In Interest of RW, 409 So. 2d 1069 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981). · Go Syfert
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In Interest of RW, 409 So. 2d 1069 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
34 citation events (1 in the last 25 years) across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: Brevard County v. DHRS (fladistctapp, 1991-11-14)
Treatment trajectory · 1981 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1981 2003 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 9 distinct citers. How cited ↗
cited Cited as authority (rule) Brevard County v. DHRS
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1991 · confidence medium
Id., 409 So.2d at 1070-1071.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Matter of Skinner
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1989 · confidence medium
The Fifth District cited In Interest of R.W., 409 So.2d 1069, 1071 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981) where the court had concluded that because HRS has the prime responsibility in carrying out the provisions of Chapter 827, it should bear the costs incurred in carrying out that responsibility.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Interest of MP (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1984 · confidence medium
In Interest of R.W., 409 So.2d 1069, 1071 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981).
cited Cited "see" W.S.M. v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1997 · signal: see · confidence high
See State of Fla., Dep’t of Health and Rehabilitative Servs. v. Lee County, 409 So.2d 1069 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981).
cited Cited "see" State, Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. Lee County
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1981 · signal: see · confidence high
See In the Interest of R.W., 409 So.2d 1069 (Fla.2d DCA 1981).
cited Cited "see" State, Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. Collier County
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1981 · signal: see · confidence high
See In the Interest of R.W., 409 So.2d 1069 (Fla.2d DCA 1981).
cited Cited "see" State, Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. Lee County
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1981 · signal: see · confidence high
See In the Interest of R.W., 409 So.2d 1069 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Hillsborough County v. Albrechta
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2003 · signal: see also · confidence low
In re D.B., 385 So.2d 83, 93 (Fla.1980); see also In re R.W., 409 So.2d 1069 , 1070-71 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1981).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Seminole County v. Mize
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1988 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also In re Interest ofR.W., 409 So.2d 1069 (Fla.2d DCA 1981), rev. denied, Department of H.R.S. v. C.C., 418 So.2d 1279 (Fla.1982).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
IN the INTEREST OF R.W., a Child. STATE of Florida, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, Appellant,
v.
LEE COUNTY, Appellee.
81-328.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
Dec 18, 1981.
409 So. 2d 1069
Campbell.
Cited by 16 opinions  |  Published

[*1070] Anthony N. DeLuccia, Jr., Fort Myers, for appellant.

James Yaeger, County Atty., Fort Myers, for appellee.

CAMPBELL, Judge.

This is an appeal by the appellant, State of Florida, Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services, from a judgment of the trial court which required appellant to pay fees to a guardian ad litem appointed for a minor child pursuant to section 827.07(16), Florida Statutes (1979). We affirm.

The sole issue raised by appellant is whether it can be required to pay such fees absent a specific legislative appropriation. In support of its position, appellant relies on article VII, section 1 of the Florida Constitution, which provides that no money shall be drawn from the state treasury except pursuant to appropriations made by law. We feel that the constitutional limitation does not require every expenditure for which the state might be obligated to pay to be specifically itemized in appropriations to the various departments of state government. That would be impossible.

We consider an award of fees to a guardian ad litem appointed as required by statute to be closely akin to an award of costs and attorney's fees provided by statute to be awarded to a prevailing party. Thus, the case of Simpson v. Merrill, 234 So.2d 350 (Fla. 1970), is so analogous to this case as to be controlling here. It is illustrative of expenditures that may be required of the state but not anticipated by a specifically itemized appropriation. In Simpson, the supreme court considered whether the state or any of its agencies would be liable for court costs that might be taxed in favor of a party recovering judgment. The court held that the state or its agencies are required to pay such costs absent any specific exemption in section 57.041, Florida Statutes (1969), which provided for recovery of legal costs.

Chief Justice Ervin's concurring opinion in Simpson thoroughly addresses the potential problem of a lack of available appropriated funds to pay for judgments rendered against the state. There, he recognized that where such judgments are rendered, in order to pay the judgments it may be necessary for the agency to transfer funds within its appropriated budget when such transfers would not seriously jeopardize the normal duties of such agencies. He also recognized that whether funds are available with which to pay such judgments is not always readily ascertainable, stating:

If there is dispute as to availability of funds of the officer or agency to pay such costs, a separate mandamus action to determine the issue could be brought. If there were no funds available, the losing officer or agency in the litigation could seek a budgetary item in his or its succeeding year's budget to pay the judgment costs or a claim or relief bill could be sought.

234 So.2d at 353. See also Roberts v. Askew, 260 So.2d 492 (Fla. 1972).

Appellant relies on In Re D.B. and D.S., 385 So.2d 83 (Fla. 1980), as support for its position that Lee County, not appellant, should pay the guardian ad litem fees incurred pursuant to section 827.07(16). We find that reliance misplaced as we interpret that decision to be restricted to cases where appointment of counsel is constitutionally required. In those instances the court held[*1071] that section 43.28, Florida Statutes (1979), requires the county to pay such fees. Appointment of a guardian ad litem in child abuse cases is not a constitutional requirement nor is it the type of appointment necessary to the operation of the court as contemplated by section 43.28. It is the result of a legislative requirement under chapter 827, Florida Statutes (1979). Section 827.07(11) places the prime responsibility for carrying out the provisions of that chapter upon appellant. Appellant, therefore, should pay the costs incurred in carrying out that responsibility.

Florida Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. In Re R.M.A., 327 So.2d 844 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976), held in a similar case that the appellant could not be required to pay a fee to the guardian ad litem. We are not in conflict, however, since that case was based on lack of statutory authority for award of a fee to a guardian ad litem and was prior to the enactment of section 827.07(16) which now requires the appointment of a guardian ad litem.

We, therefore, affirm the judgment of the trial court.

SCHEB, C.J., and SCHOONOVER, J., concur.