Universal Battery Co. v. United States & Four Other Cases, 281 U.S. 580 (1930). · Go Syfert
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Universal Battery Co. v. United States & Four Other Cases, 281 U.S. 580 (1930). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
337 citation events (10 in the last 25 years) across 52 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Knapp v. Commissioner (tax, 1988-03-15) · Strongest negative: Big Three Industrial Gas & Equipment Co. v. United States (txsd, 1971-05-19)
Treatment trajectory · 1930 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1930 1978 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 33 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited "but see" Big Three Industrial Gas & Equipment Co. v. United States (4×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
S.D. Tex. · 1971 · signal: but see · confidence high
But see Universal Battery Co. v. United States, 281 U.S. 580 , 50 S.Ct. 422 , 74 L.Ed. 1051 (1930), where the Court held that if taxable and nontaxable designs were equal, the tax did not apply. .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Knapp v. Commissioner (2×)
Tax Ct. · 1988 · confidence medium
Rept. 95-1232, supra, 1978-2 C.B. at 366; S. Rept. 95-746, supra, 1978-2 C.B. at 424.
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Parish of St. Bernard
5th Cir. · 1985 · confidence medium
See also, Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402 , 62 S.Ct. 326 , 86 L.Ed. 301 (1941); Universal Battery Co. v. United States, 281 U.S. 580, 583 , 50 S.Ct. 422, 423 , 74 L.Ed. 1051, 1054 (1930).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Parish of St. Bernard, Police Jury of the Parish of St. Bernard, Lake Borgne Basin Levee District, Fosco Enterprises, Inc., Travelers Insurance Co., Parish of Jefferson and Jefferson Parish Council, Regent Development Corp., Jefferson Levee District, Pontchatrain Levee District, Joseph F. Varisco, Jr., and Terry Tedesco, Inc., J.J. Krebs and Sons, Inc., United States of America v. The Parish of Jefferson
5th Cir. · 1985 · confidence medium
See also, Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402 , 62 S.Ct. 326 , 86 L.Ed. 301 (1941); Universal Battery Co. v. United States, 281 U.S. 580, 583 , 50 S.Ct. 422, 423 , 74 L.Ed. 1051, 1054 (1930).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Newsweek, Inc., Time Incorporated, Magazine Publishers Association, Inc., Council of Public Utility Mailers, Reader's Digest Association, Inc., and United Parcel Service of America, Inc. v. United States Postal Service, Warshawsky & Company, American Business Press, Inc., Dow Jones & Company, Inc., International Labor Press Association, Afl-Cio/clc, Parcel Shippers Association, Direct Mail/marketing Association, Inc., March of Dimes, Mail Order Association of America, Association of American Publishers, Inc., Recording Industry Assoc. Of America, Inc., National Association of Greeting Card Publishers, Magazine Publishers Association, Inc., Classroom Publishers Association, American Lung Association, National Easter Seal Society, St. Jude Children's Research Hospital, American Cancer Society, and National Wildlife Federation, Intervenors. Council of Public Utility Mailers v. United States Postal Service, Newsweek, Inc., Dow Jones & Company, Inc., Time Incorporated, Association of American Publishers, Inc., Recording Industry Assoc. Of America, Inc., Parcel Shippers Association, Reader's Digest Association, Inc., Mail Order Association of America, United Parcel Service of America, Inc., National Association of Greeting Card Publishers, International Labor Press Association, Afl-Cio/clc, Direct Mail/marketing Association, Inc., Warshawsky & Company, Magazine Publishers Association, Inc., Classroom Publishers Association, American Business Press, Inc., American Lung Association, National Easter Seal Society, St. Jude Children's Research Hospital, American Cancer Society, National Wildlife Federation, Intervenors
2d Cir. · 1981 · confidence medium
See also, e. g., Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402 ( 62 S.Ct. 326 , 86 L.Ed. 301 ); Universal Battery Co. v. United States, 281 U.S. 580, 583 ( 50 S.Ct. 422, 423 , 74 L.Ed. 1051 ). 61 Id.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Newsweek, Inc. v. United States Postal Service
2d Cir. · 1981 · confidence medium
