Ollman v. Evans Et Al., 471 U.S. 1127 (1985). · Go Syfert
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Ollman v. Evans Et Al., 471 U.S. 1127 (1985). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
278 citation events (49 in the last 25 years) across 78 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Ronald Clark Ball v. State of Florida (fladistctapp, 2019-11-01)
Treatment trajectory · 1985 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1985 2005 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 39 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited "see" Ronald Clark Ball v. State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
See Donovan v. State, 572 So. 2d 522, 528 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990) (citing United States v. Ruggiero, 754 F.2d 927 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985)); see also Gross v. State, 765 So. 2d 39, 42 (Fla. 2000) (noting that Florida courts look to the federal courts for guidance in construing RICO provisions).
discussed Cited "see" Wampler v. Higgins
Ohio · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
See Ollman v. Evans (1985), 471 U.S. 1127, 1129 , 105 S.Ct. 2662, 2664 , 86 L.Ed.2d 278, 280 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari, argued that the lower courts were erroneously relying on the Gertz dicta to “solve with a meat axe a very subtle and difficult question”). {¶ 16} Soon after the United States Supreme Court declined to review Ollman, this court, expressly relying on the Gertz dicta, adopted Ollman’s four-part 1.
discussed Cited "see" Wampler v. Higgins
Ohio · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
See Ollman v. Evans (1985), 471 U.S. 1127, 1129 , 105 S.Ct. 2662, 2664 , 86 L.Ed.2d 278, 280 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from, the denial of certiorari, argued that the lower courts were erroneously relying on the Gertz dicta to “solve with a meat axe a very subtle and difficult question”).
discussed Cited "see" Kanaga v. Gannett Co., Inc.
Del. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See four-part test of Ollman v. Evans, D.C.Cir., 750 F.2d 970, 979-85 (1984) (en Banc), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 , 105 S.Ct. 2662 , 86 L.Ed.2d 278 (1985), adopted by this Court in Riley, 529 A.2d at 251-52 . 22 .
discussed Cited "see" Biesiada v. Gyekenyesi
Oh. Muni. Ct., Rocky River · 1994 · signal: see · confidence high
See Ollman v. Evans (C.A.D.C.1984), 750 F.2d 970 (en banc), certiorari denied (1985), 471 U.S. 1127 , 105 S.Ct. 2662 , 86 L.Ed.2d 278 ; Mendise v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co. (1990), 69 Ohio App.3d 721, 726 , 591 N.E.2d 789, 792 (“It is a question of law for the court whether certain statements alleged to be defamatory are actionable.”); Matalka v. Lagemann (1985), 21 Ohio App.3d 134 , 21 OBR 143, 486 N.E.2d 1220 ; Yeager v. Local Union 20 (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 369, 372 , 6 OBR 421, 423, 453 N.E.2d 666, 669 (“it is for the court to decide as a matter of law whether certain statements alle…
discussed Cited "see" West v. Thomson Newspapers
Utah · 1994 · signal: see · confidence high
See Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 975 (D.C.Cir.1984) (en banc), cert, denied, 471 U.S. 1127 , 105 S.Ct. 2662 , 86 L.Ed.2d 278 (1985). 33 Thus, it is not surprising that following Gertz , federal courts drew heavily on earlier common law decisions to define what was then believed to be a First Amendment opinion privilege.
cited Cited "see" Metcalf v. KFOR-TV, INC.
W.D. Okla. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
See Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 978 (D.C.Cir.1984) (en banc), cert. denied 471 U.S. 1127 , 105 S.Ct. 2662 , 86 L.Ed.2d 278 (1985); Rinsley v. Brandt, 700 F.2d 1304, 1309 (10th Cir.1983).
discussed Cited "see" Hinerman v. Daily Gazette Co., Inc. (2×)
W. Va. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
See Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970 (D.C.Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 , 105 S.Ct. 2662 , 86 L.Ed.2d 278 (1985) (presenting a question of opinion versus fact); DiSalle v. P.G.
discussed Cited "see" Rosann C. Scheetz Kenneth L. Scheetz, Jr. v. The Morning Call, Inc. Terry L. Mutchler John Doe And/or Jane Doe (2×)
3rd Cir. · 1991 · signal: see · confidence high
See Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 978 (D.C.Cir.1984) ("predictability of decisions, which is of crucial importance in an area of law touching upon First Amendment values, is enhanced when the determination is made according to announced legal standards and when a body of public case law furnishes published examples of the manner in which these standards are to be applied"), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 , 105 S.Ct. 2662 , 86 L.Ed.2d 278 (1985). 51 This weighing of privacy and first amendment interests comports with the Scheetzes' reasonable expectations of privacy and the steps that they, or ot…
