Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.; & Eastman Kodak Co. v. Berkey Photo, Inc., 444 U.S. 1093 (1980). · Go Syfert
Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.; & Eastman Kodak Co. v. Berkey Photo, Inc., 444 U.S. 1093 (1980). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
307 citation events (5 in the last 25 years) across 56 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp. (alnd, 1998-04-10) · Strongest negative: Wojcieszek v. New England Telephone & Telegraph Co. (mad, 1997-09-26)
Treatment trajectory · 1980 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1980 2003 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers. How cited ↗
cited Cited "but see" Wojcieszek v. New England Telephone & Telegraph Co.
D. Mass. · 1997 · signal: but see · confidence high
But see Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 , 100 S.Ct. 1061 , 62 L.Ed.2d 783 (1980)(supporting leveraging theory); Ortho Diagnostic Sys.
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp.
N.D. Ala. · 1998 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
the use of monopoly power attained in one market to gain a competitive advantage in another is a violation of 2, even if there has not been an attempt to monopolize the second market.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Picker International, Inc. v. Leavitt
D. Mass. · 1994 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
before we would allow misrepresentations to buyers to be the basis of a competitor's treble damages action under 2, we would at least require the plaintiff to overcome a presumption that the effect 964 on competition of such a practice was de minimis.
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) Allegheny Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. Mid-Atlantic Coca-Cola Bottling Co.
4th Cir. · 1982 · signal: see, e.g. · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
a purchaser may recover only for the price increment that 'flows from' the distortion of the market caused by the monopolist's anticompetitive conduct
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) Allegheny Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company v. Mid-Atlantic Coca-Cola Bottling Company, Inc.
4th Cir. · 1982 · signal: see, e.g. · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
a purchaser may recover only for the price increment that 'flows from' the distortion of the market caused by the monopolist's anticompetitive conduct
discussed Cited "see" De Kwiatkowski v. Bear Stearns & Co., Inc.
S.D.N.Y. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 457 F.Supp. 404, 438 (S.D.N.Y.1978), aff'd in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir.1979), ce rt. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 , 100 S.Ct. 1061 , 62 L.Ed.2d 783 (1980).
cited Cited "see" Creative Copier Services v. Xerox Corp.
D. Kan. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 , 274 n. 12 (2d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 , 100 S.Ct. 1061 , 62 L.Ed.2d 783 (1980).
cited Cited "see" In Re Independent Service Organizations Antitrust Litigation
D. Kan. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 , 274 n. 12 (2d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 , 100 S.Ct. 1061 , 62 L.Ed.2d 783 (1980).
cited Cited "see" In Re Indep. Serv. Organizations Antitrust Lit.
D. Kan. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 , 274 n. 12 (2d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 , 100 S.Ct. 1061 , 62 L.Ed.2d 783 (1980).
cited Cited "see" Re/Max International, Inc. v. Realty One, Inc.
N.D. Ohio · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See id., (quoting Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 275 (2d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 , 100 S.Ct. 1061 , 62 L.Ed.2d 783 (1980)).
discussed Cited "see" Glendora v. Gannett Co. Inc.
S.D.N.Y. · 1994 · signal: see · confidence high
See Berkey Photo v. Eastman Kodak, 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir.1979), cert. denied 444 U.S. 1093 , 100 S.Ct. 1061 , 62 L.Ed.2d 783 (1980), modifying the view expressed in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir.1945).
discussed Cited "see" Advanced Healthcare Services, Inc. v. Giles Memorial Hospital
W.D. Va. · 1994 · signal: see · confidence high
See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 275 (2d Cir.1979), ce rt. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 , 100 S.Ct. 1061 , 62 L.Ed.2d 783 (1980). 16 The Sixth Circuit elected to follow Berkey Photo in Kerasotes Michigan Theatres, Inc. v. National Amusements Inc., 854 F.2d 135 (6th Cir.1988), cert. dismissed, 490 U.S. 1087 , 109 S.Ct. 2461 , 104 L.Ed.2d 982 (1989), but the Third and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeal have emphatically rejected monopoly leveraging as impermissible expansions of the sweep of section 2.
cited Cited "see" Rosen v. Hyundai Group (Korea)
E.D.N.Y · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 268 (2d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 , 100 S.Ct. 1061 , 62 L.Ed.2d 783 (1980).
discussed Cited "see" Kahn v. Kohlberg
2d Cir. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
