Westbrooks v. State, 710 S.E.2d 594 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011). · Go Syfert
Westbrooks v. State, 710 S.E.2d 594 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
106 citation events (106 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Cerron Lavar Hutchins v. State (gactapp, 2025-03-13)
Treatment trajectory · 2011 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2011 2018 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 38 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cerron Lavar Hutchins v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
Thus, “the jury’s verdict will be upheld as long as there is some competent evidence, even though contradicted, to support each fact necessary to make out the State’s case.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Westbrooks v. State, 309 Ga. App. 398, 399-400 (1) ( 710 SE2d 594 ) (2011). (a) Vehicular homicide.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gregory Wilkey v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2023 · confidence medium
In light of this testimony, the jury was authorized to find Wilkey guilty of false 3 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Jones v. State, 354 Ga. App. 568 , 571 (1) ( 841 SE2d 112 ) (2020). 4 (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Westbrooks v. State, 309 Ga. App. 398, 399-400 (1) ( 710 SE2d 594 ) (2011). 5 Rehberger v. State, 235 Ga. App. 827, 828 (1) ( 510 SE2d 594 ) (1998). 5 imprisonment beyond a reasonable doubt.6 Additionally, to the extent the victim’s testimony at trial may have differed from how she previously described the incident, any “conflicts between the victim’s testimony at…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Aaron Santoro v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2021 · confidence medium
Instead, Santoro contends that Ready’s testimony bolstered the victim’s credibility “by eliciting sympathy for her as a victim” and that, as a result, she should not have been allowed to testify at all. “[T]he credibility of a witness is to be determined by the jury, and the credibility of a victim may not be bolstered by the testimony of another witness.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Westbrooks v. State, 309 Ga. App. 398, 401 (2) ( 710 SE2d 594 ) (2011). “[I]mproper bolstering occurs when a witness gives an opinion as to whether another witness is telling the truth.” (C…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ebenezer Buwee v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2021 · confidence medium
Thus, the jury’s verdict will be upheld as long as there is some competent evidence, even though contradicted, to support each fact necessary to make out the State’s case.” Westbrooks v. State, 309 Ga. App. 398, 399-400 (1) ( 710 SE2d 594 ) (2011) (citation and punctuation omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kristin Ward v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
An expert may testify “as to her observations of the victim 12 and to her conclusion, based on those observations, that the victim’s description of the molestation did not appear to be coached.” Thomas v. State, 318 Ga. App. 849, 855 (4) (b) ( 734 SE2d 823 ) (2012). “[T]he fact that such testimony may also indirectly, though necessarily, involve the child’s credibility does not render it inadmissible.” Westbrooks v. State, 309 Ga. App. 398, 402 (2) ( 710 SE2d 594 ) (2011) (punctuation and footnote omitted).
cited Cited as authority (rule) READO-SECK v. the STATE.
Ga. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
See Miller v. State , 273 Ga. 831 , 832, 546 S.E.2d 524 (2001) ; Westbrooks , 309 Ga. App. at 399-400 (1), 710 S.E.2d 594 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) FRYE v. the STATE.
Ga. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
She explained that "at least a year" passed between the time she sent this recording and when she told her mother about the allegations of abuse. 3 Arbegast v. State , 332 Ga. App. 414 , 415 (1), 773 S.E.2d 283 (2015) ; Westbrooks v. State , 309 Ga. App. 398 , 399 (1), 710 S.E.2d 594 (2011). 4 Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307 , 319 (III) (B), 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). 5 Miller v. State , 273 Ga. 831 , 832, 546 S.E.2d 524 (2001) ; Westbrooks , 309 Ga. App. at 399-400 (1), 710 S.E.2d 594 .
examined Cited as authority (rule) Belcher v. the State. (3×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
After these text messages were read, the party was abruptly ended by the concerned host, and his guests all left. 3 Partee and Smith are not parties to this appeal. 4 Arbegast v. State , 332 Ga. App. 414 , 415 (1), 773 S.E.2d 283 (2015) ; Westbrooks v. State , 309 Ga. App. 398 , 399 (1), 710 S.E.2d 594 (2011). 5 Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307 , 319 (III) (B), 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). 6 Miller v. State , 273 Ga. 831 , 832, 546 S.E.2d 524 (2001) ; Westbrooks , 309 Ga. App. at 399-400 (1), 710 S.E.2d 594 . 7 See Court of Appeals Rule 25 (c) (2) ("Any enumeration of error that is…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Harris v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