discussed Cited "see" Yancey v. Hamilton
Ky. · 1989 · signal: see · confidence high
See cases listed in Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970 , 974 n. 6 (D.C.Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 , 105 S.Ct. 2662 , 86 L.Ed.2d 278 (1985); Restatement (Second) of Torts (Appendix) § 566 reporter’s notes on comment c (1987).
cited Cited "see" David Price v. Viking Penguin, Inc. And Peter Matthiessen, William Styron, Kurt Vonnegut, John Irving, Alfred Kazin and Susan Sontag, Amicus Curiae
8th Cir. · 1989 · signal: see · confidence high
See Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 975, n. 6 (D.C.Cir.1984) (en banc) (collecting cases), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 , 105 S.Ct. 2662 , 86 L.Ed.2d 278 (1985).
discussed Cited "see" World Boxing Council v. Cosell
S.D.N.Y. · 1989 · signal: accord · confidence high
See Letter Carriers, 418 U.S. at 282, 94 S.Ct. at 2780; Greenbelt, 398 U.S. at 11-14 , 90 S.Ct. at 1540-42 ; Mr. Chow, 759 F.2d at 224 ; Davis, 754 F.2d at 85 ; Rizzuto, 641 F.Supp. at 481 ; accord Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 979 (D.C.Cir.1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 , 105 S.Ct. 2662 , 86 L.Ed.2d 278 (1985).
cited Cited "see" White v. Fraternal Order of Police
D.D.C. · 1989 · signal: see · confidence high
See Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970 , 989 n. 39 (D.C.Cir.1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 , 105 S.Ct. 2662 , 86 L.Ed.2d 278 (1985).
discussed Cited "see" Yiamouyiannis v. Thompson
Tex. App. · 1988 · signal: see · confidence high
See Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970 , 974-75 n. 6 (D.C.Cir.1984) (en banc), cert, denied, 471 U.S. 1127 , 105 S.Ct. 2662 , 86 L.Ed.2d 278 (1985); Brasher v. Carr, 743 S.W.2d 674, 678-79 (Tex.App.— *341 Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, writ granted); City of Dallas v. Moreau, 718 S.W.2d 776, 780 (Tex.App. — Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref d n.r.e.); El Paso Times, Inc. v. Kerr, 706 S.W.2d 797, 798 (Tex.App. — El Paso 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.) cert, denied, 480 U.S. 932 , 107 S.Ct. 1570 , 94 L.Ed.2d 761 (1987).
discussed Cited "see" Cromley v. Bd. of Educ. of Lockport
N.D. Ill. · 1988 · signal: see · confidence high
See Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 979 (D.C.Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 , 105 S.Ct. 2662 , 86 L.Ed.2d 278 (1985); see also Stevens v. Tillman, 661 F.Supp. 702, 708 (N.D.Ill.1986). 18 Such *1295 opinions are constitutionally protected: “However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas.” Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 , 94 S.Ct. 2997, 3007 , 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1973).
discussed Cited "see" Mendoza v. Gallup Independent Co.
N.M. Ct. App. · 1988 · signal: see · confidence high
Aldoupolis v. Globe Newspaper Co., 898 Mass. 731 , 500 N.E.2d 794 (1986) (En banc); see Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970 (D.C.Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 , 105 S.Ct. 2662 , 86 L.Ed.2d 278 (1985); Loeb v. Globe Newspaper Co., 489 F.Supp. 481 (D.Mass.1980); National Rifle Ass’n v. Dayton Newspapers, Inc., 555 F.Supp. 1299 (S.D.Ohio 1983).
cited Cited "see" William P. Tavoulareas, Peter Tavoulareas v. Philip Piro. William P. Tavoulareas, Peter Tavoulareas v. The Washington Post Company, D/B/A the Washington Post, a Delaware Corporation
D.C. Cir. · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
See Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 982-83 (D.C.Cir.1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 , 105 S.Ct. 2662 , 86 L.Ed.2d 278 (1985).
discussed Cited "see" Capan v. Daugherty
Minn. Ct. App. · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
See Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 788 F.2d 1300 (8th Cir.) (modifying the four factor test established in Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970 (D.C.Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 , 105 S.Ct. 2662 , 86 L.Ed.2d 278 (1985)), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 272 , 93 L.Ed.2d 249 (1986).
cited Cited "see" Tavoulareas v. Piro
D.C. Cir. · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
See Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 982-83 (D.C.Cir.1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 , 105 S.Ct. 2662 , 86 L.Ed.2d 278 (1985).
discussed Cited "see" Saenz v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc.
N.D. Ill. · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