See Taylor v. Meirick, 712 F.2d 1112, 1119 (7th Cir.1983). 86 For example, in the antitrust context, the courts hold that " 'each time that a plaintiff is injured by an act of the defendants a cause of action accrues to him to recover the damages caused by that act.' " Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 295 (2d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 , 100 S.Ct. 1061 , 62 L.Ed.2d 783 (1980) (quoting Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 338 , 91 S.Ct. 795, 806 , 28 L.Ed.2d 77 (1971)).
discussed Cited "see" Trans Sport, Inc. v. Starter Sportswear, Inc.
N.D.N.Y. · 1991 · signal: see · confidence high
See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 275-276 (2d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 , 100 S.Ct. 1061 , 62 L.Ed.2d 783 (1980); Poster Exchange, Inc. v. National Screen Service Corp., 431 F.2d 334, 339 (5th Cir.1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 912 , 91 S.Ct. 880 , 27 L.Ed.2d 811 (1971); Belfiore v. New York Times Co., 654 F.Supp. 842, 847 (D.Conn.1986) (citing R.
discussed Cited "see" Advanced Health-Care Services, Inc. v. Radford Community Hospital (2×)
4th Cir. · 1990 · signal: see · confidence high
See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak, 603 F.2d 263, 276 (2d Cir.1979), ce rt. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 , 100 S.Ct. 1061 , 62 L.Ed.2d 783 (1980); Kerasotes Mich. Theatres v. National Amusements, Inc., 854 F.2d 135 , 137 (6th Cir.1988), cert. dismissed, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 2461 , 104 L.Ed.2d 982 (1989); Grason Elec.
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Syufy Enterprises Raymond J. Syufy (2×)
9th Cir. · 1990 · signal: see · confidence high
See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 273-74 (2d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 , 100 S.Ct. 1061 , 62 L.Ed.2d 783 (1980). 26 The argument government counsel presses here is a close variant of Alcoa: The government is not claiming that Syufy monopolized the market by being too efficient, but that Syufy's effectiveness as a competitor creates a structural barrier to entry, rendering illicit Syufy's acquisition of its competitors' screens.
discussed Cited "see" Westchester Radiological Associates P.C. v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc.
S.D.N.Y. · 1989 · signal: see · confidence high
A legitimate buyer is entitled to use its market power to keep prices down.” *716 Id. at 929 ; see, Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 297 (2d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 , 100 S.Ct. 1061 , 62 L.Ed.2d 783 (1980) (analogous conclusion with respect to sellers with market power).
discussed Cited "see" R.C. Bigelow, Inc. v. Unilever N v. Thomas J. Lipton, Inc., Celestial Seasonings, Inc., and Kraft, Inc.
2d Cir. · 1989 · signal: see · confidence high
While the court indicated that a post-acquisition market share of 84% was “more than sufficient to establish a prima facie showing of ‘monopoly power,’ ” 689 F.Supp. at 79 ; see United States v. Waste Management, Inc., 743 F.2d 976, 981 (2d Cir.1984), it concluded *105 that “the mere fact that Lipton will possess monopoly power after the proposed acquisition is not a sufficient showing that Lipton will exercise that power in a way that will cause injury to Bigelow.” 689 F.Supp. at 79 ; see Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 275 (2d Cir.1979) (“mere possession …
cited Cited "see" Winter Hill Frozen Foods & Services, Inc. v. Haagen-Dazs Co.
D. Mass. · 1988 · signal: see · confidence high
See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 , 273 n. 11 (2d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 , 100 S.Ct. 1061 , 62 L.Ed.2d 783 (1980).
discussed Cited "see" United States Football League v. National Football League
S.D.N.Y. · 1986 · signal: see · confidence high
See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 274 (2d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 , 100 S.Ct. 1061 , 62 L.Ed.2d 783 (1980) (even if origin of monopoly power is innocent, the maintenance or extension of market control by the exercise of such power violates § 2).
discussed Cited "see" Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company v. Drysdale Securities Corporation
2d Cir. · 1986 · signal: see · confidence high
See Berkey Photo Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 279 (2d Cir.1979) (urging use of special verdicts and interrogatories in "large and complex cases" to resolve issues, reduce probability of "laborious and expensive retrial," and facilitate appellate review), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 , 100 S.Ct. 1061 , 62 L.Ed.2d 783 (1980).
discussed Cited "see" Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. Drysdale Securities Corp.
2d Cir. · 1986 · signal: see · confidence high
See Berkey Photo Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 279 (2d Cir.1979) (urging use of special verdicts and interrogatories in “large and complex cases” to resolve issues, reduce probability of “laborious and expensive retrial,” and facilitate appellate review), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 , 100 S.Ct. 1061 , 62 L.Ed.2d 783 (1980).
discussed Cited "see" Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.
N.D. Ill. · 1986 · signal: see · confidence high
See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 , 309 n. 75 (2d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 , 100 S.Ct. 1061 , 62 L.Ed.2d 783 (1980) (expenditures for use of computer retrieval service not recoverable as costs of suit); Litton Systems, Inc. v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 613 F.Supp. 824, 836 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (costs for computerized litigation support, like word processing and Lexis costs, are not recoverable costs under Rule 54(d) and 28 U.S.C. § 1920 ).
