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Positive treatment
Trending · 56 recent citers
Quoted verbatim 1×
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“we employ this categorical approach because of the statute's terms: it asks whether committed 'an offense' that . . . 'by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used.”
Treatment trajectory · 2013 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
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2019
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 47 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
examined
Cited as authority (quoted)
United States v. Joseph Simms
(3×)
also: Cited as authority (rule)
we employ this categorical approach because of the statute's terms: it asks whether committed 'an offense' that . . . 'by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. John Armstrong, Jr.
United States v. McGuire, 706 F.3d 1333, 1336 (11th Cir. 2013).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Elliott
See id. (citing United States v. Doggart, 947 F.3d 879 , 887–88 (6th Cir. 2020) (holding explosives “generate force capable of causing . . . damage to property,” and “because fire is itself a physical force that causes physical damage too, the intentional setting of fire to . . . [buildings] necessarily has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.” (quotations and citations omitted)); United States v. McGuire, 706 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 2013) (holding that setting fire to an aircraft to damage or destroy it is “unmistakably violent” and quali…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Arthur Darby, Jr. v. United States
United States v. McGuire, 706 F.3d 1333, 1336 (11th Cir. 2013), overruled on other grounds by Ovalles v. United States, 905 F.3d 1231 (11th Cir. 2018) (en banc); United States v. Lockley, 632 F.3d 1238, 1240 (11th Cir. 2011). 2 Case: 19-14760 Date Filed: 09/02/2020 Page: 3 of 4 offense or satisfied that statute’s elements clause.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Godwin v. United States of America (INMATE 3)
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
Whether a particular offense constitutes a crime of violence under § 924(c)’s elements clause is a question of law that a court “must answer ‘categorically’--that is, by reference to the elements of the offense, and not the actual facts of [a defendant’s] conduct.” United States v. McGuire, 706 F.3d 1333, 1336-37 (11th Cir. 2013), overruled on other grounds by Ovalles v. United States, 905 F.3d 1231, 1234 (11th Cir. 2018) (en banc), abrogated on other 11 grounds by Davis, 139 S. Ct. at 2325-33 .
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Jerad Hanks
United States v. McGuire, 706 F.3d 1333, 1336 (11th Cir. 2013).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Marcos Henderson
United States v. McGuire, 706 F.3d 1333, 1336 (11th Cir. 2013), overruled in part on other grounds by Ovalles v. United States, 905 F.3d 1231, 1234 (11th Cir. 2018) (en banc), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2716 (2019), and abrogated by Davis, 139 S. Ct. at 2336 .
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Dane Gillis
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
Compare 18 U.S.C. § 924 (c)(3)(B) and 18 U.S.C. § 924 (e)(2)(B)(ii), with 18 U.S.C. § 373 (a). 26 Case: 16-16482 Date Filed: 09/13/2019 Page: 27 of 80 threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another.’” McGuire, 706 F.3d at 1336 (first emphasis added).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Rico Remon Washington
United States v. McGuire, 706 F.3d 1333, 1336 (11th Cir. 2013), overruled on other grounds by Ovalles v. United States, 905 F.3d 1231 (11th Cir. 2018) (en banc).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Emmanuel Petit Frere
United States v. McGuire, 706 F.3d 1333, 1336 (11th Cir. 2013), overruled on other grounds by Ovalles II, 905 F.3d at 1253 .
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Todd Erling Becker
United States v. McGuire, 706 F.3d 1333, 1336 (11th Cir. 2013), overruled on other grounds by Ovalles v. United States, 905 F.3d 1231 (11th Cir. 2018) (en banc).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Irma Ovalles v. United States
(3×)
The terminological distinction makes no substantive difference. 5 Case: 17-10172 Date Filed: 10/04/2018 Page: 6 of 153 706 F.3d 1333, 1336 (11th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Irma Ovalles v. United States
(3×)
The terminological distinction makes no substantive difference. 5 Case: 17-10172 Date Filed: 10/04/2018 Page: 6 of 153 706 F.3d 1333, 1336 (11th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Juan Mercado v. United States
United States v. McGuire, 706 F.3d 1333, 1336 (11th Cir. 2013).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Reggie David Sanchez v. United States
United States v. McGuire, 706 F.3d 1333, 1336 (11th Cir. 2013).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Carlos Marcano, Jr. v. United States
United States v. McGuire, 706 F.3d 1333, 1336 (11th Cir. 2013).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Shawn Dixon
That is, we must ask if the statute “plausibly covers any non-violent conduct.” United States v. McGuire, 706 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 2013); see Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 193 , 127 S.Ct. 815 , 166 L.Ed.2d 683 (2007) (requiring “a realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility, that the State would -apply its statute to conduct that falls outside” the standard).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
In re: James Allen Irby, III v.