See also, e. g., Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402 [ 62 S.Ct. 326 , 86 L.Ed. 301 ]; Universal Battery Co. v. United States, 281 U.S. 580, 583 [ 50 S.Ct. 422, 423 , 74 L.Ed. 1051 ].
cited Cited as authority (rule) National Industrial Sand Ass'n v. Marshall
3rd Cir. · 1979 · confidence medium
See also, e. g., Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402 [ 62 S.Ct. 326 , 86 L.Ed. 301 ]; Universal Battery Co. v. United States, 281 U.S. 580, 583 [ 50 S.Ct. 422 , 74 L.Ed. 1051 ].
cited Cited as authority (rule) National Industrial Sand Association, a Delaware Corporation, the China Clay Producers, Intervenor v. F. Ray Marshall, Secretary of Labor, United States Department of Labor, and Robert B. Lagather, Assistant Secretary for Mine Safety and Health Administration, United States Department of Labor, the Council of the Southern Mountains, Inc. v. F. Ray Marshall, in His Capacity as Secretary of Labor, United States Department of Labor, and Robert Lagather, in His Capacity as Assistant Secretary of Labor, Mine Safety and Health Administration, China Clay Producers, Intervenor
3rd Cir. · 1979 · confidence medium
See also, E. g., Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402 ( 62 S.Ct. 326 , 86 L.Ed. 301 ); Universal Battery Co. v. United States, 281 U.S. 580, 583 ( 50 S.Ct. 422 , 74 L.Ed. 1051 ).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Fargo Foundry Steel & Manufacturing Co. v. United States
D.N.D. · 1976 · confidence medium
They are not “within the same field . and used to the same ends” with the items listed in § 4061(a)(1), which is the test set out in Universal Battery Co. v. United States, supra, 281 U.S. at 583, 50 S.Ct. at 423.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Lehigh and New England Railway Company v. Interstate Commerce Commission and United States, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Intervenor
3rd Cir. · 1976 · confidence medium
See also, e. g., Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402 [ 62 S.Ct. 326 , 86 L.Ed. 301 ]; Universal Battery Co. v. United States, 281 U.S. 580, 583 [ 50 S.Ct. 422 , 74 L.Ed. 1051 ].
cited Cited as authority (rule) Rue R. Elston Company, Inc., Appellee-Appellant v. United States of America, Appellant-Appellee
8th Cir. · 1976 · confidence medium
Universal Battery Co. v. United States, 281 U.S. 580 , 583-84, 50 S.Ct. 422 , 423, 74 L.Ed. 1051, 1054 (1930); Durkee-Atwood Co. v. Willcuts, 83 F.2d 995, 997 (8th Cir. 1936).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Dorothy McInnis v. Caspar W. Weinberger
1st Cir. · 1976 · confidence medium
Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402 [ 62 S.Ct. 326 , 86 L.Ed. 301 ]; Universal Battery Co. v. United States, 281 U.S. 580, 583 [ 50 S.Ct. 422 , 74 L.Ed. 1051 ]. ‘Particularly is this respect due when the administrative practice at stake “involves a contemporaneous construction of a statute by the men charged with the responsibility of setting its machinery in motion; of making the parts work efficiently and smoothly while they are yet untried and new.’ ” Power Reactor Co. v. Electricians, 367 U.S. 396, 408 [ 81 S.Ct. 1529, 1535 , 6 L.Ed.2d 924 ].” The continued viability of this language is…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Corum v. Beth Israel Medical Center
S.D.N.Y. · 1974 · confidence medium
See also e. g., Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402 [ 62 S.Ct. 326 , 86 L.Ed. 301 ]; Universal Battery Co. v. United States, 281 U.S. 580, 583 [ 50 S.Ct. 422 , 74 L.Ed. 1051 ]. ‘Particularly is this respect due when the administrative practice at stake involves a contemporaneous construction of a statute by the men charged with the responsibility of setting its machinery in motion, of making the parts work efficiently and smoothly while they are yet untried and new.’ Power Reactor Co. v. Electricians, 367 U.S. 396, 408 [ 81 S.Ct. 1529 , 6 L.Ed.2d 924 ].” Accordingly, plaintiffs have the heavy b…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Pacific Coast Meat Jobbers Ass'n v. Cost of Living Council
Temp. Emerg. Ct. App. · 1973 · confidence medium