However, this Court is not tasked with weighing evidence or determining witness credibility Short, supra; Westbrooks v. State, 309 Ga. App. 398, 399 (1) ( 710 SE2d 594 ) (2011).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Angel Johnson v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
Nevertheless, she contends that (1) leaving the children home alone in a closed room with a space heater was not unlawful; (2) even if leaving her children alone were unlawful, this was not the “but 4 Arbegast v. State, 332 Ga. App. 414, 415 (1) ( 773 SE2d 283 ) (2015); Westbrooks v. State, 309 Ga. App. 398 , 399 (1) ( 710 SE2d 594 ) (2011). 5 Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (III) (B) ( 99 SCt 2781 , 61 LE2d 560) (1979). 6 Miller v. State, 273 Ga. 831, 832 ( 546 SE2d 524 ) (2001); Westbrooks, 309 Ga. App. at 399-400 (1). 7 for” cause of their injuries when those same injuries could …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Johnson v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
Arbegast v. State, 332 Ga. App. 414, 415 (1) ( 773 SE2d 283 ) (2015); Westbrooks v. State, 309 Ga. App. 398, 399 (1) ( 710 SE2d 594 ) (2011).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Morris v. the State (3×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
Reese and Bethel, JJ., concur. 1 See OCGA § 16-15-1 et seq. (“This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the ‘Georgia Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act.’ ”). 2 See, e.g., Muse v. State, 323 Ga. App. 779, 780 ( 748 SE2d 136 ) (2013). 3 Ball was subsequently charged with and pleaded guilty to several marijuana-distribution charges in the aftermath of this incident. 4 Despite performing surgery that saved his life, doctors were unable to remove the two bullets lodged in Ball’s body. 5 Arbegast v. State, 332 Ga. App. 414, 415 (1) ( 773 SE2d 283 ) (2015); Westbrooks v. State,…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Willie Andrew Johnson v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
Thus, even if the witness consults a writing while testifying, the adverse party is not entitled to see it unless the writing influenced the witness’s testimony.” (punctuation omitted)). 15 Meredith v. State, 211 Ga. App. 213, 215 (4) ( 438 SE2d 644 ) (1993). 16 Id. 17 See Smith v. State, 276 Ga. 263, 266 (3) ( 577 SE2d 548 ) (2003) (holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying mistrial based upon allegation of prosecutorial misconduct when underlying circumstances were made known to the jury and were fully probed on cross-examination, such that it could not be said “…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jones v. the State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
Phipps, P. J., concurs in Divisions 1, 2, 4, and 5 and in judgment only in Division 3. 1 See, e.g., Muse v. State, 323 Ga. App. 779, 780 ( 748 SE2d 136 ) (2013). 2 Arbegast v. State, 332 Ga. App. 414, 415 (1) ( 773 SE2d 283 ) (2015); Westbrooks v. State, 309 Ga. App. 398, 399 (1) ( 710 SE2d 594 ) (2011). 3 Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319 (III) (B) ( 99 SCt 2781 , 61 LE2d 560) (1979). 4 Miller v. State, 273 Ga. 831, 832 ( 546 SE2d 524 ) (2001); Westbrooks, 309 Ga. App. at 399-400 (1). 5 Former OCGA § 16-13-31 (b) (2012). 6 Maddox v. State, 322 Ga. App. 811, 812 ( 746 SE2d 280 ) (2013) …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Maurer v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
The evidence summarized above was sufficient to sustain Maurer’s conviction for child molestation under the standard of Jackson, supra. See OCGA § 16-6-4 (a) (1) (a person commits child molestation when he does an “immoral or indecent act to or in the presence of or with any child under the age of 16 years with the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the person”); Westbrooks v. State, 309 Ga. App. 398, 400-401 (1) ( 710 SE2d 594 ) (2011) (evidence sufficient to sustain child molestation conviction; although victim did not provide details of molestation,…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lipscomb v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
She did not repeat the allegation that he licked her. 3 OCGA § 16-6-2 (a) (2) (“A person commits the offense of aggravated sodomy... when he or she commits sodomy with a person who is less than ten years of age.”). 4 OCGA § 16-6-22.2 (b) (“A person commits the offense of aggravated sexual battery when he or she intentionally penetrates with a foreign object the sexual organ or anus of another person without the consent of that person.”). 5 OCGA § 16-6-4 (a) (1) (“A person commits the offense of child molestation when such *439 person[ ]... [d]oes any immoral or indecent act to or …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Obeginski v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
