Christy Et Al. v. Lujan, Sec'y of the Interior, Et Al., 490 U.S. 1114 (1989). · Go Syfert
Search
Christy Et Al. v. Lujan, Sec'y of the Interior, Et Al., 490 U.S. 1114 (1989). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
G Cite
cited 3× by 1 distinct case · “The only standing limitation recognized by the Supreme Court with respect to section 10(b) damage actions is the requirement that the plaintiff be a purchaser or seller of a security.”
164 citation events (19 in the last 25 years) across 40 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Ziemack v. Centel Corp. (ilnd, 1995-09-22)
Treatment trajectory · 1989 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1989 2007 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 32 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) Ziemack v. Centel Corp.
N.D. Ill. · 1995 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
the only standing limitation recognized by the supreme court with respect to section 10(b) damage actions is the requirement that the plaintiff be a purchaser or seller of a security.
cited Cited "see" United States v. Honken
N.D. Iowa · 2004 · signal: see · confidence high
See Gilmore v. Armontrout, 861 F.2d 1061, 1071 (8th Cir.1988), cert, denied, 490 U.S. 1114 , 109 S.Ct. 3176 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1989).
cited Cited "see" Chill v. Green Tree Financial Corp.
D. Minnesota · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
See, Deutschman v. Beneficial Corp., 841 F.2d 502 (3rd Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1114 , 109 S.Ct. 3176 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1989).
cited Cited "see" Jessie Lee Wise v. Michael Bowersox, Supt., Pcc
8th Cir. · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
See Gilmore v. Armontrout, 861 F.2d 1061, 1072-73 (8th Cir.1988), ce rt. denied, 490 U.S. 1114 , 109 S.Ct. 3176 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1989).
cited Cited "see" Jessie Lee Wise v. Paul Delo
8th Cir. · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
See Gilmore v. Armontrout, 861 F.2d 1061, 1072-73 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1114 (1989).
cited Cited "see" Richard S. Zeitvogel v. Paul Delo
8th Cir. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See Gilmore v. Armontrout, 861 F.2d 1061, 1071 (8th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1114 , 109 S.Ct. 3176 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1989).
cited Cited "see" Richard S. Zeitvogel v. Paul Delo
8th Cir. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See Gilmore v. Armontrout, 861 F.2d 1061, 1071 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1114 (1989).
cited Cited "see" Richard S. Zeitvogel v. Paul Delo
8th Cir. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See Gilmore v. Armontrout, 861 F.2d 1061, 1071 (8th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1114 , 109 S.Ct. 3176 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1989).
discussed Cited "see" Emmett C. Nave v. Paul K. Delo, Emmett C. Nave v. Paul K. Delo, Emmett C. Nave v. Paul K. Delo
8th Cir. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See Gilmore v. Armontrout, 861 F.2d 1061, 1065 (8th Cir.1988) (failure to raise claim in appeal from 27.26 hearing constitutes procedural default), ce rt. denied, 490 U.S. 1114 , 109 S.Ct. 3176 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1989). .The six remaining instances of attorney error were not presented, to the state courts in either the direct appeal or the collateral proceedings, and accordingly have been defaulted.
discussed Cited "see" Emmett C. Nave v. Paul K. Delo, Emmett C. Nave v. Paul K. Delo, Emmett C. Nave v. Paul K. Delo
8th Cir. · 1994 · signal: see · confidence high
See Gilmore v. Armontrout, 861 F.2d 1061, 1065 (8th Cir.1988) (failure to raise claim in appeal from 27.26 hearing constitutes procedural default), ce rt. denied, 490 U.S. 1114 , 109 S.Ct. 3176 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1989).
discussed Cited "see" Stanley E. Boyd v. Paul K. Delo
8th Cir. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See Gilmore v. Armontrout, 861 F.2d 1061, 1065 (8th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1114 , 109 S.Ct. 3176 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1989), and Stokes v. Armontrout, 851 F.2d 1085, 1092-93 (8th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1019 , 109 S.Ct. 823 , 102 L.Ed.2d 812 (1989).
cited Cited "see" Gerald Boyd v. Michael Groose
8th Cir. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See Gilmore v. Armontrout, 861 F.2d 1061, 1065 (8th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1114 , 109 S.Ct. 3176 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1989).
discussed Cited "see" Southview Associates, Ltd. v. Bongartz (2×)
2d Cir. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