“To sustain the Commission’s application of this statutory term, we need not find that its construction is the only reasonable one, or even that it is the result we would have reached had the question arisen in the first instance in judicial proceedings.” Unemployment Comm’n v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143, 153 [ 67 S.Ct. 245, 250 , 91 L.Ed. 136 ], See also e. g., Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402 [ 62 S.Ct. 326 , 86 L.Ed. 301 ], Universal Battery Co. v. United States, 281 U.S. 580, 583 [ 50 S.Ct. 422 , 74 L.Ed. 1051 ].
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Mesa Farm Co v. United States
9th Cir. · 1973 · confidence medium
See also, e. g., Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402 [ 62 S.Ct. 326 , 86 L.Ed. 301 ]; Universal Battery Co. v. United States, 281 U.S. 580, 583 [ 50 S.Ct. 422 , 74 L.Ed. 1051 ]. ‘Particularly is this respect due when the administrative practice at stake “involves a contemporaneous construction of a statute by the men charged with the responsibility of setting its machinery in motion; of making the parts work efficiently and smoothly while they are yet untried and new.” ’ Power Reactor Co., v. Electricians, 367 U.S. 396, 408 , 81 S.Ct. 1529 , 6 L.Ed.2d 924 .” The present section 40c of the B…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In The Matter Of Mesa Farm Company
9th Cir. · 1973 · confidence medium
See also, e.g., Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402 [ 62 S.Ct. 326 , 86 L.Ed. 301 ]; Universal Battery Co. v. United States, 281 U.S. 580, 583 [ 50 S.Ct. 422 , 74 L.Ed. 1051 ]. 'Particularly is this respect due when the administrative practice at stake "involves a contemporaneous construction of a statute by the men charged with the responsibility of setting its machinery in motion; of making the parts work efficiently and smoothly while they are yet untried and new."' Power Reactor Co., v. Electricians, 367 U.S. 396, 408 , 81 S.Ct. 1529 , 6 L.Ed.2d 924 ." 23 The present section 40c of the Bankruptcy…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Burruss Land & Lumber Co. v. United States
W.D. Va. · 1970 · confidence medium
And it would be also unreasonable to hold that articles can be so classified only where they are adapted solely for use in motor vehicles and are exclusively so used. * * * [A]rticles primarily adapted for use in motor vehicles are to be regarded as parts or accessories of such vehicles, even though there has been some other use of the articles for which they are not so well adapted. 281 U.S. at 583-584, 50 S.Ct. at 423.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rogers v. Laird
E.D. Va. · 1970 · confidence medium
See also, e. g., Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402 [ 62 S.Ct. 326 , 86 L.Ed. 301 ]; Universal Battery Co. v. United States, 281 U.S. 580, 583 [ 50 S.Ct. 422 , 74 L.Ed. 1051 ], “Particularly is this respect due when the administrative practice at stake ‘involves a contemporaneous construction of a statute by the men charged with the responsibility of setting its machinery in motion"; of making the parts work efficiently and smoothly while they are yet untried and new.’ ” Power Reactor Co. v. Electricians, 367 U.S. 396, 408 [ 81 S.Ct. 1529, 1535 , 6 L.Ed.2d 924 ].
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Van Norman Industries, Inc. v. The United States
Ct. Cl. · 1966 · confidence medium
Their sale is the principal thing that is taxed, and the sale of parts and accessories “for” such vehicles is taxed because the parts and accessories are within the same field with the vehicles and used to the same ends. [281 U.S., at 583, 50 S.Ct., at 423.] [Emphasis added.] Presumably an article connected to a vehicle but not “within the * * * [motor vehicle] field” and not “used to the same ends” would not be taxable.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Donald Whattoff and Vernard Whattoff, D/B/A Whattoff Motor Company, a Copartnership v. United States
8th Cir. · 1966 · confidence medium
In Universal Battery Co., supra, the Supreme Court said at 281 U.S. at page 583, 50 S.Ct. at page 423: “The administrative regulations issued under section 900 uniformly have construed the term ‘part’ in that section as meaning any article designed or manufactured for the special purpose of being used as, or to replace, a component part of such vehicle, and which by reason of some characteristic is not such a commercial article as ordinarily would be sold for general use, but is primarily adapted for use as a component part of such vehicle.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) SNAKE OR PIUTE INDIANS, ETC. v. United States