See generally Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 979-981 (D.C.Cir.1984) (en banc), cert, denied, 471 U.S. 1127 , 105 S.Ct. 2662 , 86 L.Ed.2d 278 (1985); id. at 994-1005 (Bork, J., joined by three other judges, concurring) (reviewing cases); Lewis, New York Times v. Sullivan Reconsidered: Time to Return to “The Central Meaning of the First Amendment,” 83 Colum.L.Rev. 603, 620-622 (1983).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Caporale
11th Cir. · 1986 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Ruggiero, 754 F.2d 927, 931-32 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 , 105 S.Ct. 2661 , 86 L.Ed.2d 277 (1985) (no double jeopardy where prior RICO conviction involves same enterprise if pattern of racketeering differs).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. James Caporale, Alfred Pilotto, Seymour A. Gopman, Bernard Rubin, George Wuagneux, Salvatore Tricario, Louis C. Ostrer, and John Giardiello, Defendants- United States of America v. Seymour Gopman, Salvatore Tricario, George Wuagneux, Louis C. Ostrer, John Giardiello, James Caporale, Alfred Pilotto and Bernard Rubin, Defendants
11th Cir. · 1986 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Ruggiero, 754 F.2d 927, 931-32 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 , 105 S.Ct. 2661 , 86 L.Ed.2d 277 (1985) (no double jeopardy where prior RICO conviction involves same enterprise if pattern of racketeering differs).
cited Cited "see" Stevens v. Tillman
N.D. Ill. · 1986 · signal: see · confidence high
See Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 978 (D.C.Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 , 105 S.Ct. 2662 , 86 L.Ed.2d 278 (1985).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Magnusson v. New York Times Co.
Okla. · 2004 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also, Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 978 (D.C.Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 , 105 S.Ct. 2662 , 86 L.Ed.2d 278 (1985). 20 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Guerrero v. Carva
N.Y. App. Div. · 2004 · signal: see also · confidence low
In the past, the Court of Appeals has cited three factors that should be considered: (1) whether the specific language in issue has a precise meaning which is readily understood; (2) whether the statements are capable of being proven true or false; (3) whether either the full context of the communication in which the statement appears or the broader social context and surrounding circumstances are such as to “signal. . . readers or listeners that what is being read or heard is likely to be opinion, not fact” (Brian v Richardson, 87 NY2d at 51 , quoting Gross v New York Times Co., 82 NY2d 1…
cited Cited "see, e.g." Ramunno v. Cawley
Del. · 1998 · signal: see also · confidence low
Id.; see also Ollman v. Evans, D.C.Cir., 750 F.2d 970, 979-85 (1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 , 105 S.Ct. 2662 , 86 L.Ed.2d 278 (1985). 23 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Matusevitch v. Telnikoff
D.D.C. · 1995 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also, Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 1010 (D.C.Cir.1984) (en banc) (Bork, J., Concurring) (stating that allegedly defamatory statements appearing on op-ed pages are “an assertion of a kind of fact, it is true, but a hyperbolic ‘fact’ so thoroughly embedded in opinion and tendentiousness that it takes on their qualities”), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 , 105 S.Ct. 2662 , 86 L.Ed.2d 278 (1985).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Keohane v. Stewart (2×)
Colo. · 1994 · signal: see also · confidence low
See, e.g., Potomac Valve & Fitting Inc. v. Crawford Fitting Co., 829 F.2d 1280 (4th Cir.1987); Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 788 F.2d 1300 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 883 , 107 S.Ct. 272 , 93 L.Ed.2d. 249 (1986); see also Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970 , 974 n. 6 (D.C.Cir.1984) (citing federal cases recognizing an opinion privilege), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 , 105 S.Ct. 2662 , 86 L.Ed.2d 278 (1985); Jeffrey E.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." NBC Subsidiary (KCNC-TV), Inc. v. Living Will Center (2×)
Colo. · 1994 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970 , 974 n. 6 (D.C.Cir.1984) (citing federal cases recognizing an opinion privilege), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 , 105 S.Ct. 2662 , 86 L.Ed.2d 278 (1985); Jeffrey E.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Dan E. Moldea v. New York Times Company (2×)
D.C. Cir. · 1994 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970 (D.C.Cir.1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 , 105 S.Ct. 2662 , 86 L.Ed.2d 278 (1985).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Chapin v. Greve
