James McLamore v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 934 (1972). · Go Syfert
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James McLamore v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 934 (1972). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
139 citation events (9 in the last 25 years) across 60 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: United States v. Corey Grant (ca3, 2021-08-16) · Strongest negative: Mississippi Gay Alliance and Anne Debary v. Bill Goudelock (ca5, 1976-08-12)
Treatment trajectory · 1972 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1972 1999 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 16 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited "but see" Mississippi Gay Alliance and Anne Debary v. Bill Goudelock (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
5th Cir. · 1976 · signal: but cf. · confidence high
But cf. Gay Lib v. University of Missouri, W.D.Mo.1976, --- F.Supp. ---- (45 L.W. 2051, June 29, 1976) 5 See note 4 of the majority opinion 6 Compare Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 1973, 413 U.S. 376, 384-86 , 93 S.Ct. 2553 , 37 L.Ed.2d 669 and United States v. Hunter, 4 Cir. 1972, 459 F.2d 205 , cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934 , 93 S.Ct. 235 , 34 L.Ed.2d 189 with Bigelow v. Virginia, 1975, 421 U.S. 809 , 95 S.Ct. 2222 , 44 L.Ed.2d 600 and Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Counsel, 1976, --- U.S. ----, 96 S.Ct. 1817 , 48 L.Ed.2d 346 Had the …
cited Cited "but see" Hopson v. Schilling
N.D. Ind. · 1976 · signal: but cf. · confidence high
But cf. Dorado v. Kerr, 454 F.2d 892, 894-96 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934 , 93 S.Ct. 244 , 34 L.Ed.2d 188 (1972).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Corey Grant
3rd Cir. · 2021 · confidence medium
The phrase went unmentioned in the Supreme Court for ten years after Trop, 15 356 U.S. 44 (1958). 16 Trop, 356 U.S. at 91–92. 17 Id. at 92–93. 18 Id. at 93 . 19 Id. at 100–01 (emphasis added). 4 until it surfaced in a footnote in a death-penalty case.20 And it was then quoted only in passing in seven death-penalty cases in the 1970s.21 B Nearly two decades after its introduction in Trop, the phrase was mentioned for the first time in a non-capital case, Estelle v. Gamble.22 There, Gamble claimed the prison failed to provide him adequate medical care in violation of the Eighth Amendment.2…
discussed Cited "see" Joseph Nichols III v. Christian Pfeiffer
C.D. Cal. · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
See Dorado v. Kerr, 454 F.2d 9 1 892, 896-97 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934 (1972); see also Pennsylvania v. 2 Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987) (“[T]he right to appointed counsel extends to the 3 first appeal of right, and no further.”); Villagrana v. Diaz, 2012 WL 4210308 , at *4 4 (E.D.
cited Cited "see" Short v. Manhattan Apartments, Inc.
S.D.N.Y. · 2012 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205 , 218 n. 17 (4th Cir.1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934 , 93 S.Ct. 235 , 34 L.Ed.2d 189 (1972).
discussed Cited "see" Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Harlett
Ohio Ct. App. · 1999 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Hunter (C.A.4, 1972), 459 F.2d 205 , certiorari denied (1972), 409 U.S. 934 , 93 S.Ct. 235 , 34 L.Ed.2d 189 ; Housing Opportunities Made Equal v. Cincinnati Enquirer, Inc. (C.A.6, 1991), 943 F.2d 644, 646 .
discussed Cited "see" Riske v. Oliver (In Re Oliver)
Bankr. E.D. Mo. · 1994 · signal: see · confidence high