Ct. Cl. · 1953 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Cf. Universal Battery Co. v. United States, 281 U.S. 580, 584, 585 , 50 S.Ct. 422, 423 , 74 L.Ed. 1051 .” Upon remand, this court reexamined the record, held further proceedings, and after making findings, held that the evidence did not justify a conclusion that the United States knew of the corruption of, and knowingly paid money to, corrupt chiefs for the benefit of the tribe. 102 Ct.Cl. 565 , certiorari denied 326 U.S. 719 , 66 S.Ct. 24 , 90 L.Ed. 426 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States Gear Corp. v. United States
Ct. Cl. · 1936 · confidence medium
As was said by the Supreme Court in the Universal Battery Co. v. United States, 281 U.S. 580, 583, 584 , 50 S.Ct. 422, 423 , 74 L.Ed. 1051 : “Certainly it would be unreasonable to hold that articles equally adapted to a variety of uses and commonly put to such uses, one of which is use in motor véhicles, must be classified as ‘parts or accessories for such vehicles.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Anthony Co. v. United States
Ct. Cl. · 1932 · confidence medium
As to what further evidence would be necessary, the Supreme Court has said in Universal Battery Co. v. United States, 281 U. S. 580, 583, 584 , 50 S. Ct. 422, 423 , 74 L.
cited Cited "see" Dominion Resources, Inc. v. United States
Fed. Cl. · 2011 · signal: see · confidence high
See Notice 88-99, 1988- 36 I.R.B. 29 ,1988- 2 C.B. 422 , 1988 WL 561191 (Aug. 16, 1988).
cited Cited "see" Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance v. Resolution Trust Corp.
N.D. Ala. · 1994 · signal: see · confidence high
See IRS Rev.Proe. 92-64, 1992- 2 C.B. 422 .
discussed Cited "see" Laher Auto Spring Co. v. United States (2×)
Ct. Cl. · 1933 · signal: see · confidence high
See Universal Battery Co. v. United States, 281 U. S. 580 , 50 S. Ct. 422 , 74 L.
discussed Cited "see" Englert Mfg. Co. v. United States (2×)
Ct. Cl. · 1933 · signal: see · confidence high
See Universal Battery Co. v. United States, 281 U. S. 580 , 50 S. Ct. 422 , 74 L.
discussed Cited "see" Bassick Mfg. Co. v. United States (2×)
Ct. Cl. · 1930 · signal: see · confidence high
See Universal Battery Company v. United States, 281 U. S. 580 , 50 S. Ct. 422 , 74 L.
discussed Cited "see" Rochester Woven Belting Corp. v. United States (2×)
Ct. Cl. · 1930 · signal: see · confidence high
See Universal Battery Co. v. United States, 281 U. S. 580 , 50 S. Ct. 422 , 74 L.
discussed Cited "see" Hinsdale Mfg. Co. v. United States (2×)
Ct. Cl. · 1930 · signal: see · confidence high
See Universal Battery Co. v. United States, 281 U. S. 580 , 50 S. Ct. 422 , 74 L.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Thomas v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of University Park (2×)
Tex. App. · 1951 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Universal Battery Co. v. United States, 281 U.S. 580 , 50 S.Ct. 422, 423 , 74 L.Ed. 1051 .
cited Cited "see, e.g." Pressed Steel Tank Co. v. Commissioner
unknown court · 1942 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Universal Battery Co. v. United States, 281 U. S. 580 ; Walker Manufacturing Co. v. United States, 65 Ct. Cls. 394; certiorari denied, 278 U. S. 617 .
cited Cited "see, e.g." Fairmount Tool & Forging Co. v. United States
Ct. Cl. · 1930 · signal: see also · confidence low
See, also, Universal Battery Co. v. United States, 50 S. Ct. 422 , 74 L.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Universal Battery Company
v.
United States; Vesta Battery Corporation v. Same; Bassick Manufacturing Company v. Same; F. W. Stewart Manufacturing Corporation v. Same; Gemco Manufacturing Company v. Same
127, 275, 350, 351, and 352.
Supreme Court of the United States.
May 26, 1930.
281 U.S. 580
Mr. George M. Morris for the Universal Battery Company and the Vesta Battery Corporation., Mr. George M. Wilmeth for the Bassick Manufacturing Company, the F. W. Stewart Manufacturing Corporation, and the Gemco Manufacturing Company., Mr. Claude R. Branch, with whom Assistant Attorney General Youngquist, Messrs. Sewall Key and Andrew D. Sharpe, Special Assistants to the Attorney General, and Ralph C. Williamson were on the brief, for the United States.
Van Devanter.
Cited by 160 opinions  |  Published
Mr. Justice Van Devanter

