Strange v. Dept. of Hwys. & Pub. Transp., 445 S.E.2d 439 (S.C. 1994). · Go Syfert
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Strange v. Dept. of Hwys. & Pub. Transp., 445 S.E.2d 439 (S.C. 1994). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“the trial court can only be reversed by this court when there is no evidence to support the ruling below.”
123 citation events (81 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Palmetto Pointe v. Island Pointe (scctapp, 2023-01-11)
Treatment trajectory · 1994 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1994 2010 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 40 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Palmetto Pointe v. Island Pointe (5×) also: Cited as authority (rule), Cited "see"
S.C. Ct. App. · 2023 · signal: see · quote attribution · 2 verbatim quotes · confidence high
the trial court can only be reversed by this court when there is no evidence to support the ruling below.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Weddle v. Charleston County Sheriff's Office
S.C. Ct. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
Transp., 314 S.C. 427, 430 , 445 S.E.2d 439, 440 (1994))); Etheredge v. Richland Sch.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kim v. County of Richland
S.C. Ct. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
Transp., 314 S.C. 427, 429-30 , 445 S.E.2d 439, 440 (1994))); id. ("In deciding such motions, neither the trial court nor the appellate court has the authority to decide credibility issues or to resolve conflicts in the testimony or the evidence." (citing Welch v. Epstein, 342 S.C. 279, 300 , 536 S.E.2d 408, 419 (Ct. App. 2000))).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Crenshaw v. College
S.C. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
Accordingly, we reverse the grant of JNOV. 4 See **298 Strange , 314 S.C. at 429 -30 , 445 S.E.2d at 440 (holding the trial court must deny a motion for a directed verdict or JNOV if the evidence yields more than one reasonable inference or its inference is in doubt); Gastineau , 331 S.C. at 568 , 503 S.E.2d at 713 ("A motion for JNOV may be granted only if no reasonable jury could have reached the challenged verdict.").
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Allegro, Inc. v. Scully (2×)
S.C. · 2016 · confidence medium
Transp., 314 S.C. 427 , 429–30, 445 S.E.2d 439, 440 (1994).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Graham v. Town of Latta
S.C. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
Transp., 314 S.C. 427, 429 , 445 S.E.2d 439, 440 (1994) (affirming denial of SCDOT’s directed verdict motion where evidence viewed in light most favorable to plaintiff demonstrated that SCDOT did not weigh competing considerations or use accepted professional standards).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Jones v. Builders Investment Group, LLC
S.C. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
Transp., 314 S.C. 427, 429-30 , 445 S.E.2d 439, 440 (1994).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Zinn v. CFI Sales & Marketing, Ltd.
S.C. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
Transp., 314 S.C. 427, 429 , 445 S.E.2d 439, 440 (1994).
cited Cited as authority (rule) First South Bank v. South Causeway, LLC
S.C. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
Transp., 314 S.C. 427, 429 , 445 S.E.2d 439, 440 (1994).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Jamison ex rel. Estate of Jamison-Barber v. Hilton
S.C. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
Transp., 314 S.C. 427, 429-30 , 445 S.E.2d 439, 440 (1994).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Richardson v. Piggly Wiggly Central, Inc.
S.C. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
Transp., 314 S.C. 427, 429 , 445 S.E.2d 439, 440 (1994).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Bass v. South Carolina Department of Social Services
S.C. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
Transp., 314 S.C. 427, 429-30 , 445 S.E.2d 439, 440 (1994).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Rivera v. Newton
S.C. Ct. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