discussed Cited "see" J.T. Gibbons, Inc. v. Crawford Fitting Company
5th Cir. · 1986 · signal: see · confidence high
See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 , 309 n. 75 (2d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 , 100 S.Ct. 1061 , 62 L.Ed.2d 738 (1980); Ott v. Speedwriting Publishing Co., 518 F.2d 1143, 1149 (6th Cir.1975); State of Illinois v. Sangamo Construction Co., 657 F.2d 855, 864-65 (7th Cir.1981).
discussed Cited "see" United States Football League v. National Football League
S.D.N.Y. · 1986 · signal: see · confidence high
See note 3, infra. Mr. Garvey did not allege that the NFL did anything in violation of the antitrust laws. [2] Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 296 (2d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 , 100 S.Ct. 1061 , 62 L.Ed.2d 783 (1980), quoting United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 429 (2d Cir.1945) ("the origin of a monopoly may be critical in determining its legality"). [3] In Mid-South Grizzlies , no claim was made "that abuse of NFL market power led to the demise of the World Football League." 720 F.2d at 784-85 .
cited Cited "see" R.C. Dick Geothermal Corp. v. Thermogenics, Inc.
N.D. Cal. · 1985 · signal: see · confidence high
See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 , 301 n. 66 (2d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 , 100 S.Ct. 1061 , 62 L.Ed.2d 783 (1980).
discussed Cited "see" State of Ill. v. Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co.
C.D. Ill. · 1985 · signal: see · confidence high
See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 275 (2nd Cir.1979), cert. denied 444 U.S. 1093 , 100 S.Ct. 1061 , 62 L.Ed.2d 783 (1980), Sargent Welch Scientific Co. v. Ventron Corp., 567 F.2d 701, 711-13 (7th Cir.1977), cert. denied 439 U.S. 822 , 99 S.Ct. 87 , 58 L.Ed.2d 113 (1978).
cited Cited "see" Garcia v. Chase Manhattan Bank
2d Cir. · 1984 · signal: see · confidence high
See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 278-79 (2d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 , 100 S.Ct. 1061 , 62 L.Ed.2d 783 (1980).
cited Cited "see" Garcia v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A.
2d Cir. · 1984 · signal: see · confidence high
See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 278-79 (2d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 , 100 S.Ct. 1061 , 62 L.Ed.2d 783 (1980).
cited Cited "see" Arthur Langenderfer, Inc. v. Johnson Company
6th Cir. · 1984 · signal: see · confidence high
See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 273 (2d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 , 100 S.Ct. 1061 , 62 L.Ed.2d 783 (1980).
cited Cited "see" Arthur S. Langenderfer, Inc. v. S.E. Johnson Co.
6th Cir. · 1984 · signal: see · confidence high
See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 273 (2d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 , 100 S.Ct. 1061 , 62 L.Ed.2d 783 (1980).
discussed Cited "see" J.H. Westerbeke Corp. v. Onan Corp.
D. Mass. · 1984 · signal: see · confidence high
See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 , 100 S.Ct. 1061 , 62 L.Ed.2d 783 (1980); Heatransfer Corp. v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 553 F.2d 964 (5th Cir.1977); Gradsky v. Sperry Rand Corp., 489 F.2d 502 (6th Cir.1973).
cited Cited "see" White and White, Inc. v. American Hospital Supply Corp.
6th Cir. · 1983 · signal: see · confidence high
See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 276 (2d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 , 100 S.Ct. 1061 , 62 L.Ed.2d 783 (1980).
examined Cited "see" MCI Communications Corporation and MCI Telecommunications Corporation v. American Telephone and Telegraph Company (4×)
7th Cir. · 1983 · signal: see · confidence high
United States v. Grinnell, 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 , 86 S.Ct. 1698, 1703-1704 , 16 L.Ed.2d 778 (1966); see Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 274-76 (2d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 , 100 S.Ct. 1061 , 62 L.Ed.2d 783 (1980).
cited Cited "see" Interface Group, Inc. v. Gordon Publications, Inc.
D. Mass. · 1983 · signal: see · confidence high
See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 272 (2d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 , 100 S.Ct. 1061 , 62 L.Ed.2d 783 (1980).
discussed Cited "see" Glen Eden Hospital, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield
E.D. Mich. · 1983 · signal: see · confidence high
See, Berkey Photo Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 281-82 (2d Cir.1979), cert. den. 444 U.S. 1093 , 100 S.Ct. 1061 , 62 L.Ed.2d 783 (1980); Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 510 F.2d 894 , 927 (10th Cir.1975).
discussed Cited "see" Argus Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.
S.D.N.Y. · 1982 · signal: see · confidence high
See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 , 100 S.Ct. 1061 , 62 L.Ed.2d 783 (1980); GAF Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 519 F.Supp. 1203 (S.D.N.Y.1981). 4 Discussion I.
discussed Cited "see" City of Groton v. Connecticut Light & Power Co.