delivered the opinion of the Court.

These are cases brought against the United States to recover taxes paid under § 900 of the Revenue Acts of .1918 and 1921, c. 18, 40 Stat. 1122; c. 136, 42 Stat. 291, upon sales of articles which the revenue officers regarded as “ parts or accessories for ” motor vehicles the sale of which is subjected to a tax by subdivisions 1 and 2 of that section. In each case the facts were found specially and judgment was given for the defendant. In all this Court granted certiorari.

We pass the details relating to protests, claim to a refund ,and administrative denial of those claims, and come directly to the terms of the section under which the taxes were exacted. It provides:

“ Sec,. 900. That there shall be levied, assessed, collected and paid upon the following articles.sold or leased by the manufacturer, producer, or importer, a tax equivalent to the following percentages of the price for which so sold or leased—
[*582] “(1) Automobile trucks and automobile wagons, (including tires, inner tubes, parts, and accessories therefor, sold on or in connection therewith or with the sale thereof), 3 per centum;
“(2) Other automobiles and motorcycles, (including tires, inner tubes, parts, and accessories therefor, sold on or in connection therewith or with the sale thereof), except tractors, 5 per centum;
“(3) Tires, inner tubes, parts, or accessories, for any of the articles enumerated in subdivision (1) or (2), sold to any person other than a manufacturer or producer of any of the articles enumerated in subdivision (1) or (2), 5 per centum; ”...

The claimants do not manufacture or sell any of the vehicles enumerated in subdivisions 1 and 2, but each does manufacture and sell the article on sales of which the challenged tax was assessed.and collected. These sales were all to persons other than a manufacturer or producer of any of the enumerated vehicles. In each case the question presented is whether the article sold is a “part or accessory for ” such a vehicle within the meaning of subdivision 3.

Taking the three subdivisions together it is apparent that the words “ parts ” and “ accessories ” have the same meaning in all; that they comprehend articles having some relation to the enumerated motor vehicles; and that it is because of that relation that the tax is laid on their sale.

Subdivisions 1 and 2, with the introductory provision, contemplate that parts and accessories may be sold along with the vehicle by the manufacturer of the latter, and show that where this is done the tax is to be paid by the manufacturer of the vehicle. Subdivision 3, with the introductory provision,’ contemplates that parts and accessories may be sold separately from the vehicle by the[*583] manufacturer of the former to others than a manufacturer of the latter, as where the sale is for replacement purposes, and show that the tax on such a sale is to be paid by the manufacturer of the parts and accessories. And it is implicit in the three subdivisions, with the introductory provision, that where parts and accessories are sold by their manufacturer to a vehicle manufacturer to be resold along with the vehicle by the latter, the sale by the former is to be tax free, while the resale by the latter, when incidental to the sale of the vehicle, is to be taxed against the latter as already indicated.