Transp., 314 S.C. 427, 429-30 , 445 S.E.2d 439, 440 (1994) (citation omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Madison Ex Rel. Bryant v. Babcock Center (2×)
S.C. · 2006 · confidence medium
Transp., 314 S.C. 427, 430 , 445 S.E.2d 439, 440 (1994).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Madison v. Babcock Center, Inc.
S.C. · 2006 · confidence medium
Transp., 314 S.C. 427, 430 , 445 S.E.2d 439, 440 (1994).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Law v. South Carolina Department of Corrections (2×)
S.C. · 2006 · confidence medium
Transp., 314 S.C. 427, 429-30 , 445 S.E.2d 439, 440 (1994) (providing the standard for ruling on motions for JNOV).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Erickson v. Jones Street Publishers, LLC (2×)
S.C. · 2006 · confidence medium
Transp., 314 S.C. 427, 429-30 , 445 S.E.2d 439, 440 (1994).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Proctor v. Department of Health & Environmental Control
S.C. Ct. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
Transp., 314 S.C. 427, 430 , 445 S.E.2d 439, 440 (1994); Faile v. S.C.
cited Cited as authority (rule) McMillan v. Oconee Memorial Hospital, Inc.
S.C. · 2006 · confidence medium
Transp., 314 S.C. 427, 429-30 , 445 S.E.2d 439, 440 (1994).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Dabbs v. Davis
S.C. Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
Transp. , 314 S.C. 427, 429-30 , 445 S.E.2d 439, 440 (1994). “When considering directed verdict motions, neither the trial court nor the appellate court has authority to decide credibility issues or to resolve conflicts in the testimony or evidence.” Harvey v. Strickland , 350 S.C. 303, 308 , 566 S.E.2d 529, 532 (2002). “In essence, we must determine whether a verdict for a party opposing the motion would be reasonably possible under the facts as liberally construed in his favor.” Bultman v. Barber , 277 S.C. 5, 7 , 281 S.E.2d 791, 792 (1981). “If the evidence is susceptible to more than …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Guffey v. Columbia/Colleton Regional Hospital, Inc. (2×)
S.C. · 2005 · confidence medium
Transp., 314 S.C. 427, 429-30 , 445 S.E.2d 439, 440 (1994).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) baril v. Aiken Regional Medical Centers
S.C. Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
Transp., 314 S.C. 427, 429-30 , 445 S.E.2d 439, 440 (1994)). “This Court will reverse the trial court’s rulings on these motions only where there is no evidence to support the rulings or where the rulings are controlled by an error of law.” Hinkle v. Nat’l Cas.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Clay v. Strother
S.C. Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
Transp. , 314 S.C. 427, 429-30 , 445 S.E.2d 439, 440 (1994) (“In ruling on motions for directed verdict and JNOV, the trial court is required to view the evidence and the inferences that reasonably can be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motions and to deny the motions where either the evidence yields more than one inference or its inference is in doubt.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Moore v. Moore
S.C. Ct. App. · 2004 · confidence medium
Transp., 314 S.C. 427, 429-30 , 445 S.E.2d 439, 440 (1994).
cited Cited as authority (rule) New v. Max G Crosby Construction
S.C. Ct. App. · 2004 · confidence medium
Transp. , 314 S.C. 427, 429-30 , 445 S.E.2d 439, 440 (1994).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Hawkins v. City of Greenville
S.C. Ct. App. · 2004 · confidence medium
Transp., 314 S.C. 427, 430 , 445 S.E.2d 439, 440 (1994); Steinke, 336 S.C. at 393 , 520 S.E.2d at 152 ; Arthurs, 338 S.C. at 270 , 525 S.E.2d at 551 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Henson Ex Rel. Hunt v. International Paper Co. (2×)
S.C. Ct. App. · 2004 · confidence medium