2d Cir. · 1981 · signal: see · confidence high
See generally Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 275 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 , 100 S.Ct. 1061 , 62 L.Ed.2d 783 (1980); Northeastern Telephone Co. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., slip op. at 84-86.
discussed Cited "see" City Of Groton v. The Connecticut Light & Power Co.
2d Cir. · 1981 · signal: see · confidence high
See generally Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 275 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 , 100 S.Ct. 1061 , 62 L.Ed.2d 783 (1980); Northeastern Telephone Co. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., slip op. at 84-86.
discussed Cited "see" Broadway Delivery Corp. v. United Parcel Service of America, Inc.
2d Cir. · 1981 · signal: see · confidence high
See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 , 273 n.11 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 , 100 S.Ct. 1061 , 62 L.Ed.2d 783 (1980) (noting evidential significance of decline in market share).
cited Cited "see" Richter Concrete Corp. v. Hilltop Basic Resources, Inc.
S.D. Ohio · 1981 · signal: see · confidence high
See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 274 (2d Cir. 1979), cert, denied, 444 U.S. 1093 , 100 S.Ct. 1061 , 62 L.Ed.2d 783 (1980); Cf., Areeda and Turner, supra, 88 Harv.L.
discussed Cited "see" Chatham Brass Co., Inc. v. Honeywell Inc.
S.D.N.Y. · 1981 · signal: see · confidence high
See Berkey Photo v. Eastman Kodak, 603 F.2d 263, 294 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 , 100 S.Ct. 1061 , 62 L.Ed.2d 783 (1980) (purchaser of product whose price is affected by defendant’s monopolization has standing to bring Section 2 claim); cf. Reading Industries, Inc. v. Kennecott Copper Corporation, 631 F.2d 10, at 14 (2d Cir., 1980), (if allegations are that conspirators reduced would-be purchasers’ opportunity to buy by restricting output, those purchasers denied an opportunity to buy from defendants would be in the target area).
cited Cited "see" City of Groton v. Connecticut Light & Power Co.
D. Conn. · 1980 · signal: see · confidence high
See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 , 295 96 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 , 100 S.Ct. 1061 , 62 L.Ed.2d 783 (1980). 4 .
cited Cited "see" American Hospital Supply Corp. v. Roy Lapidus, Inc.
D. Mass. · 1980 · signal: see · confidence high
See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 , 100 S.Ct. 1061 , 62 L.Ed.2d 783 (1980).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." AD/SAT v. Associated Press
S.D.N.Y. · 1996 · signal: see also · confidence low
Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1128-30 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 , 104 S.Ct. 234 , 78 L.Ed.2d 226 (1983); see also Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 , 287-88 & n. 41 (2d Cir.1979) (unless it amounts to deception, advertising by competitor with significant market share showing product in best light cannot be anticompetitive conduct), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 , 100 S.Ct. 1061 , 62 L.Ed.2d 783 (1980).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Multistate Legal Studies, Inc. v. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Legal & Professional Publications, Inc.
10th Cir. · 1995 · signal: compare · confidence low
Compare, e.g., Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 275-76 (2d Cir.1979), ce rt. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 , 100 S.Ct. 1061 , 62 L.Ed.2d 783 (1980), with Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 546-49 (9th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 977 , 112 S.Ct. 1603 , 118 L.Ed.2d 316 (1992).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Multistate Legal Studies, Inc. v. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Legal And Professional Publications, Inc.
10th Cir. · 1995 · signal: compare · confidence low
Compare, e.g., Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 275-76 (2d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 , 100 S.Ct. 1061 , 62 L.Ed.2d 783 (1980), with Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 546-49 (9th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 977 , 112 S.Ct. 1603 , 118 L.Ed.2d 316 (1992).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Advo, Inc. v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc.
E.D. Pa. · 1994 · signal: see also · confidence low
Advo would have to prove threatened or actual monopoly in the leveraged market (i.e., the advertising circulars market) by PNI to prevail. 33 Fineman, 980 F.2d at 206 ; see also Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 547 (9th Cir.1991) (the Berkey Photo Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 , 100 S.Ct. 1061 , 62 L.Ed.2d 783 (1980), monopoly leveraging doctrine rejected as an independent theory of liability under Section 2).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Berkey Photo, Inc.
v.
Eastman Kodak Company. Eastman Kodak Company v. Berkey Photo, Inc
79-427; 79-499.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Feb 19, 1980.
444 U.S. 1093
Rehnquist, Blackmun, Powell.
Cited by 3 opinions  |  Published
3 passages pin-cited by 4 cases
Pinpoint authority: bottom 92%
Citer courts: Fourth Circuit (2) · N.D. Alabama (1) · D. Massachusetts (1)
Reporter's Syllabus — editorial summary, not part of the Court's opinion