J., and Boggs, J., concur. 1 Westbrooks v. State, 309 Ga. App. 398, 399-400 (1) ( 710 SE2d 594 ) (2011). 2 Obeginski’s residence consisted of a room that he rented in a house also inhabited by several other individuals. 3 See OCGA § 16-6-4 (c) (“A person commits the offense of aggravated child molestation when such person commits an offense of child molestation which act physically injures the child or involves an act of sodomy.”). 4 OCGA § 16-6-4 (a) (1) (“A person commits the offense of child molestation when such person . . . [d]oes any immoral or indecent act to or in the presenc…
discussed Cited "see" Craig Stephen Rider v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2022 · signal: see · confidence high
See Westbrooks v. State, 309 Ga. App. 398, 400-401 (1) ( 710 SE2d 594 ) (2011) (explaining that “conflicts between the victim’s testimony at trial and the victim’s out-of-court statements were for the jury to 7 See supra footnote 5. 11 resolve”) (citation and punctuation omitted).
discussed Cited "see" Roy C. Chambers v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2021 · signal: accord · confidence high
A person commits this offense when he or she, “without authority and with the intent to commit a felony or theft therein, . . . enters or remains within an occupied, unoccupied, or vacant dwelling house of another or any building . . . or other such structure designed 3 Id. (punctuation omitted); see English v. State, 301 Ga. App. 842, 842 ( 689 SE2d 130 ) (2010) (noting that following conviction, an appellant no longer enjoys a presumption of innocence). 4 Jones v. State, 318 Ga. App. 26, 29 (1) ( 733 SE2d 72 ) (2012) (punctuation omitted); see also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (I…
discussed Cited "see" Cecil Johnson v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2021 · signal: accord · confidence high
But it is the role of the 6 Miller v. State, 273 Ga. 831, 832 ( 546 SE2d 524 ) (2001) (punctuation omitted); accord Westbrooks v. State, 309 Ga. App. 398, 399-400 (1) ( 710 SE2d 594 ) (2011). 7 See former OCGA § 16-6-1 (a) (1) (1999). 8 See former OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (1) (2003). 10 jury—and not this Court—to “determine the credibility of the witnesses and to resolve any conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence.”9 And the jury obviously resolved those conflicts against Johnson, which it was entitled to do.10 Furthermore, contrary to the implication in Johnson’s argument, corrobor…
discussed Cited "see" Reynaldo Alvarez-Maldonado v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2021 · signal: accord · confidence high
When a criminal conviction is appealed, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, and the appellant no longer enjoys a presumption of innocence.3 And, of course, in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, we “do not weigh the evidence or determine witness credibility, but only determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty of the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt.”4 The jury’s verdict will be upheld, then, so “long as there is some competent evidence, even though contradicted, to support each fact necessary to…
discussed Cited "see" Stephen Willard Webb v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2021 · signal: accord · confidence high
In addition, the arresting deputy testified that he helped pull Webb—the only occupant—from his wrecked truck, that he smelled an alcoholic-beverage odor 5 Jones v. State, 318 Ga. App. 26, 29 (1) ( 733 SE2d 72 ) (2012) (punctuation omitted); see also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (III) (B) ( 99 SCt 2781 , 61 LE2d 560) (1979) (noting the relevant question is, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, could any rational jury found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt). 6 Miller v. State, 273 Ga. 831, 832 ( 546 SE2d 524 ) (200…
discussed Cited "see" Eric J. Robertson v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2021 · signal: accord · confidence high
OCGA § 16-5-46 (c) (1) (2017) provides: “A person commits the offense of trafficking an individual for sexual servitude when that person knowingly. . . [s]ubjects an individual to or maintains an individual in sexual servitude[.]” OCGA § 16-5-46 (a) (8) (2017), in relevant part, provides: “Sexual servitude” means any sexually explicit conduct or performance involving sexually explicit conduct for which anything of value is directly or indirectly given, promised to, or received by any individual, which conduct is induced or obtained: (A) [b]y coercion or deception; [or] (B) [f]rom an …
examined Cited "see" Mamadou Lamine Sambou v. State (4×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2021 · signal: accord · confidence high
OCGA § 16-9-1 (b) provides: A person commits the offense of forgery in the first degree when with the intent to defraud he or she knowingly makes, alters, or possesses any writing, other than a check, in a fictitious name or in such 2 See English v. State, 301 Ga. App. 842, 842 (689 SE2d 130) (2010) (noting that following conviction, an appellant no longer enjoys a presumption of innocence). 3 Jones v. State, 318 Ga. App. 26, 29 (1) (733 SE2d 72) (2012) (punctuation omitted); see also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (III) (B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979) (noting the relevant quest…