Dep't of Highways and Transp., 314 S.C. 427, 429-30 , 445 S.E.2d 439, 440 (1994) (holding the trial court, when ruling on a motion of directed verdict and JNOV, is "required to view the evidence and the inferences that reasonably can be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motions and to deny the motions where either the evidence yields more than one inference or its inference is in doubt."); Priest v. Scott, 266 S.C. 321, 324 , 223 S.E.2d 36, 38 (1976) (holding an "alleged error in a portion of a charge must be considered in light of the whole charge, and must…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Jinks Ex Rel. Estate of Jinks v. Richland County
S.C. · 2003 · confidence medium
Transp., 314 S.C. 427, 429-30 , 445 S.E.2d 439, 440 (1994).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Clark Ex Rel. Estate of Clark v. South Carolina Department of Public Safety (2×) also: Cited "see"
S.C. Ct. App. · 2002 · confidence medium
Transp., 314 S.C. 427, 429-30 , 445 S.E.2d 439, 440 (1994). 15 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) Harvey v. Strickland
S.C. · 2002 · confidence medium
Transp., 314 S.C. 427, 429-30 , 445 S.E.2d 439, 440 (1994).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Brown Ex Rel. Estate of Brown v. Stewart
S.C. Ct. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
Transp., 314 S.C. 427, 429-30 , 445 S.E.2d 439, 440 (1994).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Goodwin v. Kennedy
S.C. Ct. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
Transp., 314 S.C. 427, 429-30 , 445 S.E.2d 439, 440 (1994).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Duncan v. Hampton County School District 2
S.C. Ct. App. · 1999 · confidence medium
Transp., 314 S.C. 427, 430 , 445 S.E.2d 439, 440 (1994).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Elder v. Gaffney Ledger, Inc.
S.C. Ct. App. · 1999 · confidence medium
Strange v. South Carolina Dep’t of Highways & Public Transp., 314 S.C. 427, 429-30 , 445 S.E.2d 439, 440 (1994); Stevens v. Sun Publ’g Co., 270 S.C. 65, 70 , 240 S.E.2d 812, 814-15 (1978).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Porter v. South Carolina Public Service Commission
S.C. · 1998 · confidence medium
Transp., 314 S.C. 427, 430 , 445 S.E.2d 439, 441 (1994); Edens v. Cole, 261 S.C. 556, 561 , 201 S.E.2d 382, 384 (1973); Brown v. Pechman, 55 S.C. 555, 563 , 33 S.E. 732, 737 (1899); accord 83 C.J.S.
examined Cited as authority (rule) Pike v. South Carolina Department of Transportation (3×) also: Cited "see"
S.C. Ct. App. · 1998 · confidence medium
Transp., 314 S.C. 427, 430 , 445 S.E.2d 439, 440 (1994).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Creech v. South Carolina Wildlife & Marine Resources Department (2×)
S.C. · 1997 · confidence medium
Strange, 314 S.C. at 429-30 , 445 S.E.2d at 440 (citations omitted).
cited Cited "see" Cock-N-Bull Steak House, Inc. v. Generali Insurance
S.C. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See Strange, 314 S.C. 427 , 445 S.E. (2d) 439 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Pike v. South Carolina Department of Transportation
S.C. · 2000 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Strange, 314 S.C. at 429-30 , 445 S.E.2d at 440 (“In ruling on motions for directed verdict and JNOV, the trial court is required to view the evidence and the inferences that reasonably can be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motions and to deny the motions where either the evidence yields more than one inference or its inference is in doubt.”).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Wintersteen v. Food Lion, Inc.
S.C. Ct. App. · 1999 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Strange v. South Carolina Dep’t of Highways & Public Transp., 314 S.C. 427, 429-30 , 445 S.E.2d 439, 440 (S.C.1994) (“In ruling on motions for directed verdict and JNOV, the trial court is required to view the evidence and the inferences that reasonably can be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motions and to deny the motions where *139 either the evidence yields more than one inference or its inference is in doubt.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Tammi STRANGE and Jonnie F. Hudson, Respondents,
v.
S.C. DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS AND PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION, Appellant.
24082.
Supreme Court of South Carolina.
Jun 6, 1994.
445 S.E.2d 439
Finney.
Cited by 3 opinions  |  Published

