Freeman v. First Union Nat'l, 329 F.3d 1231 (1st Cir. 2003). · Go Syfert
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Freeman v. First Union Nat'l, 329 F.3d 1231 (1st Cir. 2003). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
55 citation events (55 in the last 25 years) across 13 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Lana Patrick v. Pasco County Florida Tax Collector (ca11, 2026-06-16)
Treatment trajectory · 2003 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2003 2014 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 29 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lana Patrick v. Pasco County Florida Tax Collector
11th Cir. · 2026 · confidence medium
Whitesell Corp. v. Electrolux Home Prods., Inc., 154 USCA11 Case: 25-14234 Document: 22-1 Date Filed: 06/16/2026 Page: 10 of 19 10 Opinion of the Court 25- 14234 F.4th 1289 , 1293 (11th Cir. 2025); Freeman v. First Union Nat’l., 329 F.3d 1231, 1234 (11th Cir. 2003).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) 600 Cleveland, LLC v. Bank of America, N.A.
M.D. Fla. · 2026 · confidence medium
I must “decide novel questions of state law ‘the way it appears the state’s highest court would.’ ” Freeman v. First Union Nat., 329 F.3d 1231, 1232 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (quoting Ernie Haire Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 260 F.3d 1285 , 1290 (11th Cir. 2001)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gregory Bartko v. John Earles (2×)
11th Cir. · 2024 · confidence medium
Freeman v. First Union Nat’l, 329 F.3d 1231, 1234 (11th Cir. 2003).
cited Cited as authority (rule) De'Carlos Bobby Butler v. State of Georgia
11th Cir. · 2022 · confidence medium
Freeman v. First Union Nat’l, 329 F.3d 1231, 1234 (11th Cir. 2003).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) SE Property Holdings, LLC v. Jerry Wayne Gaddy
11th Cir. · 2020 · confidence medium
But where the lower court denies leave to amend based on futility of the proposed amendment, we review that decision de novo because it is a “conclu[sion] that as a matter of law an amended complaint would necessarily fail.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Freeman 7 Case: 19-11699 Date Filed: 09/29/2020 Page: 8 of 18 v. First Union Nat’l, 329 F.3d 1231, 1234 (11th Cir. 2003)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Craig Bassett v. Governor of Florida
11th Cir. · 2019 · confidence medium
Freeman v. First Union Nat’l, 329 F.3d 1231, 1234 (11th Cir. 2003).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Chris Payne v. DOCO Credit Union
11th Cir. · 2018 · confidence medium
“Judgment on the pleadings is appropriate where there are no material facts in dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (quotations omitted) Although we typically review the denial of a motion to amend a complaint for an abuse of discretion, “when the district court denies the plaintiff leave to amend due to futility, we review the denial de novo because [the district court] is concluding that as a matter of law an amended complaint ‘would necessarily fail.’” Freeman v. First Union Nat’l, 329 F.3d 1231, 1234 (11th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted)…
cited Cited as authority (rule) K.A. v. Renee Waters
11th Cir. · 2011 · confidence medium
Freeman, 329 F.3d at 1235.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Andrzej Madura v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.
11th Cir. · 2009 · confidence medium
Freeman v. First Union Nat’l, 329 F.3d 1231, 1234 (11th Cir. 2003).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Bravo v. United States
11th Cir. · 2008 · confidence medium
Freeman v. First Union Nat'l, 329 F.3d 1231, 1232 (11th Cir. 2003).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Freeman v. First Union Nat. Bank (2×)
Fla. · 2004 · confidence medium
Freeman v. First Union Nat'l, 329 F.3d 1231, 1234 (11th Cir.2003).
cited Cited "see" William Quinn v. Secretary of State, State of Georgia
11th Cir. · 2026 · signal: see · confidence high
See Freeman v. First Union Nat’l, 329 F.3d 1231, 1234 (11th Cir. 2003).
cited Cited "see" SE Property Holdings, LLC v. Neverve LLC
11th Cir. · 2023 · signal: see · confidence high
See Freeman v. First Union Nat’l, 329 F.3d 1231 , 1233–34 (11th Cir. 2003).
discussed Cited "see" Alexander Industries, LLC v. Town of Holly Ridge, North Carolina