United States v. McGuire, 706 F.3d 1333, 1337-38 (11th Cir. 2013). 1 .
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
In Re: Orestes Hernandez
(2×)
Rather, this question is one “we must answer ‘categorically’—that is, by reference to the elements of the offense, and not the actual facts of [the defendant’s] conduct.” United States v. McGuire, 706 F.3d 1333, 1336 (11th Cir. 2013) (O’Connor, J.).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
In Re: Orestes Hernandez
(4×)
Rather, this question is one "we must answer *categorically'—^that is, by reference to the elements ofthe offense, and not the actual facts of[the defendant's] conduct." United States v. McGuire. 706 F.3d 1333,1336 (11th Cir. 2013)(O'Connor, J.).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Luis Enrique Rosales-Acosta
United States v. McGuire, 706 F.3d 1333, 1336 (11th Cir. 2013).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Amos J. Moss
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
That is, we roust ask whether the state statute “plausibly covers any non-violent conduct.” United States v. McGuire, 706 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 2013); see Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 193 , 127 S.Ct. 815 , 166 L.Ed.2d 683 (2007) (requiring “a realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility, that the State would apply its statute to conduct that falls outside” the standard).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Moreno-Aguilar
U.S. v. McGuire, 706 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir.2013).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
In re Chance
United States v. McGuire, 706 F.3d 1333, 1336 (11th Cir. 2013).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
In Re: Ricardo Pinder, Jr.
(2×)
And both § 924(c) and § 924(e) are penal statutes, meaning they both require higher sentences once a court decides that an offense is a “crime of violence.” Also, for both statutes this 2 Case: 16-12084 Date Filed: 06/01/2016 Page: 3 of 10 question is decided “‘categorically’—that is, by reference to the elements of the offense, and not the actual facts of [the defendant’s] conduct.” United States v. McGuire, 706 F.3d 1333, 1336 (11th Cir. 2013) (O’Connor, J.).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Trevardo Dermont Dixon v. U.S. Attorney General
Applying the reasoning found in Leocal , we have found crimes of violence under § 16(b) where the offense was pointing or presenting a firearm at another, see Cole, 712 F.3d at 528 , *1345 and attempting to damage or disable an aircraft, see United States v. McGuire, 706 F.3d 1333, 1338 (11th Cir.2013), but not where the offense was an extortionate extension of credit, see Accardo, 634 F.3d at 1339 .
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
USA . Ernest LaShawn Starks
Any inconsistences Starks and Byrd point to “are classic jury arguments . . . , not a reason to disregard the jury’s determination . . . .” United States v. McGuire, 706 F.3d 1333, 1336 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1744 (2013).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Starks
Any inconsistences Starks and Byrd point to “are classic jury arguments ..., not a reason to disregard the jury’s determination .... ” United States v. McGuire, 706 F.3d 1333, 1336 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1744 , 185 L.Ed.2d 801 (2013).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Cathy Saffer
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
United States v. McGuire, 706 F.3d 1333, 1336 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 133 S.Ct. 1744 , 185 L.Ed.2d 801 (2013).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Chris Vernon
“If a reasonable jury could have found [Jeff Vernon] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, then we cannot overturn the jury’s determination.” United States v. McGuire, 706 F.3d 1333, 1336 (11th Cir.2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Chris Vernon
“If a reasonable jury could have found [Jeff Vernon] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, then we cannot overturn the jury’s determination.” United States v. McGuire, 706 F.3d 1333, 1336 (11th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Benjamin Nathaniel Livingston
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
In either circumstance, “we must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the verdict.” United States v. McGuire, 706 F.3d 1333, 1336 (11th Cir.2013).
cited
Cited "see"
United States v. Titus Bates
See United States v. McGuire, 706 F.3d 1333, 1336 (11th Cir. 2013).
discussed
Cited "see"
Duncan v. United States
Gonzales v. Duenas–Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007); accord United States v. McGuire, 706 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 2013) (applying the “realistic probability” standard to a crime of violence determination under section 924(c)(3)).
cited
Cited "see"
Kenneth H. Burke, Jr. v. United States
See United States v. McGuire, 706 F.3d 1333, 1336 (11th Cir. 2013) (O’Connor, J.), overruled by Ovalles, 2018 WL 4830079 .
cited
Cited "see"
In re: Tracy Garrett
See United States v. McGuire , 706 F.3d 1333 , 1336 (11th Cir. 2013), overruled in relevant part by Ovalles , 905 F.3d at 1253 .
cited
Cited "see"
Erskine James McKinley v. United States
See United States v. McGuire, 706 F.3d 1333, 1336 (11th Cir. 2013).