On petitions for writs of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

The petitions for writs of certiorari are denied.

Mr. Justice REHNQUIST, with whom Mr. Justice POWELL joins, dissenting.

An obviously carefully considered opinion of the Court of Appeals comprising 99 pages in a separate appendix to the petition for certiorari in this case, dealing as it does with the complexities, refinements, and contradictions embodied in the decisional law construing §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act is obviously not an attractive candidate for review under our discretionary certiorari jurisdiction. Nonetheless, I do not think we may "let this cup pass from us" unless we are prepared to forgo the opportunity to review some propositions enunciated by the Court of Appeals in this case which strike me as little less than bizarre.

Mr. Justice BLACKMUN would grant certiorari and set the cases for oral argument.

Lead Opinion

C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Blackmun would grant certiorari and set cases for oral argument.

Reported below: 603 F. 2d 263.

Dissent

Mr. Justice Rehnquist, with whom Mr. Justice Powell joins,

dissenting.

An obviously carefully considered opinion of the Court of Appeals comprising 99 pages in a separate appendix to the petition for certiorari in this case, dealing as it does with the complexities, refinements, and contradictions embodied in the decisional law construing §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act is obviously not an attractive candidate for review under our discretionary certiorari jurisdiction. Nonetheless, I do not[*1094] think we may “let this cup pass from us” unless we are prepared to forgo the opportunity to review some propositions enunciated by the Court of Appeals in this case which strike me as little less than bizarre.