E.D. Va. · 1992 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 991 (D.C.Cir.1984) (en banc) (“For the contraction of liberty’s ‘breathing space’ can only mean inhibition of the scope of public discussion on matters of general interest and concern.”), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 , 105 S.Ct. 2662 , 86 L.Ed.2d 278 (1985).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Yetman v. English
Ariz. · 1991 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 974 (D.C.Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 , 105 S.Ct. 2662 , 86 L.Ed.2d 278 (1985); Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 867 F.2d 1188, 1194 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 812 , 110 S.Ct. 59 , 107 L.Ed.2d 26 (1989); MacConnell v. Mitten, 131 Ariz. 22, 25 , 638 P.2d 689, 692 (1981) (applying federal law). 2 But English's position has been weakened; last year in Milkovich , the United States Supreme Court reviewed the constitutional protections it had grafted onto defamation law and explicitly rejected the contention that Gertz and its progeny we…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Roffman v. Trump
E.D. Pa. · 1990 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 975, n. 8 (1984), cert. denied 471 U.S. 1127 , 105 S.Ct. 2662 , 86 L.Ed.2d 278 (1985) ("Although Mr. Oilman's claim arises under the District of Columbia common law of libel ..., the issue whether the allegedly libelous statements are protected opinion is to be decided as a matter of federal constitutional law.
cited Cited "see, e.g." Robert C. White v. Fraternal Order of Police
D.C. Cir. · 1990 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970 (D.C.Cir.1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 , 105 S.Ct. 2662 , 86 L.Ed.2d 278 (1985).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Pearce v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc.
D.D.C. · 1987 · signal: see also · confidence low
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 , 94 S.Ct. 2997 , 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974) (dictum); see also Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 974-75 (D.C.Cir.1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 , 105 S.Ct. 2662 , 86 L.Ed.2d 278 (1985).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Thomas McCabe v. Daniel Rattiner (2×)
1st Cir. · 1987 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970 (D.C.Cir.1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 , 105 S.Ct. 2662 , 86 L.Ed.2d 278 (1985); Information Control Corp. v. Genesis One Computer Corp., 611 F.2d 781 (9th Cir.1980); Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882 (2d Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 , 97 S.Ct. 786 , 50 L.Ed.2d 777 (1977).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Healey v. New England Newspapers, Inc.
R.I. · 1987 · signal: see also · confidence low
As stated by the Supreme Court of Colorado, “The opinion must appear reasonably to the listener to be based on defamatory facts which the reporter has not disclosed to the audience but which the audience can reasonably expect to exist.” Burns v. McGraw-Hill Broadcasting Co., 659 P.2d 1351, 1358 (Colo.1983) (opinions which imply the existence of an undisclosed factual predicate may support a cause of action in defamation); see also Ollman v. Evans, 479 F.Supp. 292, 293-94 (D.D.C.1979) (under Gertz and its progeny, no cause of action arises unless defendant’s opinions imply underlying fals…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Doe v. Yogi
D.D.C. · 1986 · signal: compare · confidence low
Compare Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970 (D.C.Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 , 105 S.Ct. 2662 , 86 L.Ed.2d 278 (1985) (analysis in libel context) and Day, supra, 548 F.2d at 1026 (analysis in fraud context). 9 Thus, the appropriate standard for this situation is set out in the Day case.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Long v. Egnor
W. Va. · 1986 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970 (D.C.Cir.1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 , 105 S.Ct. 2662 , 86 L.Ed.2d 278 (1985); Gregory v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 17 Cal.3d 596 , 552 P.2d 425 , 131 Cal.Rptr. 641 (1976); Burns v. McGraw-Hill Broadcasting Co., 659 P.2d 1351 (Colo.1983) (en banc); Caron v. Bangor Publishing Co., 470 A.2d 782 (Me.), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1241 , 104 S.Ct. 3512 , 82 L.Ed. 821 (1984); Lyons v. New Mass Media, Inc., 390 Mass. 51 , 453 N.E.2d 451 (1983); Pease v. Telegraph Publishing Co., 121 N.H. 62 , 426 A.2d 463 (1981); Kotlikoff v. Community News, supra;…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Bertell Ollman
v.
Rowland Evans and Robert Novak
84-1524.
Supreme Court of the United States.
May 28, 1985.
471 U.S. 1127
Rehnquist.
Cited by 8 opinions  |  Published
Reporter's Syllabus — editorial summary, not part of the Court's opinion

On petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.

The petition for writ of certiorari is denied.

Justice REHNQUIST, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins, dissenting.

Lead Opinion

C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.

Dissent

Justice Rehnquist, with whom The Chief Justice joins,

dissenting.

In March 1978, petitioner, then a professor of political science at New York University, was nominated by a departmental search[*1128] committee to head the Department of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland in College Park. The committee’s recommendation proved to be highly controversial, largely because petitioner was an avowed Marxist. Petitioner’s appointment was approved by the Provost of the University and the Chancellor of the College Park Campus, but was eventually overruled by the President of the University.

While this controversy was going on, respondents, nationally syndicated columnists, devoted one of their columns to it. In the course of the article, they made a number of statements about petitioner, including a description of his principal scholarly work as “a ponderous tome in adoration of the master,” and then went on to say:

“Such pamphleteering is hooted at by one political scientist in a major eastern university, whose scholarship and reputation as a liberal are well known. ‘Oilman has no status within the profession, but is a pure and simple activist,’ he said.”

Petitioner sued respondents for libel in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, and that court granted summary judgment for respondents. 479 F. Supp. 292 (1979). On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit sitting en banc affirmed the judgment by a vote of six to five, producing three separate opinions concurring in the affirmance, and four dissenting opinions. 242 U. S. App. D. C. 301, 750 F. 2d 970 (1984).

The Court of Appeals rested its decision entirely on the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, and held that this statement about petitioner — that he had no status within his profession — could simply not form the basis of an action for defamation in the light of that Amendment. There was no question as to whether petitioner could meet the requirement of “malice” under New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 (1964), since the case had never been tried to a jury. The Court of Appeals majority relied upon a brief passage from our opinion in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323, 339-340 (1974). I think that the result' reached by the Court of Appeals in this case is nothing less than extraordinary. At the heart of the common law of defamation were a few areas of expression which even when spoken rather than written were regarded as so damaging as to be classified as “slander per se” and therefore not to require the proof of any special damages in order to allow recovery. One of these catego[*1129] ries consists of statements which defame the plaintiff in connection with his business or occupation. See, e. g., November v. Time, Inc., 13 N. Y. 2d 175, 194 N. E. 2d 126 (1963); Stevens v. Morse, 185 Wis. 500, 201 N. W. 815 (1924).

Much of the extended treatment of this question in the Court of Appeals was devoted to the question of whether or not this statement was one of “fact” or of “opinion,” the implication being that if the statement were one of “opinion” it could not be actionable under any circumstances. But for nationally syndicated columnists to quote an unnamed political scientist as saying that petitioner has “no status within the profession” is far more than the mere statements of opinion traditionally protected by qualified privilege under the common law of libel. Doctors who are disapproved of by other doctors may find solace in the fees paid by their patients; lawyers disapproved of by other lawyers may comfort themselves by the retainers paid by their clients. But the academic who is disapproved of by his peers has no such healthy recourse outside of the profession. There, if ever, the opinion of one’s peers is virtually the sole component of one’s professional reputation.

The statement from our opinion in Gertz, supra, relied upon by the majority in the Court of Appeals was this:

“Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas.” 418 U. S., at 339-340.

At the time I joined the opinion in Gertz, supra, I regarded this statement as an exposition of the classical views of Thomas Jefferson and Oliver Wendell Holmes that there was no such thing as a false “idea” in the political sense, and that the test of truth for political ideas is indeed the marketplace and not the courtroom. I continue to believe that is the correct meaning of the quoted passage. But it is apparent from the cases cited by petitioner that lower courts have seized upon the word “opinion” in the second sentence to solve with a meat axe a very subtle and difficult question, totally oblivious “of the rich and complex history of the struggle of the common law to deal with this problem.” Hill, Defamation and Privacy Under the First Amendment, 76 Colum. L. Rev. 1205, 1239 (1976).

[*1130] The scholarly treatment of this subject by the various opinions in the Court of Appeals comprises 148 pages in the appendix to the petition for certiorari in this case. Obviously the passage from Gertz quoted above has led the majority of that court to the conclusion that respondents’ article is not actionable as a matter of law. But if one draws back for a moment, and considers the passage in context and in the light both of the First Amendment and the history of common-law libel, see R. Sack, Libel, Slander and Related Problems 158 (1980), I find it impossible to disagree with Judge Wald’s characterization:

“[T]he columnists’ statement that ‘Oilman has no status within the profession, but is a pure and simple activist’ is an assertion of fact for which its authors can be made to answer, consistent with the requirements of the [Fjirst [Ajmendment, in a suit for libel.” 242 U. S. App. D. C., at 363, 750 F. 2d, at 1032.

I would grant the petition for certiorari in this case.