Thus the scheme of taxation embodied in these provisions centers around the motor vehicles enumerated therein. Their sale is the principal thing that is taxed, and the sale of parts and accessories “ for ” such vehicles is taxed because the parts and accessories are within the same field with the vehicles and used to the same ends.

The administrative regulations issued under § 900 uniformly have construed the term “ part ” in that section as meaning any article designed or manufactured for the special purpose of being used as, or to replace, a component part of such vehicle, and which by reason of some characteristic is not such a commercial article as ordinarily would be sold for general use, but is primarily adapted for use as a component part of such vehicle. The regulations also have construed the term “ accessory ” as meaning any article designed to be used in connection with such vehicle to add to its utility or ornamentation and which is primarily adapted for such use, whether or not essential to the operation of the vehicle.

This construction of those terms has been adhered to in the Internal Revenue Bureau for about ten years and it ought not to be disturbed now unless it be plainly wrong. We think it is not so, but is an admissible construction. Certainly it would be unreasonable to hold[*584] that articles equally adapted to a variety of uses and commonly put to such uses, one of which is use in motor vehicles, must be classified as parts or accessories for such vehicles. And it would be also unreasonable to hold that articles can be so classified only where they are adapted solely for use in motor vehicles and are exclusively so used. Magone v. Wiederer, 159 U. S. 555, 559. We think the view taken in the administrative regulations is reasonable and should be upheld. It is that articles primarily adapted for use in motor vehicles are to be regarded as parts or accessories of such vehicles,: even though there has been some other use of the articles for which they are not so well adapted.

It remains to apply that view to the cases in hand.

In No. 127 the claimant was taxed on the sale of storage batteries to divers dealers. In the petition it was alleged that batteries of the type sold were not primarily adapted for use in motor vehicles, but on the contrary were, and long had been, used for various other purposes particularly named. This was a material issue; but the court, although finding that the batteries were, and had been for several years, used for the purposes alleged, made no finding as to whether they were primarily adapted for use in motor vehicles or were equally adapted for the other uses named. There should have been a definite finding on the matter. The other findings are such that, in view of that omission, the judgment should be reversed and the case remanded for complete findings and such further proceedings as may be appropriate.

In No. 275 the articles sold were storage batteries. There is a special finding that the batteries were of a type specially suitable for use on automobiles as replacements and were not adapted to any other primary purpose or use. With this matter of fact so found the judgment should be affirmed.

[*585] In No. 350 the tax was on sales of gascolaters, a device used on internal combustion engines to strain dirt, water and foreign matter from the gasoline before it reaches the carburetor. The petition alleged that gascolaters were not parts or accessories of motor vehicles but commercial articles sold for general use and used on various internal combustion engines other than those in motor vehicles. This was a material issue. The findings make no definite response to it but leave the matter where conflicting inferences may be drawn respecting it. Because of this, the judgment should be reversed and the case remanded for definite and complete findings and such further proceedings as may be appropriate.

In No. 351 the articles sold were gears, flexible shafts and flexible housings, all being replacement parts for speedometers used on motor vehicles. It is conceded that speedometers are accessories; but it is insisted that parts of a speedometer cannot be such. We think they can. The finding is that these parts were specially designed, manufactured and sold for use on automobiles and are not adapted to any other purpose or use. It is not questioned that when sold they had reached such a stage of manufacture that they were adapted for ready replacement and use; so it is not as if the process of manufacture were not complete. A speedometer consists of distinct and separate parts, and we perceive no reason why one or more of these when manufactured and sold for the purpose shown by the finding should not take the same classification as speedometers. The judgment should be affirmed.

In No. 352 the tax was laid on sales of bars, brackets and fittings for use as replacement parts for bumpers on automobiles. They were designed, manufactured and sold for such use and were not adapted for any other. It is said that while bumpers are accessories these parts can[*586] not be so regarded. We think they are on the same plane as the parts of speedometers just dealt with. The judgment should be affirmed.

In Nos. 127 and 850 judgments reversed and cases remanded for further, findings.

In Nos. 275, 851 and 852 judgments affirmed.