discussed Cited "see" Ladarious Sherrod v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2020 · signal: accord · confidence high
As previously noted, the State charged Sherrod with the aggravated assault on Steele outside of the pool hall under OCGA § 16-5-21 (b) (2), which at the time provided that “[a] person commits the offense of aggravated assault when he or she assaults [w]ith a deadly weapon or with any object, device, or instrument which, when used offensively against a person, is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury.”5 Accordingly, Count 1 of the indictment charged Sherrod with aggravated assault by alleging that he made “an assault upon the person of Lavonte Steele with a deadly we…
discussed Cited "see" Antonio Gathers v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2020 · signal: accord · confidence high
Under OCGA § 16-6-4 (a) (1), a person commits the offense of child molestation when he or she “[d]oes any immoral or indecent act to or in the presence of or with any child under the age of 16 years with the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the person. . . .” And the third count in the indictment, on which the jury convicted Gathers, charged him with child molestation by alleging that he “did perform an immoral and indecent act with [F. D.], a child under the age of sixteen (16) years, by touching the buttocks of [F. D.], with intent to arouse and sa…
discussed Cited "see" Trivynski Alexander v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2020 · signal: accord · confidence high
This offense is then elevated from a misdemeanor to a felony when a person, in addition to the foregoing, (i) Operates his or her vehicle in excess of 20 miles an hour above the posted speed limit; (ii) Strikes or collides with another vehicle or a pedestrian; elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt). 4 Miller v. State, 273 Ga. 831, 832 ( 546 SE2d 524 ) (2001) (punctuation omitted); accord Westbrooks v. State, 309 Ga. App. 398, 399-400 (1) ( 710 SE2d 594 ) (2011). 4 (iii) Flees in traffic conditions which place the general public at risk of receiving serious injuries; (iv) Commits a vi…
discussed Cited "see" Nathaniel Smith v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2020 · signal: accord · confidence high
See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (III) (B) ( 99 SCt 2781 , 61 LE2d 560) (1979) (“Once a defendant has been found guilty of the crime charged, the factfinder’s role as weigher of the evidence is preserved through a legal conclusion that upon judicial review all of the evidence is to be considered in the light most favorable to the prosecution.”). 4 When a criminal conviction is appealed, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, and the appellant no longer enjoys a presumption of innocence.5 And in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, we do n…
discussed Cited "see" Jorge Alberto Miranda v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2020 · signal: accord · confidence high
A person commits the offense of aggravated child molestation when he or she “commits an offense of child molestation which act physically injures the child or involves an act of sodomy.”6 And sodomy is committed when a person “performs or submits to any sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt). 4 Miller v. State, 273 Ga. 831, 832 ( 546 SE2d 524 ) (2001) (punctuation omitted); accord Westbrooks v. State, 309 Ga. App. 398, 399-400 (1) ( 710 SE2d 594 ) (2011). 5 Although Miranda does not challenge the sufficiency of …
discussed Cited "see" Mervin Tourdon Woodard v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2019 · signal: accord · confidence high
OCGA § 16-5-40 (a) provides: “A person commits the offense of kidnapping when such person abducts or steals away another person without lawful authority or 3 See English v. State, 301 Ga. App. 842, 842 ( 689 SE2d 130 ) (2010) (noting that following conviction, an appellant no longer enjoys a presumption of innocence). 4 Jones v. State, 318 Ga. App. 26, 29 (1) ( 733 SE2d 72 ) (2012) (punctuation omitted); see also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (III) (B) ( 99 SCt 2781 , 61 LE2d 560) (1979). 5 Miller v. State, 273 Ga. 831, 832 ( 546 SE2d 524 ) (2001) (punctuation omitted); accord West…
discussed Cited "see" Harold Miller v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2019 · signal: accord · confidence high
The Supreme Court of the United States has construed the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution5 so as to set forth three tiers of police-citizen 2 See English v. State, 301 Ga. App. 842, 842 ( 689 SE2d 130 ) (2010) (noting that following conviction, an appellant no longer enjoys a presumption of innocence). 3 Jones v. State, 318 Ga. App. 26, 29 (1) ( 733 SE2d 72 ) (2012) (punctuation omitted); see also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (III) (B) ( 99 SCt 2781 , 61 LE2d 560) (1979). 4 Miller v. State, 273 Ga. 831, 832 ( 546 SE2d 524 ) (2001) (punctuation omitted); accord Westb…