E.D.N.C. · 2021 · signal: see · confidence high
As the United States Supreme Court has held, “[t]he rule that subject-matter jurisdiction depends on the state of things at the time of the action brought, does not suggest a different interpretation . . . when a plaintiff files a complaint in federal court and then voluntarily amends the complaint, courts look to the amended complaint to determine jurisdiction.” Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S. 457 , 473–74 (2007) (internal quotations and citations omitted); see Freeman v. First Union Nat., 329 F.3d 1231, 1235 (11th Cir. 2003), (“[Plaintiffs] should have been given th…
discussed Cited "see" A.W. v. Jennifer Box
11th Cir. · 2018 · signal: see · confidence high
See Freeman v. First Union Nat’l, 329 F.3d 1231, 1234 (11th Cir. 2003) (analyzing whether leave to amend should have been granted under Rule 15 even though the defect at issue implicated Article III standing); see also In re Engle Cases, 767 F.3d 1082 , 1108 n.30 (11th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he Rule 17 and Rule 15 issues 8 Case: 18-10534 Date Filed: 08/09/2018 Page: 9 of 10 presented are procedural and do not require us to pass judgment on the merits of the underlying claims.”).
cited Cited "see" Tiara Condominium Ass'n v. Marsh, USA, Inc.
S.D. Fla. · 2014 · signal: see · confidence high
See Freeman v. First Union Nat’l, 329 F.3d 1231 (11th Cir.2003).
cited Cited "see" Cathy Jackson-Platts v. General Electric Capital Corporation
11th Cir. · 2013 · signal: see · confidence high
See Freeman v. First Union Nat’l, 329 F.3d 1231, 1233-34 (11th Cir.2003) (certifying Florida UFTA question to Florida Supreme Court because district court exercised diversity jurisdiction).
cited Cited "see" Laddin Ex Rel. Liquidating Trust of the Estate of Verilink Corp. v. Powell Goldstein, LLP (In Re Verilink Corp.)
N.D. Ala. · 2009 · signal: see · confidence high
See Freeman v. First Union Nat’l, *701 329 F.3d 1231, 1234 (11th Cir.2003).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Sensient Colors, Inc.
D.N.J. · 2009 · signal: see · confidence high
See Freeman v. First Union Nat'l, 329 F.3d 1231 , 1234 (11th Cir.2003) (”[W]hen the district court denies the plaintiff leave to amend due to futility, we review the denial de novo because it is concluding that as a matter of law an amended complaint ‘would necessarily fail.’ ”); American Ins.
discussed Cited "see" In Re Adams Golf, Inc. Securities Litigation
3rd Cir. · 2004 · signal: see · confidence high
See Freeman v. First Union Nat’l, 329 F.3d 1231 , 1234 (11th Cir.2003) ("[W]hen the district court denies the plaintiff leave to amend due to futility, we review the denial de novo because it is concluding that as a matter of law an amended complaint 'would necessarily fail.' ” (quoting St.
discussed Cited "see" In Re: Adams Golf, Inc. Securities Litigation F. Kenneth Shockley, M.D. David Shockley Todd Tonore Zane Bianacci Patricia Craus Terry Linville Larry Price Federated National Insurance Company, on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated
3rd Cir. · 2004 · signal: see · confidence high
See Freeman v. First Union Nat'l, 329 F.3d 1231 , 1234 (11th Cir.2003) ("[W]hen the district court denies the plaintiff leave to amend due to futility, we review the denial de novo because it is concluding that as a matter of law an amended complaint `would necessarily fail.'" (quoting St.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Engle Cases 4432 Individual Tobacco v. Various Tobacco Companies
11th Cir. · 2014 · signal: see also · confidence low
See Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 431 , 127 S.Ct. 1184, 1192 , 167 L.Ed.2d 15 (2007) ("[A] federal court has leeway ‘to choose among threshold grounds for denying audience to a case on the merits.’ ” (quoting Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 584 , 119 S.Ct. 1563, 1570 , 143 L.Ed.2d 760 (1999))); see also Freeman v. First Union Nat’l, 329 F.3d 1231 , 1234 (11th Cir.2003) (analyzing whether leave to amend should have been granted under Rule 15 even though the defect at issue implicated Article III standing). 31 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Menotte
S.D. Fla. · 2012 · signal: see also · confidence low
See In re Venice-Oxford Assocs., 236 B.R. 820, 834 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1999) (analyzing transfers under Fla. Stat. § 726.105 and § 726.106 contemporaneously with 11 USC § 548 ); see also Freeman v. First Union Nat., 329 F.3d 1231 , 1233 (11th Cir.2003).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Pease v. MAIN TURBO SYSTEMS
M.D. Penn. · 2011 · signal: see also · confidence medium
When the state’s highest court has not addressed the issue, the federal court must predict its holding.” Borman v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 960 F.2d 327, 331 (3d Cir.1992) (internal citations omitted); see also Freeman v. First Union Nat’l, 329 F.3d 1231, 1232 (11th Cir.2003) (“We decide novel questions of state law ‘the way it appears the state’s highest court would.’”) (quoting Ernie Haire Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 260 F.3d 1285 , 1290 (11th Cir.2001)).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." North Star Capital Acquisitions, LLC v. Krig
M.D. Fla. · 2009 · signal: see also · confidence low
Accordingly, the Court must determine this novel state law issue, unaddressed by the Florida intermediate appellate courts, “the way it appears the state’s highest court would.” See Ernie Haire Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 260 F.3d 1285 , 1290 (11th Cir.1991); see also Freeman v. First Union Nat., 329 F.3d 1231 , 1232 (11th Cir.2003) (“A lack of explicit Florida case law on an issue does not absolve us of our duty to decide what the state courts would hold if faced with it.”) (internal citation and quotation omitted).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Eberhard v. Marcu
2d Cir. · 2008 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Freeman v. First Union Nat’l, 329 F.3d 1231, 1233-34 (11th Cir.2003) (certifying to Supreme Court of Florida the question of whether Florida law supports a claim by plaintiffs, including a federal receiver, for aiding and abetting a fraudulent transfer); Scholes, 56 F.3d at 753 (“The law under which the receiver proceeded is the Illinois law of fraudulent conveyances as it stood in 1989.”).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Eberhard v. Marcu
2d Cir. · 2008 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Freeman v. 11 First Union Nat’l, 329 F.3d 1231, 1233-34 (11th Cir. 2003) (certifying to Supreme Court of 12 Florida the question of whether Florida law supports a claim by plaintiffs, including a federal 13 receiver, for aiding and abetting a fraudulent transfer); Scholes, 56 F.3d at 753 (“The law under 14 which the receiver proceeded is the Illinois law of fraudulent conveyances as it stood in 1989.”). 15 In fact, some federal receivers have enjoyed the benefit of state statutes imposing looser standing 16 requirements.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Dfs Secured Healthcare Receivables Trust v. Caregivers Great Lakes, Inc. And Marc Leestma
7th Cir. · 2004 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Freeman v. First Union Nat’l, 329 F.3d 1231, 1234 (11th Cir.2003) (citing Hansard Construction Corp. v. Rite Aid of Florida, Inc., 783 So.2d 307 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2001) (“Despite the fact that the other remedies set forth in the Act are equitable in nature, we find this catchall provision sufficiently broad to encompass the monetary judgment sought by appellants.”)); Morris v. Askeland Enters., Inc., 17 P.3d 830, 833 (Col.Ct.App.2000) (“[A] court acting in equity always retains the power to enter a monetary award to implement its decree .... ”); Profeta v. Lombardo, 75 Ohio…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Georgia Receivables v. Caregivers Great Lak
7th Cir. · 2004 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Freeman v. First Union Nat’l, 329 F.3d 1231, 1234 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing Hansard Construction Corp. v. Rite Aid of Florida, Inc., 783 So.2d 308 (Fla. Dist.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Lewis B. Freeman, as Receiver of Unique Gems Int'l Corp., Lucy Martinez, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated
v.
First Union National, a National Banking Association F.K.A. First Union National Bank of Florida, N.A., Hector Ponte, an Individual
02-11559.
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
May 7, 2003.
329 F.3d 1231
Cited by 7 opinions  |  Published

329 F.3d 1231

Lewis B. FREEMAN, as Receiver of Unique Gems Int'l Corp., Lucy Martinez, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
FIRST UNION NATIONAL, a National Banking Association f.k.a. First Union National Bank of Florida, N.A., Defendant-Appellee,
Hector Ponte, an individual, Defendant.

No. 02-11559.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

May 7, 2003.

Patrice A. Talisman, Hersch & Talisman, P.A., Carol Cox Berk, Mishan, Sloto, Hoffman & Greenberg, Miami, FL, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Elliot H. Scherker, Greenberg, Traurig, Hoffman, Lipoff, Rosen & Quentel, P.A., Miami, FL, for Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.

Before BARKETT and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges, and FULLAM[*], District Judge.

PER CURIAM:

[*~1231]1

Lewis B. Freeman, court-appointed receiver for Unique Gems International Corp. ("Unique Gems"), and Lucy Martinez, class representative of Unique Gems' creditors ("the Creditor Plaintiffs"), appeal the district court's dismissal of their claims against First Union National Bank ("First Union") for its alleged participation in a fraudulent Ponzi scheme perpetrated by the principals of Unique Gems. The district court dismissed, with prejudice, Freeman and the Creditor Plaintiffs' jointly-filed aiding and abetting a fraudulent transfer claim for failure to state a cause of action under Florida law. The court similarly dismissed Freeman's individually asserted negligence claim for lack of standing. On appeal, Freeman and the Creditor Plaintiffs argue (1) that the Florida courts would recognize their aiding and abetting claim as a valid cause of action and (2) that the district court should have granted their motion to amend the complaint to cure any standing deficiencies concerning the negligence count. Because we are unsure of whether Florida law contemplates a cause of action for aiding and abetting a fraudulent transfer, we certify the question to the Florida Supreme Court. In addition, we reverse the district court's denial of the Creditor Plaintiffs' motion to amend because their proposed modification would cure the standing deficiency.

2

I. AIDING AND ABETTING A FRAUDULENT TRANSFER UNDER FLORIDA STATE LAW

3

The jointly-filed aiding and abetting claim is problematic because the lower Florida courts have not expressly approved such a cause of action[1] and the Florida Supreme Court has not yet examined this question. We decide novel questions of state law "the way it appears the state's highest court would." Ernie Haire Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 260 F.3d 1285, 1290 (11th Cir.2001). "Where the state's highest court has not spoken to an issue, a federal court `must adhere to the decisions of the state's intermediate appellate courts absent some persuasive indication that the state's highest court would decide the issue otherwise.'" Id. (quoting Insurance Co. of North America v. Lexow, 937 F.2d 569, 571 (11th Cir.1991)). A lack of explicit Florida case law on an issue does not absolve us of our duty "to decide what the state courts would hold if faced with it." Arceneaux v. Texaco, Inc., 623 F.2d 924, 926 (5th Cir.1980)[2] (citations omitted). "The issue is not resolved merely by a determination that it has not yet arisen." Id. But under Florida law, we may certify a question on the law of the state if the case turns upon it and there are no clear controlling Florida Supreme Court precedents. See Fla. Const. art. V, § 3(b)(6); Fla. Stat. § 25.031 (2002).

4

The district court concluded that the Florida Supreme Court would not recognize a cause of action for aiding and abetting fraudulent transfers, noting a dearth of case law supporting such a claim. It noted that Florida's Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act ("FUFTA"), Fla. Stat. §§ 726.101 et seq. (2002), provisions defining fraudulent transfers[3] are similar to 11 U.S.C. § 548 of the Bankruptcy Code. See In re Venice-Oxford Assocs., 236 B.R. 820, 834 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1999). Based on this similarity, the district court surmised that FUFTA, like the fraudulent transfer provision of the Bankruptcy Code, is not a source of liability; rather, it only allows creditors to set aside fraudulent transfers made to transferees under a theory of cancellation. This interpretation has received some support from Florida's Fourth District Court of Appeals, which has explained that:

[*~1232]5

[a] fraudulent conveyance action is simply another creditors' remedy. It is either an action by a creditor against a transferee directed against a particular transaction, which, if declared fraudulent, is set aside thus leaving the creditor free to pursue the asset, or it is an action against a transferee who has received an asset by means of a fraudulent conveyance and should be required to either return the asset or pay for the asset.

6

Yusem v. South Florida Water Mgmt. Dist., 770 So.2d 746, 749 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 4th Dist.2000) (reversing judgment under a FUFTA action against a debtor for his failure to pay a prior judgment amount).

7

However, despite the similarities noted by the district court, FUFTA differs from the bankruptcy model in several important respects. While the Bankruptcy Code limits remedies to the recovery of the transferred property or its value, 11 U.S.C. § 550(a) (2001), FUFTA clearly provides additionally for "any other relief the circumstances may require."[4] Fla. Stat. § 726.108 (2002). This catchall phrase grants the court broad equitable powers. See Invo Florida, Inc. v. Somerset Venturer, Inc., 751 So.2d 1263, 1267 (Fla.Dist.Ct. App.3d Dist.2000) (noting that the court's equitable powers are more extensive than what is available under a breach of contract action). Remedies under FUFTA are, therefore, not limited to setting aside a transfer or forcing disgorgement. See Hansard Constr. Corp. v. Rite Aid of Florida, Inc., 783 So.2d 307, 308 (Fla.Dist.Ct. App. 4th Dist.2001) (holding that FUFTA's catchall phrase allows plaintiffs to seek money damages). In addition, FUFTA unambiguously states that all common law remedies supplement its application.[5] See Invo, 751 So.2d at 1267 (citing Fla. Stat. § 726.111 (2002)). Together these provisions suggest that Florida's fraudulent transfer laws are much less circumscribed outside the bankruptcy context. And in contrast to the district court's interpretation, Florida's Third District Court of Appeals has treated an action for fraudulent transfer as a tort. See id. at 1265.

8

Because of the conflicting guidance from the intermediate appellate courts on the nature of FUFTA, its remedies, and its relationship to the Bankruptcy Code, we find it difficult to predict how the Florida Supreme Court would decide this issue. We, therefore, conclude that this case involves unanswered questions of state law that are determinative of this appeal and, having found no clear, controlling precedent in the decisions of the state's highest court, we certify the following question of law to the Supreme Court of Florida for instructions:

9

Under Florida law, is there a cause of action for aiding and abetting a fraudulent transfer when the alleged aiderabettor is not a transferee?

[*~1233]10

Our particular phrasing of the question is not intended to limit the Florida Supreme Court's inquiry, and any assistance the court may offer, should it decide to accept this certification, is appreciated. The entire record in this case, together with copies of the briefs, shall be transmitted herewith to the Supreme Court of Florida.

11

II. DISMISSAL OF THE NEGLIGENCE CLAIM FOR LACK OF STANDING

A. Standard of Review

12

We review de novo the dismissal of a complaint for lack of standing. See Piazza v. Ebsco Indus., 273 F.3d 1341, 1345 (11th Cir.2001). A district court's ruling on leave to amend is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Burger King Corp. v. Weaver, 169 F.3d 1310, 1315 (11th Cir. 1999). However, when the district court denies the plaintiff leave to amend due to futility, we review the denial de novo because it is concluding that as a matter of law an amended complaint "would necessarily fail." St. Charles Foods, Inc. v. America's Favorite Chicken Co., 198 F.3d 815, 822 (11th Cir.1999).

B. Standing

13

Freeman and the Creditor Plaintiffs jointly filed the Second Amended Complaint at issue in this case. However, Count VI of that complaint, which the district court dismissed for lack of standing, alleged common law negligence "as to the receiver only against First Union only." Thus, in Count VI, Freeman alone asserted that First Union negligently facilitated the continued operation of the Ponzi scheme, even after it knew or should have known that the business was illegal. The district court concluded that, as the receiver for Unique Gems, Freeman held no power to pursue claims on behalf of the company's creditors. In response to the district court's finding that Freeman lacked standing, both Freeman and the Creditor Plaintiffs sought leave to amend the complaint to cure the defect. The district court denied their motion to amend, holding that no cure was possible.

14

We agree with the district court that Freeman, as receiver, could not successfully amend as to the negligence claim. However, we also agree with the Creditor Plaintiffs that they should have been given the opportunity to cure the standing defect as to any claim they may have on behalf of Ms. Martinez and the class of creditors harmed by Unique Gems' Ponzi scheme. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court erred in denying as futile the Creditor Plaintiffs' motion to amend the complaint. See St. Charles Foods, 198 F.3d at 822. We, therefore, REVERSE with instructions that the Creditor Plaintiffs be granted leave to amend Count VI of the complaint. We AFFIRM the district court's denial with regard to Freeman.

III. CONCLUSION

[*~1234]15

Based on the foregoing, we AFFIRM in part, REVERSE in part, and REMAND in part the negligence claim to the district court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. QUESTION CERTIFIED to the Florida Supreme Court on aiding and abetting liability.

Notes:

*

Honorable John Fullam, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation

1

The issue is currently pending before the Florida Second District Court of Appeals inFreeman v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., Case No. 2D01-4195, 4202.

2

InBonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir.1981) (en banc), the Eleventh Circuit adopted as binding precedent all Fifth Circuit decisions handed down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981.

3

The relevant portions of FUFTA provide that:

(1) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor, whether the creditor's claim arose before or after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred, if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation:

(a) With actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor;

Fla. Stat. § 726.105 (2002);

(1) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor whose claim arose before the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or obligation and the debtor was insolvent at that time or the debtor became insolvent as a result of the transfer or obligation.

(2) A transfer made by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor whose claim arose before the transfer was made if the transfer was made to an insider for an antecedent debt, the debtor was insolvent at that time, and the insider had reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent.

Fla. Stat. § 726.106 (2002).

4

Fla. Stat. § 726.108 (2002) provides the following remedies of creditors:

(1) ... (a) Avoidance of the transfer or obligation to the extent necessary to satisfy the creditor's claim;

(b) An attachment or other provisional remedy against the asset transferred or other property of the transferee in accordance with applicable law;

(c) Subject to applicable principles of equity and in accordance with applicable rules of civil procedure:

1

An injunction against further disposition by the debtor or a transferee, or both, of the asset transferred or of other property;

2

Appointment of a receiver to take charge of the asset transferred or of other property of the transferee; or

3

Any other relief the circumstances may require

5

Fla. Stat. § 726.111 reads:

Unless displaced by the provisions of ss. 726.101-726.112, the principles of law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relating to principal and agent, estoppel, laches, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, insolvency, or other validating or invalidating cause, supplement those provisions.