See generally Christy v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1324, 1330-31 (9th Cir.1988) (Federal regulations regarding the killing of grizzly bears rationally advance a legitimate government objective.), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1114 , 109 S.Ct. 3176 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1038 (1989).
discussed Cited "see" Southview Associates, Ltd. v. Bongartz (2×)
2d Cir. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
See generally Christy v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1324, 1330-31 (9th Cir.1988) (Federal regulations regarding the killing of grizzly bears rationally advance a legitimate government objective.), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1114 , 109 S.Ct. 3176 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1038 (1989).
cited Cited "see" Lorenzo W. Lawson v. Paul D. Caspari
8th Cir. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
See Gilmore v. Armontrout, 861 F.2d 1061, 1065 (8th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1114 , 109 S.Ct. 3176 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1989).
cited Cited "see" Chester Treadwell v. A.L. Lockhart, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction
8th Cir. · 1991 · signal: see · confidence high
See Gilmore v. Armontrout, 861 F.2d 1061, 1065-66 (8th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1114 , 109 S.Ct. 3176 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1989).
cited Cited "see" Broadway v. State
Okla. Crim. App. · 1991 · signal: see · confidence high
See Scott v. State, 751 P.2d 758, 760 (Okl.Cr.1988), cer t. denied 490 U.S. 1114 , 109 S.Ct. 3176 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1037 .
cited Cited "see" Securities & Exchange Commission v. Wang
2d Cir. · 1991 · signal: see · confidence high
See Deutschman v. Beneficial Corp., 841 F.2d 502, 504 (3d Cir.1988) (describing the options market), ce rt. denied, 490 U.S. 1114 , 109 S.Ct. 3176 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1989).
cited Cited "see" Securities and Exchange Commission v. Wang
2d Cir. · 1991 · signal: see · confidence high
See Deutschman v. Beneficial Corp., 841 F.2d 502, 504 (3d Cir.1988) (describing the options market), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1114 , 109 S.Ct. 3176 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1989).
cited Cited "see" Pruett v. Thompson
E.D. Va. · 1991 · signal: see · confidence high
See Richardson v. Johnson, 864 F.2d 1536, 1541 (11th Cir.) (discussing cases), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1114 , 109 S.Ct. 3175 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1989); Pruett v. Commonwealth, 351 S.E.2d at 12 .
discussed Cited "see" Derrick Tabor v. Bill Armontrout, Warden
8th Cir. · 1991 · signal: see · confidence high
See Gilmore v. Armontrout, 861 F.2d 1061, 1065-66 (8th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1114 , 109 S.Ct. 3176 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1989). 3 Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. 1 .
cited Cited "see" United States v. Clarence M. Mitchell, III
4th Cir. · 1989 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Tindle, 860 F.2d 125, 129 (4 Cir.1988), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 3176 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1038 (1989).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Breard v. Netherland
E.D. Va. · 1996 · signal: see also · confidence low
Pruett v. Thompson, 771 F.Supp. 1428, 1442-43 (E.D.Va.1991) (Spencer, J.), aff'd, 996 F.2d 1560 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 984 , 114 S.Ct. 487 , 126 L.Ed.2d 437 (1993); see also Richardson v. Johnson, 864 F.2d 1536, 1541 (11th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1114 , 109 S.Ct. 3175 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1989); Williams v. Lynaugh, 814 F.2d 205, 207-08 (5th Cir.) (evidence of “unadjudicated criminal conduct,” confirmed by witnesses, is admissible in capital sentencing trial), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 935 , 108 S.Ct. 311 , 98 L.Ed.2d 270 (1987). ■ Consequently, the trial court did n…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Marvin C. Jones v. Paul Delo (2×)
8th Cir. · 1995 · signal: see also · confidence low
See Jones, 767 S.W.2d at 43 (noting that Jones abandoned all his claims except ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure "to present mitigating character evidence at the penalty phase"); see also Gilmore v. Armontrout, 861 F.2d 1061, 1065-66 (8th Cir.1988) (procedural bar under former Missouri Rule 27.26), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1114 , 109 S.Ct. 3176 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1989); Lowe-Bey v. Groose, 28 F.3d 816, 818 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 674 , 130 L.Ed.2d 606 (1994) (same procedural bar arises for failure to appeal under current Missouri Rule 29.15).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Varnall Weeks v. Charlie E. Jones, Warden, Holman State Prison, James H. Evans, Attorney General for the State of Alabama