discussed Cited "see" ANDERSON v. the STATE. (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2019 · signal: accord · confidence high
Gobeil and Hodges, JJ., concur. 1 See, e.g. , Powell v. State , 310 Ga. App. 144 , 144, 712 S.E.2d 139 (2011). 2 See English v. State , 301 Ga. App. 842 , 842, 689 S.E.2d 130 (2010) (noting that following trial and conviction, the appellant no longer enjoys a presumption of innocence). 3 Jones v. State , 318 Ga. App. 26 , 29 (1), 733 S.E.2d 72 (2012) (punctuation omitted); see also Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307 , 319 (III) (B), 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). 4 Miller v. State , 273 Ga. 831 , 832, 546 S.E.2d 524 (2001) (punctuation omitted); accord Westbrooks v. State , 309 Ga. App…
discussed Cited "see" THOMPSON v. the STATE. (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2019 · signal: accord · confidence high
See, e.g., Womble v. State , 290 Ga. App. 768 , 769 (1), 660 S.E.2d 848 (2008) ("There being no evidence that [defendant] resided at the residence or had any ownership or possessory interest in the residence, he had no expectation of privacy in the residence and thus no standing under the Fourth Amendment to challenge the search of the residence."). 10 Ware v. State , 309 Ga. App. 426 , 428, 710 S.E.2d 627 (2011) (punctuation omitted); see Brooks v. State , 285 Ga. 424 , 425, 677 S.E.2d 68 (2009) (noting that a valid consent to a search "eliminates the need for either probable cause or a searc…
discussed Cited "see" KAUFMAN v. the STATE. (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2018 · signal: accord · confidence high
Ray, J., concurs in Divisions 1, 2, and 3(a), and in judgment only in Division 3 (b).* 1 See, e.g. , Powell v. State , 310 Ga.App. 144 , 144, 712 S.E.2d 139 (2011). 2 See English v. State , 301 Ga.App. 842 , 842, 689 S.E.2d 130 (2010). 3 Jones v. State , 318 Ga.App. 26 , 29 (1), 733 S.E.2d 72 (2012) (punctuation omitted); see also Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307 , 319 (III) (B), 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). 4 Miller v. State , 273 Ga. 831 , 832, 546 S.E.2d 524 (2001) (punctuation omitted); accord Westbrooks v. State , 309 Ga.App. 398 , 399-400 (1), 710 S.E.2d 594 (2011). 5 See OCG…
discussed Cited "see" ROBERTS v. the STATE. (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2018 · signal: accord · confidence high
Nevertheless, neither Crane nor Merkerson were tried with Roberts. 3 See English v. State , 301 Ga. App. 842 , 842, 689 S.E.2d 130 (2010). 4 Jones v. State , 318 Ga. App. 26 , 29 (1), 733 S.E.2d 72 (2012) (punctuation omitted); see also Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307 , 319 (III) (B), 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). 5 Miller v. State , 273 Ga. 831 , 832, 546 S.E.2d 524 (2001) (punctuation omitted); accord Westbrooks v. State , 309 Ga. App. 398 , 399-400 (1), 710 S.E.2d 594 (2011). 6 See former OCGA § 16-9-120 (4) (D), (F), (G) (2008). 7 See Ga. L. 2009, p. 725, § 2 (effective July …
discussed Cited "see" Smith v. the State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2017 · signal: accord · confidence high
We will not disturb such rulings unless there is a showing that the trial court abused its discretion.” (citation and punctuation omitted)). 12 See Hurt v. State, 298 Ga. 51, 53-54 (2) ( 779 SE2d 313 ) (2015) (holdingthat “in order to raise on appeal an impropriety regarding the admissibility of evidence, the specific ground of objection must be made at the time the evidence is offered, and the failure to do so amounts to a waiver of that specific ground” (punctuation omitted)); Sneed v. State, 337 Ga. App. 782, 785 (1) (b) ( 788 SE2d 892 ) (2016) (“To preserve an objection upon a spec…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Joseph Reyes v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2020 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Westbrooks v. State, 309 Ga. App. 398, 401-402 (2) ( 710 SE2d 594 ) (2011).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Brandon James Allison v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2020 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Bell, 263 Ga. App. at 896 (2). 12 she denied anything happened, it is well settled that, as we stated above, “[i]f a child, who has reported child molestation to an adult permitted to testify to the out-of-court statement at trial, is incapable of reiterating the accusation at trial or is unresponsive or evasive during cross-examination, the jury must decide the child’s credibility.” (Citation omitted.) Jones, 200 Ga. App. at 103; see also Westbrooks v. State, 309 Ga. App. 398, 401 (1) ( 710 SE2d 594 ) (2011) (same).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
WESTBROOKS
v.
The STATE.
A11A0167.
Court of Appeals of Georgia.
Apr 21, 2011.
710 S.E.2d 594
Dillard.
Cited by 36 opinions  |  Published