One of the principal issues decided by the Court of Appeals was the obligation of respondent and cross-petitioner Kodak to “predisclose” information about its camera and film system to competing camera manufacturers prior to offering such camera and film for sale to the public. As to the camera market issues, the Court of Appeals held that Kodak had no such obligation, but as to the photofinishing and photofinishing equipment markets, the Court of Appeals held that Kodak violated § 2 of the Sherman Act by using its market power over films and cameras to obtain a competitive advantage with respect to photofinishing and photofinishing equipment. 603 F. 2d 263, 279-285, 304. And as to the joint development project, the court held that Kodak violated § 1 of the Sherman Act by including in the agreement a nondisclosure provision, even though Kodak made an investment of millions of dollars in the project that presumably was essential to its success.

To one not schooled in the niceties of antitrust litigation, the notion that a statute designed to foster competition requires one competitor to disclose to another, in advance of marketing a product to the general public, its plan to introduce the new product, is difficult to fathom. And this Court has held as recently as United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U. S. 563 (1966), that it is not a violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act for a business with monopoly power to achieve “growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.” 384 U. S., at 570-571. I should think this reasoning is equally applicable to the alleged violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act which the Court of Appeals also dealt with in its opinion.

[*1095] But the Court of Appeals in this case held that “the rule of Orinnell must be read together with the teaching of Griffith [United States v. Griffith, 334 U. S. 100, 107 (1948)], that the mere existence of monopoly power ‘whether lawfully or unlawfully acquired/ is in itself violative of § 2, ‘provided it is coupled with the purpose or intent to exercise that power,’ ” 603 F. 2d, at 274, even though this Court in Grinnell did not express a similar limitation on its holding.

One can understand the exasperation revealed by the statement in the opinion of the Court of Appeals that “[d] espite the daunting complexity of the case — the exhibits numbered in the thousands — Kodak demanded a jury.” Id., at 268. The trial lasted from July 1977 until March 1978, and since Kodak is entitled as a matter of constitutional right under the Seventh Amendment to demand a jury trial in a case such as this, perhaps the “daunting complexity” of the case — and presumably many other similar cases being litigated in other federal courts — suggests that either the forest is being lost sight of because of the trees, or that an Act of Congress has been battered, tortured, and encrusted with layer after layer of refinement not required by any necessary construction of the Act, but by the results wrought by a century of case-by-case adjudication of it in this Court and other federal courts.

If the Sherman Act requires “predisclosure” by one competitor to another before a new product can be marketed, I think that the raised eyebrows resulting from such a holding should come from this Court, and not from extrapolations by other federal courts of the decisions of this Court interpreting the Sherman Act. I likewise think that the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that significant parts of a defendant’s conduct which take place before the statute of limitations period may nonetheless be introduced in evidence is open to serious question under our prior cases.

So long as there are institutes for federal judges concerning the management of complex cases, and judicial panels for[*1096] handling multidistrict litigation, this Court cannot remain wholly above the battle. In this case, it is conceded that the claimed antitrust violations all arise directly from Kodak’s competitive superiority and technological innovation leading to the development of new products that consumers consider to be desirable. Because I believe that all three of these violations are interrelated, I would grant the petitions for certiorari and limit the questions as follows: (1) Was Kodak’s introduction of the 110 camera and Kodacolor II film system either an attempt to monopolize or actual monopolization of the camera market in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act? (2) Did Kodak violate § 2 of the Sherman Act by impermis-sibly using its film monopoly as “leverage” to enhance its position in the photofinishing and photofinishing equipment markets? And (3) did Kodak’s joint development agreements with General Electric and Sylvania violate § 1 of the Sherman Act? I would also grant certiorari on this question raised in the conditional cross-petition: “Did the court of appeals err in not entering judgment for Kodak on the film and color print paper claims, and instead remanding both claims for a determination of whether ‘conduct occurring many years before the commencement of suit contributed to an overcharge . . . within the limitations period’?”