United States v. Salvador Alcala-Ramirez, 141 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 1998). · Go Syfert
United States v. Salvador Alcala-Ramirez, 141 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 1998). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
67 citation events (33 in the last 25 years) across 19 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Diamond a Ranch, Western Division, L.L.C. v. Wolf (dcd, 2025-09-29)
Treatment trajectory · 1998 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1998 2012 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 8 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Diamond a Ranch, Western Division, L.L.C. v. Wolf
D.D.C. · 2025 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Mac’Avoy v. Smithsonian Inst., 757 F. Supp. 60 , 69–70 (D.D.C. 1991); Timberline Nw., Inc. v. Hill, 141 F.3d 1179, at *4 (9th Cir. 1998); Rodriguez-Mora v. Baker, 792 F. 2d. 1524, 1527 (11th Cir. 1996). 7 Indeed, on remand in North American Butterfly, the district court concluded that pre- deprivation remedies were not required for the allegations that the Butterfly Association sought to include in its amended complaint.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) (PC) Tri v. Gutierrez
E.D. Cal. · 2024 · confidence medium
The administrative appeal is considered part of the process afforded, and any 10 error in the process can be corrected during that appeals process without necessarily subjecting 11 prison officials to liability for procedural violations at lower levels”), affirmed, 141 F.3d 1179 12 (9th Cir. 1998) (unpublished disposition); Edwards v. Lamas, No. 2:19-cv-1907 MCE CKD P, 13 2020 WL 1812135 , at *3 (E.D.
discussed Cited "see" In re Allana Baroni
C.D. Cal. · 2021 · signal: see · confidence high
See generally id. 27 Further, Appellant was given an opportunity to cure her inexcusable default 1 Appellant had intentionally exploited this opportunity by again subverting her 2 obligations under the Plan and waiting to take any step toward compliance until an 3 unpaid creditor moved to convert or dismiss.
discussed Cited "see" Cobalis Corp. v. YA Global Investments, L.P.
C.D. Cal. · 2014 · signal: see · confidence high
See id. at 807 n. 5 (citing Smith v. Lee (In re Smith), 201 B.R. 267 , 273 n. 5 (D.Nev. 1996) (“[P'Jroperty revested in the Debtor upon confirmation becomes property of a Chapter 7 estate upon conversion.”), aff'd, 141 F.3d 1179 , 1998 WL 133445 (9th Cir.1998); Carey v. Flintridge Lumber Sales, Inc. (In re RJW Lumber Co.), 262 B.R. 91, 93 (Bankr.N.D.Cal.2001) (“The far better view, consistent with an integrated interpretation of the Code, is that upon conversion the Chapter 7 estate consists of all remaining assets held for the benefit of creditors.”)).
discussed Cited "see" Lacy v. Stinky Love, Inc. (In Re Lacy)
D. Colo. · 2004 · signal: see · confidence high
See Smith v. Lee (In re Smith), 201 B.R. 267, 273 (D.Nev.1996), aff'd, mem., 141 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir.1998); Carey v. Flintridge Lumber Sales, Inc. (In re RJW Lumber Co.), 262 B.R. 91, 93 (Bankr.N.D.Cal.2001); In re Calania Corp., 188 B.R. 41, 43 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1995); Bezner v. United Jersey Bank (In re Midway, Inc.), 166 B.R. 585, 590 (Bankr.D.N.J.1994).
cited Cited "see" Hagan v. Hughes (In Re Hughes)
Bankr. S.D. Ill. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
See In re Smith, 201 B.R. 267, 274 (D.Nev.1996), aff'd, 141 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir.1998); In re RJW Lumber Co., 262 B.R. 91, 93 (Bankr.N.D.Cal.2001).
cited Cited "see" Carey v. Flintridge Lumber Sales, Inc. (In Re RJW Lumber Co.)
Bankr. N.D. Cal. · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
See In re Smith, 201 B.R. 267, 274 (D.Nev.1996), aff'd 141 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir.1998).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." In Re: Consolidated Pioneer Mortgage Entities, Debtor Pioneer Liquidating Corporation v. United States Trustee
9th Cir. · 2001 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Smith v. Lee (In re Smith), 201 B.R. 267 , 273 n. 5 (D.Nev.1996) (“[P]roperty re-vested in the Debtor upon confirmation becomes property of a Chapter 7 estate upon conversion.”), aff'd, 141 F.3d 1179 , 1998 WL 133445 (9th Cir.1998); Carey v. Flintridge Lumber Sales, Inc. (In re RJW Lumber Co.), 262 B.R. 91, 93 (Bankr.N.D.Cal.2001) ("The far better view, consistent with an integrated interpretation of the Code, is that upon con *808 version the Chapter 7 estate consists of all remaining assets held for the benefit of creditors.''); In re Calania Corp., 188 B.R. 41, 43 (Bankr.M.D.Fl…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
United States
v.
Salvador Alcala-Ramirez
97-10006.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Apr 6, 1998.
141 F.3d 1179
Unpublished

141 F.3d 1179

NOTICE: Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 provides that dispositions other than opinions or orders designated for publication are not precedential and should not be cited except when relevant under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Salvador ALCALA-RAMIREZ, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 97-10006.
D.C. No. CR-95-05055-7-OWW.