[*595] Kathleen Joan Anderson, for appellant.

J. Bradley Smith, Dist. Atty., Robin Rowden Riggs, Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellee.

DILLARD, Judge.

Following a jury trial, Donald Westbrooks was convicted on one count of aggravated child molestation and three counts of child molestation. Westbrooks appeals his convictions and the denial of his motion for new trial, arguing that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred in allowing one of the State's witnesses to improperly bolster the victim's credibility. For the reasons set forth infra, we affirm.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's guilty verdict,[1] the evidence shows that in March 2006, five-year-old S.W. came to live with her step-aunt and step-uncle after having previously lived with her father and Westbrooks, her uncle, at Westbrooks's home for several months. About one month later, S.W. was watching her step-uncle cook hotdogs when she told him—after being asked whether she liked hotdogs—that she liked hotdogs but did not like "Uncle Donald's hotdog." When her step-uncle asked her to explain, S.W. told him that she was referring to Westbrooks's privates and that he had touched her with them and had made her put her mouth on them. Alarmed by her disclosure, S.W.'s step-aunt and step-uncle reported it to the police and took S.W. to a children's hospital to meet with a forensic interviewer at the hospital's child advocacy center.

Over the course of the next few months, S.W. met several times with a second forensic interviewer at a child advocacy center that was closer to her home. During those interviews, S.W. disclosed that while she and her father were living at Westbrooks's home, Westbrooks pulled her pants down and touched her privates with his privates, touched her privates with his hand on at least two occasions, and made her put her mouth on his privates. S.W. also told this same interviewer, as well as her step-uncle, that Westbrooks made her watch movies that depicted men and women having sexual intercourse and instructed her not to tell anyone.

Thereafter, Westbrooks was arrested and indicted on one count of aggravated child molestation and three counts of child molestation[*596] of S.W.[2] During his trial, S.W. testified that she and her father lived at Westbrooks's home and that she had even slept in the same bed with Westbrooks while she lived there. She further testified that Westbrooks had touched her in a way that she did not like, but did not provide any details about the alleged sexual abuse. Nevertheless, S.W.'s step-uncle and the second forensic interviewer testified regarding S.W.'s detailed disclosures that Westbrooks sexually molested her. At the trial's conclusion, the jury found Westbrooks guilty on the four counts pertaining to S.W. Thereafter, Westbrooks filed a motion for new trial, which the trial court denied. This appeal follows.