11th Cir. · 1994 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Richardson v. Johnson, 864 F.2d 1536, 1540-42 (11th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1114 , 109 S.Ct. 3175 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1989); Lindsey v. Smith, 820 F.2d 1137, 1143 (11th Cir.1987), *1044 cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1069 , 109 S.Ct. 1327 , 103 L.Ed.2d 696 (1989).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Alexander Stewart
8th Cir. · 1994 · signal: see also · confidence low
When “certain practices pose such a threat to the ‘fairness of. the factfinding process’ ... they must be subjected to ‘close judicial scrutiny.’ ” Id. at 568 , 106 S.Ct. at 1345 (quoting Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503-04 , 96 S.Ct. 1691, 1693 , 48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976)); see also Gilmore v. Armontrout, 861 F.2d 1061, 1071 (8th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1114 , 109 S.Ct. 3176 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1989).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." FLORIDA GAME & FISH COM'N v. Flotilla (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1994 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Christy v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir.1988) (no taking occurs when government prevents landowner from protecting his sheep by shooting marauding grizzly bears), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1114 , 109 S.Ct. 3176 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1038 (1989); Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Hodel, 799 F.2d 1423, 1426 (10th Cir.1986) (damage to private lands caused by legally protected wild horses did not constitute taking, even though grazing habits of animals had diminished value of property), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 951 , 107 S.Ct. 1616 , 94 L.Ed.2d 800 (1987); Moerman v. State, 17 Cal. App.4th 452 , …
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Chuck Lee Mathenia v. Paul Delo (2×)
8th Cir. · 1992 · signal: see also · confidence low
Id. at 504 ; see also Gilmore v. Armontrout, 861 F.2d 1061, 1072-73 (8th Cir.1988) (admission of defendant's videotaped confession to two unrelated murders at sentencing phase of capital murder trial violated no federal constitutional rights), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1114 , 109 S.Ct. 3176 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1989).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Eisenberg
D.N.J. · 1991 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Deutschman v. Beneficial Corp., 841 F.2d 502, 507 (3d Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1114 , 109 S.Ct. 3176 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1989); 57 Rothberg v. Rosenbloom, 771 F.2d 818, 824 (3d Cir.1985) (Higginbotham, concurring).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Pierce v. State
Ala. Crim. App. · 1990 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Gilmore v. Armontrout, 861 F.2d 1061, 1069 (8th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1114 , 109 S.Ct. 3176 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1989).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Warner v. State (2×)
Ala. Crim. App. · 1990 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also United States v. Tindle , 860 F.2d 125 , 129 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1114 , 109 S.Ct. 3176 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1038 (1989) (fact that last name of venireperson "closely resembled" that of a defendant in a trial prosecuted by same assistant prosecutor involved in the present case "was a neutral and non-pretextual reason to challenge").
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Anthony Grandison, United States of America v. Vernon Evans, Jr., United States of America v. Rodney Kelly (2×)
4th Cir. · 1989 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., United States v. Tindle, 860 F.2d 125, 129 (4th Cir.1988), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 3176 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1038 (1989); United States v. Hamilton, 850 F.2d 1038, 1040-41 (4th Cir.1988), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 1564 , 103 L.Ed.2d 931 (1989); United States v. Woods, 812 F.2d 1483, 1487 (4th Cir.1987) ("Since the United States Attorney made a showing of his reasons for the exercise of his challenges, we may examine those reasons under Batson and we may leave for another day the question of whether the defendant made out a prima facie case.”) In United States v. Lan…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Richard P. Christy
v.
Manuel Lujan, Jr., Secretary of the Interior and United States Department of the Interior
88-1461.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Jun 12, 1989.
490 U.S. 1114
White.
Cited by 41 opinions  |  Published
1 passage pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 57%
Citer courts: N.D. Illinois (1)
Reporter's Syllabus — editorial summary, not part of the Court's opinion

On petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.

Justice WHITE, dissenting.

Lead Opinion

C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Dissent

Justice White,

dissenting.

Petitioner Christy is a herder who grazed his sheep on leased land near Glacier National Park. Between July 1 and July 9, 1982, grizzly bears from the park killed 20 of Christy’s sheep. Requests for assistance from park rangers yielded no results, and efforts to frighten away the bears were unsuccessful. On July 9, when two grizzlies emerged from the forest and approached Christy’s sheep, he shot and killed a bear. Grizzlies, however, are an “endangered species”; Christy’s killing of the bear thus violated the Endangered Species Act, which makes it unlawful to “harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect” grizzlies and other animals protected by the statute. 16 U. S. C.[*1115] §§ 1538(a)(1), 1532(19). Christy was consequently assessed a $2,500 penalty for shooting the bear.

Christy then filed this action in District Court, seeking to enjoin enforcement of the Act against herders like himself, and resisting payment of the $2,500 penalty. Christy claimed, inter alia, that his actions in defense of his livestock were protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment; alternatively, Christy contended that the Act resulted in an uncompensated “taking” of his property. Both the District Court and the Ninth Circuit rejected these claims, and this petition ensued.

I would grant the petition for certiorari to consider Christy’s constitutional claims. Christy’s claim of a constitutional right to defend his property is not insubstantial. The right to defend one’s property has long been recognized at common law, see W. Blackstone, Commentaries *138-140, and is deeply rooted in the legal traditions of this country, see, e. g., Beard v. United States, 158 U. S. 550, 555 (1895). Having the freedom to take actions necessary to protect one’s property may well be a liberty “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,” Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494, 503 (1977) (opinion of Powell, J.), and, therefore, entitled to the substantive protection of the Due Process Clause. In any event, Christy’s claim to such protection presents an interesting and important question — the proper resolution of which is not altogether clear — that merits plenary review.

Even more substantial is Christy’s claim that the Endangered Species Act operates as a governmental authorization of a “taking” of his property; leaving him uncompensated for this taking violates the Fifth Amendment, Christy contends. There can be little doubt that if a federal statute authorized park rangers to come around at night and take Christy’s livestock to feed the bears, such a governmental action would constituted a “taking.” The Court of Appeals below, and the federal parties in their submission here, distinguish such a case from this one, by noting that the United States “does not ‘own’ the wild animals it protects, nor does the government control the conduct of such animals.” Christy v. Hodel, 857 F. 2d 1324, 1335 (CA9 1988); see Brief in Opposition 7.

Perhaps not; but the Government does make it unlawful for Christy to “harass, harm, [or] pursue” such animals when they come to take his property — and perhaps a Government edict bar[*1116] ring one from resisting the loss of one’s property is the constitutional equivalent of an edict taking such property in the first place. Thus, if the Government decided (in lieu of the food stamp program) to enact a law barring grocery store owners from “harassing, harming, or pursuing” people who wish to take food off grocery shelves without paying for it, such a law might well be suspect under the Fifth Amendment. For similar reasons, the Endangered Species Act may be suspect as applied in Christy’s case.

In sum, sustaining grizzly bears is a worthwhile and important governmental objective. But it “is axiomatic that the Fifth Amendment’s just compensation provision is ‘designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.’” First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U. S. 804, 318-319 (1987) (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U. S. 40, 49 (1960)). Here, Christy has been asked to bear the burden of feeding endangered grizzlies — or at the least, has been estopped from taking measures necessary to prevent the use of his property for this purpose. Thus, it seems quite possible that Christy has been denied the Fifth Amendment’s protection against uncompensated takings.

Because I think that Christy’s constitutional claims present interesting and important questions that merit our attention, I dissent from the Court’s denial of review in this case.