Russell T. Burke and W. David Kelly, both of Nexsen, Pruet, Jacobs & Pollard, Columbia, for appellant.

R. Bryan Barnes and Stacey M. Lynch, both of Sherrill and Rogers, Columbia, for respondents.

[*440] FINNEY, Justice:

In this personal injury action, Appellant South Carolina Department of Highways and Public Transportation (Highway Department) contends the trial judge committed reversible error on several grounds. We disagree and affirm.

FACTS

Respondents brought an action against the Highway Department under the Tort Claims Act alleging that the Highway Department caused their car accident because it failed to properly maintain the shoulders along Dreher Island Road. The accident occurred on a rainy night shortly after the road had been resurfaced. The road was unpainted and covered with dark asphalt. The driver, Respondent Hudson, went off the side of the road. When she returned to the road, she lost control of the car and hit a telephone pole on the opposite side of the road. Respondent Strange was a passenger in the car. Both Respondents were injured in the accident.

The first trial in this matter ended in a jury verdict for Respondents. The Highway Department appealed and this Court reversed the jury's verdict and remanded for retrial. Strange v. South Carolina Department of Highways & Public Transportation, 307 S.C. 161, 414 S.E.2d 138 (1992). The retrial also resulted in a jury verdict for Respondents. This appeal follows.

DISCUSSION

Appellant Highway Department asserts the trial court erred by denying its directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) motions because the judge should have found as a matter of law that the acts of striping the side lines, building up the shoulders after resurfacing and warning of low shoulders are all discretionary acts which are protected under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act. S.C.Code Ann. § 15-78-60 (Supp.1993). We disagree.

The following cases are dispositive in addressing the issue of discretionary immunity. Foster v. S.C. Highways and Public Transportation, 306 S.C. 519, 413 S.E.2d 31 (1992) and Niver v. S.C. Department of Highways & Public Transportation, 302 S.C. 461, 395 S.E.2d 728 (Ct.App.1990). Discretionary immunity is contingent on proof that the Highway Department, faced with alternatives, actually weighed competing considerations and made a conscious choice. Niver, supra. The governmental entity must show that in weighing the competing considerations and alternatives, it utilized accepted professional standards appropriate to resolve the issue before it. Foster, supra. There was no evidence in this case that the Highway Department weighed competing considerations and exercised accepted professional standards as required by Foster.

In ruling on motions for directed verdict and JNOV, the trial court is required to view the evidence and the inferences that reasonably can be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motions and to deny the motions where either the evidence yields more than one inference or its inference is in doubt. Vacation Time of Hilton Head Inc. v. Lighthouse Realty, Inc. 286 S.C. 261, 332 S.E.2d 781 (Ct. App.1985). The trial court can only be reversed by this Court when there is no evidence to support the ruling below. Id. The evidence taken in the light most favorable to Respondents shows that the Highway Department did not consciously weigh competing considerations or utilize accepted professional standards. Therefore the court did not err in submitting the case to the jury.

Next, the Highway Department argues that the trial court incorrectly placed the burden of establishing discretionary immunity as an affirmative defense on the Highway Department. We disagree. The burden of establishing a limitation upon liability or an exception to the waiver of immunity is upon the governmental entity asserting it as an affirmative defense. Foster, supra; Niver, supra. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in placing the burden of proof on the Highway Department.

The Highway Department further contends the trial court erred by ruling that a stipulation agreed to by the parties during the first trial did not bind Respondents at[*441] the second trial. The parties agreed at the first trial to stipulate that the Highway Department had actual notice that certain portions of Dreher Island Road had low shoulders. Respondents also agreed at that trial not to present any testimony about other accidents occurring on the same road.

During the first attempt to retry the case, the trial judge issued a consent order prior to granting a motion for mistrial. The order stated in pertinent part:

[T]he parties agree that the stipulation used in the first trial of the case is of continued effect. The exact language of this stipulation is as follows:
The Highway Department had actual notice by December 14, 1987, that certain portions of Billy Dreher Island Road had low shoulders, including those that are relevant to this action.

The consent order did not mention any agreement to limit testimony concerning other accidents.

"Whether or not a party to an action may be relieved from stipulations entered into in the course of judicial proceedings is addressed to the sound judicial discretion of the trial judge, and the determination of the question of granting such relief will not ordinarily be interfered with by an appellate court except where there is a manifest abuse of discretion." Edens v. Cole, 261 S.C. 556, 201 S.E.2d 382 (1973).

Based on the literal language of the consent order, there was no longer a stipulation to limit testimony. Additionally, the Highway Department's motion to exclude testimony of other accidents was pending when the consent order was issued. Thus, we find the trial court did not abuse his discretion in finding that the Respondents were not bound by the earlier stipulation excluding testimony of other accidents on the same road.

We do not address the remaining arguments raised by appellant. We find they are manifestly without merit. Rule 220(b)(2), SCACR. Accordingly, the judgment is

AFFIRMED.

CHANDLER, Acting C.J., TOAL and MOORE, JJ., and BRUCE LITTLEJOHN, Acting Associate Justice, concur.