1. Westbrooks contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions of aggravated child molestation and child molestation, arguing generally that S.W.'s accounts of the abuse were inconsistent and lacked credibility. This contention is without merit.

When a criminal conviction is appealed, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, and the appellant no longer enjoys a presumption of innocence.[3] We do not weigh the evidence or determine witness credibility "but only determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant[ ] guilty of the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt."[4] Accordingly, the jury's verdict will be upheld "[a]s long as there is some competent evidence, even though contradicted, to support each fact necessary to make out the State's case."[5]

A person commits child molestation by doing "any immoral or indecent act to or in the presence of or with any child under the age of 16 years with the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the person."[6] A person commits aggravated child molestation "when such person commits an offense of child molestation which act physically injures the child or involves an act of sodomy."[7] Finally, a person commits the crime of sodomy "when he or she performs or submits to any sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another."[8]

In this case, S.W. testified at trial that Westbrooks touched her in a way that she did not like, but she did not provide any details about those incidents. However, S.W.'s step-uncle and one of the forensic interviewers proffered evidence that Westbrooks sexually molested S.W., pursuant to the Child Hearsay Act, which provides that

[a] statement made by a child under the age of 14 years describing any act of sexual contact . . . performed with or on the child by another . . . is admissible in evidence by the testimony of the person or persons to whom made if the child is available to testify in the proceedings and the court finds that the circumstances of the statement provide sufficient indicia of reliability.[9]

Specifically, both S.W.'s step-uncle and the forensic interviewer testified that S.W. disclosed that Westbrooks touched her privates with his hand and his own privates and forced her to place her mouth on his privates. Thus, there is competent evidence to support Westbrooks's convictions of aggravated child molestation and child molestation.[10]

[*597] Nevertheless, Westbrooks argues that S.W.'s reticence to provide any details of the sexual abuse during trial and inconsistencies in some of her out-of-court disclosures rendered the evidence against him insufficient. But "[c]onflicts between the victim's testimony at trial and the victim's out-of-court statements were for the jury to resolve."[11] Indeed, "[i]f a child, who has reported child molestation to an adult permitted to testify to the out-of-court statement at trial, is incapable of reiterating the accusation at trial or is unresponsive or evasive during cross-examination, the jury must decide the child's credibility."[12] Here, the jury obviously resolved any credibility or inconsistency issues against Westbrooks.[13] Accordingly, Westbrooks's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions lacks merit.

2. Westbrooks also contends that the trial court erred in allowing one of the forensic interviewers, who met with S.W., to proffer irrelevant evidence that improperly bolstered S.W.'s credibility. We disagree.

In Georgia "the credibility of a witness is to be determined by the jury, and the credibility of a victim may not be bolstered by the testimony of another witness."[14] And "[i]mproper bolstering occurs when a witness gives an opinion as to whether another witness is telling the truth."[15]

In this case, during the State's direct examination of the first forensic interviewer, who met with S.W. shortly after she disclosed the sexual abuse to her step-uncle, the following colloquy occurred:

Q. Okay. And was [S.W.] reluctant to talk to you?
A. She would waver back and forth between being friendly and talking about stuff and then kind of shutting down and not wanting to talk about things.
Q. Okay. And is that normal?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Why is that normal?

But before the interviewer could answer, Westbrooks's counsel objected, arguing that the testimony was irrelevant and thus, impliedly, bolstering—which the trial court overruled. The State's prosecutor then asked the interviewer if S.W.'s reticence to talk about these issues was normal, and the interviewer responded:

Yes, it is. They're—just met somebody they've never met before and now you're talking about all this stuff. Kids tend to think they cause things. They tend to think they'll be in trouble if they talk about things. There's all kinds of reasons that children tell or don't tell. Most—Most of the time when things happen with children, a lot of times they don't tell because some of those reasons: they're afraid; they're afraid of what's going to happen; they're afraid of what it means; they don't understand about it; they're just confused about things.

