Colorado, individually and in his
official capacity; Susan Roberts, Assistant United States
Attorney, individually and in her official capacity; John
R. Barksdale, Assistant United States Attorney, individually
and in his official capacity; Dan Christopher, Assistant
United States Attorney, individually and in his official
capacity; Jan Chapman, Assistant United States Attorney,
individually and in her official capacity; United States
Department of Justice, a governmental entity; Federal
Bureau of Investigation, a governmental entity; "John Doe"
and other unnamed and unknown agents in the Denver Office of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, individually and in
their official capacities; Matt Dunn, Deputy United States
Marshal, individually and in his official capacity; Peyton
Baer, Deputy United States Marshal, individually and in his
official capacity; Les Weisenhorn, Deputy United States
Marshal, individually and in his official capacity; City
and County of Denver, a governmental entity; Dale A.
Tooley, District Attorney for the City and County of Denver,
individually and in his official capacity; Castelar Garcia,
Jr., Deputy District Attorney, individually and in his
official capacity; City of Denver Police Department, a
governmental entity; Arthur Dill, Chief of Police,
individually and in his official capacity; Robert
Shaughnessy, Chief, City of Denver Police Department,
individually and in his official capacity; Robert
Nicoletti, Captain, Denver Police Department, individually
and in his offical capacity; J.C. Tyus, Detective, Denver
Police Department; "John Does," and other unnamed and
unknown agents of the Denver Police Department; Sandy
Spencer and Peter Webb, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 82-2110.

United States Court of Appeals,
Tenth Circuit.

Submitted July 11, 1986.
Decided Aug. 29, 1986.

Adele Graham of Graham & Graham, Denver, Colo. and David Graham of Graham & Graham, San Luis, Colo. (Dan Stormer of Litt & Stormer, Los Angeles, Cal. and James I. Meyerson, New York City, with them on brief), for plaintiff-appellant.

Gary T. Cornwell of McGuire, Cornwell & Blakely, Denver, Colo. for defendant-appellee Winner.

Mark B. Stern, Appellate Staff, Civ. Div., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C. (Richard K. Willard, Acting Asst. Atty. Gen., Barbara L. Herwig, Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C. and Robert N. Miller, U.S. Atty., Denver, Colo., with him on brief), for defendants-appellees Dolan, Roberts, Barksdale, Chapman, Christopher, Dept. of Justice, F.B.I., Dunn, Baer and Weisenhorn.

Daniel J. Sears, Denver, Colo., for defendant-appellee Spencer.

Jeffrey A. Chase of Holme, Roberts & Owen, Denver, Colo. (Carol H. Green of Holme, Roberts & Owen, Denver, Colo., with him on brief), for defendant-appellee Webb.

David R. Brougham of Hall & Evans, Denver, Colo., for defendants-appellees Tooley and Garcia.

John R. Flanders of Halaby & McCrea, Denver, Colo. (Theodore S. Halaby and Leslie L. Schluter of Halaby & McCrea, Denver, Colo. and Steven M. Munsinger, of Keene, Munsinger & Stuckey, Denver, Colo., with him on brief), for defendants-appellees City and County of Denver, City of Denver Police Dept., Dill, Shaughnessy, Nicoletti and Tyus.

Before LAY,[*] Chief Judge, BRIGHT,* and ARNOLD,* Circuit Judges.

ARNOLD, Circuit Judge.

[*~230]1

The Supreme Court of the United States has vacated the judgment of this Court and remanded the case for us to consider whether it has become moot. Tyus v. Martinez, --- U.S. ----, 106 S.Ct. 1787, 90 L.Ed.2d 333 (1986).

2

The plaintiff has directed his counsel to withdraw from active participation and to conduct no additional business on his behalf in this case. This instruction to counsel, of which we had no knowledge at the time our previous opinions were filed, makes this case moot. There can be no live controversy without at least two active combatants.

3

The judgment of this Court has already been vacated by the Supreme Court. It was vacated, however, only for the limited purpose of enabling us to consider whether the case had become moot. Having now determined that it is moot, and in order to avoid any misunderstanding, we now declare our judgment vacated on the ground of mootness. We also remand this cause to the District Court with directions to vacate its judgment and dismiss the complaint as moot. See United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 39, 71 S.Ct. 104, 106, 95 L.Ed. 36 (1950). This order will remove "both the res judicata and the stare decisis effect of the vacated judgment[s]," in this case the judgments of this Court and of the District Court. United States v. National Bank of Commerce, 775 F.2d 1050, 1050 (8th Cir.1985).

4

Counsel for the federal appellees, for J.C. Tyus, and for the City and County of Denver also request that we vacate our previous opinions. We are not sure what such a request means in practical effect. The opinions have been published in bound volumes of the Federal Reporter, Second Series, and no action by this or any other Court can change that fact retroactively. Furthermore, the opinions may be useful to someone in the future simply as a description of the course of this case. We have already stated that our previous judgment is vacated. The request to vacate our opinions, if in fact it asks for some separate or different relief, is denied.

[*~231]5

It is so ordered.

*

The Hon. Donald P. Lay, Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, and the Hon. Myron H. Bright and the Hon. Richard S. Arnold, United States Circuit Judges for the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation