James Callahan v. Donal Campbell, 427 F.3d 897 (11th Cir. 2005). · Go Syfert
James Callahan v. Donal Campbell, 427 F.3d 897 (11th Cir. 2005). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“wben a defendant challenges a death sentence, we evaluate the totality of the available mitigation evidence - both that adduced at trial, and the evidence adduced in the habeas proceeding - and reweigh it against the evidence in aggravation.”
222 citation events (220 in the last 25 years) across 16 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Ford v. Schofield (gand, 2007-05-11)
Treatment trajectory · 2005 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2005 2015 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Ford v. Schofield (3×) also: Cited "see", Cited "see, e.g."
N.D. Ga. · 2007 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
wben a defendant challenges a death sentence, we evaluate the totality of the available mitigation evidence - both that adduced at trial, and the evidence adduced in the habeas proceeding - and reweigh it against the evidence in aggravation.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Fernandez v. Secretary, Department of Corrections
M.D. Fla. · 2019 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
he alabama court of criminal appeals has already answered the question of what would have happened had objected to the introduction of callahan's statements ... therefore, was not ineffective for failing to make that objection.
cited Cited as authority (rule) McCarthy v. Secretary, Department of Corrections (Polk County)
M.D. Fla. · 2022 · confidence medium
See Pinkney, 876 F.3d at 1295 ; Callahan, 427 F.3d at 932.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Loftin v. Secretary, Department of Corrections
M.D. Fla. · 2022 · confidence medium
This Court must defer to the state court’s determination that an objection would have failed. , 876 F.3d at 1295 ; , 427 F.3d at 932.6 Loftin has not shown that the state court’s decision involved an unreasonable application of or was based on an unreasonable factual determination.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bradley v. Secretary, Department of Corrections (Pasco County) (2×)
M.D. Fla. · 2021 · confidence medium
Additionally, as addressed in Ground One, to the extent Bradley’s ineffective assistance claim turns on an interpretation of state law governing charging documents, this Court must defer to the state court’s determination that counsel was not ineffective in failing to raise a state law challenge. , 876 F.3d at 1295 ; , 427 F.3d at 932.
examined Cited as authority (rule) Cook v. Secretary, Department of Corrections (Pinellas County) (3×)
M.D. Fla. · 2021 · confidence medium
See Pinkney, 876 F.3d at 1295 ; Callahan, 427 F.3d at 932.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Mansell v. Secretary, Department of Corrections (Hillsborough County)
M.D. Fla. · 2021 · confidence medium
This Court must defer to that determination of state law. 7 The Court notes that the prosecutor referred to the victim as “little [J.], 11 years old,” not as a “poor little girl.” (Doc. 12-3, Ex. 1d, p. 594.) , 876 F.3d at 1295 ; , 427 F.3d at 932.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Ibarra v. Secretary, Department of Corrections (Pasco County)
M.D. Fla. · 2021 · confidence medium
See Pinkney, 876 F.3d at 1295 ; Callahan, 427 F.3d at 932.
examined Cited as authority (rule) Norman v. Secretary, Department of Corrections (Polk County) (3×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
M.D. Fla. · 2020 · confidence medium
See Herring, 397 F.3d at 1354–55; Callahan, 427 F.3d at 932.
examined Cited as authority (rule) Derrick Anthony DeBruce v. Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections (3×) also: Cited "see"
11th Cir. · 2014 · confidence medium
Id. at 938-39 (Wilson, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Fred Anderson, Jr. v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections (2×)
11th Cir. · 2014 · confidence medium
Although evidence of sexual abuse may constitute a mitigating circumstance, “[w]hen a defendant is several decades removed from the abuse being offered as mitigation evidence its value is minimal.” Callahan, 427 F.3d at 937.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Carl Puiatti v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections (2×)
11th Cir. · 2013 · confidence medium
Callahan, 427 F.3d at 938.18 We noted “the burden a defendant faces when trying to overcome . . . harsh aggravating factors with mitigating evidence.” Id.
examined Cited as authority (rule) Carl Puiatti v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections (4×)
11th Cir. · 2013 · confidence medium
Callahan, 427 F.3d at 938.18 We noted “the burden a defendant faces when trying to overcome . . . harsh aggravating factors with mitigating evidence.” Id.
examined Cited as authority (rule) Robert Wayne Holsey v. Warden, Georgia Diagonstic Prison (4×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
11th Cir. · 2012 · confidence medium
See Sochor, 685 F.3d at 1030-33 (holding that a petitioner did not establish the prejudice prong of Strickland in part because there was strong evidence of the aggravating circumstance that the murder was “especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel”); Rose v. McNeil, 634 F.3d 1224, 1242 (11th Cir.2011) (holding that a petitioner did not establish the prejudice prong of Strickland in part because there was “substantial evidence in aggravation”); Callahan, 427 F.3d at 938 (holding that strong aggravation “demonstrates the burden a defendant faces when trying to overcome ... harsh aggrava…
examined Cited as authority (rule) Robert Wayne Holsey v. Warden, Georgia Diagonstic Prison (4×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
11th Cir. · 2012 · confidence medium
See Sochor, 685 F.3d at 1030–33 (holding that a petitioner did not establish the prejudice prong of Strickland in part because there was strong evidence of the aggravating circumstance that the murder was “especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel”); Rose v. McNeil, 634 F.3d 1224, 1242 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding that a petitioner did not establish the prejudice prong of Strickland in part because there was “substantial evidence in aggravation”); Callahan, 427 F.3d at 938 (holding that strong aggravation “demonstrates the burden a defendant faces when trying to overcome . . . harsh ag…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Stephen Toliver v. Gary McCaughtry
7th Cir. · 2012 · confidence medium
This task is made difficult by the fact that Lewis's trial counsel is deceased[],...”); Callahan v. Campbell, 427 F.3d 897, 933 (11th Cir.2005) (presuming that counsel, who had died, exercised reasonable professional judgment where there was “no evidence of what he did to prepare”). 21 .
examined Cited as authority (rule) Wood v. Allen (6×)
11th Cir. · 2008 · confidence medium
Callahan, 427 F.3d at 933.
examined Cited as authority (rule) Davis v. Jones (6×) also: Cited "see"
11th Cir. · 2007 · confidence medium
In Callahan, this Court briefly discussed and agreed with the Third Circuit’s decision in Johnson , noting that “the Third Circuit was asked to read Murchison as holding that the appearance of bias violated the Due Process Clause.” Callahan, 427 F.3d at 928.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Mark Gauthier v. Pat Mekusker (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
11th Cir. · 2006 · confidence medium
Indeed, a successful petitioner must show that "no competent counsel would have taken the action that his counsel did take.” See Callahan, 427 F.3d at 933 (quotation omitted). 11 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) Linda Michael v. James Crosby
11th Cir. · 2005 · confidence medium
Callahan, 427 F.3d at 933 (citation and quotation marks omitted; emphasis added).
discussed Cited "see" Laney v. Secretary, Department of Corrections (Polk County)
M.D. Fla. · 2025 · signal: see · confidence high
See Callahan v. Campbell, 427 F.3d 897 , 932 (11th Cir. 2005) (Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals had answered the question of what would have happened had counsel objected to the introduction of Petitioner’s statements based on state decisions; the objection would have been overruled; therefore, counsel was not ineffective for failing to make that objection).
discussed Cited "see" Jimmy Davis, Jr. v. Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections
11th Cir. · 2024 · signal: see · confidence high
See Callahan v. Campbell, 427 F.3d 897 , 937 (11th Cir. 2005) (concluding that the fact that none of the defendant’s siblings had committed violent crimes “reduc[ed] the value of abuse as mitigating evidence”); Grayson v. Thompson, 257 F.3d 1194, 1227 (11th Cir. 2001) (“The fact that [the defendant] was the only child to commit such a heinous crime also may have undermined defense efforts to use his childhood in mitigation.”); see also Jenkins, 963 F.3d at 1271–72 (explaining no prejudice because sibling’s testimony about childhood abuse and a difficult upbringing could have been…
discussed Cited "see" Morganti v. Florida Attorney General
M.D. Fla. · 2023 · signal: see · confidence high
See Callahan v. Campbell, 427 F.3d 897 , 932 (11th Cir. 2005) (recognizing that Callahan could satisfy neither prong of Strickland from counsel’s “failure to make a losing objection”).
cited Cited "see" Roosevelt Mondesir v. Secretary, Department of Corrections
11th Cir. · 2022 · signal: see · confidence high
See Callahan v. Campbell, 427 F.3d 897 , 932 (11th Cir. 2005).
discussed Cited "see" Brian Carl Richards v. Secretary, Department of Corrections (2×)
11th Cir. · 2022 · signal: see · confidence high
See id.
discussed Cited "see" Ricardo Vega v. Secretary, Department of Corrections (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
11th Cir. · 2021 · signal: see · confidence high
See Callahan v. Campbell, 427 F.3d 897 , 932 (11th Cir. 2005).
examined Cited "see" Lewis v. Secretary, Department of Corrections (Glades County) (3×)
M.D. Fla. · 2021 · signal: see · confidence high
See Callahan, supra. The postconviction court’s application of state law fatally undermines both prongs of Strickland.
discussed Cited "see" Thompson v. Secretary, Department of Corrections
M.D. Fla. · 2021 · signal: see · confidence high
See Callahan v. Campbell, 427 F.3d 897 , 932 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals has already answered the question of what would have happened had [the petitioner’s counsel] objected to the introduction of [the petitioner’s] statements based on [state law] — the objection would have been overruled . . . .
cited Cited "see" Matthew Reeves v. Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections
11th Cir. · 2020 · signal: see · confidence high
See id.
discussed Cited "see" Griffin v. Secretary, Department of Corrections
M.D. Fla. · 2020 · signal: see · confidence high
See Callahan v. Campbell, 427 F.3d 897 , 932 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals has already answered the question of what would have happened had [counsel] objected to the introduction of Callahan’s statements based on [state law]—the objection would have been overruled. . . .
discussed Cited "see" Jones v. Secretary, Department of Corrections
M.D. Fla. · 2020 · signal: see · confidence high
See Callahan v. Campbell, 427 F.3d 897 , 932 (11th Cir. 2005) (Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals had already answered the question of what would have happened had counsel objected to the introduction of petitioner’s statements based on state decisions; the objection would have been overruled; therefore, counsel was not ineffective for failing to make that objection).
discussed Cited "see" Palmer v. Secretary, Department of Corrections (Polk County)
M.D. Fla. · 2020 · signal: see · confidence high
See Callahan v. Campbell, 427 F.3d 897 , 932 (11th Cir. 2005) (Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals had already answered the question of what would have happened had counsel objected to the introduction of petitioner’s statements based on state decisions; the objection would have been overruled; therefore, counsel was not ineffective for failing to make that objection).2 Mr. Palmer has failed to show that the state court’s denial of this claim involved an 2 The Court notes that Mr. Palmer’s testimony, during the defense’s case, established that he was over the age of 18 at the time he com…
examined Cited "see" State of Florida v. Raymond Bright (6×)
Fla. · 2016 · signal: see · confidence high
See 427 F.3d at 932-36.
discussed Cited "see" Ramon Lawrence Parker v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections
11th Cir. · 2014 · signal: see · confidence high
See Callahan v. Campbell, 427 F.3d 897 , 932 (11th Cir.2005) (“It is a fundamental principle that state courts are the final arbiters of state law, and federal habeas courts should not second-guess them on such matters.” (quoting Herring v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 397 F.3d 1338, 1355 (11th Cir.2005))).
cited Cited "see" Derrick Anthony DeBruce v. Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections
11th Cir. · 2014 · signal: see · confidence high
See Callahan v. Campbell, 427 F.3d 897 , 933 (11th Cir. 2005).
discussed Cited "see" Marshall v. State
Ala. Crim. App. · 2014 · signal: see · confidence high
See Callahan v. Campbell, 427 F.3d 897 , 937 (11th Cir.2005) (social worker conceded that none of Callahan’s siblings had committed vio-., lent crimes ‘further reducing the value of abuse as mitigating evidence’); see also, Grayson v. Thompson, 257 F.3d 1194, 1227 (11th Cir.2001) (‘The fact that Grayson was the only child to commit such a heinous crime also may have undermined defense efforts to use his childhood in mitigation.’).
discussed Cited "see" Kelly Renee Gissendaner v. Kathy Seaboldt, Warden, Metro State Prison
11th Cir. · 2013 · signal: see · confidence high
See Callahan v. Campbell, 427 F.3d 897 , 934 (11th Cir. 2005) (noting that, when a defendant “does not display strong evidence of mental problems,” counsel is not even “required to seek an independent evaluation”) (quotation marks omitted).
discussed Cited "see" Kelly Renee Gissendaner v. Kathy Seaboldt, Warden, Metro State Prison
11th Cir. · 2013 · signal: see · confidence high
See Callahan v. Campbell, 427 F.3d 897 , 934 (11th Cir.2005) (noting that, when a defendant “does not display strong evidence of mental problems,” counsel is not even “required to seek an independent evaluation”) (quotation marks omitted).
cited Cited "see" Jimmy Jones v. Secretary, Department of Corrections
11th Cir. · 2012 · signal: see · confidence high
See id.
discussed Cited "see" Shelton v. Secretary, Department of Corrections (2×)
M.D. Fla. · 2011 · signal: see · confidence high
See Callahan v. Campbell, 427 F.3d 897 , 932 (11th Cir.2005).
discussed Cited "see" Means v. Secretary, DOC
11th Cir. · 2011 · signal: see · confidence high
See Callahan v. Campbell, 427 F.3d 897 , 932 (11th Cir. 2005) (denying habeas relief where a state court had explicitly found that the petitioner’s unraised state-law claim lacked merit).
discussed Cited "see" Miller v. State
Ala. Civ. App. · 2011 · signal: see · confidence high
See Callahan v. Campbell, 427 F.3d 897 , 937-38 (11th Cir.2005) (value of evidence regarding childhood abuse ‘minimal’ where defendant was thirty-five when he committed crime); Gilreath v. Head, 234 F.3d 547 , 551 n. 10 (11th Cir.2000) (petitioner not prejudiced when his attorney failed to present evidence concerning his abusive and difficult childhood where petitioner was forty years old when he committed the offense); Mills v. Singletary, 63 F.3d 999, 1025 (11th Cir.1995) (petitioner not denied effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to present evidence concerning abusive …
discussed Cited "see" Childers v. Floyd
11th Cir. · 2011 · signal: see · confidence high
See Callahan v. Campbell, 427 F.3d 897 , 930 (11th Cir. 2005) (focusing on the specific facts of Supreme Court precedent, rather than the Court’s general language, to determine clearly established Supreme Court precedent).
discussed Cited "see" Childers v. Floyd
11th Cir. · 2011 · signal: see · confidence high
See Callahan v. Campbell, 427 F.3d 897 , 930 (11th Cir. 2005) (focusing on the specific facts of Supreme Court precedent, rather than the Court’s general language, to determine clearly established Supreme Court precedent).
discussed Cited "see" Childers v. Floyd
11th Cir. · 2011 · signal: see · confidence high
See Callahan v. Campbell, 427 F.3d 897 , 930 (11th Cir. 2005) (focusing on the specific facts of Supreme Court precedent, rather than the Court’s general language, to determine clearly established Supreme Court precedent).
discussed Cited "see" Sabillo v. Secretary, Department of Corrections
11th Cir. · 2009 · signal: see · confidence high
See Callahan v. Campbell, 427 F.3d 897 , 932 (11th Cir.2005) (“ ‘It is a fundamental principle that state courts are the final arbiters of state law, and federal habeas courts should not second-guess them on such matters.’ ” (quoting Herring v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr, 397 F.3d 1338, 1355 (11th Cir.2005))).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Orr
S.D. Iowa · 2009 · signal: accord · confidence high
Accord Callahan v. Campbell, 427 F.3d 897 , 932 (11th Cir.2005) (attorney’s performance could not be “deficient” based on his failure to raise objection that would have been overruled, nor could petitioner have suffered any “prejudice” as result).
discussed Cited "see" Jefferson v. Hall (2×)
11th Cir. · 2009 · signal: see · confidence high
See Callahan v. Campbell, 427 F.3d 897 , 935 (11th Cir.2005) (recognizing mercy as a reasonable defense in the penalty phase).
discussed Cited "see" Williams v. Allen (2×)
11th Cir. · 2008 · signal: see · confidence high
See Callahan v. Campbell, 427 F.3d 897 , 935 (11th Cir.2005).
discussed Cited "see" Caperton v. AT Massey Coal Co., Inc. (2×)
W. Va. · 2008 · signal: accord · confidence high
As recently recognized by the Third Circuit, no decision "has held or clearly established that an appearance of bias on the part of a judge, without more, violates the Due Process Clause." Johnson v. Carroll, 369 F.3d 253, 262 (3d Cir.2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 924 , 125 S.Ct. 1639 , 161 L.Ed.2d 483 (2005); accord Callahan v. Campbell, 427 F.3d 897 , 928-29 (11th Cir.2005); Del Vecchio v. Illinois Dept. of Corrections, 31 F.3d 1363, 1371-82 (7th Cir.1994) ( en banc ).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
James Callahan
v.
Donal Campbell
04-12009.
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
Jan 18, 2005.
427 F.3d 897

396 F.3d 1287

James CALLAHAN, Petitioner-Appellee,
v.
Donal CAMPBELL, Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections, Attorney General of Alabama, Respondents-Appellants.

No. 04-12009.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

January 18, 2005.

J. Clayton Crenshaw, Montgomery, AL, for Respondents-Appellants.

M. Bradley Almond (Court-Appointed), M. Bradley Almond, LLC, Tuscaloosa, AL, Randall S. Susskind (Court-Appointed), Equal Justice Initiative of Alabama, Montgomery, AL, for Petitioner-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama.

Before: TJOFLAT, BLACK and WILSON, Circuit Judges.

BY THE COURT:

[*~897]1

The amended habeas corpus petition in this case presented numerous constitutional claims. On October 18, 2002, the magistrate judge addressed nine claims and issued a report and recommendation denying relief on all counts.[1] Petitioner objected to the report and recommendation as to eight of his claims.[2] The district court granted the petition, but only addressed the merits of two issues.[3] Subsequently, the court granted a certificate of appealability on all successfully preserved issues (eight) despite having addressed only two.

[*~906]2

In Clisby v. Jones, this Court "express[ed] our deep concern over the piecemeal litigation of federal habeas petitions filed by state prisoners, as exemplified by the district court's failure to resolve all claims in this case." 960 F.2d 925, 935 (11th Cir.1992) (en banc). When a district court does not address all such claims, we "will vacate the district court's judgment without prejudice and remand the case for consideration of all remaining claims whenever the district court has not resolved all such claims." Id. at 938.

[*~910]3

We therefore vacate the district court's judgment without prejudice, vacate the certificate of appealability, and remand with instructions that the district court rule on the merits of the following eight claims:

[*~913]4

(1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel due to his trial counsel's failure to object to the admission of his statements;

[*~915]5

(2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing due to his counsel's failure to investigate and present additional mitigating evidence;

[*~918]6

(3) the trial judge's failure to recuse himself violated his Sixth Amendment and due process rights to a fair trial;

[*~919]7

(4) the jury improperly considered extraneous evidence;

[*~921]8

(5) he was deprived of a fair trial because one of the jurors failed to accurately answer voir dire questions;

[*~923]9

(6) his statements should have not been admitted because they were involuntary and were obtained in violation of the right to counsel;

[*~925]10

(7) he was deprived of the right to a fair trial by the State's racially discriminatory use of its peremptory challenges; and

[*~928]11

(8) he received ineffective assistance of counsel due to his trial counsel's failure to object to the state's racially discriminatory use of its peremptory challenges.

[*~935]12

After ruling on the merits, the district court shall determine on which, if any, of petitioner's claims to grant a certificate of appealability. Realizing the issues have already been fully briefed and presented to the district court, the district court shall enter its judgment and certificate of appealability ruling within thirty days of the date of this Order.

[*~938]13

Accordingly, this case is REMANDED for the limited purposes as stated above and the Court retains jurisdiction over the appeal.

Notes:

1

The magistrate addressed petitioner's claims that: (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel due to his trial counsel's failure to object to the admission of his statements; (2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing due to his counsel's failure to investigate and present additional mitigating evidence; (3) the trial judge's failure to recuse himself violated his Sixth Amendment and due process rights to a fair trial; (4) the jury improperly considered extraneous evidence; (5) he was deprived of a fair trial because one of the jurors failed to accurately answer voir dire questions; (6) his statements should have not been admitted because they were involuntary and were obtained in violation of the right to counsel; (7) Alabama's method of execution is unconstitutional; (8) he was deprived of the right to a fair trial by the State's racially discriminatory use of its peremptory challenges; and (9) he received ineffective assistance of counsel due to his trial counsel's failure to object to the state's racially discriminatory use of its peremptory challenges

2

Petitioner did not object to the magistrate's finding that Alabama's method of execution was constitutional. We also note the State objected to the magistrate's failure to find petitioner's claim of error that was based on a juror's failure to answer voir dire questions accurately to be procedurally barred

3

The district court addressed: (1) petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing claim (the second issue addressed by the magistrate) and (2) petitioner's claims based on the trial judge's failure to recuse himself (the third issue addressed by the magistrate)