Later during the direct examination, the interviewer began to explain why it was normal for children not to provide full disclosure during a forensic interview when Westbrooks's counsel objected on the ground that the interviewer had not been tendered as an expert. At the State's request, the trial court allowed the interviewer to testify as an expert "in the areas of forensic interview and interview of children."[16] Subsequently the interviewer continued her explanation, responding:

Well, a lot of times children don't initially tell because of all the—the things that I[*598] said earlier. They are confused or afraid of [sic] they're told not to tell or they think they did something wrong. When kids do tell, they tend to tell a little bit and then stop and maybe tell a little bit more. Frequently, kids will tell you so much and then they're just not going to go any further. . . .

Contrary to Westbrooks's contention, the first forensic interviewer's testimony was relevant and did not directly address S.W.'s credibility or express a direct opinion that S.W. had been sexually abused. Moreover, "the fact that such testimony may also indirectly, though necessarily, involve the child's credibility does not render it inadmissible."[17] As such, the forensic interviewer's testimony did not improperly bolster S.W.'s credibility or address the ultimate issue before the jury. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony over Westbrooks's objection.[18]

Judgment affirmed.

SMITH, P.J., and MIKELL, J., concur.

1 See, e.g., Goolsby v. State, 299 Ga.App. 330, 330-31, 682 S.E.2d 671 (2009); see also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319(III)(B), 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).
2 In the same indictment, Westbrooks was also charged with one count of aggravated child molestation and one count of child molestation of his former girlfriend's young son, but he was acquitted of these charges by the same jury that convicted him of sexually abusing S.W.
3 See, e.g., English v. State, 301 Ga.App. 842, 842, 689 S.E.2d 130 (2010).
4 Lott v. State, 303 Ga.App. 775, 775(1), 694 S.E.2d 698 (2010) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319(III)(B), 99 S.Ct. 2781).
5 Miller v. State, 273 Ga. 831, 831, 546 S.E.2d 524 (2001) (citation and punctuation omitted).
6 Ga. L. 1997, p. 1578, § 1 (current version OCGA § 16-6-4(a)(1) (2009)).
7 Ga. L. 1997, p. 1578, § 1 (current version OCGA § 16-6-4(c) (2009)).
8 Ga. L. 2000, p. 1346, § 1 (current version OCGA § 16-6-2(a) (2006)).
10 See, e.g., Bright v. State, 301 Ga.App. 204, 205(1), 687 S.E.2d 208 (2009); Herring v. State, 288 Ga.App. 169, 170(1), 653 S.E.2d 494 (2007).
11 Newton v. State, 296 Ga.App. 332, 335(1)(a), 674 S.E.2d 379 (2009) (citation omitted); see also Amerson v. State, 268 Ga.App. 855, 855(1), 602 S.E.2d 857 (2004) (same).
12 Amerson, 268 Ga.App. at 855(1), 602 S.E.2d 857 (citation omitted).
13 See Bright, 301 Ga.App. at 206(1), 687 S.E.2d 208 (affirming defendant's child molestation conviction despite alleged inconsistencies and questions about victim's credibility).
14 Stillwell v. State, 294 Ga.App. 805, 806-07(2)(a), 670 S.E.2d 452 (2008) (punctuation and footnote omitted).
15 O'Neal v. State, 304 Ga.App. 548, 553(2)(b), 696 S.E.2d 490 (2010) (citation omitted).
16 Despite his initial objection, on appeal, Westbrooks does not challenge the forensic interviewer's qualifications to testify as an expert.
17 Mullis v. State, 292 Ga.App. 218, 220(3)(b), 664 S.E.2d 271 (2008) (citation and punctuation omitted); see Howell v. State, 278 Ga.App. 634, 643(8), 629 S.E.2d 398 (2006) (same); Odom v. State, 243 Ga.App. 227, 229(1)(a), 531 S.E.2d 207 (2000) (same).
18 See O'Neal, 304 Ga.App. at 553(2)(b), 696 S.E.2d 490 (holding that expert's testimony about the dynamics of child sexual abuse disclosure was not improper bolstering); Pearce v. State, 300 Ga.App. 777, 785(6), 686 S.E.2d 392 (2009) (holding that a nurse practitioner's general testimony about behavior associated with child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome, including secrecy, fear, and confusion, did not constitute improper bolstering); Osborne v. State, 291 Ga.App. 711, 714(3), 662 S.E.2d 792 (2008) (holding that forensic interviewer could properly testify that child's "singsong manner of responding" to interviewer's questions was not consistent with child being coached).