discussed
Cited "see"
Irma Ovalles v. United States
(2×)
See United States v. McGuire, 706 F.3d 1333, 1336-38 (11th Cir. 2013) (involving an attempt to disable an aircraft and explaining that an “ ‘active crime’ done ‘intentionally’ against the property of another, with extreme and manifest indifference to the owner of that property and the wellbeing of the passengers” is “unmistakably violent” and “[i]t makes little difference that the physical act, in isolation from the crime, can be done with a minimum of force”); United States v. Kelley, 412 F.3d 1240, 1244 (11th Cir. 2005) (analyzing “intimidation” in the similarly worde…
examined
Cited "see"
In Re: Emilio Gomez
(4×)
See United States v. McGuire, 706 F.3d 1333, 1336 (11th Cir.2013) (Whether an offense qualifies as a crime of violence under the elements clause is a question “that we must answer ‘categorically’ — that is, by reference to the elements of the offense, and not the actual facts of [the applicant’s] conduct.”).
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Bell
Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 193 , 127 S.Ct. 815 , 166 L.Ed.2d 683 (2007); accord United States v. McGuire, 706 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir.2013) (applying the “realistic probability” standard to a crime of violence determination under section 924(c)(3)).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
United States v. Michael St. Hubert
(2×)
See Mathis , 579 U.S. at ----, 136 S.Ct. at 2248-49 (explaining that, in the ACCA context, indivisible statutes must be analyzed using the categorical approach); see also United States v. McGuire , 706 F.3d 1333 , 1336-37 (11th Cir. 2013) (applying the categorical approach in the § 924(c) context).
cited
Cited "see, e.g."
Irma Ovalles v. United States
See, e.g., United States v. McGuire, 706 F.3d 1333, 1336 (11th Cir. 2013).
cited
Cited "see, e.g."
Irma Ovalles v. United States
See, e.g. , United States v. McGuire , 706 F.3d 1333 , 1336 (11th Cir. 2013).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Nathaniel Charlton v. United States
Moreover, as the Second Circuit explained in Hill, “there must be ‘a realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility,’ that the statute at issue could be applied to conduct that does not constitute a crime of violence,” and, to that end, “a defendant ‘must at least point to his own case or other cases in which the . . . courts in fact did apply the statute in the . . . manner for which he argues.’” 832 F.3d at 140 (quoting in part Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 193 , 127 S. Ct. 815, 822 (2007)); see also United States v. McGuire, 706 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 2…
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
United States v. Michael St. Hubert
(2×)
See Mathis , 579 U.S. at ----, 136 S.Ct. at 2248-49 (explaining that, in the ACCA context, indivisible statutes must be analyzed using the categorical approach); see also United States v. McGuire , 706 F.3d 1333 , 1336-37 (11th Cir. 2013) (applying the categorical approach in the § 924(c) context).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
United States v. Rejon Taylor
(2×)
See Leocal, 543 U.S. at 7 , 125 S.Ct. 377 (observing that because [§ 16] directs our focus to the 'offense’ of convictionf,] the court must "look to the elements and the nature of the offense of conviction, rather than to the particular facts relating to [the] crime”); Evans, 644 F.3d at 453 (relying on Leocal and applying the categorical approach to § 924(c) crime-of-violence inquiry); see also United States v. McGuire, 706 F.3d 1333, 1336-37 (11th Cir.2013) (noting that the court employs a categorical approach to determine if an offense is a "crime of violence” under § 924(c)(3)(B) …
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
United States v. Standberry
See also United States v. McGuire, 706 F.3d 1333, 1336-37 (11th Cir.2013); Aragon, 983 F.2d at 1311-15 (relying almost exclusively on cases involving sentencing for purposes of categorical analysis). .
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Sherry ROSS
v.
JEFFERSON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
v.
JEFFERSON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
No. 11-14258.
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
Jan 28, 2013.
Henry L. Penick, H.L. Penick & Associates, PC, Birmingham, AL, for Plaintiff-Appellant., James E. Ferguson, III, Wade Cooper Merritt, Spain & Gillon, LLC, Birmingham, AL, for Defendant-Appellee.
Barkett, Carnes, Dubina, Hull, Jordan, Marcus, Martin, Pryor, Tjoflat, Wilson.
Cited by 2 opinions | Published
Citer courts: Fourth Circuit (2)
ORDER FOR REHEARING EN BANC
BY THE COURT:The court having been polled at the request of one of the members of the Court and a majority of the Circuit Judges who are in regular active service not having voted in favor of it (Rule 35, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure), the Suggestion of Rehearing En Banc is DENIED.