See Wetteroff v. Grand (In re Wetteroff), 453 F.2d 544, 546 (8th Cir.), cert, denied, 409 U.S. 934 , 93 S.Ct. 242 , 34 L.Ed.2d 188 (1972); In re Burch, 3 BAMSL 1567, Case No. 84-00001(SE) (Bankr.E.D.Mo.1985).
cited Cited "see" Braun v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine
M.D. Ala. · 1990 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 213 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934 , 93 S.Ct. 235 , 34 L.Ed.2d 189 (1972).
discussed Cited "see" Girardeau A. Spann v. Colonial Village, Inc. Girardeau A. Spann v. Marvin J. Gerstin
D.C. Cir. · 1990 · signal: see · confidence high
See Saunders, 659 F.Supp. at 1058 (quoting United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 215 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934 , 93 S.Ct. 235 , 34 L.Ed.2d 189 (1972)); accord Ragin v. Steiner, Clateman and Assocs., 714 *30 F.Supp. 709, 713 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (question of fact for jury whether all white advertisements violate 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (c)).
cited Cited "see" Housing Opportunities Made Equal v. Cincinnati Enquirer, Inc.
S.D. Ohio · 1990 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934 , 93 S.Ct. 235 , 34 L.Ed.2d 189 (1972).
cited Cited "see" United States v. Mitchell
5th Cir. · 1978 · signal: see · confidence high
See U. S. v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205 (CA4), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934 , 93 S.Ct. 235 , 34 L.Ed.2d 189 (1972). .
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Mitchell
5th Cir. · 1978 · signal: see · confidence high
See U. S. v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205 (CA4), Cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934 , 93 S.Ct. 235 , 34 L.Ed.2d 189 (1972) 3 The court ordered the defendant to (1) display fair housing posters; (2) include an equal housing opportunity statement in all advertising; and (3) maintain and post a schematic drawing of the complex showing all vacancies.
discussed Cited "see" Linmark Associates, Inc., and William Mellman v. The Township of Willingboro and Gerald Daly (2×)
3rd Cir. · 1976 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934 , 93 S.Ct. 235 , 34 L.Ed.2d 189 (1972), reh. denied 413 U.S. 923 , 93 S.Ct. 3046 , 37 L.Ed.2d 1045 (1973), and authorities collected therein.
discussed Cited "see" Bundo v. City of Walled Lake
Mich. · 1976 · signal: see · confidence high
See Dorado v Kerr, 454 F2d 892 (CA 9, 1972), cert den, 409 US 934 ; 93 S a 244; 34 L Ed 2d 188 (1972); United States ex rel Bey v Connecticut State Board of Parole, 443 F2d 1079, 1086 (CA 2, 1971), vacated as moot, 404 US 879 ; 92 S Ct 196 ; 30 L Ed 2d 159 (1971); Menechino v Oswald, 430 F2d 403, 408 (CA 2, 1970), cert den, 400 US 1023 ; 91 S Ct 588 ; 27 L Ed 2d 635 (1971). 7 Justice Douglas, speaking for the Court, said: "We have no doubt as to the power of a State to deal with the evils described in the Act.
cited Cited "see" Barrick Realty, Incorporated v. City of Gary, Indiana
7th Cir. · 1974 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 213-215 (4th Cir. 1972), certiorari denied, 409 U.S. 934 , 93 S.Ct. 235 , 34 L.Ed.2d 189 .
cited Cited "see, e.g." High Ol' Times, Inc. v. Busbee
N.D. Ga. · 1978 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205 (4th Cir. 1972), cert, denied, 409 U.S. 934 , 93 S.Ct. 235 , 34 L.Ed.2d 189 (1973) [rental ad solicited violation of equal housing code].
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
McLamore
v.
South Carolina Et Al.
71-6489.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Oct 16, 1972.
409 U.S. 934
Douglas.
Cited by 1 opinion  |  Published
Reporter's Syllabus — editorial summary, not part of the Court's opinion

On petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of South carolina.

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.

Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, dissenting.

Lead Opinion

Sup. Ct. S. C. Certiorari denied.

Dissent

Mr. Justice Douglas,

dissenting.

I vote to hear this case because of the importance of the question raised.

A prisoner sentenced in the State of South Carolina, in any case in which confinement is the punishment, can be sent (1) to a county to work on its chain gang (if the county maintains one) (2) or in the alternative to the Department of Corrections and then to the local jail[*935] or state penitentiary.[1] Under the statute, an elected official, the County Supervisor, makes the choice. There are no statutory criteria by which he is to make his choice.

Petitioner was sentenced under S. C. Code Ann. § 17-554 and assigned to the chain gang of Richland County, South Carolina. Under the Post Conviction Relief Statute of South Carolina he sought review of two questions: (1) whether the chain gang was cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, and (2) whether the sending of certain prisoners to the penitentiary where some rehabilitative services are available and others to the chain gang where none exists is a denial of equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment.

On April 28, 1971, the relief in both areas was denied and the decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court of South Carolina, 257 S. C. 413, 186 S. E. 2d 250 (1972). The case is here on certiorari.

The delineation of just what conditions constitute cruel and unusual punishment is not well defined. But we know from Weems v. United States, 217 U. S. 349 (1910), that the concept is not rigid but progressive; that it acquires meaning as the public becomes enlightened.[*936] Id., at 378. As Mr. Chief Justice Warren said, “the words of the Amendment are not precise, and . . . their scope is not static. The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society” Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 100-101 (1958).

Does the chain gang fit into our current concept of penology? If not, does it violate the Eighth Amendment? This is an important question never decided by the Court.

The second point is of equal importance. South Carolina creates two classes of prisoners, those who work on the chain gang, and those who are sent to the penitentiary. The latter are under the Department of Corrections and have counseling, psychiatric service, and educational and vocational programs, although no penitentiary has all the programs that are available within the system. Those assigned to the chain gang have none of the rehabilitative services made available by the Corrections Department. As I have said, there are no statutory standards for the County Supervisor to use in determining wfhere each man goes; the decision is entirely within his discretion to treat one type of offender differently from another though the two are in the same class, and though each be found guilty of the same crime and sentenced to serve the same number of years.

A State can, of course, create different classes of prisoners and treat them differently as long as those classes are created for legitimate state aims. And if the basis on which groups so defined bears a reasonable relation to the purpose, the class will survive. See Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150, 158. The courts must determine whether the classification is reasonable in light of its purpose. For this Court to refuse to make the decision in this case allows a procedure to exist which[*937] arguably has many aspects of involuntary servitude for some, while others of the same class are treated in a more enlightened way.[2]

1

S. C. Code Ann. § 17-554 (1962):

“Able-bodied male convicts to work on county or municipal chain gangs. — In every case in which imprisonment is provided as the punishment, in whole or in part, for any crime, all able-bodied male convicts shall be sentenced to hard labor on the public works of the county in which convicted, if such county maintains a chain gang, without regard to the length of service, and in the alternative to imprisonment in the county jail or State Penitentiary at hard labor. . . . In any case the presiding judge shall have the power, by special order, to direct that any person convicted before him be confined in the State Penitentiary if it is considered unsafe or unwise for such convict to be committed to the county chain gang.”

Whether the exclusion of women raises an equal protection claim is not raised by the present petition.

2

Wilson v. Kelley, 294 F. Supp. 1005, aff’d per curiam, 393 U. S. 266, is not determinative of the present case. The Wilson case, so far as material here, only held that work camps are not per se unconstitutional, saving, however, a prisoner’s right to raise “the question of his own particular treatment as being a violation of his constitutional rights,” 294 F. Supp., at 1012. No such question was reached in that case, as only a class action was involved.

For a recent account of the dark chapter resulting from the Court’s decisions last century that the paramount duty to protect civil rights rested with the States, not the Federal Government, see Scott, Justice Bradley’s Evolving Concept of the Fourteenth Amendment From the Slaughterhouse Cases to the Civil Rights Cases, 25 Rutgers L. Rev. 552 (1971).