green
Positive treatment
3.8 score
Treatment trajectory · 2001 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2001
2013
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 6 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited "see"
Commonwealth v. Real Property & Improvements Commonly Known as 5444 Spruce Street
See United States v. Ahmad, 213 F.3d 805, 815 (4th Cir.) (“Although the Supreme Court has not yet expressly so held, we believe that Bajakajian's ‘grossly disproportional’ analysis applies when determining whether any punitive forfeiture — civil or criminal — is excessive.”), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1014 , 121 S.Ct. 573 , 148 L.Ed.2d 490 (2000).
discussed
Cited "see"
Anderman v. Federal Republic of Austria
See Haven v. Rzeczpospolita Polska (Republic of Poland), 68 F.Supp.2d 947 (N.D.Ill.1999), aff'd, 215 F.3d 727 (7th Cir.2000) (“It is obvious that government expropriation of private property under governmental authority — whether legitimate or illegitimate — is the classic type of [sovereign activity]”), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1014 , 121 S.Ct. 573 , 148 L.Ed.2d 490 (2000); Magnus Electronics, Inc. v. Royal Bank of Canada, 620 F.Supp. 387, 390 (N.D.Ill.1985) (seizure of goods by Argentine Air Force was a sovereign activity rather than a commercial activity).
cited
Cited "see"
Beattie v. Madison County School District
See Gerhart v. Hayes, 217 F.3d 320, 322 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1014 , 121 S.Ct. 573 , 148 L.Ed.2d 491 (2000). 17 .
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Brunk
(2×)
See United States v. Ahmad, 213 F.3d 805, 815 (4th Cir.) (“[W]e believe that Bajakajian’s ‘grossly disproportional’ analysis applies when determining whether any punitive forfeiture — civil or criminal — is excessive.”), cert, denied, 531 U.S. 1014 , 121 S.Ct. 573 , 148 L.Ed.2d 490 (2000).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Florida Evergreen Foliage v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co.
See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 , 101 S.Ct. 2524 , 69 L.Ed.2d 246 (1981); Gross v. State, 765 So.2d 39, 43 (Fla.2000) (adopting Turkette as a matter of Florida RICO law); see also U.S. v. Goldin Indus., Inc., 219 F.3d 1268 , 1270-71 (11th Cir.2000) (en banc) (ruling that the “plain language” of RICO requires that the “enterprise” be “separate and distinct” from the “person” who is the defendant), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1015 , 121 S.Ct. 573 , 148 L.Ed.2d 491 (2001).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Brown v. Kilgore College
Thompson v. Upshur County, Tex., 245 F.3d 447 , 455-56 (5th Cir. 2001); see also Gerhart v. Hayes, 201 F.3d 646 , 648 n.2, rev’d in part on reh’g, 217 F.3d 320 (5th Cir.) (deleting and substituting Part IV concerning whether speech was a matter of public concern), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 573 (2000); Colston v. Barnhart, 146 F.3d 282, 284-85 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1054 (1998).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Ahmad
v.
United States
v.
United States
No. 00-639.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Nov 27, 2000.
Published
C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.