Danciger Oil & Refining Co. of Texas v. R.R. Comm'n of Texas, 56 S.W.2d 1075 (Tex. 1933). · Go Syfert
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Danciger Oil & Refining Co. of Texas v. R.R. Comm'n of Texas, 56 S.W.2d 1075 (Tex. 1933). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
73 citation events (9 in the last 25 years) across 5 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Jeffrey Longino, Geralynn Longino & All Other Occupants v. Itay Sharoni (texapp, 2024-12-04)
Treatment trajectory · 1933 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1933 1979 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 6 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jeffrey Longino, Geralynn Longino & All Other Occupants v. Itay Sharoni
Tex. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
Comm’n, 122 Tex. 243 , 56 S.W.2d 1075, 1076 (1933); see also U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18 , 22–25 (1994) (noting that vacatur must be granted where mootness results from the unilateral action of the party who prevailed in the lower court). –19– CONCLUSION Because we conclude this Court does not have jurisdiction to address the parties’ merits-based issues on appeal, we grant Sharoni’s Motion to Dismiss Appeal, dismiss this appeal as moot, and vacate the underlying judgment. 220653f.p05 /Maricela Breedlove/ MARICELA BREEDLOVE JUSTICE –20– Court …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Texas Quarter Horse Association Texas Thoroughbred Association Texas Horsemen's Partnership Gillespie County Fair and Festivals Association, Inc.et Al. // American Legion Department of Texas v. American Legion Department of Texas, Temple Post 133 Kickapoo Traditional Tribe of Texas Thompson Allstate Bingo Supply, Inc. And Moore Supplies, Inc.// Texas Quarter Horse
Tex. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
See, e.g., International Ass’n of Machinists, 130 S.W.2d at 283 ("To dismiss the appeal would be to leave undisturbed the judgment of the lower court and thereby, in effect, affirm same without according to the appealing parties a hearing upon the merits of their appeal.”); Danciger, 56 S.W.2d at 1076 ("In order that plaintiff in error may not be prejudiced in any subsequent proceeding by a judgment which this court has refused to consider on its merits, we think a proper disposition of the case would be to reverse the judgment of the trial court and the Court of Civil Appeals and to dismi…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) John Lawton v. David W. Lawton, Individually, as Former Independent of the Estate of Joseph G. Lawton, and as Former Agent for Joseph G. Lawton Under a Power of Attorney
Tex. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
Comm’n of Texas, 122 Tex. 243, 245 (1933) (vacating so that the parties “may not be prejudiced in any subsequent proceeding by a judgment which this court has refused to consider on its merits”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Marshall v. Housing Authority of San Antonio
Tex. · 2006 · confidence medium
Comm’n, 122 Tex. 243 , 56 S.W.2d 1075, 1076 (1933); see also U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 22-25 , 115 S.Ct. 386 , 130 L.Ed.2d 233 *789 (1994) (noting that one purpose of vacating the underlying judgment if a matter becomes moot during appeal is to prevent prejudice to the rights of parties when appellate review of a judgment on its merits is prevented by some reason other than voluntary action of the parties).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) First State Bank, Hearne v. Citizens Bank of Bryan
Tex. App. · 1978 · confidence medium
Passing on whether the temporary injunction was improvidently granted would have been meaningless, and the case was remanded, although moot, in the manner required in such circumstances by the rule announced in Danciger Oil & Refining Co. v. Railroad Commission, 122 Tex. 243 , 56 S.W.2d 1075, 1076 (1933).
discussed Cited "see" Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. Mathis (2×)
Tex. App. · 1936 · signal: see · confidence high
See, in this connection, Danciger Oil & Refining Co. v. Railroad Commission, 122 Tex. 243 , 56 S.W.(2d) 1075 ; Teer v. McGann (Tex.Civ.App.) 65 S.W.(2d) 362 ; McWhorter v. Northcut, 94 Tex. 86 , 58 S.W. 720 .
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
DANCIGER OIL & REFINING CO. OF TEXAS
v.
RAILROAD COMMISSION OF TEXAS Et Al.
Motion No. 10,530 Cause No. 6283..
Texas Supreme Court.
Feb 13, 1933.
56 S.W.2d 1075
S. A. L: Morgan and Morgan, Culton, Morgan & Britain, all of Amarillo, I. J. Ringolsky and Ringolsky, Boatright & Jacobs, all of Kansas City, Mo., and Chas. L. Black and Black & Graves, all of Austin, for plaintiff in error., James V. Allred, Atty. Gen., Fred Up-church and Maurice Cheek, Asst. Attys. Gen., Hines H. Baker, of Houston, Robert E. Hard-wicke, of Fort Worth, Marion S. Church, of Dallas, and, John E. Kilgore, of Wichita Falls, for defendants in error.
Leddy, Cureton.
Cited by 38 opinions  |  Published
LEDDY, C.

Defendants in error have filed a motion to dismiss the writ of error in this case on the ground that the questions presented for decision are now moot.

This suit involves an attack made by plaintiff in error on a proration order of the Railroad Commission of Texas promulgated under the terms of the oil conservation statutes as they existed prior to August, 1931. The order sought to be annulled expired by its own terms subsequent to the rendition of the judgment in this case. In addition to this, the conservation statutes authorizing the Railroad Commission to regulate the production of oil in Texas have been materially changed since the judgment was rendered by the district court, from which the appeal was taken. Acts Fourth Called Session, 42d Legislature (1932) c. 2, p. 3 (Vernon’s Ann. Civ. St. arts. 6014, 6014a, 6029, 6048c, §§ 5, 7, 8, 6049d).

Courts have sometimes decided questions involving attacks upon short time orders of commissions after the same have expired by their own terms. Such cases were decided on the theory that a decision of the question as to the power of the tribunal to make the order involved might be of material value in the promulgation of similar orders in the future, and for the further reason that the person against whom such order was made might be subjected to liability in subsequent proceedings if the legality of the order were not determined. Southern Pacific Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 219 U. S. 433, 31 S. Ct. 288, 55 L. Ed. 283; Technical Radio Laboratory v. Federal Radio Commission, 59 App. D. C. 125, 36 F.(2d) 111, 66 A. L. R. 1355; United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U. S. 290, 308, 17 S. Ct. 540, 41 L. Ed. 1007; Leonard v. Earle, 279 U. S. 392, 49 S. Ct. 372, 73 L. Ed. 754.

But in this ease the law under which said[*1076] order was made has been materially changed; hence a decision of the questions involved in this case would be of little, if any, practical value for such purpose.

We are inclined to the view that, although the questions involved in this case are moot, it would not be proper for this court to dismiss the writ of error. Such action would leave in effect a final judgment of the district court of Travis county adjudicating that plaintiff in error has violated a valid proration order of the Railroad Commission. In order that plaintiff in error may not be prejudiced in any subsequent proceeding by a judgment which this court has refused to consider on its merits, we think a proper disposition of the ease would be to reverse the judgment of the trial court and the Court of Civil Appeals and to dismiss the cause. Alejandrino v. Quezon, 271 U. S. 528, 536, 46 S. Ct. 600, 70 L. Ed. 1071; Railroad Commission of Texas v. Alfred MacMillan et al., 53 S. Ct. 223, 77 L. Ed. _.

The judgments of the district court and the Court of Civil Appeals are both reversed, and the cause dismissed.

CURETON, C. J.

The foregoing opinion is adopted as the opinion of the Supreme Court, and judgment will be entered in accordance therewith.