United States Court of Appeals,
Ninth Circuit.

Submitted February 9, 1998.[**]
Decided April 6, 1998.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California, Oliver W. Wanger, District Judge, Presiding.

Before GOODWIN, KOZINSKI and THOMPSON, Circuit Judges.

1

MEMORANDUM[*]

2

Salvador Alcala-Ramirez appeals his conviction for (1) conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1); and (2) conspiracy to launder money, in violation of 18 U .S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(1) and (h). Alcala-Ramirez contends the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, the district court erred by admitting certain evidence, and the court incorrectly applied the Sentencing Guidelines. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S .C. § 1291 and we affirm.

1. Sufficiency of the Evidence

3

The government's proof at trial was not materially at variance with the indictment. The proof established a single conspiracy. The government presented evidence establishing consistent joint activity among Alcala-Ramirez and his codefendants over the time period charged in the indictment. This evidence included purchases of large amounts of methamphetamine precursor chemicals, the establishment of clandestine labs, and a working arrangement among the Alcala-Ramirez group to sell precursor chemicals the group manufactured. This evidence was sufficient for a reasonable juror to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Alcala-Ramirez was involved in a single conspiracy. See United States v. Ross, 123 F.3d 1181, 1184 (9th Cir.1997), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 733, 139 L.Ed.2d 670 (1998).

2. Evidentiary Rulings

4

The district court admitted evidence from the Kenneth Road lab site in Modesto and from the lab site in Coulterville, which evidence was gathered after Alcala-Ramirez severed his relationship with Raul Rincon. Any error in admitting this evidence, however, was nonconstitutional error. We will not reverse for such error unless it is more likely than not that the error affected the verdict. United States v. Workinger, 90 F.3d 1409, 1412 (9th Cir.1996).

5

Here, there was substantial evidence, apart from that challenged by Alcala-Ramirez, that his group bought large amounts of chemicals, as well as equipment, to be used to manufacture precursor chemicals to produce methamphetamine. Moreover, when he was arrested, Alcala-Ramirez stated he knew the items purchased were going to be used in the process of manufacturing methamphetamine, and he stated he was aware the money he used to make these purchases came from sales of methamphetamine.

6

Alcala-Ramirez also challenges the district court's admission of evidence that Diane Sanchez shipped chemicals to herself at the Kenneth Road lab site and that she bought chemicals and used wire transfers. He contends this evidence was admitted without connecting it to him or to any conspiracy in which he was involved.

7

Even if the district court erred in admitting the evidence regarding Diane Sanchez, the error was nonconstitutional error and we cannot say it is more likely than not that this evidence affected the verdict. The Diane Sanchez evidence is insignificant when considered in light of the evidence of large purchases of methamphetamine precursor chemicals and equipment and what amounted to Alcala-Ramirez's confession after he was arrested. It was this latter evidence, not the Diane Sanchez evidence, or the evidence from the Kenneth Road and Coulterville lab sites, which established Alcala-Ramirez's involvement in the charged conspiracy.

3. Evidence From the Traffic Stop

8

Alcala-Ramirez concedes the lawfulness of the traffic stop, but contends his twenty-minute detention was an arrest requiring a warning under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). We disagree.

9

The duration of Alcala-Ramirez's detention and questioning was limited to the time necessary for the officers to conduct a consensual search and write citations. During this time, the officers merely detained Alcala-Ramirez. He was never "in custody," thus no Miranda warning was required. The district court did not err by admitting the evidence obtained during the traffic stop.

10

4. Type and Quantity of Methamphetamine Used for Sentencing

11

The government elicited expert testimony on the predominance of D-methamphetamine production and introduced evidence of precursor chemical analysis consistent only with the production of D-methamphetamine. This evidence was sufficient to support the district court's finding that the chemicals were to be used to produce D-methamphetamine.

12

Because the district court did not commit clear error when finding that the conspirators were engaged in the production of D-methamphetamine, Alcala-Ramirez's challenge to the district court's drug quantity calculation fails. Even if we were to limit the drug quantity calculation to the amount of D-methamphetamine which could be produced solely from Alcala-Ramirez's purchases of precursor chemicals, that amount would exceed three kilograms of D-methamphetamine, supporting a base offense level of 38. USSG § 2D1.1 §§ (a)(3), (c)(1), comment. (n. 12) (1995).

13

AFFIRMED.

**

The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for disposition without oral argument. Fed.R.App.P. 34(a); 9th Cir.R. 34-4

*

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3